Managing the humanitarian supply chain: developing a generic model to improve collaboration, efficiency and effectiveness by Ramsden, Gary P.
	

	


	

	







 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	









 



	
 
 
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 	
!
"	





#
$
 



 #
 !
 %	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 	
 	
 
 
 
 
 
 
		

	










 !
 &
 
 
 
 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 '
 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 "
 
 
 
 
(







	


 
 
 
 '
 	
 
 
 
 
 
"	






)

	


 
 
 
 


		
 	
 

 


 








*
+
,


-.



,
)
/



0

1

2
	

3

2	
%	



!
		
	

%$)


1

2
4*

%	
*
,5





	



	



	



	
	




	




	



	




	




 !"	
     
	

	

			
		   	   
			
		
	
 ! 	
	 
"    	 #	  	 
$	!% 	!  	 & $  
'		'	 ($ 	 
'	#	%	%)		%*		%
'	  $ '	
+    "	% 	  	  & 
'	!#		
	$,
	(	$
 
	
	-		.
 		   	   
			
								
	 !  
"-					(
		% 	  	  	 	 		  
		 
     .  
 	 	% 
	%	%		% $
				$$	-		
 	 	-  	 	    
 		 	
			-	- 
//	$$$ 	 
0	
1"1"#23."	
			

4&)*5/ +)
*!6!& 7!8%779:9&		%	)	-
2	
;	! 
*&
			

< "-1%=+%=-
1%.%:>9?
/-@:>9A4&)*5/ +)
"3	 " &		:>9A
iABSTRACT
Humanitarian disasters are expected to increase 5-fold over the next 50
years. In 2010 a total of 385 separate disasters killed over 297,000
people worldwide, affected more than 217 million others and caused
US$ 123.9 billion of economic damages. It is suggested that the scale of 
resource dedicated to logistics provision in response to disasters
accounts for upwards of 80% of the total budget, hence humanitarian
logistics both as a practice and a research topic is very much in the
spotlight. Consequently, this research addresses what is argued to be
the under-representation of humanitarian logistics in the literature and
the associated lack of empirical research focussed on the management 
of the supply chain.  
Collaborative working has been promoted as a Silver Bullet in many
areas of Supply Chain Management and is contended to be a
mechanism to prevent organisations optimising solely their own results
rather than integrating their goals and activities with others to benefit 
overall end user value. Collaborative techniques inherent within
commercial supply chains have not been observed in the humanitarian
relief chain. This study investigates why this is the case, as this lack of 
collaboration is reported to lead to inefficiency; which at worst results in
increased humanitarian suffering and additional loss of life. Hence, the
findings reveal ways to advance collaborative working within the
humanitarian relief supply chain. 
Criticism is levelled at the predominance of quantitative methodologies
in current research within humanitarian logistics. This study addresses
this gap as well as the calls for more cross-organisational case studies
within the field, by adopting a multi-case, qualitative approach based on
the triangulation of data gathered during a series of in-depth interviews
and focus groups across 4 separate humanitarian relief organisations. 
Data interpretation is through content analysis to identify specific
patterns and themes. The research concerns itself with the response
immediately following the onset of a disaster. This limited scope helps to
address issues surrounding the generalisability of a purely qualitative
ii
approach whilst also maintaining control over data volume; however, 
there are still ample opportunities for significant theoretical and practical
contribution.  
The findings identify specific barriers to collaborative working within the
sector; in particular, themes and patterns within management and
control, understanding and training, relationships, and military
involvement have surfaced. Outcomes also have implications for
commercial supply chain managers who are increasingly faced with
challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven
certainty and predictability, and are therefore, expected to adopt the
more event driven, agile and flexible approaches that are already a
reality for their humanitarian sector counterparts.  
The study concludes with the development of a conceptual generic
model of the humanitarian supply chain that includes a number of 
significant issues which, if addressed will improve collaboration and
thereby benefit overall efficiency and effectiveness to the general
betterment of future relief provision.  
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
“As in previous years, there has been an increase in demand
for humanitarian assistance while the operating environment 
for delivering such assistance becomes more complex. 
Humanitarian responders are more numerous and
diverse…..It will be essential over the coming years for the
international system to find ways to take full advantage of the
opportunities offered by this new environment and to respond
more effectively to its challenges and demands”.
(UN, 2013, p.2)  
1.1 Introduction
During the final writing of this thesis Typhoon Haiyan struck the
Philippines. The devastation caused as a result of this natural disaster
(see Fig 1.1) illustrates that disasters, either artificial or natural, may
occur at any time around the world with enormous consequences
(Decker et al, 2013; Haavisto and Kovács, 2013; Day et al, 2012; Carroll
and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and
Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006).  
Fig 1.1: Aerial Images of Before and After Typhoon Haiyan (BBC News, 2013a)
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In 1883, Krakatoa in Indonesia erupted causing over 100,000 deaths and
the eruption was heard over 3000 miles away. However, it took weeks
for people in the Western World to learn the true extent of the disaster
(Day et al, 2012, p.21) and even longer for any kind of response to be
generated. Contrast that with the devastation caused by the Tohoku
earthquake and tsunami in 2011 which was watched in real time across
the world. Modern day humanitarian relief operations are likely to be
conducted in the spotlight of the media and will be afforded heightened
public and political attention (Heaslip, 2011). In 2010, a total of 385
separate natural disasters killed over 297 000 people worldwide, 
affected more than 217 million others and caused US$123.9 billion of 
economic damages (Guhu-Sapir et al, 2011). The earthquake in Haiti
affected at least 3 million people with between 217,000 to 230,000
deaths and flooding in Thailand affected over 12.8 million people with
the World Bank estimating economic damages exceeding US$45 billion
(Tang, 2011). Moreover, disaster relief is and will continue to be a growth
area with both natural and man-made disasters expected to increase
another five-fold over the next 50 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). 
Consequently, disasters will continue to generate an impact and a public
awareness that demands immediate action aimed at reducing
humanitarian suffering as well as speeding up overall response and
recovery times.  
The provision of timely and appropriate humanitarian aid has developed
into a global and multinational industry (Carroll and Neu, 2009) and more
and more focus is being placed on the optimisation of the logistics and
supply chains that are charged with transforming public and private
donations into tangible aid1. Whilst commentary (Blansjaar, 2011; van
Wassenhove, 2006) debates the actual scale of resource that is
dedicated to logistics provision in response to disasters, (somewhere
between 50 and 80% of the total budget) what is clear is that 
humanitarian logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now
very much in the spotlight. Emergency logistics and Supply Chain
 
1 As will be discussed within section 2.3.2 a unionist perspective (Larson and
Halldórsson, 2004) will be adopted within this thesis, whereby logistics is regarded
as a fundamental part of SCM as an overall discipline. 
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Management (SCM) have emerged as worldwide-noticeable themes, as
there now exists a fierce need to coordinate the logistics resources of 
the public and private sectors to avoid arbitrary resource allocation
during disasters (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and
Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006). Collaborative working has been
promoted as a ‘Silver Bullet’ in many areas of SCM and is contended to
be a mechanism to prevent organisations within the supply chain
optimising solely their own results rather than integrating their goals and
activities with others to benefit overall end user value (Porter, 1998; 
Cooper et al, 1997). However, collaborative techniques inherent within
commercial supply chains have not been observed in the humanitarian
relief chain and ineffective coordination of efforts between relief 
suppliers, logistics servers and demanders is still a major concern (Day
et al, 2012; Heaslip, 2012a, 2011 and 2010; Carroll and Neu, 2009; 
Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). Whilst acknowledging the
attention that the field of humanitarian logistics and SCM has gained as
a research area, and the fact that researchers have begun to lay the
foundations for a core body of knowledge, numerous academic
commentators (Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Day et al, 2012; Kunz and
Reiner, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács and Spens, 2011, 2008 and
2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Mangan et al, 2012; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2004; Yamada
et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; 
Rickard, 2003) suggest that the field is relatively new and is still in its
infancy. Moreover, criticism is also levelled at the predominance of 
quantitative methodologies in current research within humanitarian
logistics and there are calls for the collection of more qualitative empirical
data within the field (see section 2.11 and Kunz and Reiner, 2012; 
Kovács and Spens, 2011). Hence, this qualitative study addresses this
gap as well as the calls for more cross-organisational case studies within
the field, focusing on the participant narratives and responses of logistics
practioners engaged in the delivery of humanitarian aid immediately
following the onset of a disaster.  
Having set the scene for the reader, this first chapter serves as an
introduction to the thesis, detailing the rationale and context of the
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research and setting out the final research objective, question and aim
for the investigation. A short introduction to the final methodology
adopted is included as well as a summary of the research findings and
overall contribution to knowledge. The final conclusion to the chapter is
preceded by a short explanation of the overall structure of the thesis.  
1.2 Origins of Interest, Research Rationale and Context
It is suggested that any narrative depends on the perspective of its
author (Hatch and Cunliffe, 2013, p.viii). Hence, it is appropriate to begin
with a short description of the author’s background which will serve to
establish the personal perspective, whilst giving the reader the context 
and rationale behind the overall research, thereby forming the basis of 
the on-going discussion within this thesis. Prior to taking up a role within
academia, the researcher served for almost 26 years in the Royal Air
Force (RAF), during which time he was involved in numerous overseas
military operations, on behalf of the UK Government, NATO and the
United Nations. In particular, time spent on a variety of overseas
operations gave first hand exposure to the challenges and frustrations
of working alongside organisations engaged in the practical provision of 
humanitarian relief and support to affected populations in need of life
saving aid. The researcher recalls being struck at the time by the
common drive amongst all participants within the humanitarian supply
chain to improve the provision of aid and to alleviate suffering, but also
by the reticence of some organisations and individuals to avoid and, in
some cases to actively reject the attempts made by military personnel
and their chains’ of command to step away from a solely security based
role and to involve themselves in the practical provision of the relief effort 
itself. On leaving the RAF, the author took up a position as a senior
lecturer in logistics and operations management within higher education
and as such was given responsibility by his institution for the leadership
of under and post graduate programmes in logistics management. As
such, along with the student body, he attended a wide variety of guest 
lectures and presentations given by logistics practioners. One such
lecture, delivered by a senior logistics manager with in excess of 25
years practical association with humanitarian relief provision, highlighted
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what was perceived to be the vital importance, yet frustrating lack of a
collaborative approach within the sector. These practical observations
chimed with the military experiences of the author, and served to ignite
personal academic interest within the field. Further research and
consideration of what was a somewhat limited array of academic articles
at the time (early 2009), left the author convinced that he had identified
an area of study that was at the time, lacking in academic rigour and, 
hence presented an attractive area to dedicate a period of doctrinally
focussed research to. Of particular interest was the opportunity to
engage in an area of academic knowledge that was at a relatively early
stage in its development but also in one that, given the life and death
realities of associated outcomes also demanded not only significant 
academic contribution but perhaps, of equal importance a practical
development of existing managerial strategy.  
The initial UN response to Typhoon Haiyan was to launch an appeal for
$301 million (£190 million) to help the relief effort (BBC News, 2013b). 
Moreover, the quotation at the start of this Chapter is taken from the
annual United Nations (UN) report on the strengthening of the
coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance issued in July 2013
(UN, 2013); it serves to illustrate the increasing demand for humanitarian
aid, and to support the view that the operating environment for delivering
such assistance is becoming ever more complex due to the involvement 
of an increasingly numerous and diverse group of responders and
organisations. In reporting on progress in the coordination of 
humanitarian assistance the document goes on to discuss the need to: 
“Improve humanitarian leadership, coordination and accountability
both in headquarters and in the field” (UN, 2013, p6)
In short, this research is both timely and pertinent as it investigates
themes and issues that have significant financial implications but that 
are also associated with what the UN currently regard as key areas for
future development and progress within the humanitarian relief supply
chain.  
As discussed earlier numerous academic commentators agree that the
research field of humanitarian logistics is relatively new and still in its
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infancy; indeed Kovács and Spens (2007) suggest that “Literature on
humanitarian logistics is scant” (p100) and Day et al (2012) determine
that relief activity coordination in a changing environment is amongst the
most pressingly significant challenge areas in which researchers can
contribute to the field of humanitarian relief disaster SCM (p32). 
Moreover, Fawcett and Waller (2013) contend that SCM is the newest 
business discipline and that as such, it is going through what they
describe as “growing pains” (p.183) as it seeks to chart its future course
and define a meaningful destiny for itself. Although the number of 
beneficiaries of humanitarian aid has grown year-on-year (Kunz and
Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011; Tatham 2011), until the
inception of The Journal of Humanitarian Logistics and Supply Chain
Management (JHLSCM) in June 2011 no dedicated journal existed
within the field nor was there any journal or other outlet focusing on this
topic alone. Academic interest has been growing in this area, yet 
publications still remain fragmented and generalised; however, 
acknowledgment is now made of the increasing number of special issues
of scientific journals that have been dedicated to the humanitarian
logistics field since 2005 (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 
2011). Hence, whilst lessons have been learned from past aid
operations, operational failures still occur at the point of contact for
humanitarian missions. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006) comment on the
growing body of practice-based literature on humanitarian SCM and
Logistics, but note that this work seldom refers to well-established
concepts within academic supply chain literature; they go on to postulate
that if attempts were made to apply such concepts from the business
model to the humanitarian aid supply chain, we may identify many
important parallels, but also many equally important differences (p.115). 
Similarly, Beamon (2004) observes that the majority of existing supply
chain research focuses on managing and/or optimizing the commercial
supply of goods and services and that whilst the humanitarian relief 
process is an important domain for SCM it has received little academic
attention.  
Chandes and Paché (2009) discuss the absence of collaboration
between humanitarian actors (Kovács and Spens, 2008) and highlight 
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that this results in lost time, wasted resources and ultimately a deeply
disorganised supply chain (p337); they go on to suggest that the opening
of a research agenda on the critical need for a more collaborative
strategy is of the highest priority. Dash et al (2013) suggest that “Disaster
response supply chain management is an emerging field and there is
great potential for research in emergency logistics and disaster response
initiatives” (p60) and Kumar and Havey (2013) highlight the need for
more research on disaster relief supply chain management in light of 
frustrations with the delays in receiving aid following the Haiti earthquake
in 2010. Finally, by way of a summary of current thinking in the field, 
Fawcett and Waller (2013) suggest that: 
“Recent research indicates that the top barrier to more effective
humanitarian aid and disaster relief is inadequate logistics, 
followed by weak governance and insufficient collaboration” (p187)
1.3 Appropriate Research Boundaries
As will be developed in more detail in Chapter 3, a qualitative, inductive, 
approach was adopted (Garfinkel, 1967 and Sacks et al, 1974 both cited
by Bryman and Bell, 2007). A variety of carefully selected methods were
utilised to produce the rich data needed to establish similarities and, 
perhaps more importantly differences between key organisations (Gill
and Johnson, 2010, Saunders et al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
Noting that generalisability and justification of a purely qualitative
approach would be key concerns, distinct barriers (Gieryn, 1983) were
put around the research at an early stage. Whilst acknowledging the
importance of all phases of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and
Spens, 2008, 2007) (see Fig 2.9 and Section 2.6.1), the expected
outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed research, volume of 
information and the need for focussed research effort, resulted in the
decision to concentrate on the Immediate Response phase of 
humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). 
Moreover, for the same reasons, whilst the importance of all types of 
disasters is noted, the overall emphasis of the study took as its focus the
sudden onset - natural type of disasters (Van Wassenhove, 2006) (see
Fig 2.5 and Section 2.4.1).  
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1.4 Final Research Objective, Question and Aim  
Within this context, the overall objective of this research was to fill the
identified gap in knowledge surrounding the effective planning and
coordination of the provision of humanitarian logistics during the
immediate response phase (see Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 
2007), and to evaluate how effective collaboration might be achieved
within the humanitarian relief supply chain. The research question was
therefore: 
When considering the Immediate Response to Natural 
Disasters what are the key drivers within the Humanitarian
Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve future
collaborative working?
The aim of the thesis was to make a theoretical contribution to
contingency theoretic perspectives and a functional contribution to
existing humanitarian and commercial supply chain practice, by
revealing what factors restrict effective collaboration between actors
(Kovács and Spens, 2008) within humanitarian relief environments and
suggesting how these issues might be addressed in the future. 
1.5 Research Methodology
Whilst the range of issues that bear, both directly and more peripherally, 
on the research approach adopted are developed and discussed within
Chapter 3 of this thesis, by way of introduction the final research
approach was split into 3 distinct stages (see Fig 3.4). The aim of the
first stage was to establish contact with prospective participants whilst 
also confirming the relevance of the etic issues developed during the
literary review process. Stages 2 and 3 were designed to gather the rich
data that would be needed to address the overall aims and research
question of the study; furthermore the emic issues which were used to
formulate the final contribution to knowledge were also identified. All 3
stages lent themselves to a qualitative approach and to the use of 
multiple methods of data collection. Once analysis was complete the
related findings and interpretations were confirmed with participants
through a checking and feedback process.  
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The use of case studies and in particular the merits afforded by a
multiple-case approach (Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) were
exploited and given the perspectives sought here, the use of a multi-site
cross comparison served to increase confidence in the overall findings, 
whilst addressing the concerns levelled at the qualitative researcher’s
door regarding reliability of data and generalisability of findings. Hence, 
four different humanitarian relief organisations, all of whom are involved
in the provision of immediate response to disasters (see Fig 2.9, Kovács
and Spens 2008, 2007) participated in the final research (see Table 3.2). 
In keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; 
Stake, 1995) each organisation was considered in isolation (Chapters 4
through 7) with final conclusions and contributions being established
through a cross-case analysis (Chapter 8). Whilst fulfilling the final
research objectives, this overall approach also addressed the thoughts
offered by Kovács and Spens (2011), as developed in Chapter 2 (see
section 2.11.2) who highlight the need for good and applicable research
within the field with empirical data being gathered through the use of 
appropriate qualitative method.  
1.6 Summary of Research Findings and Overall Contribution to
Knowledge
It is a recognised and frequently criticised characteristic of qualitative
research that simple descriptions of the emergent findings are difficult to
articulate (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Saunders et al, 2012; Silverman, 
2011a). For example, in the body of this thesis the findings and overall
contribution to knowledge emerge over many pages of data extracts, 
analysis and explanatory text that span five chapters. Hence, in
addressing the research question, the associated cross-case analysis of 
the data gathered provided an overall contribution to knowledge that will
be presented in Chapter 8. The contribution was applicable to both the
humanitarian and commercial supply chains and implications for
methodology were also identified. By way of introduction a short 
summary of the key areas of the contribution are discussed here.  
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1.6.1 The Humanitarian Relief Sector
The findings identify specific barriers to collaborative working within the
humanitarian relief sector; in particular, key emic issues and themes are
identified and subsequent contributions made in four key areas, namely: 
1. Management and Control. 
2. Understanding and Training. 
3. Relationships. 
4. Military Involvement. 
Moreover, the study concludes with the development of a development 
of a conceptual generic model of the humanitarian supply chain that 
includes a number of significant issues which, if addressed will improve
collaboration and thereby benefit overall efficiency and effectiveness to
the general betterment of future relief provision.  
1.6.2 The Commercial Sector
Commercial supply chain managers are increasingly faced with
challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven
certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more event driven
approaches utilised by their humanitarian sector counterparts (Kovács, 
2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Large scale
disruptions with very short lead times are emerging as one of the most 
pressing issues for commercial supply chains, consequently business
sector supply chain managers can learn from their humanitarian sector
counterparts who are expected to respond to disasters with very short 
lead times (Decker et al, 2013, p238). Hence whilst the main focus of 
this research was the development of findings and an overall contribution
within the specialised context associated with the humanitarian relief 
sector, a constant consideration throughout was the potential for
generalisation of the findings to the wider body of knowledge and in
particular to that associated within the management of commercial
sector supply chains. Consequently, the implications of some of the
findings of this research and elements of the final contribution are also
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considered in the following areas of the commercial business supply
chain: 
1. Barriers to Collaborative Working. 
2. Combating Supply Chain Complexity. 
3. Joint Training Initiatives. 
4. Suppression of Market Forces. 
5. Defining Value in the Value Chain. 
6. Network Structures and Power. 
1.6.3 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Methodology
In common with all research this study suffered from a number of 
limitations. Whilst these limitations did not detract from the overall
significance of the findings, it was right to comment on them at some
stage in the final reporting process (Section 8.9). Moreover, whilst the
final Research Strategy (Fig 3.4) proved on the whole to be successful, 
it was not without its difficulties and challenges; hence, comment is also
made by way of lessons learned and some implications for methodology
are identified in 3 key areas, namely: 
1. Research Boundaries. 
2. Multiple ‘Domains’. 
3. Interviews, Focus Groups and Observation. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis
To introduce and develop the arguments summarised here in detail, the
thesis comprises eight chapters, including this introduction, that cover
the literature in the field, methodological considerations, individual
domain analysis with theoretical comments, and final conclusions and
contribution to knowledge. These chapters are constituted as follows. 
Chapter 1. Introduction. The first chapter serves to set the scene
for the reader and details the rationale and context of the research
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itself. The final research objective, question and aim of the
investigation are explained and a summary of the final research
findings and overall contribution to knowledge offered. 
Chapter 2. Perspectives on Humanitarian Supply Chain
Management and Collaboration. The literary review begins by
setting the scene with a discussion on the scale of the challenge
that the humanitarian relief community faces. The disciplines
associated with, and the definitions of supply chain and logistics
management are considered, and a comparison of the key issues
associated with the business and humanitarian supply chains
leads into a contextual discussion on the humanitarian supply
chain itself. The actors within the humanitarian supply chain are
established before consideration of the arguments for a network
approach to the supply chain, and also of the academic discourse
on the formation of hastily formed networks in the immediate
aftermath of a natural disaster is made. The pressures on the
humanitarian supply chain and on those employed within it, are
analysed as themes and issues are identified which will help to
inform the first stage of the final research design. Thoughts then
turn to the distinct phases of disaster relief operations (Kovács and
Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of an appropriate
phase of focus for this research. The case is made for the review
and overall research to take as its focus the immediate response
phase to disaster relief and an appropriate supply chain for the
immediate response phase is discussed. Arguments are then
considered for optimisation and collaboration within the
humanitarian supply chain before a discussion on achieving
collaboration through clusters leads into an analysis of the aims
and structure of the United Nations Cluster Approach. This
discussion suggests that the United Nations has a significant role
to play in the management of relationships amongst collaborating
actors within the humanitarian supply chain, hence the review
moves on to consider the associated academic discourse on
relationship management and power within this context. The
penultimate section of the review highlights a clear research
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opportunity; moreover, a significant number of research gaps are
identified which form the basis of, and underpin the final research
question and aim of the thesis. 
Chapter 3. Research Methodology. The range of issues that 
bear, both directly and more peripherally, on the research
approach adopted are discussed within this chapter. In explaining
how the final methodology was arrived at both the external and
internal influences on the methodological decisions made are
acknowledged, and sources revealed surrounding the connections
between the purpose of the research, the philosophical and
theoretical perspectives taken and the research question
previously arrived at in Chapter 2. In order to clearly explain and
justify the thought processes involved in arriving at the final
methodology the research onion (Saunders et al, 2009) is
systematically peeled, with discussion of each exposed layer being
offered to explain the thinking behind the final chosen approach. 
The resulting research design provides a framework for the
collection and analysis of data and the choice of design reflects
decisions made about the priority given to a range of dimensions
within the research process (Bryman and Bell, 2007); hence, set 
against this background the research design methods employed
to collect and analyse data are also discussed. 
Chapter 4. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs – Individual Domain Analysis. The data
gathered from The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA) and the participants within the UN Civil-Military
Coordination Section (CMCS) is presented and discussed
concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the field
of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A short 
background and history of the OCHA, its formation and role is
included together with a discussion on the organisation’s growing
influence and focus on the coordination of the overall humanitarian
relief effort. The tasking and structure of the CMCS is explained
before the use of the organisation as a research domain for the
study is justified. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the
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key etic and emic issues and themes identified. Final conclusions
and overall domain themes and issues are then established
through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic
discourse. 
Chapter 5. The UK Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command
– Individual Domain Analysis. The data gathered from the UK
Ministry of Defence (MOD) Joint Forces Command (JFC) is
presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic
discourse within the field of research that was first introduced
within Chapter 2. A short background and history of the UK military
contribution to humanitarian disaster relief is included. A
discussion on the strategy behind the Joint Forces Logistic
Component then follows, together with narrative on the
organisation’s role within the planning and coordination of the UK
military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief. The UK MOD’s
definitions of disaster relief operations are then explained and
clarified before the future strategy for the JFC (post 2012) is
considered together with a consideration of the on-going and
escalating MOD involvement within disaster relief. The discussion
then turns to an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and
themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes
and issues are then established through triangulation of the data
gathered and the academic discourse. 
Chapter 6. Oxfam International – Individual Domain Analysis. 
The data gathered from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief 
(Oxfam) is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate
academic discourse within the field of research that was first 
introduced within Chapter 2. A short background and history of 
Oxfam International is included together with a discussion on the
organisation’s current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian
programmes and structures. The discussion then turns to an
analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified. 
Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then
established through triangulation of the data gathered and the
academic discourse.  
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Chapter 7. Tearfund – Individual Domain Analysis. The data
gathered from participants within The Evangelical Alliance Relief 
(TEAR) Fund is presented and discussed concurrently with
appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that 
was first introduced within Chapter 2. A short background and
history of Tearfund is included together with a look at its current 
(as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures. 
The discussion then turns to an analysis of the key etic and emic
issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain
themes and issues are then established through triangulation of 
the data gathered and the academic discourse. 
Chapter 8. Thesis Conclusions and Overall Contribution to
Knowledge. In keeping with the classic case study process (Yin, 
2013 Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995) the discussion within Chapters
4 through 7 considers each of the research domains in isolation. 
Hence, in seeking to establish the final conclusions and academic
contribution the debate within this Chapter considers the results of 
a cross-domain analysis and uses as its basis the 4 significant 
emic themes and issues that emerged during the individual domain
analyses; namely, management and control, understanding and
training, relationships and military involvement. Each emic theme
is discussed separately, with the latter part of the Chapter drawing
out the significance of the overall cross-domain analysis and with
it the final contribution to knowledge. The implications of this
research and the associated findings are then considered within
the context of the business supply chain. In common with all
research this study suffered from a number of limitations; hence, 
whilst these limitations did not detract from the overall significance
of the findings, they are discussed within this Chapter. Similarly, 
whilst the final Research Strategy (Fig 3.4) proved, on the whole
to be successful, it was not without its difficulties and challenges; 
therefore, by way of lessons learned comment is also included on
the implications for methodology. Finally, the findings of this
research reveal a number of opportunities for further research that 
would both enhance the contributions identified within this thesis
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and also generate new contributions to the body of knowledge. 
Thus, in closing the Chapter, a number of suggestions for further
research are highlighted. 
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter has laid the foundations for the thesis. The extent of the
research problem and its background were introduced. The rationale and
context of the study were set out and the final research objective, 
question and aim established. A short introduction to the final
methodology adopted was included together with a summary of the
research findings and overall contribution to knowledge. Finally, a short 
explanation of the overall structure of the thesis was set out. What 
emerges is a timely and pertinent investigation into what is a burgeoning
field of academic interest, and one in which more qualitative empirical
research is called for (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). 
Public awareness when a disaster strikes demands immediate action
that is aimed at reducing humanitarian suffering as well as speeding up
overall response and recovery times. It is clear that humanitarian
logistics both as a practice and a research topic is now very much in the
spotlight and that this research has a valid contribution to make to the
developing body of knowledge in the field. 
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CHAPTER 2
PERSPECTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN SUPPLY CHAIN
MANAGEMENT AND COLLABORATION
“The line between order and disorder lies in logistics”  
Sun-Tzu, translated by Ames, 1993)
2.1 Integrating Existing Literature within the Research Process  
A competent review of the literature is at least in part a means of 
affirming your credibility as someone who is knowledgeable in your
chosen area (Bryman and Bell, 2007). However, this is not simply a
matter of reproducing the theoretical opinions that previous scholars
have variously expressed, but must also include a demonstration of the
ability to interpret what has been written whilst possibly using the ideas
of others to support a particular view-point or argument. Two main
reasons exist for reviewing the literature (Sharp et al, 2002 cited in
Saunders et al, 2009); the first, the preliminary review helps to generate
and refine ideas in order to arrive at a final research idea that meets the
requirements of both the examining and sponsoring organisations. The
second often referred to as the critical review or critical literature review
(Saunders et al, 2009), is a part of the research project proper. Here the
student will demonstrate an awareness of the current state of knowledge
within the chosen subject field, note its limitations and identify in the
wider context the anticipated area of contribution to be achieved through
further enquiry. Jankowicz (2005) best summarises the fundamental
intentions of the literature review: 
“There is little point in reinventing the wheel…..the work that you
do is not done in a vacuum, but builds on the ideas of other people
who have studied the field before you. This requires you describe
what has been published, and to marshal the information in a
relevant and critical way” (p.161)
The review of previous related research should also help to identify key
concepts and variables relevant to the chosen research area which may
18
well have been defined by researchers in different ways and thus
inconsistently reported (Gill and Johnson, 2010). Indeed these
inconsistencies may need appropriate recognition and resolution within
the review itself. A key part of this close review of the topic should be an
attempt to narrow the focus of discussion in order to position the
research substantively and methodologically in relation to existing
literature. In doing so there should also be ample opportunity to highlight 
those issues within the research which will provide additional or
alternative insights; thereby justifying the project through elaboration of 
the predicted contribution. 
The precise approach to the literature will depend upon the
methodological approach (deductive or inductive) that the researcher is
intending to use (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al, 2009). With a
deductive approach the role of the literature review is to critically review
existing knowledge and to enable an exploration between differing
variables or constructs of interest. The primary aim is to identify theories
and ideas which will be used to test hypotheses which have been
developed through the review process; these hypotheses are then
testable through the collection of appropriate data. However, with
inductive research the purposes of the literature review are altogether
different (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al, 2009). Whilst the
issues of contextualization and justification in relation to the existing
body of knowledge are equally important within the literature review, and
the research will still have a clearly defined purpose with associated
research question(s) and objectives, there are no predetermined
theories or conceptual frameworks at the outset. Inductive approaches
are concerned with developing a pre-understanding of the substantive
area of interest that provides a starting point for the research in terms of 
what Blumer (1954, cited by Gill and Johnson (2010) and Saunders et 
al, 2009) described as sensitizing concepts. Blumer argued that the
literature review should not be used as a vehicle to impose previously
conceptualized ideas through the process of operationalisation used by
deductive researchers; moreover the view is that there should be no
“preconceived theory that dictates, prior to research, relevancies in
concepts and hypotheses” (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, p.215).  
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As already noted in Chapter 1 and developed in more detail in Chapter
3, a qualitative, inductive, approach was adopted for this thesis
(Garfinkel, 1967 and Sacks et al, 1974 both cited by Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Carefully selected data gathering techniques were utilised to
produce the rich data needed to establish similarities and, perhaps more
importantly differences between key actors and/or organisations (Gill
and Johnson, 2010, Saunders et al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).
Noting that generalisability and justification of a purely qualitative
approach would be key concerns, distinct barriers (Gieryn, 1983) were
put around the research at an early stage (see Section 2.6). Whilst 
acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief 
provision (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) (see Fig 2.9 and Section
2.6.1), the expected outcomes of a piece of doctrinally focussed
research, volume of information and the need for focussed research
effort, resulted in the decision to concentrate on the Immediate
Response phase of humanitarian relief provision (Kovács and Spens, 
2008, 2007).  
2.1.1 Structure of the Literary Review
This literary review has been written to give the reader a logical flow to, 
and justification of the final research question and aim. By way of a road
map, the structure of the review is depicted in Fig 2.1. 
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  Setting the Scene and a Discussion on the Scale of the Overall Challenge
Generic Definitions of Supply Chain Management & Logistics and a
discussion within the context of Humanitarian Relief 
Pressures on the Humanitarian Supply Chain, its actors and
donors
The Phases of Disaster Relief and a Focus on the
Immediate Response Phase
The Case for Optimisation and Collaboration
and a discussion on differing strategies and
approaches  
The United Nations Cluster
Approach
The Case for Further
Study and Identified
Research Gaps
Research
Question
& Aim
Fig 2.1: Structure of the Literary Review
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The literary review will begin by setting the scene with a discussion on
the scale of the challenge that the humanitarian relief community is faced
with. The disciplines associated with, and the definitions of supply chain
and logistics management will then be considered, commencing with a
generic view before a comparison of the key issues associated with the
business and humanitarian supply chains will lead into a contextual
discussion on the humanitarian supply chain itself. The actors within the
humanitarian supply chain will be established before consideration of the
arguments for a network approach to the supply chain, and also of the
academic discourse on the formation of hastily formed networks in the
immediate aftermath of a natural disaster is made. The pressures on the
humanitarian supply chain and on those employed within it, will be
analysed as themes and issues are identified which will help to inform
the first stage of the final research design (as discussed and developed
in Chapter 3). Thoughts will turn to the distinct phases of disaster relief 
operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the identification of 
an appropriate phase of focus for this research. The importance of all
phases of humanitarian relief provision is acknowledged and the case is
made for the review and overall research to take as its focus the
immediate response phase to disaster relief. An appropriate supply
chain for the immediate response phase will be discussed before the
arguments for and concept of optimisation and collaboration within the
humanitarian supply chain are considered. A discussion on achieving
collaboration through clusters will lead into an analysis of the aims and
structure of the United Nations Cluster Approach, and a discussion on
the overall effectiveness of this approach as an aid to collaboration. This
discussion suggests that the United Nations has a significant role to play
in the management of relationships amongst collaborating actors within
the humanitarian supply chain, hence the review will move on to consider
the associated academic discourse on relationship management and
power within this context. The penultimate section of this review will draw
on previous discussion within this Chapter to highlight a clear research
opportunity within what is a burgeoning field of academic knowledge. 
Moreover, a significant number of research gaps will be identified which
will form the basis of this research and the final doctoral study. Finally, 
the research question and aim of the thesis will be stated.
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What emerges within this review is a growing body of knowledge in a
field that has come a long way since the original outcries about the poor
management of the 2004 Asian tsunami relief effort (Kovács, 2011, 
p250). Whilst commentary (Blansjaar, 2011; van Wassenhove, 2006)
debates the actual scale of resource that is dedicated to logistics
provision in response to disasters, (somewhere between 50 and 80% of 
the total budget) what is clear is that humanitarian logistics both as a
practice and a research topic is now very much in the spotlight; so much
so that opinion is now being offered that no longer is there simply a case
for humanitarian logisticians to look at their commercial counterparts for
best practice but that there is also a growing case for adoption of the
reciprocal view (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011).  
The scene will now be set with a discussion on the scale of the challenge
that the humanitarian supply chain community face. 
2.2 Setting the Scene - the Scale of the Challenge
“As in previous years, there has been an increase in demand for
humanitarian assistance while the operating environment for
delivering such assistance becomes more complex. Humanitarian
responders are more numerous and diverse…..It will be essential
over the coming years for the international system to find ways to
take full advantage of the opportunities offered by this new
environment and to respond more effectively to its challenges and
demands”. (Un, 2013, p.2)
“Effective [Humanitarian] logistics is the essence of famine relief 
because the greatest task in providing aid is getting food to the
people who are starving” (Long and Wood, 1995, p213).  
“The speed of humanitarian aid after a disaster depends on the
ability of logisticians to procure, transport and receive supplies at 
the site of a humanitarian relief effort” (Thomas, 2003, p4)
The unprecedented world-wide response to the 2004 Asian Tsunami
resulted in approximately $5 billion being raised by the United Nations
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Thomas and Fritz, 
2006); but many global companies wanted to do more – to give goods in
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kind and to lend logistics staff or managers. Despite cautions against 
sending out unsolicited items, aid agencies were confronted with a
stream of gifts sent out by well-meaning donors. Within two weeks of the
Tsunami, Colombo airport (Sri Lanka) reported that 288 freighter flights
had arrived without airway bills to deliver humanitarian cargo (Thomas
and Fritz, 2006); whilst some carried much-needed supplies that had
been cleared by recognised humanitarian organisations a significant 
number brought unsolicited and inappropriate items (such as cuddly toys
for children). What results is described as a “Crowded Stage” (Heaslip, 
2011, p.150) with the sheer number of disparate actors involved in the
provision of humanitarian assistance complicating efforts to improve
coordination. 
Disaster and disaster relief are not particularly new concepts. Fritz
(1961) described disaster as “Uncontrollable events that are coordinated
in time or space, in which a society undergoes severe danger and incurs
such losses that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfilment of all
of the essential functions is prevented” (p.655); Sjoberg (cited by Baker
and Chapman,1962) saw disaster as “a severe, relatively sudden and
frequently unexpected disruption of a social system resulting from some
precipitating event that is not subject to social control” (p.357); a view
clearly supported by Guhu-Sapir, et al (2011) whose reference to “a
situation or event which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a
request to a national or international level for external assistance; an
unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, 
destruction and human suffering”(p7) is that preferred by the Centre for
Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED). Perhaps a more
telling and forthright assessment is that offered by Smith (cited by
Rodriguez et al, 2006) who simply see disasters as: 
“Events that produce death and destruction and cause
considerable social, political and economic disruption” (p.301).  
Van Wassenhove (2006) provides a simple grid to help differentiate
between sudden disasters and those which develop more slowly over a
more protracted period, see Fig 2.2. 
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Natural Man-Made
Sudden-onset 
Earthquake
Hurricane
Tornadoes
Terrorist Attack
Coup d’état 
Chemical Leak
Slow on-set 
Famine
Drought 
Poverty
Political Crisis
Refugee Crisis
Fig 2.2: Explaining Disasters. (Van Wassenhove, 2006, p476)
As will be discussed later and developed in greater depth within Chapter
3, appropriate boundary setting based on associated research boundary
work (Gieryn 1983) was a key issue at the outset of this study. This
meant that, whilst acknowledging the importance of all types of disasters, 
this review and the overall emphasis of the study took as their focus the
sudden onset - natural (Van Wassenhove, 2006) type of disasters. 
According to figures offered by CRED, in 2010 alone a total of 385
separate natural disasters killed over 297 000 people worldwide, 
affecting more than 217.0 million others and causing US$ 123.9 billion
of economic damages (Guhu-Sapir et al, 2011). It is unsurprising
therefore that an extensive humanitarian community has built up
progressively during the last 50 years (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006). 
Moreover, disaster relief is and will continue to be a growth market with
both natural and man-made disasters expected to increase another five-
fold over the next 50 years (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). Consideration
of the natural disasters reported between 1900 and 2010, Fig 2.3
(International Disaster Data Base, EM-DAT, 2012) would seem to
support these somewhat pessimistic forecasts.  
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Year 1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Number of
Disasters
5 5 8 10 15 30 45 65 120 250 450 400
Fig 2.3: Natural Disasters Reported 1900-2010 (International Disaster Database, 
EM–DAT, 2011). 
Trunick (2005) notes that supply chain management and logistics have
always been an important factor in humanitarian aid operations, to the
extent that logistics efforts account for 80 percent of disaster relief. 
Agreeing with this, van Wassenhove (2006) argues that the majority of 
NGOs are in practice logistics organisations as he also estimates that 
some 80 percent of NGO expenditure is related in some way to logistics. 
One of the notable aspects of the relief effort following the 2004 Asian
Tsunami was the public acknowledgement of the role of logistics in
effective relief. In the immediate aftermath of the Tsunami, relief goods
flooded airports and warehouses in the affected regions leaving aid
agencies struggling to sort through, store and distribute the piles of 
supplies. In Sri Lanka cargo-laden humanitarian flights overwhelmed the
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goods capacity of the airport and downstream relief agencies struggled
to locate warehouses to store excess inventory. Indian transportation
pipelines were bottlenecked and in Indonesia damaged infrastructure
created what Thomas and Kopczak (2005) described as a “logistical
nightmare” (p1). A spokesman for Doctors Without Borders at the time
acknowledged the importance of coordinated logistics and supply chain
management: 
“What is needed are supply managers: people who sort goods, 
identify priorities, track deliveries and direct the traffic of a relief 
effort in full gear” (Economist, 2005).  
However, the logistical obstacles to delivering humanitarian aid make
managing a commercial supply chain look easy by comparison and
many organisations continue to underestimate the importance of 
logistics in disaster relief operations and still focus on fundraising
activities only (Murray, 2005). Whilst the perspective of the logistician is
seen as a strategic and central component to the planning of effective
relief effort (Thomas, 2003), research (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) has
shown that only a handful of aid agencies have prioritized the creation
of high-performance logistics and supply chain operations and that 
consequently, relief operations are not as efficient and effective as they
could be; as a result relief to beneficiaries is delayed or reduced.  
Having set the scene discussion must now turn to the background to and
definitions of, SCM and logistics both in the generic sense and to those
more pertinent to the humanitarian sector. 
2.3 Supply Chain Management and Logistics
Supply Chain Management (SCM) and Logistics are not new ideas
(Christopher, 2011). From the building of the pyramids to the relief of 
hunger in Africa, the principles underpinning the effective flow of 
materials and information to meet the requirements of customers have
altered little. Academic opinion (Mangan et al, 2012; Slack et al, 2010; 
Greasley 2009; Bozarth and Handfield, 2008; Harrison and van Hoek, 
2008 to name but a few) support the traditional Transformational
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Process view of an organisation, placing the emphasis on the activities
that the particular organisation must perform when managing its own
operations. However, opinion is also quick to acknowledge that it is not 
enough for an organisation to simply focus on operations within its own
boundaries anymore, and that managers must also appreciate how the
organisation is linked within the operations of its suppliers, distributors
and most importantly, customers; in essence it is vital for organisations
to appreciate their position in what is termed the Supply Chain and the
role that logistics has to play within it (Sweeney, 2005). SCM’s economic
and social construction are not just noteworthy but remarkable (Fawcett 
and Waller, 2013, p.183) as it provides the opportunity to optimise
logistical performance at the inter-organisational level (Mangan et al, 
2012; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Monczka
et al, 2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006). It seeks to achieve linkage
and co-ordination between the processes of other entities (suppliers and
customers) in the pipeline and the organisation itself. For SCM to be
successful it involves a significant change from the traditional arm’s-
length, even adversarial, customer/supplier relationships of the past with
a focus on co-operation and trust and the recognition that, if properly
managed “the whole can be greater than the sum of the parts”
(Christopher, 2011, p.3). It appears that SCM is “Logistics taken across
inter-organisational boundaries” (Cooper et al, 1997, p.1) but what is
also clear is that for SCM to succeed managers must appreciate how
their organisational processes are linked in with those of their suppliers, 
distributors and customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and
Handfield, 2008). The discussion will now consider the generic
background to, and definitions of SCM and logistics.  
2.3.1 Generic Background and Definitions
There has been significant debate surrounding what distinguishes
logistics and SCM. It appears that SCM is “Logistics taken across inter-
organisational boundaries” (Cooper et al, 1997, p.1) but what is also
clear is that for SCM to succeed managers must appreciate how their
organisational processes are linked in with those of their suppliers, 
distributors and customers (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and
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Handfield, 2008). Larson and Halldórsson (2004) offer 4 conceptual
perspectives (see fig 2.4)
The traditionalist view places SCM within logistics, and suggests that 
SCM is just one small part of the logistics function. The re-labeling
perspective contends that SCM is simply a renaming of what was once
understood to be logistics and is now known as SCM. The unionist 
perspective regards logistics as a fundamental part of SCM in that SCM
completely subsumes the logistics function. Finally, the intersectionist 
perspective is described by Larson and Halldórsson (2004) as: 
“The intersection concept suggests SCM is not the union of 
logistics, marketing, operations management, purchasing and
other functional areas. Rather, it includes strategic, integrative
elements from all of these disciplines. For instance, in the
purchasing area, negotiating a long-term arrangement is a
Logistics
Logistics
Logistics
Logistics
SCM
SCMSCM
SCM
X
Traditionalist
Unionist Intersectionist
Re-Labelling
Fig 2.4: Perspectives on Logistics versus Supply Chain Management (Larson
and Halldórsson, 2004, p19)
29
strategic element and transmitting a purchase order is tactical. The
supply chain manager would be involved in the negotiations, but 
not the purchase order transmission. Similarly, in the logistics area, 
hiring a third-party logistics (3PL) provider is a strategic decision, 
while picking and packing in the warehouse are tactical. At the
intersection, SCM co-ordinates cross functional efforts across
multiple firms. SCM is strategic, not tactical. (p.21)
The Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals (CSCMP, 
2014) acknowledge that supply chain management (SCM) as a
profession has continued to change and evolve to fit the needs of the
growing global supply chain. They also note that the fact that the supply
chain is expected to cover a broad range of disciplines, means that it can
be difficult to clearly define what a supply chain actually is. Indeed the
CSCMP argue that at times SCM can be confused with the term logistics
management; accordingly, they propose the following definitions: 
“Supply chain management encompasses the planning and
management of all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, 
conversion, and all logistics management activities. Importantly, it 
also includes coordination and collaboration with channel partners, 
which can be suppliers, intermediaries, third party service
providers, and customers. In essence, supply chain management 
integrates supply and demand management within and across
companies” (CSCMP, 2014).
“Logistics management is that part of supply chain management 
that plans, implements, and controls the efficient, effective forward
and reverses flow and storage of goods, services and related
information between the point of origin and the point of 
consumption in order to meet customers' requirements” (CSCMP, 
2014). 
If we are to be in a position to move the discussion on to consider the
specific context of the humanitarian supply chain, given that these
generic definitions are set against the business sector it is appropriate
at this point to consider a comparison of the humanitarian supply chain
with that for the business sector.  
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2.3.2 Humanitarian and Business Supply Chains – a Comparison
Table 2.1 offers a comparison of the key issues associated with
Business and Humanitarian Supply Chains.  
Supply Chain
Issue Business Humanitarian
Logistical
Demands
Predetermined  
Predictable - Efficient 
Stable - Uncomplicated
Unique
Unpredictable – Reactive -
Inefficient 
Unstable - Complex
Logistical Drivers/ 
Motivators
Profit 
Costs
Quality
Efficiency
Effectiveness
Preservation and
Improvement of Life
Speed of Response – acute
timeframe
Flexibility
Agility
Effectiveness
Improvement and
Learning
Encouraged
Achievable
Waking up
Little time to review, rapid
response leads to a fire
fighting approach
Actor/Stakeholder
Involvement 
Manageable Numbers
Similar Interests
Numerous
Differing Interests – political, 
ideological
Risk of Mismatch Increasing - globalisation =
longer paths and shorter
response times
Decreasing margins for error
High
Very small margins for error  
Approaches to
Collaboration
Common reasons to
collaborate –win-win long-
term non-adversarial
relationships encouraged
Business Culture and
successes reinforce
cooperation. 
High levels of buyer
dominance over suppliers. 
Ability to reconfigure supplier
relationships selectively and
dissolve partnerships that 
have outlived usefulness. 
Little Reason to Collaborate
- large numbers of disparate
donors, governments and
military actors with differing
interests  
Little evidence of agreement 
on relationships
Overall lack of coordination
– some evidence of 
improving cooperation with
organisations becoming
more adept at working with
corporate partners  
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Supplier Associations –
forums to enable suppliers to
understand customer plans
Businesses can see
humanitarians as idealistic
and inefficient. 
Logistics Cluster - cross
functional team to coordinate
NGOs and allocated process
Increasing power of donors
who can detrimentally affect 
balance of supply and
demand  
Humanitarians sceptical of 
the business world.  
Table 2.1: Comparison of Business and Humanitarian Supply Chains
Emergencies generated by natural disasters are unique (Chandes and
Paché, 2010, p322); lives are at stake and in contrast to the business
sector the issue is not to bring quality logistical service to consumers at 
the lowest cost. Unlike in business, where traditionally logistical
demands have usually been predetermined, the humanitarian supply
chain is faced with a series of unknowns (Cassidy, 2003). In business
profit maximisation and cost minimisation are ordinarily key
drivers/motivators as is the desire to sustain long-term market demand
and the limitation of uncertainty within the supply chain; however, the
provision of humanitarian aid has a differing set of characteristics which
inevitably complicate the associated management task (Decker et al, 
2013; Kumar and Havey, 2013; Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2012; 
Heaslip, 2011; McLachlin and Larson, 2011; Kovács and Spens, 2007). 
Humanitarians aim to prioritise a shared moral code which overrides
economic outcomes; moreover they operate in environments which will
feature high uncertainty and constantly changing contexts (Mays et al, 
2012). Humanitarian organisations may also be expected to leave one
disaster zone and deploy straight into another offering little time to invest 
in the process of improvement and learning. Commentators argue that 
humanitarian organisations are somewhere between 15 and 20 years
behind their private sector counterparts in respect of the application of 
supply chain management tools, and in the realisation of the levels of 
efficiency and effectiveness associated with the recognition of logistics
as a managerial discipline (Spring, 2006; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  
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Humanitarian disasters often involve and test the abilities of numerous
organisations, actors and contending stakeholders including
governments, non-governmental (NGOs) or private voluntary
organisations, multi-governmental organisations, and local and national
military organisations (Kovács and Spens, 2008; Tomasini and Van
Wassenhove, 2009a). Within two weeks of the 2004 Asian Tsunami, 
Colombo airport (Sri Lanka) 288 freighter flights had arrived without 
airway bills to deliver humanitarian cargo (Thomas and Fritz, 2006); 
moreover approximately 400 NGOs were working on the ground in
Indonesia alone (Völz, 2005). As is the case in the private sector, the
risk of mismatch and the disruption afforded by globalisation, together
with the associated smaller margins for error (Kleindorfer and Van
Wassenhove, 2004) will inevitably put even more strain on humanitarian
supply chains. Indeed, it is argued (Perry, 2007, Van Wassenhove, 
2006; Kleindorfer and Van Wassenhove, 2004) that the private sector
could have lessons to learn from the challenges faced by humanitarian
supply chains, which show the extremes of a trend towards the greater
levels of risk and uncertainty that are becoming more and more apparent 
in modern global private sector supply chains (Christopher, 2011).  
This comparison and discussion leaves us in a position to consider
appropriate definitions within the specific context of the humanitarian
supply chain, and the associated logistics demands and requirements.  
2.3.3 Humanitarian Supply Chain Management and Logistics
Humanitarian SCM and logistics have emerged as a worldwide-
noticeable theme as disasters, either man-made or natural, may occur
at any time around the world with enormous consequences (Carroll and
Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 
2007; Yamada et al, 2006). Consequently, the provision of timely and
appropriate humanitarian aid has developed into a global and
multinational industry (Carroll and Neu, 2009) and more and more focus
is being placed on the optimization of the logistics and supply chains that 
are charged with transforming public and private donations into tangible
aid. There now exists a fierce need to coordinate the logistics resources
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of the public and private sectors to avoid arbitrary resource allocation
during disasters; however, ineffective coordination of efforts between
relief suppliers, logistics servers and demanders is still a major concern
(Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). It has
been recognised that the humanitarian relief effort concerns itself with: 
“A process of planning, managing and controlling the efficient flows
of relief, information, and services from the points of origin to the
points of destination to meet the urgent needs of the affected
people” (Ernst, 2003),  
and that in humanitarian relief operations: 
“Logistics planning and coordination need to be seen as essential
rather than merely desirable” (Rickard, 2003).  
Whilst business logistics has already been clearly defined by numerous
authors (see for example Mangan et al, 2012; Christopher, 2011; 
Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Slack et al, 2010; Chopra and Meindl, 
2010; Monczka et al, 2010), definitions of humanitarian logistics are less
prevalent. The principles of the Chartered Institute of Logistics and
Transport’s Humanitarian and Emergency Logistics (HELP) forum offer
one definition: 
“Right people, equipment and material, in the right place, in the
right sequence as soon as possible, to deliver maximum relief at 
the least cost – saved lives, reduced suffering and the best use of 
donated funds” (CILT, 2011). 
However, the statement offered by Thomas and Kopczak (2005) seems
to be the one that is currently adopted by the majority of authors within
the field: 
“the process of planning, implementing and controlling the efficient, 
cost-effective flow and storage of goods and materials, as well as
related information, from the point of origin to the point of 
consumption for the purpose of alleviating the suffering of 
vulnerable people. The function encompasses a range of activities, 
including preparedness, planning, procurement, transport, 
warehousing, tracking and tracing, and customs clearance” (p.2)
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The similarity between this definition and that offered by the CSCMP
(2014) and discussed earlier, in respect of the business sector is striking. 
Hence, for the purposes of this research Thomas and Kopczak’s (2005)
definition for the humanitarian SC is adopted. Moreover, thinking back
to the perspectives offered by Larson and Halldórsson (2004), some
argue that within the humanitarian logistics community a re-labeling is
taking place in that what was once logistics is now SCM (Heaslip, 2012b, 
p.38). However, given the focus on collaboration within this thesis a
unionist stance will be adopted whereby logistics is regarded as a
fundamental part of SCM. In keeping with the thoughts of Mangan et al
(2012): 
“The SC is a much wider, intercompany, boundary-spanning
concept, than is the case with logistics”. (p.13)
Thomas and Kopczak (2005, p2) offer four supporting reasons why
humanitarian logistics is central to disaster relief and crucial to the
performance of both current and future operations: 
1. Logistics is crucial to the effectiveness and speed of response for
major humanitarian programs. 
2. With procurement and transportation included in the function
logistics can be one of the most expensive parts of a relief effort. 
3. The logistics department is often the repository of data that can be
analysed to provide post-event learning, as it will handle the
tracking of goods through the supply chain. 
4. Logistics data reflects all aspects of execution from the
effectiveness of suppliers and transportation providers, to the cost 
and timeliness of response, to the appropriateness of donated
goods and the management of information.  
Having defined the humanitarian supply chain within the context of this
research and acknowledged the significance of the chain itself and of the
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associated logistics processes, thoughts must now turn to defining the
actors involved in the overall relief effort.  
2.3.4 The Actors within the Humanitarian Supply Chain
The supply chains associated with business enterprise ordinarily
concern themselves with the effective and efficient management of the
flow of goods, information and finances to final customers (demand
satisfaction); however in the case of humanitarian logistics, 
circumstance calls for the process to go beyond mere profitability (Ernst, 
2003). In humanitarian logistics demand is not actually created as the
end customer has no true choice (Kovács and Spens, 2007); hence, the
numerous actors involved in the Humanitarian Aid Supply Network are
not linked or motivated by pure financial gain or by the simple need to
satisfy demand. Each actor within what will be a complex supply network
will have their own motivation and distinct reasons for their participation
(the idea of motivation and influences will be discussed in greater depth
later, see Section 2.4). Kovács and Spens first offered a model of actors
within the supply network of humanitarian aid in 2007, which included
donors, aid agencies, governmental and non-governmental
organisations (NGO), military, logistics service providers and suppliers. 
The original model was presented in numerous arenas both academic
and practical and following the associated feedback was modified to the
revised version below (Fig 2.5)  
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Fig 2.5: Actors in the Supply Chain Network of Humanitarian Aid – a Revised
Model (Kovács and Spens, 2008)
The revised model depicts the actors within the supply network as
donors, aid agencies, NGOs, governments, military and logistics
providers. Donors are considered as the important actors who, in recent 
years have provided the bulk of funding in support of the relief effort; 
typically these will include foundations, individual donors and the private
sector, as well as country specific funding such as that from the United
Kingdom. Other actors include the military, the governments from host 
and neighbouring nations, and other NGOs and logistics providers. The
military is acknowledged as a significant actor on many occasions
(Ozdammer et al, 2004) and their role will be discussed in greater detail
in the next section of this review. Many independent companies or
individuals may elect to supply materials and services in disaster relief; 
however, these suppliers (Kovács and Spens, 2008) may have vastly
different reasons for participating in disaster relief (the idea of Corporate
Social Responsibility will be discussed later).  
NGOsAid Agencies
Humanitarian aid
Supply Network
Donors
Suppliers Military
Logistics Service
Providers
Governments
37
This model is still not without its critics and the failure to include
beneficiaries as customers in respect of the aid effort has been noted
(Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006); however Kovács and Spens (2008)
contend that they should not be included as they are not in a position to
shape demand, the contention being that NGOs and aid agencies will
effectively represent the interests of beneficiaries by completing needs
assessments in the aftermath of a disaster (Long and Wood, 1995). 
Another criticism surrounds the inclusion of the media (Heaslip et al,
2007), and the assertion that they can influence the donor response to
disasters. Whilst acknowledging the role of the media Kovács and Spens
(2008) are content that they should not feature as the final model stems
from the use of an industrial network approach and, as such only
includes active participants within the delivery of humanitarian aid. It 
should also be noted at this stage that whilst the core responsibility of 
humanitarian organisations is towards beneficiaries of aid, actors also
face pressure from other stakeholder groups, most prominently the
donors that they are ultimately accountable to (Beamon and Balcik
2008). (The associated pressures will be discussed in greater detail later
in thesis). Hence, the customers of this SC network are both the donors
and beneficiaries and the suppliers can also be donors and/or paid
suppliers (Charles et al, 2010, Oloruntoba and Gray 2009). As discussed
earlier, the model offered here serves to illustrate the number of 
disparate actors and the resulting complexity of the humanitarian SC and
hence the challenge associated with achieving overall coordination of 
effort when at times “everyone and no one may seem to be in charge”
(Heaslip, 2011, p.151).  
2.3.4.1 The Military Contribution
The involvement of military forces in the provision of humanitarian aid in
cases of conflict or natural disasters is not a new concept (Heaslip and
Barber, 2014). Examples of associated intervention exist during World
Wars I and II and up to the present day, including the Berlin Airlift, the
Congo, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Sudan, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, 
Rwanda and Mozambique (Heaslip et al, 2012, p.377; Doel, 1995, p.26). 
Weeks (2007) notes the significant United States military involvement in
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the responses to recent natural disasters, such as the Asian Tsunami
and Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Moreover, Weeks also highlights the
wish of the then President (George W Bush) to see an even larger role
for the military in the response to natural disasters. Similarly, with the
end of the Cold War, the UK government has become more involved in
the provision of humanitarian aid, not only through the funding of UN
Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) but also with
the tasking of its armed forces. Such an outlook and focus is highlighted
by the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011)
which, under the chairmanship of Lord Ashdown considered the way that 
the UK government responds to humanitarian emergencies. The review
identified that: 
“It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in
morality that our interventions to relieve suffering at times of 
disaster must always be driven by need and need alone. 
Nevertheless, the fact that Britain is prepared to play a full part 
(and often a leading part) as a member of the international
community in order to relieve suffering at times of crisis makes
for, not only a more compassionate world, but a safer one too
– and that benefits all of us”. (HERR, 2011, p3)
There is a clear distinction between the military response to a complex
emergency (such as that in Iraq or Afghanistan) and that associated with
a natural disaster, and the contention amongst academic commentators
is that the contributions of military actors are more readily accepted
following a natural disaster (Cross, 2012; Balcik et al, 2010, Kovács and
Taham, 2009). Moreover, in some cases the contributions of militaries
who are regarded as middle powers such as those from Canada, 
Holland, Ireland or the Scandinavian countries is seen as more
acceptable than that offered by those from larger powers, for example
the United States or United Kingdom (Rutherford et al, 2003). Military
humanitarian actors have traditionally favoured short-term lifesaving
interventions with a clearly defined exit strategy (Rigby, 2001, p.957), 
hence in keeping with the focus of this thesis the immediate response
phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008) to a natural disaster is considered to
be the element where there is likely to be a mix of military and non-
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military organisations working alongside one another (Pettit and
Beresford, 2005). This is due in no small part to the capacity boosting
availability of military resources, and on the military’s ability to cope with
the unpredictability of demand and associated flexibility of response
required (Rietjens et al, 2007); moreover, the rapid response offered by
the military together with its structured command and control systems is
not found in the majority of NGOs or other actors within the humanitarian
supply chain (Kovács and Tatham, 2010).  
As will be discussed later within this thesis (Section 4.4.1) the Oslo
Guidelines (UN, 2006) were developed to ensure that foreign military
and civil defence assets deployed in response to a natural disaster could
support and complement relief operations whilst working together in
collaboration. The Guidelines clearly state that military resources must 
not be used “in a manner that would compromise the civilian nature and
character of humanitarian assistance” (p.4). However, noting that 
military assets are still frequently used in support of the relief effort, the
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
(UN OCHA) and its humanitarian partners are frequently called upon to
work with its member states to incorporate into contingency planning the
possibility of military asset usage, and to engage military actors at an
early stage in the response in order to guide military efforts and to protect 
the humanitarian space (Seigel, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 
2009). The United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
Section (CMCS) is the organisation within OCHA tasked with facilitating
dialogue and interaction between civilian and military actors within a
given disaster zone (OCHA, 2012d). As a result of its role, as will be
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 the UN CMCS was chosen as an
appropriate domain of study for this research. Furthermore, following a
humanitarian natural disaster the UK government may be requested to
mount or lend support to the relief effort in the country or region affected
(see discussion on the role of a humanitarian military, Fischer, 2011). 
The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for
International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if 
civilian resources are insufficient or if this approach provides a
comparative advantage. The Joint Forces Logistic Component (JFLogC)
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is the organisation within the UK Ministry of Defence which is tasked with
the planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance and
Disaster Relief Operations (HADRO) (MOD, 2008). Hence, as will be
discussed within Chapters 3 and 5 the JFLogC was selected as an
appropriate domain of study for this research. 
2.3.5 Supply Network Management and Hastily Formed Networks
In an attempt to reflect the growing recognition that the logistics of a
disaster response are a key cost driver (Christopher, 2011; Aitken et al, 
2005), some argue that the term Supply Network Management (SNM) is
actually a more accurate representation of the reality found in many
commercial and humanitarian scenarios (Tatham and Pettit, 2010, 
p.610). This argument is typified by Lambert et al (1998) who suggest 
that: 
“Strictly speaking, however, the supply chain is not just a chain of 
businesses with one-to-one business-to-business relationships, 
but a network of multiple business and relationships” (p.1)  
Given this, discussion will now turn to a network approach to the supply
chain. The terms supply chain and supply network are both offered by
way of descriptors of the linkages that enable organisations to serve the
end customer (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011). Whilst the term chain
describes a relatively simple, sequential set of links, network refers to a
more complex structure which relies upon two-way exchanges between
member organisations. In essence the network can be described as a
series of interdependent processes which, when working in harmony go
together to serve the end customer (Sadler, 2007). In offering arguments
in support of collaboration in what he describes as a “synchronous
supply chain” Christopher (2011, p141) discusses the problems
associated with the inherent disconnection between stages within
conventional supply chains. Moreover, Christopher goes on to contend
that if the supply chain is regarded as a “confederation of partners linked
together as a network” (p104) and not as a series of “separate islands”
(p141), then true agility can be achieved.  
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Gadde et al (2010) bring strategic choice into the debate as they discuss
three basic approaches to network strategy: 
1. Conservative Network Strategy: Rely on low-involvement and
minimal ‘thin’ relationships, looking instead to actively exploit 
perceived benefits within the market.  
2. Liberal Network Strategy: Characterised by a variation between
high- and low-involvement relationships depending on
circumstances. Extensive collaboration will be used if benefit is
perceived whilst other relationships may be governed by market 
mechanisms. 
3. Radical Network Strategy: Relationships should be the norm as
it is believed that collaboration will always provide opportunities for
performance improvement.  
In discussing barriers and facilitators to the development of sustainable
networks, Hingley and Lindgreen (2013) argue for a clearer
understanding of the potential benefits of a network structure within a
business context, whilst highlighting the possible impact of power
relationships and the role of lead organisations within distribution
networks. Although the discussion focusses on the role of local and
regional food businesses within networks the similarities with the field of 
humanitarian relief provision are striking. Hence the concept of 
relationships and power will be discussed later in this review as the
potential position of the United Nations within the humanitarian SC is
considered. The use of market mapping as an approach to describe the
value chain, support services and business environment (Albu and
Griffith, 2006) offers a participative vehicle to identify the blockers or
gatekeepers (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) who
ultimately prevent cooperation and cohesion within a given network. The
mapping process also promotes a better understanding of the
competencies and relationships necessary for specific market systems
to work by identifying 3 distinct components: 
1. Business Environment (the influencers): Infrastructure and
policies, institutions and processes that shape the market system. 
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2. Market Chain Actors and their Linkages (the players): The
chain of actors who own a product as it moves form primary
producers to consumers. 
3. Service Providers (the supporters): The business and extension
services that support the operation. 
Taking this discussion into the field of this research, Yaziji and Doh
(2009) recognise the importance of NGO networks, advising that given
their limited resources, NGOs in particular can benefit from network
involvement. If an NGO is positioned correctly it can gain influence by
identifying and filling structural holes within the network, and can find
itself in the role of a power broker as it is called upon to mediate or
moderate relationships between others within the overall synchronised
configuration (Doh and Teegan, 2003). Kumar and Havey (2013) support 
this view, arguing the case for a network authority to make best use of 
the diverse expertise inherent within a humanitarian supply chain; the
associated structure being designed to make best use of the community
relationships and trust that exists between NGOs throughout the world, 
resulting in a more effective overall response. However, the challenge in
applying this theoretical approach to rapid onset disasters is that the
networks are what Kumar and Havey (2013) describe as hastily formed
(HFN), hence there is not the opportunity to build the trust that can be
associated with longer term relationships. The characteristics of HFN’s
are listed as (Tatham and Kovács, 2010): 
1. Rapidly Established Network. 
2. Participants from Different Communities, Organisations and
Cultures. 
3. Participants Forced to work in a shared, confined space. 
In a development of Hung et al’s, (2004) discussion on a peripheral route
to trust Tatham and Kovács (2010, p38) suggest a model of swift trust
that they feel is pertinent within humanitarian supply chains, see Figure
2.6.  
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Fig 2.6: The Route to Swift Trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010, p38). 
Given the critical nature of humanitarian relief and the necessarily short 
delivery times required, the HFNs that are formed are normally between
relatively small numbers of suppliers which may already have mature
trusting relationships (Tatham and Kovács, 2010). However, the nature
of the HFN becomes important when the other individuals and
organisations that are also active in the same disaster response are
considered as these relationships are not mature and the Route to Swift 
Trust may well be evident. Furthermore, the complexity of the final
network is multiplied still further due to the numerous additional internal
and external pressures that act on the humanitarian supply chain, hence, 
the discussion will now turn to consider these as we endeavour to clarify
the overall scale of the associated managerial challenge.  
2.4 Pressures on the Humanitarian Supply Chain  
The discussion thus far has identified the complexity that results when a
humanitarian supply chain is developed and also highlighted the number
and variety of different associated actors. As will be discussed and
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developed in Chapter 3 of this thesis, a 3 stage research design was
developed with the initial stage being based on the development of the
etic themes and issues that have an influence on the humanitarian SC
and collaboration within it. Hence, if these themes and issues are to be
identified then consideration must be given at this stage to the inherent 
pressures both internal and external on the SC itself. 
2.4.1 Humanitarian Principles and the Humanitarian Space
“The Humanitarian Space is an environment where humanitarians
can work without hindrance and follow humanitarian principles of 
neutrality, impartiality and humanity” (Spearin, 2001, p22). 
The principle of humanity means that humankind shall be treated
humanely in all circumstances by saving lives and alleviating suffering, 
while ensuring respect for the individual. This is a fundamental principle
of humanitarian response (Picet, 1979). The Code of conflict for the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in
Disaster Relief, introduces the concept of the humanitarian imperative
which expands the principle of humanity to include the right to receive
and to give humanitarian assistance. It states the obligation of the
international community “to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it 
is needed” (Slim, 2000). 
Humanity, neutrality and impartiality must be present to constitute a
humanitarian operation (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009). Add to
this the concept of independence and the 4 humanitarian principles are
defined (DFID, 2008): 
1. Humanity: to bring assistance to people in distress without 
discrimination
2. Impartiality: Action is based solely on need
3. Neutrality: Humanitarian action must not favour any side in an
armed conflict. 
4. Independence: Humanitarian action must be kept separate from
political, economic, military or other objectives. 
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These principles were first developed by Henry Dunant after the battle
of Solferino (1859), initially to protect the rights of soldiers. They became
part of the Geneva Convention in 1864 and then formed the seeds of the
Red Cross Movement in 1875 (British Red Cross, 2010). Dunanists have
their beliefs firmly rooted in the principles advocated by Henry Dunant 
and work tirelessly to uphold the principles of impartiality and neutrality, 
advocating a non-interventionist strategy in conflict (Seipel, 2011; 
Tatham, 2011).  
The Humanitarian Space (the framework within which organisations can
properly conduct humanitarian work) is driven by the three principles of 
humanity, neutrality and impartiality (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 
2009, p.25). The Humanitarian Space exists in both a physical and
virtual sense, and it is the goal of all humanitarian agencies to live and
operate within it. In the physical sense, security is the key as it represents
the zone where all aid agencies are protected from violent intervention
and can move and operate freely. In the virtual sense, it represents the
interaction between the different humanitarian actors and systems and
how they can create a working environment where their mandates can
be maintained and executed. Given that all three principles included are
of equal importance, Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009) contend
that the visual representation of this idea (Fig 2.7) should be one of an
equilateral triangle whose internal area equates to the humanitarian
pace. Maintaining its balance is what all agencies should strive for and
any compromise on any one principle would affect the size and shape of 
the triangle and ultimately individual agencies’ ability to operate
effectively. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the forth principle of 
Independence must also have an overriding influence on the overall
strategy and shape of any relief operation (DFID, 2008). 
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Fig 2.7: Humanitarian Space and Principles (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 
2009, p.27)
Weiss and Collins (2000) note that a dilemma may emerge when armed
conflict rages and non-combatants are clearly being targeted by a
warring party. How should the humanitarian organisation maintain
impartiality neutrality and independence, when this may involve breaking
these key principles by making public the violations and atrocities that 
they are witnessing? Moreover, as well as courting question from
voluntary financial contributors, this approach may also involve
humanitarian actors taking the chance that the belligerents may
withdraw their consent for a humanitarian presence. Recent 
commentary (Charity and Security, 2010a) on the approaches of the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) towards the provision
of health services in Afghanistan illustrates this point and highlights the
lengths that humanitarian actors must go to, and the criticism which they
may face whilst endeavouring to uphold Dunanist principles. The ICRC’s
Mission Statement is to be: 
“An impartial, neutral and independent organisation whose
exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity
of victims of armed conflict and other situations of violence and to
provide them with assistance” (ICRC, 2010).  
Humanity
Neutrality Impartiality
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In keeping with this statement the ICRC has been providing first aid kits, 
training and other humanitarian aid to anyone in the conflict areas, 
including Afghan security forces and the Taliban. This has triggered an
angry response from some but others see it as “neutrality at its best”
(Radio Netherlands Worldwide, 2010). Indeed, a US military spokesman
for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan
offered his support to the ICRC approach recognising “the need for the
their [Red Cross’] work to be executed impartially” (Washington Times, 
2010). Moreover, arguments are growing (Charity and Security, 2010b)
that impartiality is a fundamental principle of NGOs who provide
humanitarian assistance and that it is time for the US to change laws that 
restrict aid groups in these efforts.  
Post the 9/11 atrocities in New York (2001), arguments began to emerge
regarding the humanitarian communities’ ability to maintain its neutral
position (Stoddard, 2003; Lobe, 2003; USAID, 2003) in the face of 
messages from the White House (USAID, 2003) that neutral
humanitarianism had no place within the framework of the Global War
on Terror. More recently, Bear (2009) offered the view that it was time to
accept that NGOs were no longer neutral and that they should stop
‘clinging to the myth’ that they are. He cites statistical analysis
(Humanitarian Policy Group, 2009) that demonstrates the increasing
numbers of humanitarian aid workers killed, kidnapped or seriously
injured in 2008 when compared to figures for the previous year (260 in
2008 against 206 in 2007). Bear (2009) contends that although NGOs
still believe that they are maintaining a neutral stance the harsh reality is
that NGOs are no longer seen as neutral, at least not in places such as
Afghanistan and Darfur. Indeed the Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG)
report (2009) explains that: 
“The most recent evidence continues to show that even those
agencies that make considerable efforts to dissociate themselves
from political actors and project an image of neutrality have not 
been immune from attack….aid organisations are being attacked
not just because they are perceived to be cooperating with
Western political actors, but because they are perceived as wholly
a part of the Western agenda” (p.6)
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The HPG (2009) go on to highlight the relative surge in attack rates seen, 
especially against NGO international (expatriate) staff and conclude that 
attacks on aid workers were increasingly politically motivated. In the face
of these pressures, historically NGOs have still refused to accept military
assistance (Beauregard, 1998, p.3), believing that it undermines their
independence or compromises the key principles of impartiality and
neutrality. Many NGOs oppose military assistance in the belief that being
seen with any military organisation, including peace keepers, can
increase the chances that the NGO will be attacked and/or denied
permission to travel freely. Some organisations refuse military
assistance in almost any circumstance, one such being the ICRC:  
“Only on direct order from the ICRC headquarters will delegates
even converse with any military force, let alone work with them
operationally” (Natsios, 1995, p.73).  
Clearly given this discussion the role for the armed forces within
humanitarian supply chains should be clarified. A view echoed by Seipel
(2011) who highlights the potential that combined working between
humanitarian aid logisticians and military supply chain specialists could
bring (p.228) and also by Boin et al (2010) who call for more research to
help establish under what conditions and during which phases of the
disaster the military can play a role, as they note that flawed disaster
supply chains often evoke calls for the military to “take over” as they will
bring “unified command” and “decisive leadership” (p.4). 
2.4.2 Political Influence and Motivation
Doh and Teegan (2003) suggest that NGOs have been defined as
“Those non-profit associations focused on social change via political
influence” (p.xi) and as “Organisations of individuals and donors
committed to the promotion of a particular set of issues through
advocacy work” (p206). In recent years numerous NGOs have been
formed with the goal of influencing policy decisions and shaping global
political perspectives on issues ranging from protecting humanitarian law
to protecting the environment (Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003). 
By way of example, Amnesty International whose stated purpose is to: 
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“Stand up for humanity and human rights…………..to protect 
individuals wherever justice, fairness, freedom and truth are
denied” (Amnesty International, 2010)  
has, through relentless campaigning, succeeded in gaining immense
power in placing human rights issues high on governmental agendas
(Steinberg, 2003). Similarly, Oxfam International believe that they can
“End poverty and injustice, as part of a global movement for change”
(Oxfam International, 2010) whist Médecins Sans Frontiéres
“Are committed to providing medical aid where it is most needed, 
regardless of race, religion, politics or gender” (Médecins Sans
Frontiéres, 2010). Using a wide range of tactics with different audiences, 
NGOs increasingly push their agendas through campaigns targeting
specific corporations, governments or audiences (Yaziji and Doh, 2009). 
In some instances NGOs target specific corporations pushing them to
meet existing social expectations and legal requirements but also
seeking to change broader expectations about corporate responsibility
and governmental regulations (Doh and Teegan, 2003). 
Steinberg (2003) notes that one of the harshest fronts of the Arab-Israeli
conflict is the information war, in which powerful NGOs with major
influence on the international media consistently display a biased
approach. He highlights what he describes as the “hijacking” of the
Durban anti-racism conference in 2001 by anti-Israel NGOs as an
illustration of the dangers of politically motivated humanitarian groups
that derive credibility simply on the basis of mission statements
promoting what he describes as universal human right”. Moreover, 
Steinberg (2003) believes that NGOs’ non-political nature and
adherence to these human rights principles has given them a halo effect 
against criticism and scrutiny, and that direct political influence has been
felt through the misquotation of international law and the overuse of 
terms such as war crimes, genocide and ethnic cleansing. This
unchecked authority has allowed several groups to blur the distinction
between advancing human rights and promoting narrow ideological and
political causes, and this coupled with perceived impartiality has granted
NGOs immense moral authority. Steinberg’s comments ultimately
resulted in the establishment of NGO Monitor (2010) which was founded
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to “promote [NGO] accountability and to advance vigorous discussion on
the reports and activities of NGOs claiming to promote moral agendas, 
such as human aid and human rights”. 
2.4.3 The World Economy and International Response
Humanitarian workers and organisations face the challenge of finding
neutral ways to operationalise their mandate without compromising their
principles or producing a negative impact (Tomasini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000). NGOs will typically try
and assert economic pressure on countries and organisations to further
their own stated goals or missions. One year on from the Gleneagles G8
summit, Oxfam (2006) issued a briefing note reminding member states
of their agreed commitment to debt cancellation, aid provision, 
peacekeeping and arms control, world trade deals and climate change. 
This note, issued one week in advance of a follow up meeting of G8
finance ministers, explored the progress (or the lack thereof) since the
G8 summit. It contrasted the positive results of decisions such as the
cancellation of Zambia’s $5 billion debt to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the removal of education fees in Burundi, with the fact 
that 500,000 women died in either pregnancy or childbirth and 11 million
children died from poverty, conflict, and disease during the same period. 
A similar note (Oxfam, 2009) highlighted the perceived negativity of a
model of economic growth utilised by nations rich in minerals and
hydrocarbons involved in extractive activities. Arguments were offered
that the model frequently had negative social, environmental, financial, 
and institutional impacts. Furthermore, Oxfam (2009) suggested that 
these issues were all consequences of exploitation contracts agreed
between producing states and multinational corporations which were
harmful to the common good. The view was that in many cases, such a
model had contributed to bad public policies and low levels or bad quality
of public spending in producing countries. 
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2.4.4 Fund Raising Strategies, Competition and Corporate Social 
Responsibility  
In terms of total resources in the mid-1990s, NGOs surpassed the
resources of the United Nations (excluding the IMF and World Bank) in
the disbursement of total official development (Weiss and Collins, 2000). 
The largest NGOs had budgets of several million US dollars and were
dependent upon funds from governments and international
organisations as well as donations from private individuals and
foundations. The Lancet (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007)
acknowledge the competition amongst NGOs for donor funding and the
associated desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency, 
sometimes at the expense of quantifiable end results. Indeed, in a review
of the immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the Lancet offer
the view that NGOS were: 
“Jostling for position, each claiming that they are doing the most 
for earthquake survivors” (p253)
In the past funding for international disaster response came primarily
from a small number of western governments (Katoch, 2006). This
allowed donor governments to insist that those agencies to which they
gave their money participated in established coordination processes. 
However, responses to the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) and to
Hurricane Katrina (2005) changed this situation as the public emerged
as a major donor in its own right. The United Nations (2005, p4) noted
that the tsunami resulted in: 
“An unprecedented influx, at all levels of relief effort, of goods and
services from the corporate business community”.  
An increasing number of companies were seeking visible means of 
demonstrating to their stakeholders, including employees, customers, 
vendors, and local communities, that they were actively subscribing to
the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) (Tomasini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006).  
In 2002 Porter and Kramer noted that many corporations appreciated
that they could enhance their competitiveness by engaging in
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partnerships where social and economic values overlapped. 
Consequently, private logistics companies (TNT, DHL, UPS, FedEx and
the like) were increasingly seeking to participate in partnerships with
NGO humanitarian organisations, not only with charitable and societal
intent but also as an opportunity for learning and business development. 
Accordingly, in an era of rapid globalisation of business, disasters such
as the Indian Ocean Tsunami (2004) have prompted companies to re-
examine their roles and to consider humanitarian activities in terms of 
their overall CSR strategy (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009). The
Tsunami triggered immense interest in disaster response amongst major
corporations and added to the proliferation of corporate sector networks
seeking their own distinct role in the relief effort. However, motivation for
this interest appears to be mixed; whilst the ethics of CSR undoubtedly
plays a major part, so too does a desire for the associated positive
publicity and perhaps increased market access that contributions may
bring (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006). In short, by
seeming to become better corporate citizens the view is that these
organisations believe that they can benefit both their own business and
society in general.  
Although some NGOs, in a bid to uphold their Dunanist principles
vehemently refuse any governmental contributions or limit them to a
small percentage of their overall budget (Tomasini and Van
Wassenhove, 2009), Weiss and Collins (2000) argue that the majority
are not so discriminating about contributions to their organisational well-
being and that this dependency on corporate and governmental
donations can produce another negative effect. In a bid to maintain
contribution levels, NGOs may feel that they must demonstrate to donors
that their presence and inputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable. 
Hence, the NGO may be pressured into ignoring local inputs and ideas
as well as the comparative advantages of collaborating with other
agencies in the field, and look instead to create and capture the
humanitarian space (Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27) that 
best suits their donors perceived needs. Indeed, The Lancet (2010)
observed during the relief effort following the Haiti earthquake, that many
aid agencies sometimes acted according to their own best interests
53
rather than in the interests of disaster victims and believed that aid
organisations must be judged not just financially but also on how they
physically operated within the field:  
“Large aid agencies and humanitarian organisations are often
highly competitive with each other. Polluted by the internal power
politics and the unsavoury characteristics seen in many big
corporations, large aid agencies can be obsessed with raising
money through their own appeal efforts”. (p253)
2.4.5 Societal Wealth, Interference and Influence
High income societies can afford better measures to limit the effects of 
natural disasters (Strömberg, 2007). Buildings can be constructed of 
stronger and more durable materials; housing can be built on raised
platforms to withstand flooding and agricultural areas irrigated to reduce
loss during droughts. Warning systems can be introduced for certain
natural disasters (Sheets and Williams, 2001 cited by Strömberg, 2007)
and when disaster does strike, such as the recent floods in Australia or
the earthquakes in Japan and New Zealand (BBC News, 2011, 2011a, 
2011b) negative effects can be limited, as medical care and food can be
quickly provided and mass evacuations facilitated when needed. 
Moreover, as the government typically handles many of these measures, 
disasters may be less severe in societies which have efficient and
accountable governments, and within countries that are more
democratic with civil liberties and a free press (Isham et al, 1997; Sen, 
1990). Indeed, in a comparison across states within India, Besley and
Burgess (2002) found that emergency relief was more responsive in
states where people read newspapers. 
In the aftermath of natural disasters there can be significant interference
with society and therefore institutional change arising from both the initial
impact effects and corresponding responses (Albala-Bertrand, 2000). 
Moreover, such effects and responses may be intense, long-term and, 
in the main deliberate. The associated preventative activities may have
societal implications as they aim to modify people’s behaviour and
institutions, so that if the impact cannot be avoided at least its effects
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can be both reduced and effectively counteracted when and if they do
occur. Preventative activities may include, for example the
establishment of land-use regulations and building codes, with the
associated enforcement structures. They may also deal with people’s
involvement in the implementation of effective prediction or warning
measures and self-help systems, and also in government’s rapid and
effective reaction to potential and actual impact effects (Strömberg, 
2007, Albala-Bertrand, 2000). Furthermore, preventative measures may
include insurance, mortgage and taxation systems that encourage safer
types of behaviour and a better distribution of risk so that disaster effects
can be reduced (Albala-Bertrand, 2000). Finally, in a bid to gauge
response effectiveness and to minimize antisocial and speculative
behaviour, markets, migrations and human reactions may be monitored. 
Having considered the pressures that are inherent within the
humanitarian supply chain thoughts must now turn to the distinct phases
of the relief effort (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) and to the
identification of an appropriate phase of focus for this research.  
2.5 The Phases of Disaster Relief
Disaster Relief is often described as a multi-stage process (Tomansi and
van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007; Petit and
Beresford, 2005; Nisha de Silva, 2001; Long,1997). Lee and Zbinden
(2003) discuss three phases of disaster relief operations, preparedness, 
during operations and post operations. This idea is taken a stage further
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) with different operations or phases
within disaster relief being identified as preparation, immediate response
and reconstruction, see Fig 2.8.  
Fig 2.8: Phases of Disaster Relief Operations (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007)
Preparation Reconstruction
Immediate
Response
55
Preparation: Although natural disasters are difficult to predict, 
some regions are prone to prepare for particular risks. Tokyo, San
Francisco and Reykjavik are offered as examples of cities that 
need to make careful preparations for the possibility of major
earthquakes (Kovács and Spens, 2007, p.102) and other cities and
regions are too close to active volcanoes or lie in hurricane prone
regions to simply ignore appropriate preparation and planning
(Nisha de Silva, 2001). However, Murray (2005) notes that as
donors often insist that money is seen to go directly to help
beneficiaries by way of direct aid, the financing of preparatory
measures are often neglected; hence regional actors such as
regional governments, businesses and NGOs should finance and
lead preparatory initiatives. From a research perspective, Kovács
and Spens (2008) discuss the focus within the literature on the
preparation phase to the detriment of the immediate response and
reconstruction phases. They note the abundance of simulation and
modelling articles on the preparation phase (p.220) and the
reliance on the ability to offer predictions of requirements, such as
inventory (see for example Chang et al, 2007; Beamon and
Kotelba, 2006) in support of natural disasters. In short, the
contention is that few papers deal with the physical dynamics of an
emergency and with tem the immediate response phase (Kovács
and Spens, 2008). 
Immediate Response: Once a natural disaster strikes, the
emergency plans of regional actors are instigated (Kovács and
Spens, 2007). However, although actors may be prepared for the
disaster, they will still be forced to operate in an environment with
a significantly destabilised structure (Murray, 2005; Cassidy, 
2003). Moreover, the challenge can be compounded if the disaster
strikes in a less developed region, which from the outset may have
inadequate infrastructures (Long and Wood, 1995). As a result, 
actors are forced to make assumptions regarding the requirements
of the aid effort on limited information. The main problem areas
within the immediate response phase lie in coordinating supply
requirements against unpredictable demand (Long and Wood, 
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1995) and with what is termed the last mile problem (Gaboury, 
2005; Ozdamar et al, 2004; Beamon, 2004; Long 1997; Long and
Wood, 1995) of transporting the correct items to beneficiaries. 
Consequently, unsolicited supplies are seen to create blockages
within the humanitarian SC at airports and within warehouses
(Murray, 2005; Cassidy, 2003). The few articles that have
focussed on the immediate response phase consider the problems
of coordinating supply and also consider the challenges of 
unpredictability and of meeting the last mile challenge (Kovács and
Spens, 2008, p.221). However, many of these articles are located
within quantitative method and suggest new modelling and
simulation developments (see for example Tzeng et al, 2007; Yi
and Kumar, 2007; Tovia, 2006). In short, the call is for more
qualitative research which has as its focus the immediate response
phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008). 
Reconstruction: Gustavsson (2003) notes that for many disaster
struck regions funding is often focussed on short-term relief and
that the long-term reconstruction phase is neglected. However, the
reconstruction phase is argued to be of equal importance as
disasters can have long term effects on a region (Kovács and
Spens, 2007). Hence, regional actors should also have as their
focus the reconstruction phase, which will require some form of 
continuity planning; moreover, a key element of this process
should include consideration and appropriate revision of 
preparatory plans to encompass lessons learned from the
outcomes of the response to the current disaster (Thomas, 2003), 
thereby completing the loop back to the preparation phase. Kovács
and Spens (2008) contend that the reconstruction phase has
largely been neglected both in the literature and in humanitarian
aid as a whole (p.222). Gustavsson (2003) believes that this is
indicative of the lack of long-term funding and the associated
concentration on the immediate response phase. Perhaps
understandably, articles that do focus on reconstruction are
focussed on regional perspectives rather than on the overall relief 
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effort (see for example Salam, 2007, which focusses on the
outcomes of the Asian Tsunami).  
Whilst acknowledging the importance of all phases of humanitarian relief 
provision, the calls for more qualitative research within the immediate
response phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008) and the expected outcomes
of a piece of doctrinally focussed research, volume of information and
the need for focussed research effort, meant that the decision was taken
to concentrate on the Immediate Response phase of humanitarian relief 
provision.; hence, this review will now take as its focus the immediate
response phase and the discussion will turn to an appropriate supply
chain to address the associated demands. 
2.5.1 Immediate Response Phase – The Right Supply Chain  
“The onset of a disaster will demand an immediate response with
the emphasis on getting the right goods, at the right time, to the
right place, and distributed to the right people” (Tomansi and van
Wassenhove, 2009, p.48)
During the early stages of the disaster relief effort supply chains need to
be designed and deployed at once even though the knowledge of the
situation may be very limited (Beamon, 2004; Tomansi and van
Wassenhove, 2004; Long and Wood, 1995). Whilst it is essential to
design and instigate a supply chain that addresses the immediate needs
of the affected population (food, water, shelter, medicines), information
may be very limited on the specific impact of the particular disaster.  
“The smooth coordination and avoidance of duplication of effort 
relies on information sharing and knowing who will be involved in
the disaster response and in what capacity” (Tomansi and van
Wassenhove, 2009, p.49).  
The urgency and pressures involved may mean that humanitarian
agencies are happy to accept a premium to get the right goods to the
right place at the right time; for example, goods may be flown in from
abroad as quickly as possible as at this stage expense is secondary. 
Research into sources of supply chain delay within warehousing or
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customs processes (Handfield and Nichols, 1999) suggests that as
much as 95% of associated time and resources are wasted on waiting
for goods and services to arrive in the required place. Clearly any saving
in this area within a humanitarian supply chain could be turned into
preserved lives on the ground. Whilst speed and urgency are key, not 
every type of good is needed in every disaster zone and unsolicited
donations may actually become a burden on the supply chain; hence, it 
is imperative that appropriate monitoring and communication are evident 
to promote efficiency; what Christopher (2011) describes as supply chain
responsiveness. Moreover, supply chain collaboration is argued to be
important as sub-optimisation occurs when each organisation within a
supply chain attempts to optimise its own results rather than integrating
its goals and activities with other organisations for the benefit of the
whole chain (Christopher, 2011; Senge, 2010; Cooper et al, 1997), 
hence it is appropriate that we consider these concepts next.  
2.6 Humanitarian Supply Chains - The Case for Optimisation and
Collaboration
“Problems of inter-agency coordination are often most evident in
the initial frantic stages of response to a humanitarian emergency
when aid agencies often fail to make the effort, or simply find it too
difficult to collaborate” (Fenton, 2003, p23)
“The myriad of humanitarian organisations must co-ordinate their
efforts in every disaster if they are to provide real relief at the point 
of need’”  
(Kovács and Spens, 2009, p506)
“Logistic co-ordination is required both within humanitarian supply
chains and between humanitarian organisations to achieve
efficient relief”  
(Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p115)
Supply Chain Collaboration (SCC) is not a new concept. Writing in 1990
Bowersox concluded that what he termed logistics alliances “were
making US industry more efficient and thus more competitive” (p.45). In
citing one executive who said “for us, the reason for this venture [logistics
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alliance] is market impact…. cost reduction is important but secondary”
(p.45), Bowersox further noted that, in keeping with Porter’s (1990) value
chain analogy, the main rationale for orchestrating an alliance was to
increase competitive advantage. SCC is focused on relationships and
may be of significant benefit to all supply chain partners (Monczka et al, 
2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006). SCC simply refers to a chain where
two or more independent organisations work jointly (collaborate) to plan
and execute supply chain operations with greater success than when
acting in isolation (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). Successfully
formulating the appropriate strategy in a particular customer/supplier
situation implies that all entities within the supply chain must work
together (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006). Collaboration has been
promoted as a silver bullet in many areas of SCM and it is argued that 
overall supply chain value is increased when organisations within the
chain seek to integrate their goals and activities together with other
organisations for the benefit of the whole chain (Christopher, 2011; 
Cooper et al, 1997; Porter, 1990) rather than focussing on their own
individual results. A global survey of supply chain progress conducted in
2004 (Supply Chain Management Review and Computer Sciences
Corporation) observed that collaboration was cited as the single most 
pressing issue. The survey showed that 44 percent of the sample
organisations had initiatives specifically associated with collaboration; 
however, only 35 percent of these initiatives turned out to be even
moderately successful. Kampstra and Ashayeri (2006) contend that this
offers a typical example of a situation where not all participants in every
supply chain had embedded collaborative values and that you cannot 
ultimately collaborate with a party that lacks a genuine desire to
collaborate.  
Dash et al (2013) discuss the positive impact that collaboration and
coordination can have on overall supply chain performance. With
emerging competition for funding amongst major relief organisations, 
Thomas and Kopczak (2005) note that although many humanitarian
heads of logistics faced the same challenges, there is still a tendency for
each to fight their own battles with little collaboration; indeed the lack of 
logistical integration means that humanitarian organisations run the risk
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of entering into direct competition with other organisations (Chandes and
Paché, 2010); competition that limits the ability to achieve some level of 
common intent (Olson and Gregorian, 2007). Fenton (2003) comments
on the sad reality of this behaviour, noting that all too often emergencies
trigger a huge scramble amongst aid organisations for donor money to
support their own relief incentives, which is often to the detriment of 
valuable coordination (p24). Following their review of core logistics
challenges post the 2004 Asian Tsunami, Thomas and Kopczak (2005)
found that several humanitarian relief organisations were, in a bid to
speed up future response times, independently seeking to procure
regional warehousing and that three such organisations were actually
talking to the same warehouse providers in the same city. Similarly two
organisations had commissioned costly analyses to select a fleet 
management system and three were, again, independently wrestling
with the idea of a training program for field logisticians. None of these
managers knew that their counterparts had the same objectives hence, 
there was little collaboration or resource sharing. Moving this idea on to
the immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake, The Lancet (2010, 
p253) comment on the “jostling for position” amongst NGOs and on the
fact that some agencies claimed to be “spearheading” the relief effort, 
whilst in reality the situation in Haiti was “chaotic, devastating and
anything but coordinated”. 
A theoretical discussion (Carroll and Neu, 2009) seeking a
developmental framework for a comprehensive set of universal
techniques and a commonality in humanitarian logistics and supply chain
management, discusses the importance of taking a tri-axial view based
around the complementing characteristics and common values
associated with the business, military and humanitarian logistics sectors. 
Through better collaboration the humanitarian relief sector could take
best practice from business and military logistics and supply chain
management systems, as they seek to improve the overall performance
of humanitarian logistics missions. A similar review in the aftermath of 
the Asian tsunami (Oloruntoba, 2005) suggests that whilst the extent of 
effective collaboration between national authorities, local actors and
international actors appeared to be adequate, longer term coordination
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and partnership between actors would be required for a successful relief 
effort and that there should be clarification of organisational roles in
disaster management. In Haiti, the United Nations, commenting on the
relief efforts following the 2010 earthquake noted the lack of: 
“Capacity [on the ground] required to coordinate efficiently the
large number of partners (in excess of 900 official NGOs were
operating in Haiti according to the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)) involved in the operation” (Lynch, 
2010).  
In addition, Heaslip (2010) observes that: 
“In fragile settings such as Haiti, the mandates, timeframes, 
guiding principles and methodologies for working of civilian aid
agencies and military forces are radically different and often clash, 
despite good intentions and a sincere common desire to “help the
people” held by international military and civilian aid personnel
involved in disaster relief operations”. 
Moreover, extensive academic commentary (Russell, 2005 and
Davidson, 2006 both cited by Carroll and Neu, 2009; DEFRA 2007; 
Townsend, 2006) on a wide variety of humanitarian relief operations, 
ranging from the Asian Tsunami in 2004, the South Asian earthquake
and US Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the UK floods in Hull in 2007, all
point to catastrophic logistics and supply chain management failures. All
of these examples display similar identifiable failures stemming from the
neglect of close proactive collaboration within the whole network of 
disaster and emergency relief actor agencies. Whilst each organisation
had its own operating methods and goals, it is only through the
coordination of plans and the sharing of resources that “effective
humanitarian logistics” would be truly achieved (Long and Wood, 1995, 
p216). Additional work written in the days immediately following the
Asian Tsunami (Oloruntoba, 2005) also acknowledged the plethora of 
domestic and international agencies and organisations working to
address the regions’ humanitarian relief requirements, whilst it also
offered additional support for the establishment of a standardised, 
coordinated logistics management system within the region. Earlier work
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(Gustavsson, 2003) focussing on lessons learned following
humanitarian relief efforts within Kosovo and Iraq (post military
intervention), acknowledged that no one agency could meet the logistical
challenges presented within the associated supply chains on its own, 
and that what was required was a much higher degree of collaboration
across all agencies. It was important that the whole humanitarian relief 
sector drew on the proven expertise and successes borne out of 
cooperation and collaboration across the commercial sector. In a similar
vein, Kovács and Tatham (2009) in a paper investigating ways of 
improving SC responsiveness pointed to the necessity of greater
interoperability between the numerous actors, whilst Akhtar et al (2012)
noted that successful coordination in Humanitarian Supply Chains could
contribute towards: 
“acceptance of proposals, amount of donations received, 
delivering supplies and completing projects on time, quality, 
reduction of costs, a quick response time, flexibility, fair distribution
of supplies, donors and beneficiary satisfaction” (p.22)
A selective review of literature within the field (Carroll and Neu, 2009)
noted that proposed solutions to alleviate operational failures along
humanitarian logistics and supply chains centred upon adaptations of 
traditional conceptual approaches to SCM. The underlying theme was
for a common approach requiring collaboration throughout and between
supply chain tiers and actors at all levels and positions of responsibility.  
“Where end to end supply chain collaboration was not developed
sufficiently to offer a robust and responsive logistics system, 
product or service delivery failure was inevitable” (Carroll and Neu, 
2009, p1029)  
Supply Chain Optimisation concentrates on controlling the various
elements of the supply chain and removing the non-value-added steps
that are evident within it. In keeping with many academic commentators, 
(Mangan et al, 2012; Seipel, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; 
Heaslip, 2011; Christopher, 2010; Skjoett-Larsen et al, 2003), Lysons
and Farrington (2006) argue that optimisation of the supply chain is most 
likely to be achieved by collaboration between cross-functional teams
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within the organisation and customers and suppliers external to it, but 
can this be achieved within the pressurised environments inherent after
a disaster within environments which are typically characterised by the
need for acute urgency and a high level of intensity (number of tasks vs
time and available resources). Moreover, actions within these
environments will be carried out by a series of different actors with
different levels of commitment to the task and each other, and with
differing motives and agendas (Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005). In essence, 
the profit-making incentive associated with Lysons and Farrington’s
(2006) arguments for supply chain collaboration is effectively replaced
by the need for a speedy and lifesaving response. Furthermore, Davis
(1993) suggested that reduction of uncertainty within such a supply chain
would lead to optimisation and pointed out that failure to fulfil promises
was a distinct source of such uncertainty. 
2.6.1 Collaboration through Clusters
In offering his economic cluster theory, Porter (1998) suggested that 
clusters are: 
“Geographic concentrations of interconnected companies and
institutions in a particular field…. they often extend downstream to
channels and customers and laterally to manufacturers of 
complementary products and to companies in industries related by
skills, technologies, or common inputs” (p.78). 
Moreover, being part of a cluster allows companies to “Operate more
productively whilst coordinating with related companies; and measuring
and motivating improvement” (p.81). Patti (2006) develops this concept 
into the Supply Chain context, contending that clusters should “include
upstream suppliers and downstream customers and may often extend
horizontally to include the makers of similar and complementary
products that require the same basic skills, raw materials, and
specialized equipment” (p.266). Cluster members benefit from both
competition and cooperation. Productivity increases for members as
they are afforded better access to employees and suppliers and to
specialised information and public institutions, increased availability of 
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complementary products and services, and better motivation and
incentivisation. Competition amongst members forces them to improve
their efficiencies, to control costs, and to actively seek ways to enhance
their capabilities and overall contribution; without this competition and
motivation amongst members a cluster will fail. Much of the cooperation
will occur vertically within the supply chain. However, horizontal
cooperation will occur whenever there is no direct competition and
whenever there is an outside threat to the overall existence of the cluster
(Patti, p.267). 
Whilst recognising what they describe as the “veritable flood of interest”
(p.1) of the cluster concept in regional analysis and policy, by way of 
contrast, and in critique of Porter’s (1998) original work Asheim et al
(2009) contend that clusters have been “oversold” (p.23) and suggest 
that there has long been a need for an objective assessment of their
feasibility and overall success. Simmie (2009) also criticises Porter’s
(1998) contribution to the debate on clusters as he comments that many
industrial regions and areas of the business sector cannot be fully
analysed and driven using a clustered approach. Similarly, Martin and
Sunley (2003, p.5) question the success of a clustered approach and
argue that “the mere popularity of a construct is by no means a
guarantee of its profundity”; indeed, they go on to debate the influential
nature of the clustered approach and the fact that “its overall
seductiveness has resulted in a rush to apply the concept in some
business arenas, in advance of theoretical and empirical assessments
of the strategy” (p.35). Turning to the practical application of the concept 
and in particular the application of the clustered approach to the
humanitarian sector, as will be discussed later in this Chapter (section
2.10) Jensen (2012) argues that whilst clusters are fine in principle, in
practice they are ineffective and cumbersome as they slow things down
in the field; in essence little had actually changed since clusters were
first introduced into the humanitarian supply chain. 
2.6.2 Horizontal and Vertical Collaboration
When considering the variety of forms of potential supply chain
collaboration, Barratt (2004) argues the case for two main categories, 
vertical and horizontal collaboration, see Fig 2.9. Horizontal
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collaboration improves coordination between organisations that are
“experts in the same functional area” (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.666)
and occurs when 2 or more competing or unrelated organisations
cooperate to share private information or resources such as a
warehouse space or manufacturing capacity (Prakash and Desmukh, 
2010; Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002). It is defined as “concerted
practices between companies operating at the same level(s) in the
market” (Cruijssen et al, 2007) and may involve collaboration with both
competitors and non-competitors (Barratt, 2004; Simatupang and
Sridharan, 2002). Vertical collaboration aims to “synchronise different 
levels of a supply chain for overall efficiency…..making all participants
focus on the final customers’ needs” (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, p.667). It 
takes place across different tiers within the supply chain and occurs
when “two or more organisations such as the manufacturer, the
distributor, the carrier, and the retailer share their responsibilities, 
resources, and performance information to serve relatively similar end
customers” (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, p.19).  
Vertical
Collaboration
  
  
External
Collaboration
(Suppliers)
  
External
Collaboration
(Other
Organisations)
Internal
Collaboration
External
Collaboration
(Competitors)
Horizontal
Collaboration
  
External
Collaboration  
(Customers)
  
Fig 2.9: The Scope of Collaboration: Generally (Barratt, 2004)
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In summarising selected theoretical ideas on collaboration and
categorisation, Jahre and Jensen (2010, p.666) offer the following views
on what to coordinate and why: 
Dimension/ Type of 
Coordination
Horizontal Vertical
What to Coordinate
Actors, activities, 
resources at strategic, 
tactical and operational
levels in information, 
money and material flows
for companies at the same
stage in the supply chain. 
Focus on the companies
and their specific tasks. 
Actors, activities, resources at 
strategic, tactical and
operational levels in
information, money and
material flows for companies
at different stages in the
supply chain. 
Focus on the customer and
synchronisation. 
Why Coordinate
To achieve economies of 
scale and to reduce costs
for the individual company. 
To have access to more
physical resources, 
information and
competence. 
To reduce overall supply
chain costs for some actors. 
To improve customer service
through smoother flows. 
Table 2.2: Coordination Aspects in Selected Literature (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, 
p666)
Collaboration through the adoption of clusters has been suggested as a
possible solution to address the lack of optimisation and coordination
inherent within the humanitarian supply chain, and the United Nations
Cluster Approach has been identified as a step in the right direction in
this respect (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 
2006), hence the review will now turn to a consideration of the UN
Cluster Approach. 
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2.7 The United Nations Cluster Approach – A Step in the Right
Direction?
Fig 2.10: How the Cluster System Works (UN OCHA, 2011)
The United Nations (UN) Cluster Approach was developed following the
Humanitarian Response Review (HRR) of the global humanitarian relief 
system commissioned by the then United Nations Emergency Relief 
Coordinator and Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, 
which was tasked with carrying out “an independent assessment of the
humanitarian system in which the experts identify reasons why the aid
community sometimes falls short of its goals” (p.1). The HRR (OCHA, 
2005) concluded that: 
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“A common element in the problems encountered is reliance of 
many NGOs on individual initiatives as opposed to group
action….however, there is a sense that the time has arrived for the
humanitarian community to work collectively towards an inclusive
system-wide coordination mechanism to which all stakeholders
can feel a sense of belonging.” (p.47)
2.7.1 Aims and Structure
The UN Cluster Approach organises humanitarian relief into a number
of specialist clusters with a predefined leadership. The aim of the
approach is to strengthen overall response capacity as well as to
improve the overall effectiveness of the response in five key ways
(United Nations OCHA, 2005):  
1. Ensure sufficient global capacity is built up and maintained in all
the main sectors/areas of response, with a view to ensuring timely
and effective responses in new crises.  
2. Provide predictable leadership in all the main sectors/areas of 
response.  
3. Develop/ design approaches around the concept of partnerships
(i.e. clusters) between UN agencies, international organisations
and NGOs.  
4. Strengthen accountability by making cluster leads answerable at 
the global level for building up a more predictable and effective
response capacity and at the field level, for fulfilling agreed roles
and responsibilities. 
5. Improve strategic field-level coordination and prioritization in
specific sectors/areas of response by placing responsibility for
leadership and coordination of these issues with the competent 
operational agency. 
The cluster concept is designed to apply to all humanitarian UN bodies, 
as well as national and international NGOs involved in the provision of 
disaster relief. In essence any humanitarian organisation which has the
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capacity can lead a cluster and organisations working in the field may
find themselves contributing to a number of clusters. The Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC) which is designated as the primary
mechanism for inter-agency coordination of humanitarian assistance
(IASC, 2011) has defined global clusters in eleven functional areas of 
humanitarian activity, with associated lead organisations, see Table 2.3. 
However, whilst the responsibilities for cluster leads have been clearly
defined, commentators (Jensen, 2012) argue that the ways in which
those responsibilities should be handled are “less obvious” (p.148). In
essence how is the cluster leader expected to fulfil its lead
responsibilities in an environment where many independent 
organisations “often object to being directed” (p.148). 
Global Cluster Cluster Lead Organisation(s)
Camp Coordination and Camp
Management 
UN Higher Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
International Organisation for Migration (IOM)
Early Recovery UN Development Programme (UNDP)
Education UN Children’s’ Fund (UNICEF)
Save the children (SC)
Emergency Shelter UNHCR
International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC)
Emergency
Telecommunications
World Food Programme (WFP)
Food Security Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO)  
WFP
Health World Health Organisation (WHO)
Logistics WFP
Nutrition UNICEF
Protection UNHCR
International Rescue Committee (IRC)
UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-
HABITAT)
UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS)
International Development Law Organisation
(IDLO)
UNDP
Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights (OHCHR)
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene UNICEF
Registered Engineers for Disaster Relief (RedR)
Table 2.3: Global Clusters and Cluster Leads (Humanitarian Reform, 2011)
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Having introduced the cluster concept and described it in general terms, 
given the framing of this research and overall research question it is
appropriate that this research takes as its focus the logistics cluster. 
2.7.2 The Logistics Cluster
The Logistics Cluster is responsible for preparedness and emergency
response in respect of the overall logistics response and is expected to
(Altay and Labonte, 2011, p.92; Jahre and Jensen, 2010): 
1. Fill logistics gaps and alleviate bottlenecks
2. Prioritize logistics interventions and investments
3. Collect/ share information and assets
4. Coordinate port and corridor movements to reduce congestion
5. Provide details of transporters and rough indication of market 
rates
6. Provide guidance on customs issues
7. Provide information on equipment and/or relief supply items
In the first year of implementation of the UN Cluster Approach (2006) the
Logistics Cluster accounted for by far the largest portion of the allocated
resource (almost one quarter of the US $40 million total budget, (OCHA, 
2006, p.3). Altay and Labonte (2011, p.93) suggest was that this
substantial contribution could serve as an indicator of the importance of 
logistics in humanitarian operations or alternatively could demonstrate
the amount of neglect afforded logistics as a discipline within the field up
to that point in time. Encouragingly, or perhaps worryingly as at 2011, 
the only one of the eleven functional clusters to meet the IASC Working
Group baseline capacity and preparedness standard (to be able to
respond to 3 major disasters per annum, affecting up to 500,000 with
two disasters occurring simultaneously) was the Logistics Cluster (Altay
and Labonte, 2011, p.93).  
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2.7.3 An Aid to Collaboration?
Research into and evaluations of the cluster approach and of 
interventions since its first field use in the Democratic Republic of Congo
in 2006 (Jahre and Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et al 2007; 
Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 2007) note initial high levels of confusion
regarding individual agency roles; there was a general lack of 
understanding amongst field workers in respect of the role of each
cluster and the associated cluster leads (Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 
2007; OCHA, 2006). However, there were many positive aspects to the
Concept including increased opportunities for collaboration and
dialogue, improved coordination and greater predictability (Street, 2007; 
OCHA, 2006); the approach continues to develop and in 2011 it was
viewed as a means of facilitating more effective and efficient levels of 
humanitarian response in the medium to long-term (Altay and Labonte, 
2011). However, there are still concerns relating to inter-cluster
coordination. It has been noted that: 
“The general feeling amongst NGOs was that clusters were overly
compartmentalised and that there were too many” (ActionAid, 
2007, p.5).  
There was also a  
“Fundamental barrier to addressing cross-cutting issues stemming
from weak inter-cluster coordination, including inadequate
information management and analysis” (Stoddard et al, 2007, 
p.40).  
When reflecting on the humanitarian efforts in respect of the 2007
Mozambique floods, concerns were raised that whilst the clustered
approach might encourage a closer focus on the designated functional
areas (see Table 2.3), this could be to the detriment of cross-cluster
themes (Cosgrave et al, 2007, p.3). Furthermore, research on the
application of the approach in Pakistan post the 2005 earthquake, 
observed that some participants: 
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“Found the increased demands due to the need for inter-cluster
coordination to be a burden rather than a help in ensuring
adequate and timely responses, in managing information and
avoiding both gaps and duplication” (Street, 2007, p.3).  
2.7.4 Horizontal or Vertical Collaboration?
Considering the relative merits offered by the application of both
horizontal and vertical collaboration it has been argued (Altay and
Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010) that the focus of the cluster
system thus far has been on Horizontal Collaboration, that is “improving
coordination between organisations that are considered to be experts in
the same functional area of disaster response” (Jahre and Jensen, 2010, 
p.666). Cluster collaboration takes place, on the whole between
providers of services at the same stage of the supply chain, for example
between providers of water and sanitation solutions. However, Kovács
(2011) does question the role of cluster leaders, describing the current 
system as a “stove-pipe approach” whilst noting that:  
“Everybody wants coordination [collaboration] but nobody wants to
be to be coordinated” (p251)
One clear advantage of horizontal collaboration is the achievement of 
economies of scale for actors and this is perhaps a key driver for the
adoption of this approach in what are globally frugal times. However, this
approach can also be the source of a significant overall disadvantage as
became evident when considering the response to the Pakistan
earthquake (Street, 2007), where individual clusters were seen to
function with internal efficiency, whilst failing to operate in harmony with
one another. An issue summarised by Jahre and Jensen (2010): 
“Coordination [collaboration] within clusters may impede
coordination [collaboration] across clusters, leading to excessive
functional focus and reduced focus on total beneficiary needs”
(p.667)
Whilst accepting that the application of horizontal collaboration is still far
from perfect, academic opinion (Kovács, 2011; Altay and Labonte, 2011; 
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Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Street, 2007) suggests that the real challenge
for the cluster approach lies in the adoption of vertical, cross-cluster
collaboration, which occurs when “2 or more organisations such as the
manufacturer, the distributor, the carrier, and the retailer share their
responsibilities, resources, and performance information to serve
relatively similar end customers” (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2002, 
p.19). Research (Jahre and Jensen, 2010) suggests that it is inherently
difficult to make humanitarian supply chains customer driven, and that a
more strategic approach considering the upstream level could serve to
enhance on going and future humanitarian operations (p677). Significant 
problems are generated as responsibility for global resource allocation
is defined by the permanent cluster lead whilst facilitation of the
appropriate response in the field rests with the designated local cluster
leader. Evidence suggests that cross-cluster collaboration, and a means
to bridge the supply chain from the global to the local level has still to be
addressed (Stoddard et al, 2007). Summarising (Jahre and Jensen, 
2010): 
“Effective vertical collaboration depends on successfully merging
the pipelines of many of the organisations in an operation, and on
creating a strategic level for carrying out coordination between
disasters; that is preparing for a coordinated approach in
operations” (p668)
Building on these ideas it has been suggested that the next dimension
for collaboration within humanitarian disaster relief should be to seek a
more strategic view as the field looks to move on from a Humanitarian
Logistics Management (Horizontal) approach to adopt Humanitarian
Supply Chain Management (Vertical) concepts (Kovács, 2011, p253). A
view echoed by the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review
(HERR), an independent review chaired by Lord (Paddy) Ashdown
tasked to look at how Great Britain responds to humanitarian disasters, 
who amongst their findings concluded that clusters needed to be more
strategic, and be grouped around need and the ability to work on several
levels (HERR, 2011, p31). 
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This discussion on the United Nations Cluster Approach would suggest 
that the United Nations has a significant role to play in the management 
of relationships amongst collaborating actors within the humanitarian
supply chain, hence it is appropriate that the discussion moves on to
consider the associated academic discourse within this context.  
2.7.5 Relationship Management, Power and Supply Chain
Collaboration  
Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that the three critical components to
a supply chain strategy are information flow, product flow and
relationship management. Moreover, they describe relationship
management as the most fragile and tenuous of the three. Traditionally
business exchange has been based on transactional relations focusing
on a single product transaction with little if any information sharing
(Jagdev and Thoben, 2001). Transactions in the 1970s and 80s were
characterized by tough price negotiations with seller and buyer looking
at their customers and suppliers as adversaries that provided the best 
way to increase the individual company’s profit margin (Skjoett-Larsen
et al, 2003). These arm’s length relations were often characterised by
distrust and competition. At the end of the 1980s a significant change in
trading relations took place with previous arm’s length relations being
replaced by durable arm’s length relationships and strategic
partnerships (Kalafatis, 2000; Dyer et al, 1998), characterised by a high
degree of information exchange. It has been suggested (Christopher, 
2011) that the practice of partnership sourcing is now widespread and
that the benefits of such an approach can include improved quality, 
innovation sharing, reduced costs and integrated scheduling of 
production and delivery. At the route of this argument are the concepts
of Relationship Marketing (RM) and Partnering. RM emphasises the
importance of establishing and maintaining relationships between
customers and buyers (Iglesias et al, 2011, p631). Initial definitions of 
RM (for example Berry, 1983 cited by Iglesias et al, 2011) centred their
focus on relationships with external customers; however, other, more
recent commentators developed the concept of RM to include other
actors and relationships, out with those established between a company
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and its end customers (Christopher et al, 1991). This idea of the
expanded view leads to the concept of Partnering which Upadhye and
Battacharya (cited by Sadler, 2007) define as: 
“Business relationship based on mutual trust, openness, shared
risk and shared rewards that yield a competitive advantage, 
resulting in greater business performance than companies could
achieve individually” (p169)
The idea proffered is that customer/supplier relationships should be
based on partnership and that successful supply chains will be those
based on mutuality and trust where there is a constant search for win-
win solutions (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 
2006).  
Power as a construct in business to business relationships has received
irregular and contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley, 2005a, 
p.848). Contrasting views surround the idea that on the one hand power
can have a negative effect on the workings of a successful supply chain, 
in that it negates co-operation and is not helpful in building relationships
(Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997); however, there are
some commentators (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois, 1998; 
Campbell, 1997) who support the view that power can have a positive
influence and that diversity within relationships is a good thing. Campbell
(1997) notes that there is no clear correlation between a customer’s trust 
in a supplier or vice versa and that the basis of relationships is founded
on other factors such as business opportunism or a salesman’s
charisma. Similarly, Palmer (2002, 2000) contends that individuals and
organisations are not motivated by the need or desire to cooperate but 
by self-interest and in the longer term self-preservation; a view supported
by Cox (2004, 2001) who argues that business relationships are entered
into for reasons of self or organisational gain, usually associated with
monetary gain. The acceptance of power imbalance is a first step
towards successful relationship building and although collaborative
chain activity is commended suppliers must still be prepared to operate
within conditions of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 2005a, 
p.63). Whilst modern day literature more often than not trumpets SCM
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and SCC as strategies that benefit all collaborators and ultimately the
end customer, we should not lose sight of the fact that it is possible for
some contributors to try and take advantage of the situation by forming
opportunistic trade deals at the expense of other members (Simtupang
and Sridharan, 2002). These actions may generate inertia and supply
chain conflict, resulting in unnecessary cost and a degraded customer
service. Consequently, a key factor in the construction of a successful
collaborative supply chain must be the elimination of managerial inertia
in favour of a chain that develops joint initiatives to ensure that each
member has a stake in success by delivering value to the end customer. 
A collaborative supply chain should develop appropriate and common
performance measures, integrated policies, information sharing, and
incentive alignment. Despite the clear and slightly historic message on
the benefits that SCC can bring, Senge (2010) seems to suggest that 
little has changed. Whilst initially agreeing that in order to effect change
across a supply chain you must first “Focus on the nature of 
relationships” (p.71); sadly, Senge goes on to add: 
“In most supply chains, 90 percent of them [relationships] are
transactional …..there is very little trust and very little ability to
innovate together” (p.71).  
Having discussed power as a construct in business to business
relationships and the contrasting views on the influence that power can
have on the workings of a successful supply chain (Hingley and
Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005a; Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Kalafatis, 
2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois,1998; Doney and Cannon, 1997; Campbell, 
1997) the debate must now turn to the question of who is the true power
broker along the humanitarian supply chain? In introducing the Structural
Holes Theory Burt (2005) contends that an individual or organisation
within a network, can strengthen its position by acting as a broker. In this
context the broker would seek to identify structural holes within the
humanitarian supply chain and to creating bridges across these holes, 
hence relocating the organisation in a stronger and more powerful
position. The United Nations Cluster Approach suggests that the UN is
the accepted power broker in a system that is realising opportunities for
dialogue and improved coordination and that is now facilitating more
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effective and efficient levels of humanitarian response in the medium to
long-term (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006). 
However, is this really the case with actors and organisations readily
accepting that power imbalance is a first step towards successful
relationship building and in certain circumstance being content to
operate within conditions of imbalanced power and reward (Hingley, 
2005a, p.63). 
2.8 An Empirical Opportunity - The Case for Further Study and
the Identified Research Gaps
The foregoing discussion and analysis have served to highlight a clear
empirical opportunity within what is a developing body of academic
knowledge. Moreover, a significant number of research gaps have been
identified which will form the basis of this research and the final doctoral
study. These gaps will now be analysed and considered by way of 
justification of the final research question and aim.  
2.8.1 A Burgeoning Field
Whilst acknowledging the attention that the field of humanitarian SCM
has gained as a research area, and the fact that researchers have begun
to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge, numerous academic
commentators (Leiras et al, 2014; Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Kunz and
Reiner, 2012; Mangan et al, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács and
Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2004; Yamada
et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005; 
Rickard, 2003) suggest that the research field of humanitarian SCM is
relatively new and is still in its infancy.  
“Literature on humanitarian logistics is scant” (Kovács and Spens, 
2007, p100)
Fawcett and Waller (2013) contend that SCM is the newest business
discipline and that, as such it is going through what they describe as
“growing pains” (p.183) as it seeks to chart its future course and define
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a meaningful destiny for itself. Indeed, whilst the use of SCM techniques
is becoming more prevalent in the humanitarian sector (Leiras et al, 
2014; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009), with the intent to
encompass cross-functional and inter-agency approaches becoming
more popular, it is acknowledged that there is no single form of 
humanitarian supply chain and, therefore no single definition of 
Humanitarian Supply Chain Management (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, 
p.115). 
Modern Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) supply
chains enable a faster and more effective response than ever before
(Day et al, 2012). Although the number of beneficiaries of humanitarian
aid has grown year-on-year (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 
2011; Tatham 2011), until the inception of The Journal of Humanitarian
Logistics and Supply Chain Management (JHLSCM) in June 2011 no
dedicated journal existed within the field nor was there any journal or
other outlet focusing on this topic alone. Academic interest has been
growing in this area, yet publications still remain fragmented and
generalised; however, acknowledgment is now made of the increasing
number of special issues of scientific journals that have been dedicated
to the humanitarian logistics field since 2005 (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; 
Kovács and Spens, 2011). Hence, whilst lessons have been learned
from past aid operations, operational failures still occur at the point of 
contact for humanitarian missions. Oloruntoba and Gray (2006)
comment on the growing body of practice-based literature on
Humanitarian SCM and Logistics, but note that this work seldom refers
to well-established concepts within academic supply chain literature; 
they go on to postulate that if attempts were made to apply such
concepts from the business model to the humanitarian aid supply chain, 
we may identify many important parallels, but also many equally
important differences (p.115). Similarly, Beamon (2004) observes that 
the majority of existing supply chain research is focused on managing
and/or optimizing the commercial supply of goods and services, and that 
whilst the humanitarian relief process is an important domain for SCM it 
has received little attention.  
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In their study of the 2007 Pisco Earthquake in Peru, Chandes and Paché
(2010) discuss the absence of collaboration between humanitarian
actors and highlight that this resulted in lost time, wasted resources and
ultimately a deeply disorganised supply chain (p337). Observation of the
logistical response to the Pisco earthquake demonstrated that business
logistics, mixing a service and a manufacturing perspective, could
furnish valuable information to the field of humanitarian logistics not only
on the conditions of success within collaborative logistics, but also on
the obstacles that must be overcome (opposition of individual and
collective interests, conflict over the division of tasks to be performed….). 
In concluding, Chandes and Paché (2010) demand a greater depth of 
exploratory reflection within humanitarian logistics and a more rigorous
maintenance of the debate surrounding SCM, opening a research
agenda of the highest priority on the critical need for a more collaborative
strategy (p337). Moving this debate forward Dash et al (2013) suggest 
that “disaster response supply chain management is an emerging field
and there is great potential for research in emergency logistics and
disaster response initiatives” (p.60) and Kumar and Havey (2013)
highlight the need for more research on disaster relief supply chain
management in light of frustrations with the delays in receiving aid
following the Haiti earthquake (2010). Finally, by way of a summary of 
current thinking in the field, Fawcett and Waller (2013) suggest that: 
“Recent research indicates that the top barrier to more effective
HADR is inadequate logistics, followed by weak governance and
insufficient collaboration” (p.187)
2.8.2 Standardisation and Collaboration
In the aftermath of the Asian Tsunami, there was a noticeable increase
in interest from academia as well as from logistics practitioners in the
development of theory and practice within the field of Humanitarian
SCM; indeed some 40 separate articles and conference papers were
published in the area between late 2005 and 2007 (Grant and Auton, 
2008; Kovács and Spens, 2008). Humanitarian logistics had established
itself as a field of high research interest however, whilst many papers
within the field used the concept of supply chain management as a
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starting point, very few of them had a supply chain focus in the empirical
research, for the field to develop such an approach was called for
(Kovács and Spens, 2008). There is an urgent requirement for
standardisation of logistics for humanitarian emergencies, a shortage of 
humanitarian logistics experts, inadequate assessment and planning
and limited collaboration and coordination across the humanitarian
supply chain as a whole, which creates duplication of effort and wastage
(Kovács and Spens, 2007, p103). This lack of collaboration could, at 
worst mean that relief efforts in the field are restricted; hence, networks
within affected countries which are best placed to implement immediate
aid might be severely limited, leading to an increased loss of life and
suffering (The Lancet, 2010). Although the discipline of humanitarian
logistics is “maturing” (Kovács, 2011, p260), for the field to truly evolve, 
further research is needed in support of the planning and execution of 
the important operations of disaster relief. Sophisticated collaboration
mechanisms, such as those seen in commercial supply chains that are
not currently observed in the disaster relief chain, require further inquiry
to develop new and innovative ways to define relationships and contracts
in ways that support the provision of humanitarian relief (Akhtar et al, 
2012; Balcik et al, 2010, p33; Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005). However, as
already discussed the extent of the challenge implicit in achieving a
coordinated response between NGOs must also reflect, at least in part, 
the desire of many such organisations to maintain a degree of 
independence from their colleagues (Tatham, 2011).  
Thomas and Fritz (2006) note that academic comparability between
humanitarian and business operations processes has been limited and
Carroll and Neu (2009), whilst supporting the concept of end-to-end
supply chain collaboration within humanitarian logistics, offer what they
describe as a pioneering attempt to promote best practice analysis from
military, business and humanitarian sectors (p1029).  
“Perhaps the supply chain academic community has a role to play
in disseminating the concepts of its discipline in a way that 
convinces humanitarian donors of the importance and value of 
providing resources for appropriate information systems and
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supply chain processes [Supply Chain Collaboration] as much as
for tangible relief supplies”. (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006, p118)  
Discussing aspects of humanitarian supply chain management that are
in need of further research, Larson (2011) highlighted the importance of 
further investigation into the role of intra- and inter-organisational
relationships offering the hypothesis that: 
“Greater coordination – within NGOs, among NGOs and between
NGOs and other actors can reduce disaster risk and improve
humanitarian effectiveness” (p29)  
whilst Boin et al (2010) offer the compelling view that:   
“Coordination is the Holy Grail of disaster response” (p4)
In a similar vein, outlining potential areas of research within the field
Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that the combination of inter-agency
collaboration with supply chain collaboration should be a key research
area (Table 1, p8); humanitarian logistics requires good and applicable
research with empirical data being gathered through the use of case
studies or other qualitative methodologies. Indeed, a poll of Editorial
Advisory and Review Board members carried out to establish the scope
of the first publication of the JHLSCM (Kovács and Spens, 2011) led to
specific criticism of the seeming reliance on the use of quantitative
methodologies, which led to research outcomes that “often propose
elegant solutions to problems, with little or no attention paid to how
solutions might be implemented” (p10). Kunz and Reiner (2012) offer the
view that “empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case
studies should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field”
(p.133) as they note that most research methodologies utilised within
humanitarian logistics research use simulation and modelling. 
Supporting these views, Balcik et al (2010) point out that : 
“The literature lacks studies that broadly and systematically
address relief chain coordination” (p22)
This drive and need for more research in this area is perhaps best 
summarised by Tatham (2011): 
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“Given its pivotal role in the preparation for, and response to, a
disaster, logistics and the members of the logistic profession
across all of the responding agencies and organisations have a
highly influential role to play. Improved cooperation would not only
pay significant dividends through the development and sharing of 
best practice and the appropriate integration of people, processes
and technology, it would also help to break down the wider barriers
of mutual suspicion that, unquestionably, exist” (p14)
2.8.3 A More Strategic View - Learning From and Informing
Business  
What of the discipline and practice of supply chain management as a
whole? Larson (2011) offers the view that humanitarian logisticians have
much to learn from their business counterparts; there has been limited
knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian logistics
practitioners and as a result aid agencies are many years behind
business organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain practices
(p15); indeed it has been suggested that humanitarian aid agencies may
be 15 or even 20 years behind adopting today’s fundamental tools of 
logistics and supply chain management (van Wassenhove, 2006; 
Spring, 2006). However, it should also be noted, that there is increasing
opinion that the traditional view of a predictable and stable commercial
supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm. Dash et al (2013)
proffer the idea that some aspects of commercial logistics and SCM in
support of normal every day activity are similar to those within disaster
response supply chains; hence, managers of both disciplines could learn
from each other and supplement best practice within both fields (p.58). 
Commercial supply chain managers are increasingly faced with
challenges that no longer obey the traditional rules of forecast driven
certainty and are therefore, forced to adopt the more event driven
approaches utilised by their humanitarian counterparts (Decker et al, 
2013; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Indeed, the
prospective outreach of humanitarian logistics research through
managerial relevance and access to research results, and the overall
usefulness of such work to logistics practitioners in all fields is now being
noted (Dash et al, 2013; Decker et al, 2013; Kovács, 2012). In short, 
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perhaps the commercial sector has something to learn from its
humanitarian counterparts and vice versa?
2.9 The Final Research Question and Aim of the Thesis
Given the foregoing discussion, this study will seek to fill the identified
gaps in the research (Table 2.4) surrounding the effective planning and
coordination of the provision of emergency logistics and to evaluate how
effective collaboration might be achieved along the humanitarian supply
chain as a result. The foregoing narrative and analysis therefore gives
rise to the single research question: 
The aim of the thesis is to make a theoretical contribution to contingency
theoretic perspectives and a functional contribution to existing business
and humanitarian supply chain practice, by revealing what factors restrict 
effective collaboration between actors within humanitarian relief 
environments and suggesting how these issues might be addressed in
the future. 
  
When considering the Immediate Response to Natural Disasters what are
the key drivers within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain that will help
to improve future collaborative working?
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CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
“People undertake research in order to find things out in a systematic
way, thereby increasing their knowledge”
(Jankowicz, 2005)  
3.1 Introduction
Once a topic has been identified and a research question refined, 
thoughts must then turn to the sort of data required to answer the
question and to how this data might be gathered (Cameron and Price, 
2009). A research methodology is simply a technique for collecting data
(Creswell, 2013; Bryman and Bell, 2007) and choosing an appropriate
methodology depends on a clear understanding of what each method
has to offer, what it can do and, perhaps more importantly what it cannot 
do and what type of research findings will be produced. The research
philosophy adopted contains important assumptions about the way in
which the researcher views the world and these assumptions will
underpin the overall research strategy and chosen methods (Saunders
et al, 2010). Accordingly, the range of issues that bear, both directly and
more peripherally, on the research approach adopted will be addressed. 
In explaining how the final methodology was arrived at both the external
and internal influences on the methodological decisions made will be
acknowledged, and sources revealed surrounding the connections
between the purpose of the research, the philosophical and theoretical
perspectives taken and the research question previously arrived at in
Chapter 2. A research design provides a framework for the collection
and analysis of data and the choice of design reflects decisions made
about the priority given to a range of dimensions within the research
process (Bryman and Bell, 2007); hence, set against this background
the research design methods employed to collect and analyse data will
also be discussed. 
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3.2 Methodological Choice, Research Philosophy and the
Personal Perspective
Methodology should represent the theory of how actual research is
undertaken (Blaikie, 2007). In achieving this, methodology seeks to
guide the development of rigorous, comprehensive and integrated
approaches based on critical assessment of a range of influences and
options. Blaikie (2007) goes on to suggest that these should include, 
amongst other things, the topic of research, underlying philosophical
inclinations about how theory should be generated and/or tested, what 
criteria should be satisfied and what resources are available. In essence
the research methodology adopted must contain important assumptions
about the researcher’s ontological and epistemological views on the
world (Saunders et al, 2009). Business and management researchers
must have an awareness of the philosophical commitments that they
make through their choice of research strategy as this has a significant 
impact not only on what they do but on their understanding of what it is
that they are actually investigating. In part the philosophy adopted will
be influenced by practical considerations, however the main influence is
likely to be the particular researcher’s view of the relationship between
knowledge and how it is developed. The important issue is not whether
the researcher is philosophically informed but how well is the researcher
able to reflect upon the philosophical choices made and defend them in
relation to the alternatives available (Johnson and Clark, 2006 cited by
Saunders et al, 2009, p108).  
Individual assumptions about human knowledge and about the nature of 
reality will have an inevitable impact on how we shape and understand
research questions, the methods that we use and how findings are
interpreted (Crotty, 1998). The contention being that the main influence
on the philosophy that an individual adopts is likely to be their particular
view of what is acceptable knowledge and the process by which this is
developed (Saunders et al, 2012, p.128). As discussed earlier within this
thesis (section 1.2), prior to taking up a role within academia, the
researcher served for almost 26 years in the RAF, in what is arguably a
classic objectivist reality. The structures and social entities certainly exist 
in a reality that is external to, and independent of the social actors within
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it (Bryman and Bell, 2012; Blakie, 2007). In essence military personnel
change roles on a regular basis, but duties are described by terms of 
reference and operating procedures which must be adhered to. A strict 
hierarchy is necessarily maintained and there is little, if any room for the
subjectivist view. Furthermore, when considering the epistemological
position and what is accepted as knowledge (Bryman and Bell, 2012; 
Saunders et al, 2012; Cameron and Price, 2009; Blaikie, 2007) the law
like generalisations associated with the military environment would seem
to reflect the positivist philosophy and the position associated with that 
of the natural scientist (Saunders et al, 2012, p.134). Add to this the fact 
that this researcher served as an aviation engineer and the suggested
links to an objectivist, positivist stance would seem obvious. However, 
whilst still serving, this researcher began to consider management as an
academic discipline and was stuck by the fact that despite this objectivist 
structure, individual approaches to management and the interactions
between the associated social actors within the military arena, still had a
significant part to play in the overall nature of reality. In effect, for this
researcher the opinion was formed in favour of the subjectivist aspect of 
ontology. Moreover, the view was also developed that the social world
of management was simply too complex to support this ‘law-like’
scientific generalisation and that for meaningful commentary, an
understanding of the differences between social actors must be
considered. Hence, against this argument and realisation the
subjectivist, interpretivist views are favoured by this researcher and, as
will be described in this Chapter will form the basis for the remainder of 
this thesis. 
3.3 Formulating the Research Question – Identifying Relevant
Literature
Exploring and engaging with the literature relevant to the particular focus
of the research must be a thread that runs through the entire research
process (Creswell, 2013; Cameron and Price, 2009; Blaikie, 2007). 
Moreover, in order to establish what work has been previously published
within the subject field, it is important that the literature search is carefully
planned to ensure that the relevant and up-to-date literature is located
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(Saunders et al, 2009). In order to avoid what they describe as
information overload Saunders et al (2009, p.75) suggest that key words
and search items should be established at an early stage; accordingly, 
the table included at Appendix A sets out the key words used throughout 
this research process. These key words were revisited on a 4 monthly
cycle to ensure that an up-to-date literary review was maintained; in
addition reference lists associated with articles found during the initial
keyword search were also investigated. Consequently, the stock of 
literature gradually expanded to well in excess of 250 items. Hence, it 
was useful to keep a data base of articles with a short précis of each
article being maintained to aid with the management of the literature. In
addition to journal searches through established library search engines, 
such as Emerald and Ebsco, the research was also informed through
registration with Google Scholar, which proved to be a very useful and
much used facility throughout the project. 
3.4 Arriving at a Methodology
Arriving at a methodology is a complex process. The range of 
methodological literature that explains the different approaches to
research that have developed, in both the natural and social sciences, 
bears witness to how diverse the options are, how problematic the
choices may be and how these are intimately connected to different 
philosophical and theoretical perspectives (see for example: Creswell, 
2013; Gill and Johnson, 2010; Cameron and Price, 2009; Saunders et 
al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007; Blaikie, 2007). Numerous academic
models are offered which seek to assist researchers in navigating these
diverse options and the inherent complexities and perhaps conflicts
involved in selecting an appropriate methodology (see for example: Gill
and Johnson, 2010; Saunders et al, 2009; Hussey and Hussey, 1997). 
As with any model it would be unwise to consider any one in particular
as necessarily right, but by the same token it would also be folly to
consider any model as wrong, at least because they all offer an attempt 
to distil ideas and options down to a workable and tangible level. In short, 
as a guide for how an issue might be resolved, they are essential and
extremely helpful. Indeed, Partington (2000) suggests that the level of 
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consideration should lie somewhere between simply applying an
established, normative approach with little further comment and
reconstructing the entire philosophy of science to arrive at a unique
methodological strategy. His advice, however, is to find and explain an
approach that is appropriate to the requirements of the research and its
context rather than to favour either extreme. This advice echoes that of 
Emmett (1972), to adopt a style that is essentially a matter of 
convenience, employing an approach that is relevant and helpful to the
subject matter and the method of enquiry, rather than given as an
absolute. Accordingly, the thinking that was used to arrive at the chosen
approach will now be explained. 
3.4.1 The Research Process - An Appropriate Methodological 
Model
As discussed previously there are numerous models which attempt to
represent the field. The models aim to integrate contributions from a
range of academic texts in an attempt to encapsulate the options
available for the researcher. More or less prescriptive as to the
approaches to research, they usefully indicate how philosophical, 
theoretical and methodological perspectives might be aligned. One such
model, that offered by Saunders et al (2009), (Fig 3.1) depicts what they
refer to as the research onion. This nested hierarchy seeks to avoid the
strict polarity apparent within some models (see for example: Hussey
and Hussey, 1997), while retaining the conceptual identity of the different 
layers and still indicating potential associations between those layers.  
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Fig 3.1: The Research Onion (Saunders et al, 2009, p.108)
In keeping with other such representations, Saunders et al (2009) offer
a model that allows the researcher to identify the key issues that require
attention if the final research methodology adopted is to be both
justifiable and credible. Fundamental to its use is a process that leads
from initial considerations of underlying philosophical perspectives
through a series of layers before finally arriving at appropriate methods
of data collection and analysis. The researcher also considered this
model to be similar to the depiction of a hill on an Ordnance Survey map. 
If one considers the onion in a 3 dimensional way, then the overall data
collection method becomes the top of the hill with all of the supporting
elements that go towards the overall philosophy and approach
underpinning the peak. With this in mind, in order to clearly explain and
justify the thought processes involved in arriving at the final methodology
the onion will now be systematically peeled, (or indeed the hill climbed), 
with discussion of each exposed layer being offered to explain the
thinking behind the final chosen approach.
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3.5 Philosophical Positioning
As discussed earlier, the research philosophy adopted must contain
important assumptions about the researcher’s ontological and
epistemological views of the world (Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and
Bell, 2007). In part the philosophy adopted will be influenced by practical
considerations (access to data and/or participants, time constraints etc..)
but it is these assumptions about initial researcher positioning that will
underpin the overall research strategy and the associated research
methods. Considering the outer layer of the research onion at Fig. 3.1
Saunders et al (2009) offer a comparative view of the 4 alternative
research philosophies.  
Positivism Realism Interpretivism Pragmatism
Ontology –
the nature of 
reality
External, 
objective, 
independent 
of social
actors
Objective. 
Exists
independent of 
human
thoughts and
beliefs or
knowledge
Socially
constructed, 
subjective, 
may change
External
multiple, view
chosen to
best enable
answering of 
research
question
Epistemology
–what 
constitutes
knowledge
Only
observable
phenomena
can provide
credible data
Observable
phenomena
provide
credible facts. 
Insufficient 
data means
inaccuracies
Subjective
meanings and
social
phenomena. 
Focus upon
the details of a
situation and
reality behind
the details
Depends on
the research
question. 
Either or both
observable
phenomena
and
subjective
meanings can
provide
acceptable
knowledge
Table 3.1: Comparison of 4 Research Philosophies in Management Research
(Saunders et al, 2009, p.19)
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3.5.1 Ontology and Epistemology
The idea that ontological and epistemological standing can be effectively
polarised onto a position on a sliding scale is somewhat simplistic
although it is fair to acknowledge that this representation does help to
portray the options that are available to the researcher. As this research
was primarily concerned with the relationships that exist amongst actors
within Humanitarian Relief Supply Chains, and the influence of those
relationships on the collaborative process, the focus had to be from the
perspective of the actors involved. Furthermore, given the objectives it 
was of limited interest to simply describe particular behaviours in
particular circumstances. Von Wright (1971, cited by Bryman and Bell, 
2007) depicts the epistemological clash between positivism and
interpretivism when considering the social sciences and discusses the
issues surrounding appropriate approaches when trying to interpret 
human action. In essence the clash reflects a division between gaining
an explanation of human behaviour that is inherent within the positivist 
approach and the understanding of human behaviour that is the goal of 
interpretivism. The aim within this research project was, through
appropriate analysis and some warranted speculation to identify the
processes and mechanism that produced inherent behaviours, the
influences on those behaviours and to speculate on how they might be
modified and ultimately improved for the greater benefit of all involved in
the provision of humanitarian relief (see discussion on Porter’s Value
Chain (1990) within Section 2.2). The goal was not to simply explain
inherent behaviour, but to develop an approach that would reveal
participants’ understandings of behaviours that held reality for them; 
hence the epistemological locations would have to reveal humanitarian
actor's interpretations and understandings of their reality coupled with an
ontology that would link participant experiences with dissimilar levels of 
reality. 
Hence in keeping with the thoughts of Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998, 
cited by Saunders et al, 2009, p.109) whilst the pragmatic approach was
intuitively appealing, the idea of a constantly moving ontology did not 
seem appropriate. The subjective, socially constructed ontological view
coupled with the epistemological focus on the details of a situation and
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the reality behind those details meant that the overall standpoint within
this thesis was an interpretivist one. 
3.6 The Appropriate Research Approach – Deductive or
Inductive?
3.6.1 Distinctions
The distinction between deductive and inductive approaches is at first 
glance a simple one (Creswell, 2013; Saunders et al, 2010; Cameron
and Price, 2009). Deductive research has its origins in research in the
natural sciences. It starts with theory and proceeds by testing
hypotheses derived from that theory. On the other hand, inductive
research does quite the opposite in that it starts with observations and
derives theory from those observations. Bryman and Bell (2007) offer
the opinion that the deductive approach represents the commonest view
of the nature of the relationship between theory and research as the
researcher develops hypotheses based on what is known about the
domain under scrutiny and of the associated theoretical ideas; however, 
they also argue that the last step when utilising deduction actually
involves some induction, as the researcher infers the implications of his
or her findings for the theory that prompted the whole exercise. Whilst 
noting that deductive research is what most people understand as
scientific research Cameron and Price (2009) believe that logically
speaking inductive research must come first and that induction is the
“chicken that lays the theory egg” (p.75). But just as the processes
associated with a deductive approach will entail an element of induction
so the inductive approach is likely to include some deduction. Once the
phase of theoretical reflection on a set of data has taken place, the
researcher may wish to collect additional data in order to identify the
conditions in which a suggested theory will or will not hold true, in short 
the application of a deductive approach utilising the newly induced
theoretical ideas (Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
Final Philosophical Positioning
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3.6.2 A Collective Wariness – the Case for the Inductive Approach  
The emergence of the social sciences in the 20th century led to a
wariness of deduction amongst associated researchers. Social sciences
researchers were critical of the idea that a cause-effect link could be
made between particular variables without allowance being made for an
understanding of the way in which humans interpret and interact with
their social world. Followers of induction also criticise the ridgid
methodologies associated with deduction that make no allowance for
alternative explanations of what is actually happening (Saunders et al, 
2009). The call for more inductive, theory-building studies which are
useful, relevant and up-to-date has been growing for some time (see for
example Daft and Lewin, 1990 who question the usefulness and
relevance of much organizational theory). Underlying these practical
concerns are the more fundamental methodological issues surrounding
the dominance of the quantitative, deductive, theory-testing research
paradigms in management research which is challenged on scientific
grounds (Partington, 2000, p.92). Numerous commentators now offer
the view that the evolving status of research into organisations has made
it appropriate for researchers to adopt methodologies that aim to build
new theories from empirical data (see for example Eisenhardt, 1989). As
discussed earlier this research sought to identify and understand
relationships within the field of humanitarian supply chains and the
influences that social interaction could have, hence the interpretive view
working with what Saunders et al (2009, p.116) describe as the social
actors within the field was adopted. Moreover, as highlighted within
Chapter 2 (see section 2.11), although the discipline of humanitarian
logistics is “maturing” ( Kovács, 2011, p260); for the field to truly evolve, 
further research is needed in support of the planning and execution of 
the important operations of disaster relief. Sophisticated collaboration
mechanisms, such as those seen in commercial supply chains that are
not currently observed in the relief chain, require further inquiry to
develop new and innovative ways to define relationships and contracts
in ways that support the provision of relief (Balcik et al, 2010, p.33). 
Hence, the case for an inductive approach lies in this desire to induce
hypotheses from the field research. Given that the purpose of the
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research was to develop an understanding and explanation of the nature
of relationship forming, analysing data as defined by the subject matter
rather than on pre-constructed hypotheses which had been developed
in advance of the fieldwork, the inductive approach was considered to
be the most appropriate.  
3.7 The Final Research Strategy
3.7.1 Grounded Theory
“The purpose of grounded theory is theory construction rather than
description or application of existing theories” (Charmaz and
Bryant, 2011, p.292)
Grounded theory is thought to be the best example of the inductive
approach as it is firmly rooted in the assumption that research should not 
begin with a prior hypothesis but that hypotheses should be developed
from close data analysis (Silverman 2011a, Saunders et al, 2009, 
Bryman and Bell, 2007). Based on the seminal work of Glaser and
Strauss (1967) it is a strategy which should be adopted where a more
behaviouristic review is required (Sunday, 1979 cited by Gill and
Johnson, 2010). But grounded theory was and still remains more than
simply a process of theory development that is grounded in data
collection. It is implicit in the joint and several works of Glaser, Strauss, 
Corbin and others that the term grounded theory refers to a process. 
However, although much cited in the organisational literature, Bryman
and Bell (2007) note that the associated methods and techniques remain
contentious, not least between its original authors who developed the
approach along different paths following the publication of the initial text 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967); moreover, there is considerable controversy
about what grounded theory actually is and entails (Charmaz, 2000 cited
by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.585). Whereas Glaser (1992) has sought 
continuously to promote a highly flexible approach dependent as much
on the creativity and ingenuity of the research as on any procedure
Final Research Approach
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guidance, Strauss (1987) and Strauss and Corbin (1990) have
developed an ever more systematised approach where data collection, 
analysis and eventual theory stand in close relationship to one another. 
Reassuringly, one part of the process of development is the clear shift 
that Glaser and Strauss have both made from their initial 1967 view that 
grounded theory was uniquely the domain of professionally trained
sociologists to one accepting that the approach was adaptable to a
variety of fields and disciplines (Glaser, 1992; Strauss and Corbin, 
1990), although perhaps more especially in the social sciences. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) offer the view that the grounded approach
can be used to enable the researcher to “identify and explain patterns
and processes, commonalities and differences” (p.9). However, 
Suddaby, (2006, cited by Saunders et al, 2009) lists six common
misconceptions about a grounded approach: 
1. It should not be an excuse to ignore the literature.  
2. It is not a presentation of raw data. 
3. It is not theory testing. 
4. It is an interpretative, highly creative process and not a logico-
deductive one. 
5. It is not perfect and can by its very nature be ‘messy’; hence the
researcher must develop a tacit feel for their data. 
6. It is not easy and is the product of experience, hard work and
creativity. 
Partington (2000) offers a similar view, in that researchers attracted by
the guiding principles associated with grounded theory cannot escape
the undiminished need for “sensitivity, creativity, patience, 
perseverance, courage and luck” (p.91). Against these warnings is the
view that where the researcher wishes to facilitate reflection upon events
and/or identify organisational structure then inductive grounding may
make this process easier (Locke, 2001); moreover, this approach can
also offer a “strong handle on what real life is like” (Miles and Huberman, 
1994, p.10) and is conducted by “people who apply a broad set of skills
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and experiences in a variety of settings rather than exclusively by
functionally constrained academics “ (Partington, 2000, p.91). 
In this research, therefore, the decision was taken to use the highly
flexible approach espoused by Glaser (1992). The attraction of the
Glaserian approach was that it does not simply support the ‘classic’
grounded approach, but allows the researcher the licence to build upon
existing theory and the freedom to speculate on developing elements of 
that theory rather than simply producing a range of procedurally linked
concepts as espoused by Strauss and Corbin (1990). Glaser (1992)
explicitly allows for considerable freedom in speculating beyond the raw
data to draw generalisations, rather than to depend on strict adherence
to procedural rules and the constraints of conditional process. However, 
in spite of his somewhat free-form approach Glaser’s ultimate and
explicit interest remains in the development of strong sociological
constructs (Glaser, 1992). Although the researcher is not a trained
sociologist, this work was based on an interest in the processes of 
organisational life and on the wish to generate a theoretical explanation
for poorly researched phenomena in a discrete context. The view was
taken that, even for a relatively novice researcher, this kind of 
investigation held the potential to produce interesting contributions to
both theory and practice, and perhaps have relevance beyond the limited
context of the research. Hence, the overall strategy was best placed
within the grounded theory-building approach. 
3.7.2 Case Studies
“A strategy for doing research which involves an empirical
investigation of a particular contemporary phenomenon within its
real life context using multiple sources of evidence” (Robson, 
2002, p.178)
Yin (2009) describes a case study as “an empirical enquiry that 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context”
(p.14). Simons (2009) argues that in-depth case study research is more
effective in addressing what is currently happening within an industry
and why it is happening when compared to more traditional analysis, 
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which often describes what has happened in the past. Case studies
should be of particular interest if the overall aim of the research is to gain
a rich understanding of the process being studied (Creswell, 2013; 
Morris and Wood, 1991 cited by Saunders et al, 2009). Saunders et al
go on to suggest that case study research is more often than not used
in explanatory and exploratory research which is aimed at addressing
the question why? Yin (2013) distinguishes between case studies and
histories, but the only difference that he identifies between the two is that 
a case study uses direct observation and systematic interviewing. Yin
also offers the view that a case study is an empirical inquiry that enables: 
1. In depth investigation of a contemporary phenomenon within its
real-life context. 
2. The study of a situation in which there will be many more variables
of interest than data points. 
3. The utilisation of multiple sources of evidence. 
Traditionally theory has been developed by combining observations from
previous literature, common sense and experience, but the tie to actual
data may often be a somewhat tenuous one (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However, back in 1967, Glaser and Strauss were arguing that it is the
intimate connection with the empirical reality that permits the
development of a testable, relevant and valid theory. Qualitative
research studies social phenomena from the perspective of the
informants (Creswell, 2013; Banister et al, 1994). Within this general
tradition, case studies have an important function in theory building, 
especially when investigating emergent organisational behaviour that is
informal or unusual, when current theory is weak or under-developed
and there are potentially many variables whose connections are not 
immediately obvious (Hartley, 1994). Hartley goes on to suggest more
specifically that case studies allow us to explore social processes as they
unfold, in their natural organisational and environmental context, often
revealing uniqueness rather than typicality. Similarly, by engaging
closely with the informant’s domain the researcher can capture the
concepts and categories used by subjects to organise their world and
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therefore aid the emergence of new insights (Jones, cited by Mangham, 
1987). Yin (2013) notes that case studies are also useful when the
boundaries between context and phenomena are not clearly evidenced
and context is deliberately part of the design.  
When researching in a field for which little or no formal theory exists or, 
as here, when new insights are sought, the value of the qualitative theory
building approach to case study becomes evident (Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Yin (2009) points out that bias on the part of the researcher and
a lack of rigour has undermined the legitimacy of case studies in some
fields and that conclusions drawn from single case studies are open to
accusations that they produce insufficient data for effective conclusions
to be drawn. However, what is clear is that the case study continues to
be an important part of research in the fields of management and social
science. Indeed numerous supply chain management text books are
populated with case studies, both long and short, for instructional
purposes (see for example Mangan et al, 2012; Chopra and Meindl, 
2010; Lysons and Farrington, 2006, Mentzer, 2004; and Lysons and
Gillingham 2003). Moreover, it is argued that the in-depth case study
approach allows for greater insight into the field of study within a real life
context and that the method is especially useful for analysing various
stages of a supply chain (Soosay et al, 2008). The exploratory aspects
of a multiple case study approach proves especially useful for
investigating supply chains and developing an in-depth insight into
individual key stages within the chain itself. Case studies can be used to
offer a multi-dimensional and flexible assessment of supply chains
through deeper exploration and identification of relatively complex key
areas and events within the chain. This allows for the collation of a wide
spectrum of information for the enhancement of academic research and
the development of theories which may benefit various key personnel at 
various stages of the supply chain (Soosay et al, 2008). In a similar vein, 
outlining potential areas of research within the humanitarian field Kovács
and Spens (2011) suggest that the combination of inter-agency
collaboration with supply chain collaboration should be a key research
area: 
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“Humanitarian logistics requires good and applicable research with
empirical data being gathered through the use of case studies or
other qualitative methodologies” (Table 1, p8).  
As discussed earlier (section 3.6), a strong argument in favour of the
inductive approach is that it offers the potential to answer not only the
research question but also questions not originally asked (Partington
2000); the contention being that when research is conducted from the
perspective of the informant, and the researcher remains open to
surprise rather than seeking to confirm expectations, ever more
interesting insights can emerge from field work. Qualitative case studies
allow for the adoption of an integrated method approach, not only to
improve rigour, but also to explore and understand a specific topic while
allowing the researcher to develop the best possible methodology for
their given area of research (Cameron and Price, 2009; Saunders et al, 
2009; Yin, 2009).  
The kind of focus, depth and detail proposed by these scholars
represents an almost self-evident description of, and argument for the
use of case study within the context of this research. While the criteria
evinced above have discrete characteristics it is clear by inspection that 
they also emerge from a common underlying theme. To paraphrase, this
can be stated as follows. When new insights are sought and when it is
deemed important to reveal and to understand the unique perspectives
of informants within the natural organisational contexts and
environments then the argument for adopting a qualitative, inductive
case based approach is strong. In light of the study objectives, a
qualitative multiple case study approach using an integrated research
methodology was acknowledged as an appropriate and valuable means
of developing this research. Within the context of this study, the case
study approach allowed the researcher to investigate and examine the
studied phenomena within a real life context and explore why and what
was happening in a current situation (Yin, 2009). Case studies also
provide the opportunity for a holistic view of what is happening within a
business, enabling the researcher to see the whole picture. Finally, this
method was chosen as it is considered to be one of the most effective
means of obtaining a broad range of rich data (Saunders et al, 2009). 
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3.7.3 Single vs Multiple-Case Design
Each of the notions advanced in the previous paragraphs resonate with
the needs and intentions of this investigation and so the use of a case
based, qualitative and inductive approach held clear attractions for the
overall research strategy. However, should the approach be that of a
single case or would a multiple-case design be the better option? Yin
(2009) argues that the use of multiple-cases provides more compelling
evidence and is therefore regarded as being more robust. In addition, a
qualitative multiple-case study not only allows for comparison between
individual companies or cases, but the collection of increased, in-depth, 
exploratory data favours the identification of a greater number of 
unknown conditions and events (Soosay et al, 2008). Yin (2009) also
suggests that the use of multiple-case designs has increased in
frequency over recent years and offers the view that in some fields
multiple-case studies have been regarded as a different methodology
from the single-case approach. Multiple-case designs arguably have
distinct advantages when compared to the single-case approach
(Herriott and Firestone, 1983 cited by Yin, 2009) in that the evidence
produced is often considered to be more compelling, hence overall
findings are viewed as more robust. Furthermore, they are used more
often than not where the intention of the research is to compare and
contrast findings and to look for similarities and differences across a
number of organisations (Cameron and Price, 2009; Simons, 2009). As
this thesis was concerned with identifying reasons why participant actors
within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain were struggling to
collaborate, it was felt that the associated field work was well suited to
the use of multiple-case studies based on different actors within the
Supply Chain itself. Yin (2009) also suggests that whilst supplementing
the findings associated with a single-case, the data gathered from
additional cases might also fill a gap left by the first case (p.62), thereby
making the findings all the more compelling. Moreover, the selection of 
a multiple-case approach also benefits the justification of the final
findings and serves to address the arguments surrounding triangulation
of the final qualitative data and associated findings (see section 3.11.7).  
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3.7.4 Cross-Case Research and Analysis
An illustration of the cross study method is included in Fig 3.2.  
Fig 3.2: Case Study Research (Yin, 2009, p.57)
Following the development of theory the figure illustrates the importance
of the case selection and data collection process. It also shows that each
case should be treated as an individual study before cross-case analysis
is used to identify trends, commonality and differences (Yin, 2009) which
will lead to the final findings and the overall contribution. The adoption of 
this approach is amplified within Fig 3.4 and the associated discussion
(see section 3.10).  
3.7.5 A True Case Study?
Having considered the overall methodology to be adopted within this
research thoughts turned to the actual definition of the word case and
the merits of its use given the overall context of this study. Definitions of 
classic cases (Simons, 2009, Yin, 2009, Stake, 1995) suggest that the
selected organisations should be considered from all angles and all
aspects and clearly this was not to be the approach here, where a much
more focussed view of the participant organisation’s particular
approaches to disaster relief and the immediate response phase (see
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Fig 2.9, Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) in particular would be the key. 
Accordingly, in order to locate the cases within the general context the
decision was taken to use the term domain instead of case, whereby a
domain is understood to be more descriptively rich than a case
expressed as an area of human practice valued by society and mastered
through a recognised period of study and learning (Gardner,1997). 
Hence, hereafter, throughout the thesis the classification of domain is
used in preference to the term case. 
3.7.6 The Final Research Domains – A Justifiable Choice
As will be discussed later, within the general context, the aim was to
identify a sufficient number of domains to achieve data triangulation and
with it generalisability of the final findings and contribution (See section
3.11.7). Following Stage I of the research design (See Fig 4) responses
were received from 11 of the 18 organisations that were contacted (see
Appendix B). However, a decision had to be taken on the number of 
domains that would feature in the final research, offset against the
necessary limitations associated with the required word count for the
final thesis together with the requirement for rich qualitative data, 
identified as key to the successful fulfilment of the study itself. Hence, 
against these restrictions and stipulations four actor organisations, all of 
whom are involved in the provision of immediate response (see Fig 2.9, 
Kovács and Spens 2008, 2007) to disasters were identified as domains
for the study. In-depth introductions to these organisations are included
within the separate domain analysis chapters (4 through 7); but by way
of summary and justification, the following organisations were selected: 
The United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Assistance: Following initial contact during Stage
I of the research process (see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), and a
discussion on the overall research topic, the researcher was
advised by the United Nations to contact their Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UN OCHA) as it is
deemed to be responsible for bringing together humanitarian
actors to ensure a coherent and coordinated response to
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emergencies and disaster relief. A key pillar of the OCHA mandate
is to “coordinate effective and principled humanitarian action in
partnership with national and international actors” (OCHA, 2012a). 
OCHA's overall role is to ensure effective coordination, including
strengthening the cluster approach (see section 2.10), data and
information management, and reporting. The organisation believe
that by ensuring that the right structures, partnerships and leaders
are supported, they and their humanitarian partners can better
coordinate humanitarian situations. Moreover, OCHA also aims to
promote efficient interaction between civilian and military actors in
humanitarian operations. Given that the overall emphasis of this
research was based around an investigation of the use of 
collaborative techniques within the humanitarian relief supply
chain, inclusion of OCHA was considered to be essential. 
The UK Ministry of Defence Joint Forces Command: Weiss
and Campbell (1991) note that it seems that when disasters occur, 
governments often turn to the military for help as the military have
certain resources immediately to hand as well as the transport and
human assets with which to distribute them. Following a
humanitarian disaster the UK government may be requested to
mount or lend support to the relief effort in the country or region
affected (see discussion on the role of a humanitarian military, 
Fischer, 2011). The UK contribution will usually be led by the
Department for International Development (DFID) who may call on
military assistance if civilian resources are insufficient, or if this
approach provides a comparative advantage. The Joint Forces
Logistic Component (JFLogC) within the Ministry of Defence’s
Joint Forces Command is the organisation tasked with the
planning and coordination of all military Humanitarian Assistance
and Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 2008). The researcher’s
personal origins of interest, and previous military background have
already been highlighted (section 1.2); moreover, access to
participants within JFLogC could be facilitated through previous
military colleagues and contacts. Hence having identified, the key
role that the military has to play within the humanitarian relief 
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supply chain and the responsibilities placed on the JFLogC in
particular, the organisation was identified as a key contributor
towards achievement of the overall research aims. 
Oxfam International: is a confederation of 17 organisations
networked together in more than 90 countries (Oxfam
International, 2011). One of the 14 members of the Disasters
Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) Oxfam International is
registered as a Foundation in The Hague and as a foreign
company limited by guarantee in the UK (Oxfam International, 
2011). The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012)
records total expenditure as €911 million (£730 million as at 
November 2012), with €660 million (£530 million) being spent on
regional programmes. Figures such as these show the
organisation listed in the top 10 humanitarian NGO’s and agencies
(see Table 1 in Tatham and Petit, 2010, p.611) together with some
of the other positive respondents contacted during Stage I of the
research (see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), and listed at Appendix
B, namely the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies (IFRC), CARE International and UNICEF. 
Moreover, a close comparison of the mission statements, overall
aims and structure of similar sized NGOs operating within the field, 
confirms that Oxfam International can be considered to be one that 
represents a typical large organisation. Hence, Oxfam
International was selected as a domain that could represent the
views of the NGOs listed in the top ten of those operating within
the humanitarian relief supply chain, and as a domain that could
offer a significant contribution to the overall outcomes and final
contribution.  
Tearfund: Tearfund is a Christian international aid agency working
globally to end poverty and injustice (DEC, 2012). One of the 14
members of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) the
organisation is a signatory to the Red Cross Code of Conduct 
(IFRC, 2012) and a member of the Humanitarian Accountability
Partnership (HAP, 2012). Tearfund follows a biblical path in
believing that helping communities in need is central to the
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purpose of local churches, wherever they may be (Tearfund, 
2011). The 2011/12 Director’s Report and Accounts (Tearfund
2012) records total Tearfund income as £70 million and
expenditure on charitable activities as £59 million. In keeping with
similar size religious NGOs, Tearfund is committed to ensuring that 
as much as possible of the money donated is turned into aid on
the ground. Hence, for the purposes of this research it was
considered to be representative of those smaller organisations
who responded positively during Stage I of the research process
(see Fig 3.4 and section 3.11.1), namely Comic Relief and
Concern Worldwide. Moreover, whilst it does not have a lead role
in the collaborative effort within the humanitarian SC, Tearfund is
considered to be a representative of those smaller organisations
who are a key element of the overall SC and are therefore, in a
position to offer key contributions and comment in support of the
overall research approach. Moreover, a close comparison of the
mission statements, overall aims and structure of similar sized
NGOs operating within the field, confirms that Tearfund can be
considered to be one that is typical of those smaller organisations. 
Hence, Tearfund was selected as an organisation that could
represent the views of the smaller sized NGOs operating within the
humanitarian relief supply chain, and as a domain that could add
to the overall findings and associated final contribution.  
By way of final summary the organisations to be considered as cases
within this study are also shown in Table 3.2.  
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Organisation Mission Statement Justification
United Nations
Office for the
Coordination of 
Humanitarian
Affairs  
(UN OCHA)
“Mobilize and coordinate
effective and principled
humanitarian action in
partnership with national
and international actors in
order to alleviate human
suffering in disasters and
emergencies”  
(OCHA, 2012)
OCHA is the part of the United Nations
Secretariat responsible for bringing
together humanitarian actors to ensure a
coherent response to emergencies. 
OCHA also ensures there is a framework
within which each actor can contribute to
the overall response effort. 
UK MOD –Joint 
Force Logistics
Command  
“A Disaster Relief operation
is a primary Military Task
and contribution to a
disaster relief response. It 
provides specific assistance
to an afflicted overseas
population”
(JDP 3-52, 2008)
Following a humanitarian disaster
overseas, the UK may be requested to
mount or lend support to a relief effort in
the country or region affected. The UK
military contribution will be coordinated by
the Joint Force Logistics Command within
the UK MOD.  
Oxfam
International
“We believe we can end
poverty and injustice, as
part of a global movement 
for change”
(Oxfam, 2011)
Considered to be representative of the 10
largest NGOs within the sector. An
international confederation of 17
organizations networked together in 92
countries, as part of a global movement 
for change, to build a future free from the
injustice of poverty.  
Tearfund
“Our vision is to see 50
million people released
from spiritual and material
poverty through a
worldwide network of 
100,000 local churches”
(Tearfund, 2011)
Considered to be representative of a
relatively small NGO within the sector
formed and based around core Christian
values. Tearfund takes a comprehensive
and integrated approach to disasters and
disaster vulnerability, undertaking disaster
risk reduction, disaster response and
advocacy work. 
Table 3.2: Organisations Selected as Cases within this Study
Whilst discussing her approach to case study research, and the linkage
of it to the grounded theory approach, Simons (2009) draws on the work
of Charmaz (2006) and explains that whilst engaged in case study she: 
“Always works from an intention to reflect and accurately represent 
participants’ meanings in the policy and practice contexts in which
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they work, that is for these to be grounded in participants’
perspectives” (p.125)
Simons goes on to clarify that throughout the research process she is
concerned with theorising and using a range of different processes
before arriving at an interpretative theory associated with her selected
case or cases. Given the similarity of the approach and research design
explained and adopted here, and the support for the linkage between
grounded theory and case study the final research strategy will be a
multiple-domain grounded one. 
3.8 Qualitative or Quantitative Method?
Most texts seem to find it useful to distinguish between qualitative and
quantitative research although it is argued that the distinction can be an
ambiguous one as it is regarded by some as a fundamental contrast but 
by others as no longer useful or even “false” (Layder, 1993 cited by
Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28). Use of the distinction does however still
seem to be a useful one, as it represents a means of classifying the
different methods that are available to the researcher and provides a
helpful vehicle when considering the options open for data collection and
analysis. Although, on the face of it the clear distinction between
quantitative and qualitative research would seem to be the presence or
lack of measurable, quantifiable data, some writers suggest that the
differences run far deeper (Barbour, 2009; Cameron and Price, 2009; 
Flick, 2009; Saunders et al, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 2007). In short, 
choice of approach will differ in relation to the researcher’s philosophical
preference in respect of the epistemological and ontological foundations
associated with the overall research strategy adopted (see Table 3.3).  
Final Research Strategy
Multiple-Domain and
Grounded  
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Quantitative Qualitative
Principal orientation to the role
of theory in relation to research Deductive Inductive
Epistemological orientation Positivism Interpretivism
Ontological orientation Objectivism Constructionism
Table 3.3: Fundamental Differences between Qualitative and Quantitative
Research Strategies (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.28)
Moreover, once chosen the associated mechanisms and processes to
be utilised by the researcher will differ markedly (see Table 3.4). These
will be discussed in greater depth later, particularly in respect of the
criticisms that are proffered as a result. 
Quantitative Qualitative
Numbers Words
Point of view of researcher Points of view of participants
Researcher distant Researcher close
Theory Testing Theory emergent 
Static Process
Structured Unstructured
Generalization Contextual understanding
Hard, reliable data Rich, deep data
Macro Micro
Behaviour Meaning
Artificial settings Natural Settings
Table 3.4: Some Common Contrasts between Quantitative and Qualitative
Research (Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.426)
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3.8.1 Quantitative Research
Quantitative research can be constructed as a strategy that emphasises
quantification through the collection of data that entails a deductive
approach with the accent on testing theories. Data gathering will
incorporate the practices associated with the natural scientific model and
of positivism in particular, embodying a view of social reality as an
external, objective reality (Cameron and Price, 2009; Bryman and Bell, 
2007). Data collection and analysis are much less labour intensive than
that for qualitative work and conclusions can be drawn across a much
wider sample set. This is important to a positivist as generalisability will
normally be of concern and justification that findings can be taken
beyond the confines of the particular context in which the research was
originally conducted; hence findings may also encompass statistical
analysis and estimations of probability across a representative sample. 
Moreover, results seem to be more scientific feel and are, therefore more
appealing to most managers (Cameron and Price, 2007, p.213). 
Several criticisms have been offered against the quantitative approach
and the associated epistemological and ontological foundations on
which it is based. As one would expect, these have been voiced most 
loudly from exponents and supporters of the qualitative method. Social
scientists employing a deductive, positivist, quantitative approach are
effectively turning a blind eye to the inherent differences between the
social and natural worlds and to the key factors which distinguish people
and social institutions from the world of nature.  
“The thought objects constructed by the social scientist ……. have
to be founded upon the thought objects constructed by the
common-sense thinking of men living their daily life within the
social world” (Schultz, 1962, cited by Bryman and Bell, 2007, p.19). 
Other commentators (Silverman, 2011b; Brabour, 2009) offer the view
that the measurement processes utilised by quantitative researchers
present an artificial and spurious sense of precision and accuracy. For
example are respondents to questionnaires all interpreting questions
similarly and can true validity of responses be justified as a result?
Finally, the reliance on instruments and procedure to gather and analyse
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data leaves the researcher and associated outcomes isolated from
reality. Overall outcomes are left detached from reality with findings
representing a ‘snap shot in time’ rather than the on-going and
developing reality of the social world (Mordue, 2011).  
3.8.2 Qualitative Research
Against a background of historical academic scepticism qualitative
research has over the past 15 years or so established itself as an
acceptable approach within a broad range of disciplines (Silverman, 
2011b; Barbour, 2009; Flick, 2009). It is usually constructed as a
research strategy that emphasises words rather than quantification in
the collection and analysis of data. This approach will most likely appeal
to a pragmatist or a constructionist, interested in how meaning is
constructed. Data will be richer and less shaped by the researcher’s own
preconceptions than that associated with the quantitative approach. It 
can generate deeper insights and understanding and form the basis for
theoretical development where none exists. Data gathered will
predominantly support an inductive approach surrounding the rejection
of the natural scientific model in favour of the generation of theory and a
review of the way in which individuals interpret their social world; social
reality will be viewed as a constantly shifting emergent property of the
individual’s creation (Cameron and Price, 2009; Flick, 2009; Bryman and
Bell, 2007).  
However, data collection can be time-consuming and data analysis may
require sophisticated and even more time-consuming analysis if 
conclusions are to be robust rather than simply reflections on the
researcher’s own thinking (Silverman, 2011a, 2010; Miles and
Huberman, 1994). The associated time demands will normally mean that 
the data set will be gathered from a relatively small sample (when
compared to that for a quantitative approach) meaning that 
generalisability of findings will always be an issue. Indeed it is interesting
to note that the majority of academic publications based around the
outcomes of qualitative research strategy seem to dedicate significantly
more narrative in support of the research strategy than that afforded to
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research strategy within papers dedicated to their quantitative
counterparts, perhaps reflecting the scepticism and concerns discussed
here (Mordue, 2011). 
In keeping with the critical views afforded by the qualitative community
on their quantitative counterparts, the quantitative community have
some equally strong views on the pitfalls of a qualitative research
strategy. The approach is considered to be too subjective, relying too
much on the researcher’s unsystematic views on what is significant and
important and also on the close relationships that the researcher
invariably builds up with his subject audience. The basic premise of the
strategy means that replication of studies is another area of concern, in
that the unstructured nature of the research leaves it all but impossible
to reproduce the original conditions and circumstances of the findings. 
Moreover, as outcomes are bound to be dependent upon the individual
characteristics of the researcher (personality, background, age, 
gender….) replication is unachievable. Similarly, generalisation is of 
concern with the scope of the findings being severely restricted. In
essence, how can just one or two cases be presented as truly
representative of all cases? (Cresswell, 2013; Saunders et al, 2009; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007). 
3.8.3 An Appropriate Method?  
The focus of this research was to gain an in-depth insight into the
humanitarian relief supply chain and with it a thorough understanding of 
existing practices as perceived by the study participants. This type of 
research lends itself to exploratory qualitative techniques, including case
studies and in-depth interviews, which have been shown to be an
effective means of gathering a large amount of data rich information
about a particular subject area while being closely involved with the
subject participants (Silverman, 2011a; 2011b; 2010; Brabour, 2009; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Outlining potential areas of research within
the field Kovács and Spens (2011) suggest that humanitarian logistics
requires good and applicable research with empirical data being
gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative methods. 
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A poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board members carried out to
establish the scope of the first publication of the Journal of Humanitarian
Logistics and Supply Chain Management (Kovács and Spens, 2011)
resulted in specific criticism of the seeming reliance on the use of 
quantitative research methods within the field. Sandwell (2011)
performed a study into the operational issues encountered in
humanitarian logistics which considered the wider issues affecting
humanitarian organisations, whilst McLauchlin and Larson (2011)
sought to advance thought and practice on supply chain relationship
building by considering lessons to be learned from leading humanitarian
logistics practitioners. Such studies are examples of those within the field
of humanitarian logistics that have implemented the use of qualitative
methodological techniques including exploratory in-depth interviews, 
case studies and focus groups to fulfil their objectives. However, Kunz
and Reiner (2012) discuss the paucity of such research, offering the view
that “empirical methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies
should be used more in order to increase knowledge in the field” (p.133)
as they note that most research methodologies currently utilised within
humanitarian logistics rely solely on the use of quantitative simulation
and modelling.  
Whilst there is clearly a balance to be struck between the use of 
qualitative and quantitative method, given the foregoing discussion a
qualitative method (Saunders et al, 2009) was determined to be the most 
appropriate within this study, with the inflexible nature of the positivist 
quantitative methods regarded as unsuitable for addressing the research
problem in this instance. As will be discussed later (see section 3.11) the
strategy associated within this research was effectively broken down
onto 3 distinct stages based on the application of differing qualitative
methods. 
Final Research Method
Qualitative  
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3.9 Time Horizons – a Cross-sectional Study
The researcher must decide whether the final findings are to offer a
snapshot taken at a particular point in time or results that are more in
keeping with a diary over a given period. Saunders et al (2009, p.155)
contrast Cross-sectional studies with Longitudinal studies; the former
being typical of research projects undertaken for academic courses
which are necessarily time constrained and describe an incidence or
phenomenon at a given point in time, the latter offering the capacity to
study change and development. As discussed earlier this study utilised
a retrospective review (a snapshot) of the humanitarian relief supply
chain at a given point in time; moreover, whilst recommendations would
be made for future improvements there was no realistic opportunity to
change process or actual events during the study; hence, this study
clearly fulfilled the criteria associated with a Cross-sectional study. 
3.10 The Final Methodology
Table 3.5 is now included, by way of a summary of the discussion thus
far and as a means to clarify and justify the final methodological
approach: 
  
Time Horizon
Cross-Sectional 
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Final 
Approach Reasoning
Philosophical
Positioning
Interpretivism
An approach that would reveal participants’
understandings of behaviours that held reality for them.
To reveal humanitarian actor’s interpretations and
understanding of their reality coupled with an ontology
that would link participant experiences with dissimilar
levels of reality. 
Approach Inductive
To develop an understanding and explanation of the
nature of relationship forming, analysing data as defined
by the subject matter. 
Methodological
Choice
Grounded
(‘Theory
Building’)
Not classic but the Glaserian (1992) approach which
explicitly allows for considerable freedom in speculating
beyond the raw data to draw generalisations, rather than
to depend on strict adherence to procedural rules and
the constraints of conditional process. The potential to
produce interesting contributions to both theory and
practice and perhaps have relevance beyond the limited
context of the research. 
Multiple-
Domain Study
As this thesis is concerned with identifying reasons why
participant actors within the Humanitarian Relief Supply
Chain are struggling to collaborate, the associated field
work was well suited to the use of multiple-case studies
based on different actors within the Chain itself. The
focus and context of the study meant that the term
domain was substituted for the term case.  
Strategy
Qualitative
This study considers the opinions and approaches
utilised by a number of different organisational actors
within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain. A
qualitative approach would address the need for good
and applicable research within the field with data being
gathered on the emic issues through the use of 
appropriate qualitative methodologies (Kovács and
Spens 2011). 
Time Horizon Cross-sectional
A retrospective review (snapshot in time) of the
humanitarian supply chain fulfilling the cross-sectional
criteria. 
Table 3.5: A Summary of the Final Methodological Approach
In keeping with the strategy discussed in section 3.3.1, it is only right that 
the research onion model (Saunders et al, 2009) is also returned to at 
this stage. 
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Fig 3.3: The Research Onion ‘Peeled’ (adapted Saunders et al, 2009, p.108)
Note: Dotted line around grounded theory to indicate a ‘theory building’ rather than
a classic grounded approach. 
3.11 Etic and Emic Knowledge and Data
The terms etic and emic were first suggested by linguist Kenneth Pike in
1990 (Headland et al, 1990). Referring to the insider versus outsider, 
subjective versus objective view of the world, they offer a method of 
signposting for anthropologists and other researchers working within
social and behavioural sciences to refer to 2 kinds of data concerning
human behaviour (Kottack, 2012). According to Pike (1967 cited by Xia, 
2011), the use of these terms “proves convenient…to describe
behaviour from two different standpoints, which lead to results which
shade into one another (p.77). The proposition offered by Headland et 
al (1990) is that researchers use the term etic to refer to objective or
outsider accounts and emic to refer to subjective or insider accounts. 
They offer the following by way of definition: 
Etic Knowledge: refers to generalisations about human behaviour and
describes observations of behaviour from the perspective of the
outsider. The etic approach acknowledges that members of a culture
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may be too involved in day to day activity to offer an impartial view. 
Hence, when using the etic approach the researcher develops what he
or she considers to be important (Kottack, 2012) and issues and themes
are identified by the researcher in advance of field work through
consideration of secondary sources. Etic data represent the
researcher’s interpretation as an outsider (Xia, 2011, p.80). 
Emic Knowledge: and interpretations are those existing within a
culture that are determined by local custom, meaning and belief and are
described by a native of the culture associated with the research. The
emic approach investigates how people think and how they perceive
and categorise their world (Kottack, 2012), hence, emic issues and
themes will be identified and developed by the researcher engaged in
field work. In their simplest form, emic data come primarily from
interviews among subjects. It is the subject who describes to the
researcher his/her own behaviours and thoughts of the phenomena
under investigation (Xia, 2011, p.80).  
The etic and emic approaches are at times regarded as in conflict with
one another, and the suggestion is that one should be preferred to the
exclusion of the other. However, Xia (2013) argues in favour of the
complimentary nature of the two approaches, particularly for researchers
involved in identifying the form and function of human social systems. 
Given this discussion and the context of the research question, the
associated research design and the data gathering methods adopted, 
the terms etic and emic were considered as appropriate signposts
(Headland et al, 1990) to describe and label the key issues and themes
as they were developed.  
3.12 The Overall Research Design - Data Collection and Analysis
Having established an overall methodology for the study the next stage
must be to address the issue of data collection and analysis and
ultimately the final research design. A number of methods exist which
will facilitate the collection of the rich data required in order to fulfil the
requirements of this study and they will be discussed in greater detail
now. By way of illustration the final research design for this study is
outlined in Figure 3.4. 
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Research Aims and Objectives
Stage I 
(section
3.11.1)
Initial contact 
with NGOs
through
questionnaire to
identify willing
participants and
key etic issues
Stage II
(section
3.11.2)
Confirm etic
issues and
develop emic
issues through
 Develop semi-structured interview guide based on
key etic issues
 Pilot with one NGO
 Approach other selected NGOs and MOD/ UN OCHA
 Coding and analysis of responses (qualitative data –
confirm key etic issues/themes and emergent emic
issues/themes)
 Check findings/understanding with participants
Three Stage Research Design
 Develop an introductory questionnaire based on etic
issues  
 Pilot with one NGO
 Send out to other NGOs
 Coding and analysis of responses (identify key etic
issues/themes)
Research Idea
Fig 3.4: The Final Research Design
/ŶĨŽƌŵĞĚďǇ
ƉƌŝŽƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
 Develop focus group topic guide based on key emic
issues
 Pilot with one NGO
 Approach other selected NGOs and MOD/ UN OCHA
 Coding and analysis of responses (qualitative data –
confirm key emic issues/themes)
 Check findings/understanding with participants
>ŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ
ZĞǀŝĞǁůĞĂĚƐ
ƚŽŝŶŝƚŝĂůĞƚŝĐ
/ƐƐƵĞƐͬdŚĞŵĞ
Final Contribution to Knowledge
ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ
sĂůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶͲ
&ĞĞĚďĂĐŬ
Cross-Domain Analysis
ZĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ
sĂůŝĚĂƚŝŽŶͲ
&ĞĞĚďĂĐŬ
Stage III
(section
3.11.3)
Confirm emic
issues and
investigate
through focus
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By way of summary, the final design was split into 3 distinct stages; the
aim of the first stage was to establish contact with prospective
participants whilst also confirming the relevance of the etic issues
developed during the literary review process. A covering letter/e mail
(Appendix C) and self-completion questionnaire (Appendix D) was sent 
out to prospective NGO participants. The aim of this was 2 fold; firstly
the questionnaire and accompanying letter would serve as a means of 
introduction to prospective participants and secondly, the completed
questionnaires would provide some initial primary data on the
respondent NGOs and allow the researcher to select appropriate
participants for Stages II and III of the study. Stages II and III were
designed to gather the rich data that would be needed to address the
overall aims and research question of the study, hence, all 3 stages lent 
themselves to a qualitative approach using multiple methods of data
collection. Once analysis was complete the related findings and
interpretations were confirmed with participants through a checking and
feedback process (as illustrated in Fig 3.4). 
This overall research process also addressed the thoughts offered by
Kovács and Spens (2011), discussed in Chapter 2 (see section 2.11)
who highlight the need for good and applicable research within the
humanitarian logistics field with data being gathered through the use of 
appropriate qualitative method. Indeed Kovács and Spens (2011) go on
to discuss the specific criticism levelled at research within this particular
field whereby there is a seeming reliance on the use of quantitative
methodology. The use of case studies and in particular the merits
afforded by a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009) has been discussed
earlier (see section 3.7.3) but given the perspectives sought here, a
multi-site cross comparison also served to increase confidence in the
overall findings whilst addressing the concerns levelled at the qualitative
researcher’s door regarding reliability of data and generalisability of 
findings. For completeness, each stage of the final research design will
now be discussed in greater detail. 
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3.12.1 Stage I – Identification of Participants and Confirmation of
Key Etic Issues
Stage I of the research process was designed to identify prospective
participants and also to confirm the relevance and currency within the
humanitarian relief community of those etic issues identified during the
literary review (see Appendix E). Analysis of the data gathered would
also aid with the production of the interview schedule to be used during
the semi-structured interviews within Stage II of the process (see
Appendix F). A survey strategy is a common and popular approach
within business and management research and is best used for
exploratory and descriptive research (Saunders et al, 2009). Moreover, 
data can be collected which can be used to suggest possible reasons
for particular relationships between participants. Brown (1998) believes
that the information gathered through questionnaires can be used to
make meaningful comparisons between departments within an
organisation or between organisations themselves. Keohane (1971)
supports this view as she argues that the data offered by questionnaires
emerges more clearly than that for interviews and that the resulting
recommendations can be made with greater confidence. There are a
number of advantages and disadvantages associated with the use of 
questionnaires as a means of gathering data are encapsulated by
Oppenheim (1996), see Table 3.6
Advantages Disadvantages
Low cost data collection Low response rates
Low cost processing Cannot correct misunderstandings/ 
probe or explain. 
No Interviewer – respondents more
willing to answer awkward/ 
embarrassing questions
No control
Quickly reach widely dispersed
respondents
No observation of respondents
Table 3.6: An Adaptation of Oppenheim’s (1996) Advantages and Disadvantages
of Questionnaires
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3.12.1.1 An Initial Questionnaire
Given this discussion an initial questionnaire was produced (see
Appendix D). This was sent out to a total of 16 NGOs which were
selected as being typical (Stake, 1995) of those operating within the
Humanitarian SC as well as to the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the MOD Joint Forces
Command (JFLogC) (see Appendix B); also included was a letter/e mail
of introduction (see Appendix C). Prior to this the questionnaire was
piloted with one NGO in order to establish clarity of the questions asked
and also the time taken to complete the questionnaire. The questions
used were based around the etic issues that had been highlighted during
the literary review (see Appendix E). To increase response speed, 
questions were made deliberately straight forward with closed or multiple
choice answers being sought. Moreover, noting the warnings offered
against the use of sensitive questions (Collins and Hussey, 2003), in that 
they may result in questionnaires being discarded or ignored these were
also avoided. The final responses assisted with the selection process of 
appropriate organisations for Stages II and III of the study and also with
the development of the interview schedule to be used within Stage II 
(see Appendix F). Responses were received from OCHA, the JFLogC
and 9 NGOs (see Appendix B); moreover 7 of the NGO respondents also
offered to participate in the study, representing 43% of the non-
governmental organisations contacted. Of these respondents the
OCHA, JFLogC and 2 NGOs were finally selected as participants in the
research and justification of these final selection is included in Section
3.7.6 and Table 3.2. 
3.12.2 Stage II – Discussion of Etic Issues and Development of
Emic Issues
Having established links to, and selected the participant organisations
which would be considered as the domains throughout the study, Stage
II was designed to gather rich qualitative data on the associated etic
issues; furthermore, the emic issues which would be used to formulate
the final contribution to knowledge would also be identified. 
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Interview data is often considered to be the major source of information
obtainable for qualitative research and the use of in-depth interviews is
often the foremost form of data collection within a case-based study (Yin
2009). Barbour (2009) describes interviews as “the gold standard of 
qualitative research which involve a somewhat rarified, in-depth
exchange between researcher and researched” (p.133). Simons (2009)
describes this technique as a means of getting inside someone’s head
and discovering their perspective and finding out feelings, memories and
interpretations that would otherwise be left undiscovered using any other
means; in essence Simons believes that interviews allow insight into a
participant’s memories and as such provide explanations of how things
have come to be. In the business research interview the aim is for the
interviewer to elicit all manner of information such as interviewee
behaviour, attitudes, norms, beliefs and values (Saunders et al, 2009; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007); moreover an interview can help the researcher
to gather valid and reliable data that is relevant to the established
question and aims. Indeed, where research questions and aims have yet 
to be established an interview or interviews may help the researcher to
establish these. Interviews can give you a degree of flexibility and
adaptability that it is difficult to replicate using other methods (Cameron
and Price, 2009). An experienced interviewer can re-word questions, 
drawing out discussions to make the whole process more akin to having
a conversation. This conversational ambience makes the subject more
willing to disclose things that they may be reluctant to put in writing on a
questionnaire. Meaning can also be explored as the researcher can ask
the respondent to elaborate, expand upon or clarify a point. 
Interviews may be highly formalised and structured, using standardised
questions for each interviewee or may be informal and unstructured
conversations, or indeed they may fall somewhere in between these two
extremes. Various typologies are used to illustrate this level of formality
(see for example Healey, 1991 and Robson, 2002 both cited by
Saunders et al 2009). Fig 3.5 offers a summary of the wide variety of 
interview formats that are available. 
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Fig 3.5: Summary of Interview Forms (Saunders et al, 2009, p.321)
Standardised interviews (often referred to as interviewer-administered
questionnaires) are based on a predetermined set of questions which
are read out with the response being recorded and coded against a
standard schedule. They are invariably used to collect quantifiable data
as part of a survey and whilst there is some social interaction between
researcher and participant they do not offer the flexibility and adaptability
afforded by their non-standardised counterparts. Non-standardised
interviews, on the other hand are used to facilitate the gathering of data
which will afford itself to qualitative analysis, thereby helping the
researcher to reveal and understand not only what and how but also to
explore the why (Saunders et al, 2009, Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
One particular advantage of selecting interviews as a means of data
collection is that they provide an opportunity for the researcher to receive
feedback when face-to-face with the respondent, which would otherwise
be unobtainable (Cameron and Price, 2009). This was particularly
relevant within the context of this research, as the researcher felt it was
important to be able to gauge the interviewee’s body language and
expressive non-verbal responses (see section 3.11.5 on Observation). 
Interviews
Standardised
One to One
Face to Face Telephone Electronic
One to Many
ElectronicGroup
Focus
Groups
Focus
Groups
Non-Standardised
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The scope of in-depth interviews can vary greatly from being highly
structured to completely unstructured, depending on the design and
requirements of a particular study (Saunders et al, 2009). Unstructured
interviews do not normally require a pre-determined interview schedule
and allow for completely open dialogue and discussion between the
researcher and the participant. However, if a completely unstructured
approach is adopted then concerns can be raised as to whether all of 
the relevant information pertinent to the research question will be
gathered. By contrast, a highly structured approach is one that will follow
a strict interview schedule solely relying on a set of pre-prepared
interview questions. In this study both of these extremes were deemed
to be unsuitable as it was felt that adopting a highly structured approach
would not allow any opportunity for discussion to take place, or for the
development of any answers or obvious discussion points; however, 
some structure was still required if the interviews were to lead to relevant 
rich data. In essence, the exploratory nature of this research required a
method that facilitated open discussion, whilst ensuring that relevant and
in-depth data was collected; hence, a semi-structured interview
approach which effectively fell somewhere between the two extremes
discussed here, was adopted. 
Within the framework of a semi-structured interview, whilst questions will
not be asked in an inflexible manner or even in a pre-determined order
the researcher will set out to ask the interviewee about a set of 
predetermined topics or subject areas. In order to achieve this, and to
ensure that all of the themes and separate issues under investigation
are addressed in sufficient depth, the researcher will often use an
interview guide or schedule (Bryman and Bell 2007). Whilst the
exploratory nature of the technique is intended to gain a greater depth
and broader range of knowledge, allowing for adaptations and deviations
to be made, the interview schedule will serve to keep the researcher
within the parameters of the overall research question. Within the realms
of the in-depth interview, the researcher has an opportunity to use their
initiative and follow up on an interviewee’s response to develop areas of 
interest that may not have been previously anticipated (Cameron and
Price, 2009). This provides an opportunity for other, relevant topics to be
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discussed that may arise during the course of the interview and which
appear to be promising for providing rich data or additional insights
(Saunders et al, 2009); in effect the process allows for the identification
of the emic issues which may formulate the final contribution to
knowledge. Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005), argue that one of the main
advantages of in-depth interviews is that the researcher gains a more
accurate and clear picture of a participant’s position and attitude and
behaviour. This is possible because of the open ended question
structure often in place that allows the interviewee to answer freely
according to their own thinking and their answers are not constrained by
only a few alternatives. 
3.12.2.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
One of the greatest disadvantages of in-depth interviewing is that it 
requires a certain level of skill by the researcher (Saunders et al, 2009; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007; Ghauri and Gronhaug, 2005). However, in this
case the researcher was an experienced and trained interviewer who
had carried out upwards of 1000 semi-structured interviews with
applicants for places as Royal Air Force officers and aircrew. Given this, 
the original research question, associated aims, and the call for a more
qualitative approach to data gathering within the field (Kovács and
Spens, 2011) the non-standardised approach was seen as the ideal
vehicle to gather the rich, in-depth data that would be needed to address
the final aims and research question. Accordingly a semi-structured
interview schedule was produced for this stage (Appendix F). This
strategy also ensured the consistent, yet isolated approach necessary
within each individual participant and organisational domain given the
adoption of a multiple-case approach (Yin, 2009 and Fig 3.2). 
3.12.3 Stage III – Clarification of Emic Issues and the Final 
Contribution
Having established the emic issues associated with the research
question through analysis of the data gathered during Stage II of the
process, the overall aim of Stage III was to clarify these issues with a
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view to formulating the final contribution to knowledge. Given the
approach in Stage II, due consideration had to be given to the thoughts
of Silverman (2011b) on how one-to-one interview data is being used in
research, and on the increasing tendency for qualitative research to rely
exclusively on interview data alone. This is a view supported by Atkinson
and Silverman (1997) who suggest that one-to-one interviews are more
often than not being held up as a means of reflecting the character of the
wider society, laying bare people’s feelings in order to elicit the inside
story. In short any assumption that interviews are the default method to
establish qualitative data must be challenged. Hence, the decision was
taken that another research method was required to address these
comments and to increase overall credibility of findings and contribution. 
Moreover, the researcher was also attracted by the clear opportunity to
practice and hone an additional method. The use of focus groups proved
to be an attractive means of addressing some of these comments and
to also assist still further in expanding the ideas raised within the one-to-
one process utilised during Stage II, thereby justifying and underpinning
the final contribution to knowledge. 
Focus groups have become a popular method for researchers examining
the ways in which people interact with one another, allowing for collective
exploration of themes and issues (Liamputtong, 2011; Cameron and
Price, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007). The
approach assists the researcher to develop an understanding of why
people react in the way that they do. The researcher acts as a facilitator, 
prompting the group to discuss and explore the area of research interest 
in a bid to discover what is important to the group whilst exposing
differences in opinion and perspective, areas of tension and conflict as
well as areas of agreement and consensus. Focus groups also give the
researcher an opportunity to observe participant behaviour and
dynamics allowing the researcher to perceive the political and social
interactions that take place (Laimputtong, 2011; Krueger and Casey, 
2008). As discussed earlier this research utilised multiple domain studies
to ascertain differing humanitarian actors’ views on collaboration within
associated relief supply chains. Hence, the use of focus groups was
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considered to be a key, final factor in gathering appropriate qualitative
data.  
3.12.3.1 Participant Focus Groups and Additional Stimuli 
Given this discussion, the decision was taken to utilise a series of focus
groups during the third stage of the research, with participants being
those respondents who had already been interviewed during Stage II of 
the process. One focus group was carried out within each of the four
participant organisations, with the researcher facilitating the process and
recording key themes on a white board as participants discussed the key
emic themes. In order to ensure consistency across all focus groups
cross-domain analysis of the emic issues identified during Stage II led to
the production of a single topic guide (Barbour, 2009) (see Appendix G). 
Whilst focus groups were identified and utilised in gathering appropriate
qualitative data, consideration also had to be given to ensure that group
focus was maintained on what was effectively a retrospective review of 
participant experiences. Hence, drawing upon the work of Ericsson and
Simon (see Hayes, 1986) within the field of psychological protocol
analysis and verbal reporting (the idea that subjects should be
encouraged to think aloud using triggers to stimulate recall and
discussion), and further discussion by Barbour (2009) on the use of 
stimulus materials to enrich the qualitative data gathered within focus
groups, participants were also encouraged to recount experiences
utilising their own materials such as maps, photographs and video clips. 
Thus, with the researcher acting as the facilitator, the basis of the focus
groups was initially set around the topic guide; however the individual
stimuli quickly served to expand discussion and to help group members
to develop the issues at hand and to put them into context. Moreover, 
the stimuli used also provided another strand of invaluable data for desk
top study and analysis, and an additional lens to add depth and density
(richness) to the overall data set gathered as suggested by Denzin and
Lincoln (2005). 
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3.12.4 Observation
Whilst the main purpose of the interview is to gather in-depth information
relating to the subject area, it is recommended (Flick, 2009; Yin, 2009, 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994), that the
researcher seeks to utilise additional techniques in conjunction with this
strategy to establish further data rich information in order to address
issues surrounding corroboration and generalisability (see section
3.11.7 on triangulation). One such method is observation (Barbour, 
2009). Observation essentially involves “the systematic observation, 
recording, description, analysis and interpretation of people’s behaviour”
(Saunders et al, 2009 p.288). Barbour (2009) describes observational
fieldwork as “a method that was initially very popular with anthropologists
engaged in the study of other cultures” (p.17); she also acknowledges
that it is now a popular method within sociology which has allowed
researchers to study how work or social practices are enacted on a daily
basis. Observation affords the researcher the opportunity to effectively
act as a fly on the wall, the minimal involvement on the part of the
researcher being used to uncover inconsistencies between how people
perceive and present their involvement, to how they actually act in
practice. Saunders et al, (2009) differentiate between participant 
observation and structured observation offering the view that whilst the
former enables the researcher to gather data on the meanings that 
people attach to their actions, the latter is a technique that is more
concerned with the frequency of those actions. Participant observation
will enable the researcher to discover the delicate nuances of meaning
and as Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994, p.39) put it: 
“In the social sciences we cannot hope to adequately explain the
behaviour of social actors unless we at least try to understand their
meaning” (p.39). 
Given the research question and aims under investigation here, 
observation was identified as a useful method to gain appropriate data
on the interaction between actors along the humanitarian relief supply
chain. However, amongst others Delbridge and Kirkpatrick (1994) note
that classic participant observation involves the researcher “immersing
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himself in the research setting, with the objective of sharing peoples’
lives while attempting to learn their symbolic world” (p.37) (see for
example the study by Boje (1991) on story performance in an office
supply firm). Given the subject matter within this thesis, a classic
participant approach was deemed impractical as, clearly the researcher
would not be able to follow humanitarian relief specialists into an active
disaster area or relief zone. However, conscious of a desire to avoid the
temptation to just focus on narrative and in particular what was said, the
decision was taken to utilise observation in order to highlight many other
issues surrounding the research. Hence, turning to the thoughts of 
Cameron and Price (2009) who suggest that non-participant observation
is an approach where “the researcher is concentrating simply on the act 
of observing” (p.255) a mix of the two approaches was identified as a
suitable compromise which would allow observation to form a constituent 
part of the data gathering strategy. As a former military officer the
researcher had previous experience of employment within such areas
and effectively understood the associated working practices and
language, arguably associated with a participant observer. Moreover, in
his previous role as an RAF interviewing and selection officer (see
section 3.11.2), the researcher had extensive experience and training
within the field of interviewee observation and in identifying the
messages associated with participant behaviour during interview, 
arguably acting as a non-participant observer. 
3.12.4.1 Observation within Interviews and Focus Groups
Consequently, whilst the verbal content of interviews and focus groups
gathered during Stages II and III was digitally recorded and transcribed
into narrative representation, field notes were also maintained which
produced a description of what was seen; this included issues such as
how things were said, focus group interaction, what issues were avoided
and which areas drew the more emotional responses and reactions. 
Whilst some field notes were made during the interviews and focus
groups it proved invaluable to also take time out immediately after the
sessions to revisit and embellish the field notes whilst observations were
still relatively fresh in the mind. 
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3.12.5 Respondent Validation – Feedback
Silverman (2011a) discusses the merits of taking research findings back
to those who have been studied in a bid to validate research findings. 
This argument builds on the ideas proffered by Reason and Rowan
(1981) and Bloor (1978 cited by Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007) who
offer the idea that good researchers will go back to participants with
tentative results in order to refine them in the light of subjects’ reactions. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (2007) also suggest that a crucial test for any
final results is whether the actors whose beliefs and behaviour have
been analysed and described, actually recognise the final findings. 
Moreover, they highlight that further detail and evidence may be
forthcoming from participants as they are invited to review initial findings
and that this new data may alter the plausibility and interpretation of 
existing data and with it the final overall contribution to knowledge. 
Consequently, the findings of the research were presented to the
participants at each stage of the research process for comment and
feedback on the final analysis, understanding and findings. (see Fig 3.4). 
3.12.6 Triangulation of Qualitative Data and Generalisability
The integration of a number of different methodological techniques has
been shown to strengthen qualitative research. This is known as
triangulation or methodological triangulation whereby the combination of 
research techniques can strengthen and add weight to the validity of the
research findings (Gill and Johnson, 2010; Cameron and Price, 2009; 
Bryman and Bell, 2007). The term triangulation has its roots in the
engineering profession where it was used to ensure increased accuracy
of results produced. By taking three measurements rather than two, 
engineers were more able to produce findings that would be considered
to be both accurate and valid (Hassard and Cox, 1995 cited by Cameron
and Price, 2009). Whilst this motive of accuracy may seem somewhat at 
odds with the ontology and epistemology that underpin the general
approaches and methodology associated with qualitative research, 
thinking back to the discussion earlier on the criticism and scepticism
surrounding the generalisability of associated findings (see section
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3.8.2), it would seem that a means of triangulating findings is key to the
success and ultimate credibility of a thesis of this type. Denzin and
Lincoln (2005) offer the view that in the context of qualitative research, 
triangulation should be looked upon as an “alternative to validation” (p.4)
in that it should allow the researcher, through the use of a number of 
different lenses to “add depth and density to the data”. Saunders et al
(2009) echo this sentiment referring to triangulation as “the use of 
different data collection techniques within one study to ensure that the
data are telling you what you think they are telling you” (p.146). Similarly, 
Cameron and Price, (2009) discuss the value of gathering data from a
range of different sources as they describe and discuss the merits of 
what they term “Data Triangulation” (p.257). 
This study used multiple sources of “data source triangulation” (Yin, 
2009, p.116) which are aimed at “corroborating the same facts or
phenomenon”. Convergence of Evidence was achieved as data was
gathered through the form of interviews and focus groups with diverse
organisations (actors within the humanitarian relief supply chain) and
with different types of interviewees (at all strategic and operational
levels). Moreover, additional data was gathered through observation and
analysis of protocol data (Hayes, 1986); hence, it can be argued that the
use of multiple settings and multiple method to gather data enhanced
the overall generalisability of the research. Finally, checks were also
made as to whether the findings were plausible and agreeable through
the use of participant feedback (Miles and Huberman 1994).  
3.13 Data Analysis
Once the process of data collection commences, the real challenge for
any researcher is the collation and control of that data. The process of 
data collection during the 3 stages described earlier and an appreciation
of the sheer volume of information generated, illustrates what is an
acknowledged problem within qualitative research, in that the research
is done chiefly with words and not numbers (as in quantitative research)
and that words, unlike numbers can have multiple meanings and by their
very nature are harder to manipulate (Silverman, 2011a; 2011b; 2010; 
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Barbour, 2009; Miles and Huberman, 1994) Hence, the need for a
structured strategy to collate and analyse the data gathered to cope with
what has been described as data pile up or data overload (Miles and
Huberman, 1994, p.56). 
3.13.1 Data Management and Research Ethics
In keeping with the final research design the following chain of evidence
was created:  
  
Fig 3.6: The Chain of Evidence
As a result of this process a substantial amount of qualitative data was
gathered, necessitating the need for the digital storage and achieving of 
research data. Whilst digital folders were created for each case study
and the associated individual interviews and focus groups, all data
gathered was destroyed following final approval and submission of the
thesis. Moreover, as the data collection, analysis and field work
associated with this study involved gaining access to a variety of 
organisations and their employees, research ethics and the
appropriateness of the researcher’s behaviour in relation to the rights of 
those who become the subject of their work or are affected by it (Bryman
and Bell, 2007, p183) had to be a key consideration; hence, all Ethical
Principles for Research with Humans within the University of Lincoln
Ethics Procedures (UofL, 2009) were adhered to during the design and
subsequent implementation of the final research strategy, in that the
dignity and autonomy of individuals was considered at all times. All
participants gave informed consent and anonymity was assured at all
times.  
Stage I  
(section 3.11.1)
Initial contact with
NGOs through
questionnaire to
identify willing
participants and key
etic issues
Stage II 
(section 3.11.2)
Confirm etic issues and
develop emic issues
through semi-
structured interviews
with willing participants
Stage III 
(section 3.11.3)
Confirm emic issues
and investigate through
focus groups with
willing participants
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3.13.2 Codification and Codes
Miles and Huberman (1994) differentiate between coding and codes. 
Coding is a process of analysis where field notes are transcribed or
synthesized to give them meaning. This part of analysis involves how
the researcher differentiates and combines the data gathered and the
reflections that are made about the information. “Coding is an attempt to
fix meaning, constructing a particular vision of the world that excludes
other viewpoints” (Seale, 1999, p.154). Codes are the tags or labels that 
are used to assign meaning to the description and inferential information
complied during the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). They are
more often than not a word or a short phrase that “symbolically assigns
a summative, salient, essence-capturing and/or evocative attribute for a
portion of language-based or visual data” (Saldana, 2013, p.3). They will
usually be attached to chunks of data, words, phrases, sentences or
whole paragraphs connected to a specific setting, a grouping which Dey
(1993) describes as distinguishable or definable themes which can be
used as a basis for comparison. They can take the form of a
straightforward category label or a more complex one such as a
metaphor (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In interpretive research these
codes are often already known as they are based on the general topics
that have been previously set out within the thesis. These predetermined
themes or etic issues (those brought to the research from the outside)
were guided by the literature and concepts of the research problem, its
aims and objectives and are prevalent within the interview guide
developed for Stage II (see Appendix F). Hence for the initial analysis
stages of this study, a manual coding system was developed in order to
organise the data in line with those whose etic topics previously
discussed and developed within Chapter 2 (as included in Appendix E).  
By way of illustration of the process used, included below is a short data
extract from one of the Stage II interviews with coding for etic topics. This
extract comes from the second domain of study (UK MOD – Joint Force
Logistic Command) and an interview with the Commandant: 
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You have small and medium NGOs some of which are better at delivering than
others with scale bringing its own complexity of organisation but also strengths
[PWRPOS]. The airport was tiny, with a very small area of aircraft and
equipment. Very early on the NGOs had flooded in and there was limited
military involvement and it took some time to get my team onto the ground. 
There was only one real hard standing and the NGOs had occupied this with
flags flying [SUSFR], however I struggled to see why a number of these were
there apart from having their flag flying [SUSSTRAT]. It was pretty chaotic as
NGOs do not like to be told what to do and do not like to be coordinated
[RMOPP, PWRNEG]. The scale thing does matter as it is clear that there are
some small organisations that rely on the larger ones for logistic support
[PWRPOS, RMT, COLALL, COLHOR, COLVER] but there are also others
who will jealously guard their independence [HUMSIND] and do not like to be
seen as working with any other organisations [PWRNEG]. As a general rule
the NGOs are far happier to operate alone than to be seen as being part of an
alliance [COLALL]. These organisations almost trade on their independence
[HUMSIND] and impartiality [HUMSIMP] and their main aim seems to be to
wave a flag and to get publicity and be noticed [SUSFR, SUSSTRAT]. They
effectively claimed the ground because they got there first [PWRNEG, 
SUSSTRAT]. Most of the aid that was delivered was not actually needed and
effectively clogged up the airhead some form of coordination was clearly
needed [COLCLU].  
This example which is from an early interview illustrates the density of 
coding that was typical at the beginning of the process when what was
important in respect of the study was not entirely clear and so
consequently, many comments were coded. Also many of the same
codes are repeatedly used throughout, this is both natural and deliberate
as there are mostly repetitive patterns of action and consistencies within
human affairs and the ultimate aim of the coding process is to identify
repetitive patterns and themes (Saldana, 2013; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). As the process unfolded, this density reduced markedly as the
significant categories were identified and subsumed earlier categories. 
Indeed in keeping with the thoughts of Dey (1993) who regards the
creation and identification of codes as an on-going aspect of any
research project, where coding categories can be extended, modified or
even discarded, the researcher was conscious of the need to identify
emerging codes as and when they appeared. Miles and Hubmeran
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(1994) commend the revision of codes throughout any research project 
in order to address the emic issues (those that emerge throughout the
study which may be nested within the original etic issues) and to also
take account of the researcher’s growing field experience, as they put it: 
“There is more going on out there than our initial frames have
dreamed of, and few field researchers are foolish enough to avoid
looking for these things” (p.61)
Furthermore, some codes will simply not work, others may decay away
and some may flourish to an extent that they may have to be broken
down into more manageable sub-codes.  
3.13.3 Thoughts on Computer-assisted Qualitative Data Analysis
– Nvivo 10
Drawing on the thoughts of Bryman and Bell (2012) who believe that one
of the most significant developments in qualitative research since the
middle of the 1980s is the emergence of computer software that can
assist in the use of qualitative data analysis (p593), time was taken
during the analysis phase to experiment with the use of NVivo (QSR
International, 2012) as an a computer based aid to data analysis. 
Unfortunately, the software was found to be cumbersome and far from
intuitive leaving the researcher to take the decision quite early on in the
process to stick with manual coding and the use of coloured highlighter
pens to facilitate analysis. 
3.14 Writing Up the Research and Final Contribution
3.14.1 The Write Up – Presenting Qualitative Research
As this thesis was based predominantly on a qualitative approach and
the gathering of rich and in-depth data, questions were raised on how to
present this data within the final manuscript. Pratt (2009) and Silverman
(2011b) discuss the challenges associated with writing up qualitative
research and agree that unlike quantitative findings, which will invariably
have a significance level or a magic number associated with them, 
qualitative findings present quite different issues for the researcher if an
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appropriate message is to be conveyed to the reader. Pratt (2009) talks
of 2 perilous paths which should be avoided when qualitative research
is discussed: 
1. A lack of balance between theory and data. 
2. Turning a qualitative narrative into a quantitative one. 
Golden-Biddle and Locke (2007 cited by Pratt, 2009) talk of “telling and
not showing” (p.857), where the author offers no clear evidence of the
transition from their data to their interpretation of that data. The advice
offered is to place some data within the body of the thesis and to avoid
the inclusion of elaborate tables of data which rely on the reader
constantly transiting to and from the table whilst also hoping that the
reader has the understanding of the data that the author had originally
intended. Consequently the domain analysis Chapters (4 through 7) and
the final Concluding Chapter (8) include quotations extracted from the
data gathered which offer a summary of overall opinion or typify
responses within a particular area of discussion or focus. This approach
will also hopefully make the document more interesting and logical for
the reader.  
Qualitative researchers will often try and make their research more
palatable to the quantitative community by using deductive shorthand
which effectively mimics quantitative techniques (Pratt, 2009, p.857; also
discussed in Mordue, 2011). Given the inductive nature of this study, 
clearly this was to be avoided. In a similar vein, the triangulation of the
data analysed is key for credibility and generalisability, hence the use of 
4 research domains and an associated array of data gathering
techniques (see section 3.11.7). Finally, in keeping with the advice on
presenting such work (Yin, 2013) the final report consists of separate
chapters (4 through 7) for each domain of study together with a final
chapter (8) covering the cross-domain analysis, results and overall
contribution. 
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3.14.2 The Theoretical Contribution?
The ultimate aim of any study such as this is to spell out the final
significant contribution to knowledge (Phillips and Pugh, 2005; Rugg and
Petre, 2004). Most organisational scholars do not generate theory from
scratch but generally work on the improvement of what already exists
(Whetten, 1989, p492) and this is certainly the case here. As discussed
earlier whilst the principles of grounded theory were utilised a theory
building rather than a classic grounded approach was adopted (see
section 3.7.1) with a view to presenting findings that would improve upon
processes that already exist. However, this does create a problem in that 
it is difficult to then judge what constitutes a sufficient contribution to
warrant the final award.  
A theory must contain the following elements (Dubin, 1978 cited by
Whetten, 1989, p.490): 
What factors logically should be considered as part of the
explanation of the social phenomena of interest? When authors
begin to map out the conceptual landscape of a topic, they should
remember that it is easier to delete unnecessary or invalid
elements and recognise that their ideas will be refined over time; 
hence they should err on the side of including too many factors as
they look to justify their arguments. 
How are the factors that are included related? Visual
representation may help to clarify the author’s thinking whilst also
increasing reader comprehension, not forgetting that the
researcher must also justify why the findings and related factors
should be given credence in the context of the particular
representation or phenomena under discussion?
Why should colleagues give credence to this particular
representation of the phenomena? The answer lies in the logic of 
the underlying model. The soundness of fundamental views of 
human nature, organisational requisites or societal processes
provide the reasonableness of the proposed conceptualization.  
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Whilst it is possible to make a theoretical contribution by simply adding
or subtracting factors to the existing processes (the whats) a better way
to demonstrate the value is to identify how these changes affect current 
relationships between variables (the hows). These relationships, 
Whetten (1989) argues are where the true theory lies as he cites
Poincare (1983): 
“Science is facts, just as houses are made of stone….But a pile of 
stones is not a house and a collection of facts is not necessarily
science” (p.493)
But what are the factors that conceptual arguments are judged upon as
these must inform what is a ‘significant contribution’ and with it the final
award. Tables 3.7 summarises these key factors by way of 7 questions: 
Question Notes: 
Whats new? Reviewers are not necessarily looking for new theories but 
modifications or extensions to current theories should alter
scholarly opinion in some way. 
So what? Will the theory change existing practice and process?
Why so? Is there compelling evidence to support the proposed theory?
Well done? Is there evidence of reasoned thinking and a broad
understanding of the associated subject area?
Done well? Is the argument well written and presented and is it an enjoyable
read?
Why now? Is the topic of contemporary interest?
Who cares? What is the likely scale of academic interest in the subject area
and overall contribution?
Table 3.7: Factors Considered in Judging the Theoretical Contribution (adapted
from Whetten, 1989, p.494)
3.15 Conclusion
In this chapter a detailed account of the philosophy, strategy, 
methodology and analytical processes of the research study has been
presented. As explained and justified, in order to address the research
question and achieve the associated aims the study adopted qualitative
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methods utilising a multiple-case study approach (Yin, 2009). A 3 stage
process involving self-completion questionnaires, semi-structured
interviews and focus groups is described and illustrated (Fig 3.4), with
observation and protocol data being incorporated in the final approach
in order to address criticisms levelled at the validity and generalisability
of purely qualitative data gathering strategies. Similarly, the use of case
studies and in particular the merits afforded by a multiple-case approach
(Yin, 2013; Simons, 2009; Stake, 1995), are exploited and arguments
offered that given the perspectives sought here, the use of a multi-site
cross comparison serves to increase confidence in the overall findings; 
in essence adding credibility to the overall contribution to knowledge. 
Definitions of classic cases (Yin, 2009, Simons, 2009, Stake, 1995)
suggest that the selected organisations should be considered from all
angles and all aspects; however this is not the approach here, where a
much more focussed view of the participant organisation’s particular
approaches was deemed to be a key to success. Hence, in order to
locate the cases within the general context of the research, arguments
are offered to justify the use of the term domain instead of case
throughout the analysis; whereby a domain is understood to be more
descriptively rich than a case (Gardner,1997).  
By systematically peeling the research onion (Saunders et al, 2009) the
discussion of each exposed layer affords the opportunity to understand
and appreciate the thinking behind the final chosen approach. The
resulting research design provides a framework for the collection and
analysis of data, and the choice of design reflects decisions made about 
the priority given to a range of dimensions within the research process. 
Hence, set against this background the research design, methodology
and associated methods employed to collect and analyse data are also
described and clarified. Whilst enabling the fulfilment of the final
research aims, the approach described also addresses the calls offered
by Kovács and Spens (2011), who highlight the need for good and
applicable research within the humanitarian logistics field, with empirical
data being gathered through the use of appropriate qualitative method; 
and also those of Kunz and Reiner (2012) who believe that “empirical
methodologies such as cross-organisational case studies should be
used more in order to increase knowledge in the [humanitarian logistics] 
field” (p.133).  
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CHAPTER 4
THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS
“OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to
ensure a coherent response to emergencies. The aim is to assist 
people when they most need relief or protection. A key pillar of the
OCHA mandate is to coordinate effective and principled humanitarian
action in partnership with national and international actors.”
(OCHA, 2012a)
4.1 Introduction  
This is the first of four chapters that present an analysis of the data
gathered from the individual domains considered during this research. 
This approach is in keeping with classic multiple-case design (Simons, 
2009; Yin, 2009; Hartley, 1994; Eisenhardt, 1989) where the researcher
is advised to consider each case in isolation prior to final cross-case
analysis. Consequently, it should be noted at this stage that in order to
ensure this isolated yet consistent consideration of the research
domains, the approach described within this chapter will be mirrored
within chapters 5,6 and 7.  
The data gathered from The United Nations (UN) Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the participants within
the UN Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is presented and
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discussed concurrently with appropriate academic discourse within the
field of research that was first introduced within Chapter 2. A continuation
of the adopted research methods established within Chapter 3 will be
utilised as data gathered at each of the 3 stages of the final research
strategy will be discussed and analysed. Following guidance on the
application of the case study method (Yin, 2009) the narrative and
analysis presented here will be completed in isolation from the other
cases (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7) with a cross-comparison of the data
gathered from all four domains being included in Chapter 8 where a
review of trends, commonality and differences will result in the final
contribution to knowledge.  
By way of introduction a short background and history of the OCHA, its
formation and role is included together with a discussion on the
organisation’s growing influence and focus on the coordination of the
overall humanitarian relief effort. The tasking and structure of the CMCS
is explained before the use of the organisation as a research domain for
the study is justified. Following the inclusion of a listing of respondents
and their backgrounds the discussion turns to an analysis of the key etic
and emic issues and themes identified. The chapter is structured in 3
parts at this point which follow Stages I to III of the final research
approach as developed and discussed within Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
Final conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then
established through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic
discourse. Thus, the approach will enable an exploration of the trends
that describe the barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief 
supply chains and the identification of measures that might help to
address these barriers, thereby potentially improving collaboration along
humanitarian relief supply chains in the future.  
4.2 Background – Coordinating the Overall Humanitarian Effort  
The Under-Secretary-General and Emergency Relief Coordinator
(USG/ERC) is responsible for the oversight of all emergencies requiring
United Nations humanitarian assistance. The ERC also acts as the
central focal point for governmental, inter-governmental and non-
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governmental relief activities. This responsibility is managed through
OCHA which is the organisation within the UN Secretariat tasked with
the overall coordination of humanitarian actors to ensure a coherent 
response to emergencies (OCHA, 2012a). OCHA also ensures that 
there is a framework within which each actor can contribute to the overall
response effort. The ERC leads the Inter-Agency Standing Committee
(IASC), an inter-agency forum for coordination, policy development and
decision-making involving the key UN and non-UN humanitarian
partners. In a country affected by a disaster or conflict, the ERC may
appoint a Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) who will be tasked with
ensuring that response efforts are organised. The HC works through an
established OCHA office with government, international organisations, 
non-governmental organisations and affected communities. OCHA's
stated overall mission is to (OCHA, 2012a): 
1. Mobilise and coordinate effective and principled humanitarian
action in partnership with national and international actors in order
to alleviate human suffering in disasters and emergencies. 
2. Advocate the rights of people in need. 
3. Promote preparedness and prevention. 
4. Facilitate sustainable solutions. 
OCHA's Strategic Framework is built on three pillars (OCHA, 2012a): 
1. Partnerships: Partnership has always been integral to OCHA's
efforts. Sustained relations, built on trust and mutual respect, are
considered to be vital when preparing for and responding to
humanitarian emergencies. OCHA is positioned within the
international humanitarian system to convene and influence
agendas. They try and achieve this strategically, with the aim of 
creating a more enabling environment for humanitarian action. 
2. Service Provision: OCHA try to ensure that their services and
support to partners evolve and meet clients’ needs. They achieve
this by focusing on helping partners through humanitarian
coordination, leadership, strengthening coordination mechanisms, 
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and improving the evidence base for humanitarian decision-
making, planning and resource allocation. 
3. Reliability and Professionalism: In 2010, OCHA introduced
rapid reaction solutions to ensure that the right people are on the
ground immediately after a new disaster. This effort is coordinated
by longer-term staff to ensure continuity of the overall OCHA
presence. 
OCHA has over 30 offices around the world, split across 4 continents
with upwards of 1,900 staff. OCHA’s coordination work is funded from
the UN’s regular budget, member states’ voluntary contributions and
private donations. Since 2002, OCHA’s budgetary requirements have
almost quadrupled as it has expanded its overall role and influence; 
however, its regular budget allocation from the UN has remained almost 
static (OCHA, 2012a). This trend means that OCHA now places great 
reliance on extra-budgetary resources and that its current income is
predominantly by way of voluntary contributions from individual member
states and the European Commission (see OCHA, 2012b for a
breakdown of donors as at February 2011). By way of example, for 2010-
11 only 0.6 per cent of the United Nations Regular Budget was allocated
to OCHA which amounted to some US $14 million (£9 million) however
its reported programme and administrative budget was close US $242
million (£151 million) (OCHA, 2012c).  
Donors to OCHA are grouped in an informal OCHA Donor Support 
Group (ODSG) with members committing to annual funding of a
minimum threshold (currently US $0.5 million, £0.3 million). They provide
financial, political and technical support towards fulfilling OCHA’s
mandated coordination activities. The ODSG’s goal is to support OCHA
in fulfilling its mandate by acting as a sounding board and a source of 
advice on policy, management, budgetary and financial questions. The
Group also acts as a mechanism for feedback, donor consultation and
the exchange of views on OCHA’s strategic priorities, new project 
initiatives, evaluations and reviews. The Group also discusses measures
that members may take individually or collectively to assist OCHA in
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better fulfilling its mission and goals on the basis of the humanitarian
principles (DFID, 2008).  
It should also be noted at this stage that the UN and OCHA have no
influence on governments that have bi-lateral arrangements with
countries requesting military assistance in the aftermath of a natural
disaster (Cottey and Forster, 2005; Macrae, 2002). By way of example, 
during the response to Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines (2013)
Australia and Canada were embedded with OCHA in delivering the
humanitarian response, whilst other countries who lacked bilateral
agreements with the Philippine government, such as the United States
and the United Kingdom found themselves on the periphery of the
humanitarian effort.  
4.3 A Brief History – United Nations’ Commitment since 1991
In December 1991, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution 46/182
(UN, 2012), which was designed to strengthen the UN response to
complex emergencies and natural disasters, whilst improving the overall
effectiveness of humanitarian operations in the field. The resolution also
created the position of ERC; a role which combined into a single UN
focal point the functions carried out by the Secretary-General's
representatives for major and complex emergencies, as well as the UN's
natural disaster functions carried out by the UN Disaster Relief 
Organisation. Soon after the resolution was adopted, the Secretary-
General established the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). He
also assigned the ERC the status of Under-Secretary-General for
Humanitarian Affairs, with offices in New York and Geneva to provide
institutional support. Resolution 46/182 (UN, 2012) also created the
IASC, the Consolidated Appeals Process and the Central Emergency
Revolving Fund as key coordination mechanisms and tools of the ERC. 
In 1998, as part of the Secretary-General's programme of reform, DHA
was reorganised into the OCHA that exists today, with an expanded
mandate to include the coordination of humanitarian response, policy
development and humanitarian advocacy. This means that OCHA
carries out its coordination function primarily through the IASC, which is
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chaired by the ERC. Participants include all humanitarian partners, from
UN agencies, funds and programmes, to the Red Cross movement and
NGOs. The IASC is expected to ensure inter-agency decision-making in
response to complex emergencies and these responses include needs
assessments, consolidated appeals, field coordination arrangements
and the development of humanitarian policies. 
4.4 A Growing Influence - Current Focus and Coordination
Activity
OCHA lists as its main areas of focus, policy, advocacy, information
management, humanitarian financing and coordination (OCHA, 2012a); 
however, given the topic of research within this thesis the discussion will
now deal solely with the final OCHA area of focus, that of coordination.  
OCHA is responsible for bringing together humanitarian actors to ensure
a coherent and coordinated response to emergencies and disaster relief. 
The aim is to assist people when they most need relief or protection. A
key pillar of the OCHA mandate is to “coordinate effective and principled
humanitarian action in partnership with national and international actors”
(OCHA, 2012a). OCHA is committed to leading the international
community's efforts to develop a better architecture for the humanitarian
system, a strategy which includes; the introduction of HCs within disaster
areas; the development of representative and inclusive Humanitarian
Country Teams; the management of an effective and well-coordinated
framework within which all humanitarian organisations can contribute
systematically; and predictable funding tools. OCHA currently plays a
key role in operational coordination in crisis situations, including
assessing situations and needs; agreeing common priorities; developing
common strategies to address issues such as negotiating access, 
mobilizing funding and other resources; clarifying consistent public
messaging; and monitoring progress. OCHA's overall role is to support 
the leadership of the HCs and to ensure effective coordination, including
strengthening the cluster approach, data and information management, 
and reporting. They believe that by ensuring that the right structures, 
partnerships and leaders are supported, they and their humanitarian
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partners can better prepare for and more effectively coordinate
humanitarian situations. OCHA serves as the secretariat for inter-agency
coordination mechanisms such as the IASC and for rapid-response
tools, such as the United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
system, and the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group. 
OCHA also aims to promote efficient interaction between civilian and
military actors in humanitarian operations, to bridge gaps in
environmental emergency management, and to map global emergency
relief stockpiles on behalf of the whole humanitarian community.  
4.4.1 United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination
Section
The Oslo Guidelines (UN, 2006) which sought to ensure that foreign
military and civil defence assets deployed in response to a natural
disaster could support and complement relief operations were
developed through an inter-governmental, inter-agency process. The
Guidelines clearly state that military assets must not be used “in a
manner that would compromise the civilian nature and character of 
humanitarian assistance” (p.4). However, military assets are frequently
used in support of relief efforts, hence OCHA and its humanitarian
partners are frequently called upon to work with its member states to
incorporate into contingency planning the possibility of military asset 
usage, and to engage military actors at an early stage in the response in
order to guide military efforts and to protect the humanitarian space
(Seigel, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009, p.27). The United
Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination Section (CMCS) is the
organisation within OCHA tasked with facilitating dialogue and
interaction between civilian and military actors within a given disaster
zone (OCHA, 2012d).  
4.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results
The UN CMCS was first contacted in July 2012 through a series of 
introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research
methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 4.1: 
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Respondent Time with
OCHA
(years)
Relevant
Practical 
Experience
Role Code
Officer In
Charge
15
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Africa, 
Balkans, Asian
Tsunami, Sudan; 
Somalia
Leadership and overall
command of the UN-
CMCoord.  
OIC
Officer In
Charge Policy
and Plans
10
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Africa, 
Afghanistan,  
Coordination and
development of 
strategic policy and
planning. 
PP
Officer In
Charge
Operational 
and Field
Support Unit
12
Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Asian
Tsunami, 
To manage resources
engaged in the delivery
of individual relief 
projects
OFS
Officer In
Charge
Training and
Partnership
Unit  
11
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Afghanistan, 
Iraq,  
To develop, coordinate
and deliver training
within the UN-
CMCoord
TPU
Humanitarian
Coordinator  
10
Pakistan Floods, 
Haiti, Africa, 
Afghanistan, 
To ensure that the
response effort during
a given relief operation
is organised and
coordinated on the
ground. 
HC1
8
Haiti, Asian
Tsunami (Banda
Aceh), 
HC2
  
Table 4.1: UN CMCS – Key Respondents
4.6 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues
Analysis of the data gathered through the introductory questionnaires
will now be discussed. In achieving this due consideration will be given
to the practical relevance of the initial etic issues and themes identified
within the Literature Review as set out and codified at Appendix E. Note
that etic data analysis codes included within Appendix E and respondent 
codes within Table 4.1 will be used at this stage. 
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4.6.1 Humanitarian Space
The senior respondent (OIC) made it clear that an essential
responsibility of the UN CMCS was to protect and promote all four of the
humanitarian principles. He was keen to stress that whilst military action
supports political purposes (POLINF), humanitarian assistance should
be based on recipient need and should be provided neutrally
(HUMSNEU). The remaining respondents had a variety of opinions as to
the relative importance of the humanitarian principles however, it was
clear that they all agreed on the significance of the Oslo Guidelines (UN, 
2006a) when working with the military to ensure that the key areas of 
impartiality (HUMIMP), operational independence (HUMIND) and
neutrality (HUMNEU) are not compromised and that the overall civilian
character of the humanitarian assistance offered is not affected
(SUSCSR).  
4.6.2 Organisational Sustainment, Power and Relationships
The UN CMCS is regarded by the respondents as the key arbiter in the
avoidance of competition (SUSSTRAT) between NGOs and local
governments. Moreover, the respondents with operational, on the
ground experience (OIC, OFS, HC1,2) highlighted that the organisation
is tasked with minimising any inconsistency in approach (RMT) and also
regards itself as a driver in helping to facilitate and establish common
goals amongst contributors (PWRPOS, RMT).  
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Humanitarian Principles/ Military Role/ 
Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines/ Corporate
Social Responsibility
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Management of Competition/ Power and
Relationship Management 
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4.6.3 Collaborative Working and the Military
The operational involvement in the relief effort was highlighted by the
junior respondents (PP, OFS, TPU, HC1,2) who emphasised the
importance of the UN CMCS in its role as the enabler of collaborative
working between donors operating in the same humanitarian relief space
(COLCLU, COLALL). This is particularly true when local and
international humanitarian organisations are involved and are expected
to work alongside the military (HUMSIND). The belief is that effective
and consistent humanitarian civil-military coordination (COLCLU, 
COLLALL, COLRES) is a shared responsibility that is crucial to
safeguarding humanitarian principles and the humanitarian space
(PWRPOS, RMT). All respondents expressed the opinion that the OCHA
is expected to manage the level of coordination and the associated
differing relationships that develop (RMT, RMOPP, COLCU). The senior
and operationally experienced respondents (OIC, OPS, HC1,2) were
keen to comment on the military contribution to the disaster relief effort 
and believed that, given their ability to rapidly mobilise and deploy unique
assets and expertise, the military could offer a valuable contribution to
any humanitarian operation (COLHOR, COLVER, COLLALL). The
senior respondent (OIC) also noted that the acceptance of military
assistance is vital in some circumstances and that the UN cluster
concept could ensure differing levels of collaboration between
humanitarian organisations and the military; collaboration which could
effectively range from what he termed cooperation through to
coexistence (PWRPOS, RMT, COLCLU).  
  
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
UN Cluster Concept/ Lead Status/ Power
and Relationships/ Military Assistance
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4.6.4 Summary – UN-CMCS Key Etic Themes and Issues
In completing Stage I of the research strategy with the UN CMCS the
following key etic themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of 
the research strategy. 
Theme Issue Description Notes
Humanitarian Space  
Humanitarian
Principles
Neutrality and Impartiality How maintained/ 
managed
Military Role Should not compromise
humanitarian principles
How to ensure civilian
character is established
and maintained
Maintenance of 
Oslo Guidelines
Success of guidelines How enforced
Corporate Social
Responsibility
Humanitarian principles
are not compromised and
the overall civilian
character of the
humanitarian assistance
offered is not affected. 
How achieved?
Clarify meaning/ 
understanding
Organisational
Sustainment, Power
and Relationships
Management of 
Competition
Key arbiter in avoidance
of competition
How?
Power  Facilitate and establish
common goals amongst 
contributors
How? How is this
approach received by
participants?
Examples?
Relationship
Management 
Power broker role? How are relationships
managed? Problems?
Examples?
Collaborative Working
and the Military
UN Cluster
Concept 
Success of the approach Successes? Examples?
How established/ 
managed/ maintained
Lead Status Manager of collaboration
and alliances
How received/ 
managed/ maintained
Examples?
Power Broker between military, 
governments and NGOs
How received?
Successes?
Examples?
Relationship
Management 
Military
Assistance
Table 4.2: UN CMCS – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues
4.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and
Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with
members of the UN CMCS listed in Table 4.1 will now be discussed. In
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keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based
around the schedule (Appendix F) which was developed following cross-
domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and issues
that had been identified as a result (see Appendix E). Note that 
respondent codes listed within Table 4.1 will still be used throughout this
discussion. 
4.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration
“The increasing number of actors within humanitarian relief areas
means that whilst coordination of effort is essential it is [at the
same time] extremely challenging” (OFS)
“We regard OCHA as a critical contributor….we have seen
examples in the past where the genuine drive to help has led to aid
agencies working on their own without proper coordination…this
leads to duplication of effort and ineffectiveness”. (OIC)
The thoughts cited above illustrate agreement with the views offered in
the literature (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) on the growing number
of actors within humanitarian relief zones and reflect the common
perception amongst those interviewed within the UN CMCS on the need
for coordination within humanitarian relief provision, and the overall
requirement for their office and the UN OCHA. Effective collaboration will
be a contributing factor in any supply chain activity (Seigel, 2011; Carroll
and Neu, 2009) and it is reassuring to note that OCHA’s role as a
facilitator of closer working was regarded as “crucial” (OIC, PP) amongst 
participants and effectively made life “easier within relief zones, as
providers and recipients of aid know who to approach to get quick
answers and quick responses” (OFS). Hinting at the importance of 
supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011) and the ability of that chain
to withstand turbulence, OFS offered the view that the presence of 
OCHA and its representatives made victims of disasters feel “safer and
reassured”, a view shared by OIC and PP who asserted a strong belief 
that “OCHA make a clear difference to those who are suffering on the
ground”. TPU was keen to discuss the impact of previous disasters and
highlighted the fact that a new strategic framework had been adopted by
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the OCHA following a review of the lessons learned post the responses
to the Haiti Earthquake and Pakistan Floods of 2010. This is also echoed
in the OCHA Plan and Budget statement (UN OCHA, 2013) where a new
strategic plan is explained based on the UN Under-Secretary General’s
emphasis on “strengthening OCHA’s field effectiveness” (p.5).  
OIC emphasised that this strategic framework is at the heart of all OCHA
activity and that he saw his organisation’s role as one that should look
to: 
“Broaden partnerships and become more accountable for the way
that resources are managed whilst also trying to improve
coordination of humanitarian provision and making the provision of 
humanitarian relief more effective and efficient”
Agreeing with academic support for the use of clusters as a vehicle to
achieve collaboration within supply chains (Patti, 2006, Porter, 1998) the
respondents were supportive of the UN Cluster Concept and believed
that it has a clear role to play in the overall effectiveness of humanitarian
relief provision.  
“The Cluster Concept is a leap forward from its predecessor where
basically every organisation did its own thing…it was an obvious
requirement and has been, on the whole a success since its
introduction” (PP).  
OIC believed that the cluster approach strengthened the relationship
between the UN and international NGOs, but felt that there is a need to
develop mechanisms for assessing the performance of clusters. OIC
was unaware of any such mechanisms but agreed that they would be
useful at all levels and stages of the relief effort. Agreeing with OIC, PP
felt that accountability was a real weak point of the cluster approach and
that there were very low levels of accountability of cluster leads to the
HC in the field. He offered the view that this is as a direct result of what 
he termed the “very loose” link between the cluster approach and the
overall OCHA coordination system. Referring to his experiences in Haiti, 
OFS felt that the cluster approach had been driven from the top down
and that there had been little inclusion of the local providers and
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population, hence he felt that this had effectively undermined local
ownership and with it local responsibility for relief action. This experience
would seem to echo the academic view that in order to be effective, 
clusters should include both “upstream suppliers and downstream
customers” (Patti, p.266). 
OFS also felt that there is no clear criteria for the implementation of 
clusters in the context of situations where reoccurring natural disasters
exist, which serves to undermine participation and promote what he
termed “emergency thinking outside emergencies”. In a similar vein, OIC
commented that the cluster approach is too exclusive and does not 
include important providers such as national NGOs, governments and
local donors. Agreeing with Porter’s initial economic cluster theory
(1998), OIC felt that this lack of involvement could: 
“Weaken local ownership and create tension with local government 
which could lead to unsustainable solutions and clear issues in the
overall success of the long term recovery strategy”.  
Demonstrating agreement with the academic view that cluster leads
could learn valuable lessons from consideration of 4PL strategies
(Jensen, 2012) the data gathered offers empirical evidence that there is
a requirement to improve and promote interǦagency contingency
planning and that joint exercises at a country level might help to achieve
this. Moreover, there is also a requirement for clear guidance on inter-
cluster coordination and an explanation of the role of OCHA in making
this happen within humanitarian emergency areas. The view is that 
clusters need to be rationalised to avoid duplication and to ensure the
most efficient use of time and resources (PP). There is a common view
that there is a lack of guidance on how to effectively invoke an ‘exit 
strategy’ (OFS) to help countries to move on from the cluster approach, 
and that there is a requirement to establish appropriate links between
humanitarian aid organisations and local developmental actors within
affected countries. Further comment on this issue related back to the
model on the Phases of Disaster Relief Operations (Kovács and Spens, 
2008, 2007) and on the clear need to establish closer linkages between
the different stages of the disaster relief operation (OFS,HC1,HC2). TPU
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noted that there is a requirement to provide training for country
representatives on the cluster approach, its roles and responsibilities
and that this should include all countries involved and all agencies be
they governmental or non-governmental.  
Maintaining the training theme and suggesting agreement with the
thoughts offered by Moore and Taylor (2011) and Thomas and
Mizushima (2005) on the importance of humanitarian logistics
professionalisation, TPU discussed the idea of long term investment in
cluster coordination as a professional career path within provider
organisations, and that whenever possible trained cluster coordinators
and teams should be in the field for longer periods, putting them in a
position to effectively train national and local personnel prior to final
withdrawal.  
The data gathered illustrates that OCHA regards itself as effectively a
4PL provider (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010)
which acts as a facilitator of resource sharing:  
“We do not have our own resources as such but regard our role as
one that brings together providers and encourages the effective
and efficient sharing of facilities and resources” (OIC). 
All respondents agree with the view that effective information sharing is
a key element in a successful supply chain (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; 
Bozarth and Handfield, 2008); however, the consensus is that there is a
significant amount of misunderstanding amongst humanitarian
organisations and providers on OCHA’s role and capacity in relation to
information sharing and management at both the global and country
level. That said, all respondents agree that the cluster approach has
improved information sharing, however information management is
weak with significant amounts of information being lost or not shared
when it was most needed (HC1, commenting on his experiences of the
Pakistan floods, 2010). 
Returning to a discussion on supply chain resilience (Christopher, 2011)
OIC believed that the UN CMCS contribution is essential in complex
emergencies, particularly where there is associated risk to individual
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contributors, and that the military has a vital role to play in facilitating
humanitarian access, protecting civilians, and providing security for
humanitarian aid workers. All respondents acknowledged the import role
that the military has to play in the overall relief effort agreeing with
commentary on the inevitability of such a contribution (Heaslip, 2011; 
Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011). PP felt that there was an inevitability in
that:  
“National governments see the deployment of their military
resources as a quick and visible sign of involvement at an early
stage of the disaster response”.  
OFS echoed this thought: 
“When an emergency or disaster occurs which leads to a
humanitarian need, lots of countries will deploy their military’s or
paramilitary organizations in direct response”
However, OFS also seemed to reflect the ideas discussed by Tomasini
and Van Wassenhove (2009) in respect of the role that the Humanitarian
Principles have to play in what they argue constitutes a humanitarian
operation, as he noted the problems that military intervention can create
when local and international humanitarian organisations are involved. In
short, OFS clearly believes that it is vital that all organisations operating
in the same area do not affect the overall neutrality and impartiality of 
the response. 
4.7.2 Power and Relationships
The data confirm the view that the relationship that exists between
humanitarian actors will change depending on the type of emergency
and the roles and responsibilities that are agreed and established with, 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Field Effectiveness/ Strategic Framework/ 
Cluster Concept/ Cluster Training/ 
Professionalisation/ Local Organisational
Training/ Joint Training
155
and for the associated military contributors (OFS, HU1, HU2). There was
acknowledgement that UN CMCS is seen by some humanitarian relief 
organisations as the power broker (Burt, 2005) in the supply chain and
that the organisation is regarded by some humanitarian organisations as
the focal point in the UN system for humanitarian civil-military
coordination. However the respondents do not regard themselves as
necessarily a lead organisation, but more as one that plays the role of a
facilitator.  
OFS agreed that the CMCS is happy to offer advice on matters relating
to the involvement of foreign military resources to disaster relief and
humanitarian relief operations, but was quick to stress that this is always
complimented by the publication of operational guidance. The data
gathered shows that the UN CMCS regards its role as one of providing
support for humanitarian and military actors through the provision of 
training and advice on the guidelines that govern the use of foreign
military and civil defence assets and humanitarian civil-military
interaction. TPU explained that the training programmes that UN CMCS
offer are designed to develop the skills and knowledge necessary
amongst humanitarian and military actors to facilitate communication
and, where required successful coordination and interaction (for details
of courses see discussion in OCHA 2013b). OIC related his experiences
at Banda Aceh in support of the Asian Tsunami (2004) in the following
vignette, where he discusses power and relationships in respect of the
need, as he saw it for OCHA to take the lead in the overall coordination
of the humanitarian relief community: 
“We developed a Humanitarian Information Centre and
encouraged all NGOs to register with us and also to give an
indication of what contribution they were intending to make. This
helped us to produce maps of sectors showing who was working
where and doing what and also to produce a list of contact 
information for all contributors. I suppose it was accepted that in
this sense we held the power in the region at that time. We also
chaired bi-weekly meetings and circulated minutes of decisions
and outcomes……. We were conscious that attendance [at the
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meetings] was voluntary and that there were other meetings being
held amongst some of those who elected not to attend ours”.  
OIC went on to discuss the role that the local government had to play in
this process and was quick to emphasise that meetings were also
brokered with local representatives, with an emphasis on giving them the
lead role at an early stage in the relief effort. OIC was quick to stress that 
he did not feel that there is any competition for the lead role in the
recovery effort and that the role of OCHA and of the UN CMCS is to
facilitate rather than dominate; moreover the overall aim is to return
control to local government and agencies at the earliest opportunity. 
Arguing against the academic view that market competition does not 
really influence organisations within the humanitarian relief supply chain
(Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) OIC agreed with the assertions
offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) in that there is clear competition
between donor organisations when it comes to what OIC termed as the
“more high profile” elements of the disaster relief process; an opinion
shared by other UN CMCS respondents (OFS, HC1, HC2) who felt that 
there is a drive to be noticed amongst NGOs and that this could be
“unhealthy at times” (OFS). 
4.7.3 The Humanitarian Space
In keeping with arguments offered regarding what constitutes a
humanitarian operation (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 
2008) all participants were happy to acknowledge the importance of the
humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and
independence. There is a common view that it is essential to protect and
promote the humanitarian principles. PP explained that the
administration of the principles within UN CMCS and OCHA lies with the
IASC, which is designated as the primary mechanism for inter-agency
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Power Broker and Facilitator/ Local
Governmental Involvement/ Inter-Agency
Competition
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coordination of humanitarian assistance (IASC, 2011). OIC referred to
his experiences in South Sudan: 
“Successful coordination in humanitarian relief operations is based
on logical and consistent UN engagement and on the
establishment of stable peace arrangements, particularly in those
countries that are recovering from a conflict. Maintaining the
humanitarian principles means that in classic political
peacekeeping missions there should be close coordination
between all organisations that are on the ground, be they local, 
military, governmental or NGO”. 
OFS felt that the humanitarian principles can be used to help facilitate
collaboration between military and non-military organisations operating
within disaster relief areas as they are understood by everyone, and the
common need to maintain them can be used to break down all types of 
barriers, be they political and/or religious or those that result from armed
conflict.  
Weiss and Collins (2000) noted the dilemma that may emerge when
humanitarian organisations are asked to provide aid in regions where
armed conflict means that non-combatants are being targeted by a
warring party, and the data gathered (OFS, HC1, HC2) also confirms the
need for military assistance in such disaster relief areas. Afghanistan, 
Sudan and Somalia were all offered as a typical examples of insecure
countries where security of aid workers is a real issue. However, there
also seemed to be agreement with the Humanitarian Policy Group
Report (2009) on the view that violence against aid workers in other
humanitarian areas has reduced in recent times and that this is probably
due to what OFS described as: 
“The overall improvements to organisations’ management and
assessment of security risk over the past 5 years”.  
As a result, there is a common view that humanitarian relief 
organisations, and in particular those sponsored by the UN, struggle to
maintain a meaningful presence and safe access to affected people in
areas where there is inherent conflict, which “ironically is normally where
those most in need of aid find themselves” (HC2). Despite these issues
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it was clear that the UN CMCS strategy is to avoid a military response
as such, with a clear reluctance to resort to armed escorts be they from
the military or private security organisations. Moreover, there is no
support to the idea of centralisation or to a regime of restricted
movement. Reflecting the views highlighted by Heaslip (2011) and
Beauregard (1998) on the acceptance of military assistance, HC1
pointed to his experiences in Haiti following the earthquake (2010), 
contending that the fact that the security rules which were in place called
for armed escorts as standard actually restricted the aid effort as some
NGOs simply refused to accept military assistance. 
OFS did point out however, that in keeping with the humanitarian
principles organisations within the sector will always find ways to carry
on delivering aid to affected populations. He also believed that he had
seen a shift in approach which was due to a change in the overall UN
security management strategy. Many humanitarian organisations now
appreciate the importance of remaining in the secure environment that 
is established with the local community over time, and this acceptance
helps to facilitate wider reaching and more effective access to those in
greatest need.  
Reflecting the academic discussion on political perception (Reindrop
and Wiles, 2001) OFS commented on the view that some NGOs still
exhibit in respect of the UN and OCHA: 
“Whilst the UN are meant to be neutral, politics and perception
often prevent us from carrying out and coordinating humanitarian
relief effort. We are still regarded by some [NGOs] as an
organisation that represents Western governments and this
creates problems for us in some disaster relief operations”  
The data gathered support a common belief that the UN CMCS was
created to facilitate discussions and working relationships between all
contributors. This is particularly true when it comes to the issue of military
assistance and cooperation, where the view is that the organisation’s
role is to promote communication and interaction between all actors
within the disaster relief zone be they civilian or military. Those
relationships and agreements that developed as a result, are between
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the donors and should be based solely on their requirements and overall
beliefs. The UN CMCS provide a framework that is designed to promote
a broader understanding of humanitarian relief provision, which does
include guidelines for political and military actors on how best to work
together in humanitarian relief areas (UN OCHA, 2012d). PP explained
that the framework had been designed to: 
“Help all of those involved [in the relief effort] to develop specific
policy within internationally agreed guidelines based on the
working environments that they find themselves in …..it [the
framework] should help organisations to come to agreements
based on appropriate civil-military coordination structures”  
There is also a view that OCHA is trying to establish a predictable
approach to the involvement of military resources by encouraging their
use in not just the disaster relief stage but also in the build-up and
recovery; clearly linking to Kovács and Spens (2008, 2007) discussions
on the different phases of disaster relief operations and in particular to
their call for an increase in the military contribution to the preparation and
reconstruction phases.
4.7.4 Organisational Sustainment
“We now understand our role a lot better and are more effective
and efficient as a result…….I think that more importantly the donor
community are starting to understand our role too” (PP)
The above statement echoes the views within the data gathered, which
suggests agreement that UN OCHA and the UN CMCS in particular have
a growing role to play in the disaster relief effort. OIC and PP pointed to
the fact that the organisation and its role has grown significantly since its
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Maintain Secure Environment/ Maintain
Humanitarian Principles/ Political Perception
of OCHA/ Longer Term Military Involvement 
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inception in 1991, a view shared by the USG/ERC in her opening
statement in OCHA’s latest Annual Plan and Budget (UN OCHA, 2013): 
“Power is shifting and evolving; from traditional Government 
structures to a multiplicity of civic and private actors living
increasingly interconnected lives. This has profound implications
for the way that we do our work” (p1)
TPU offered the view that a broadening of role and emphasis for OCHA
has yet to be transmitted to the humanitarian community and agreed that 
this should be included in all new training strategies both within and out 
with his organisation. Participants pointed to the challenges associated
with achieving sustainment against the growing demand for instant 
information (HC1), and to the fact that there is far greater expectation
from donors and customers (OIC). Much like in the business sector the
risk of mismatch and the disruption caused by globalisation and the
associated smaller margins for error, will inevitably put more strain on
humanitarian relief supply chains (Perry 2007, Kleindorf and van
Wassenhove, 2004); however, HC1 was quick to stress that advances
in technology and the ability to quickly gather more accurate and timely
information were realising significant improvements in the ability to
deliver better and more effective aid. PP agreed that new technology
could play an active role in the facilitation of information sharing, but was
also keen to stress that the gathering of such information rested with the
organisations involved in the disaster response itself and not necessarily
with members of OCHA and the UN CMCS. Reflecting the overall
strategic plan for OCHA (2013, p5) respondents discussed the need to
demonstrate overall economic value for money to donors and agreed
that they were being driven to achieve greater effectiveness within relief 
zones (HC1) and a more visible presence and lasting contribution (TPU).  
  
N Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Strategic Framework/ Overall Role of 
OCHA/ Economically Accountable/ 
Information Facilitator/ Flexibility
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4.7.5 Summary – UN-CMCS Key Emic Themes and Issues
Theme Issue Description Notes
Management 
and Control
Field Effectiveness
Visibility of Presence and Overall
Contribution
Increasing
pressure to
demonstrate
economic value
Economically
Accountable
Information Facilitator Utilise modern technology
Emphasis on
facilitation of 
data access
and not on data
gathering
Flexibility How to achieve against economicpressures
Increasing
pressure to
demonstrate
value for
money
Strategic Framework Increase efficiency andeffectiveness
Cluster Concept 
Performance Measurement 
How to make
Cluster Leads
Accountable
Exclusivity
Local
Government 
must be
Involved at all
times  
Overall linkage to OCHA  Very loose =confusion. 
Implementation Guidelines
Need to be
produced to
prevent 
confusion
Relationships
Local Governmental
Involvement 
Promote local ownership and
responsibility at an early stage. 
Prevent 
undermining of 
local authorities
Power Broker and
Facilitator Not leader. 
Promote
understanding
Inter-Agency
Competition Evident in the field. How to manage
Political Perception of 
OCHA Guidelines Local confusion
Understanding
and Training
Overall Role of OCHA Promote Wider Understanding Facilitator not actor. 
Joint Training Interagency exercises in planningand coordination
Who does what 
when
Professionalisation  Career path for Cluster andHUMLOG Leaders/Managers
Improve
efficiency/ 
effectiveness
Local Organisational
Training
Part of exit strategy for HUMLOG
organisations  
Pass
responsibility
for recovery to
locals
Cluster Training Promote understanding andmanagement 
Roles and
responsibilities. 
Military
Involvement 
Maintain Secure
Environment 
Provide security for HUMLOG
workers Last resort 
Longer term  Not just immediate response but preparation and reconstruction
Maintain
presence after
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Theme Issue Description Notes
immediate
response  
Maintain Humanitarian
Principles
Help to Facilitate collaboration
and break down political barriers
Use in insecure
countries  
Table 4.3: UN CMCS Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues
4.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirming Emic Themes and
Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with
members of the UN CMCS will now be discussed. Three of the
participants listed in Table 4.1 (OFS, HC1, HC2) were unable to take
part in the Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the
remaining three UN CMCS participants listed in Table 4.1. In keeping
with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion during the Focus
Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G)
which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and
the key emic themes and issues that had been identified as a result. 
Note that respondent codes listed within Table 4.1 will still be used
throughout this discussion. 
4.8.1 Management and Control
“We believe that OCHA and the CMCS play vital roles in the
disaster relief effort, particularly in those areas where there are
security issues as we [CMCS] are tasked with providing security
for the civilian population and for the humanitarian aid workers”
(OIC)
From the outset of the UN-CMCS Focus Group there was clear
agreement on the importance of effective coordination and a common
belief that an ad hoc approach was not effective within humanitarian
relief areas. There was clear consensus on the role and responsibility of 
OCHA and the CMCS, however, it is acknowledged that achieving
effective coordination is not an easy task and that the UN organisations
do not always get it right.  
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“We provide guidelines to help participating organisations and
governments to provide humanitarian aid but we do to a certain
extent rely on those organisations involved to adhere to the
guidance offered” (OIC)
The Group felt that their coordination challenge is being exacerbated as
those involved in humanitarian relief have two new issues to face. Firstly, 
the increasing scale and number of crises which often occur
simultaneously, and secondly new types of emergencies which are more
often than not caused and made worse by long-term problems such as
extreme poverty, population growth and climate change; the view is that 
both of these issues call for much closer links between humanitarian
actors themselves, as well as between those involved in third world
developmental projects. Local involvement is also recognised as a key
to success:  
“The pressure to effectively coordinate is all the more prevalent as
is a clear recognition of the importance of establishing national
ownership at an early stage. The UN must look to lead effective
and principled humanitarian action, which is also aimed at long
term recovery and addressing the root causes of disasters”. (TPU)
Turning to the Cluster Concept. The Group are in agreement with the
overall aims of the Concept itself and also agree that it should seek to
make global cluster leads accountable to the ERC for ensuring more
effective inter-agency working, and with it a more effective response to
humanitarian disasters. All participants also agreed that whilst the
Cluster Leads are issued with objectives, there is little evidence of an
effective monitoring system to report cluster performance against. The
consensus was that clusters should look to involve local communities
and authorities wherever possible as omission of local governments in
the decision making process can lead to unnecessary tensions and
confusion. PP reiterated the view expressed during Stage II of the
research (see 4.8.1) in that the linkage between the clusters and OCHA
is unclear to some and that this does effect the overall efficiency of the
humanitarian relief system. This is a view shared by TPU who felt that: 
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“Clearer guidelines on the cluster approach, similar to those that 
we [CMCS] issue on Civil-Military Coordination in relief areas
would help everyone not involved with the UN. I have witnessed
local and national confusion as well as a duplication of effort on
occasion which could have been addressed though clearer
direction at the start”  
4.8.2 Understanding and Training
“The demands and expectations on OCHA and its Humanitarian
Coordinators is growing as is the pressure that is placed upon
them. The situation calls for experienced and professional
leadership and this is not always easy to find”. (TPU)
In agreement with the assertions offered in the literature (Tatham and
Altay, 2013; Bolshe et al, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and
Mizushima, 2005), the Group acknowledged the importance of training
and professionalisation within humanitarian logistics. As Goffnet et al
(2013) and Heaslip (2011) discuss, the participants also appreciated the
merits of joint training exercises; however they did recognise that such
initiatives may be difficult to arrange in practice. Some group members
had taken part in such events in the past, but they commented that 
although valuable, attendance had been sporadic; moreover, given the
current financial climate and increasing number of humanitarian relief 
operations, the view was that it may be difficult to justify such a strategy
in the future. 
The Group discussed the UN CMCoord Officer Deployment Plan, which
offers a number of options and is used to provide predictable and
sustainable humanitarian civil-military coordination in the event of 
humanitarian emergencies (OCHA, 2013a). The Plan utilises the phased
deployment of CMCS staff members and additional OCHA personnel, 
together with outsourced consultants to effect a staged approach to the
build-up following a humanitarian disaster. TPU was quick to emphasise
that all of these staff will be appropriately experienced and trained
through the CMCS Training Partnership Programme which offers a
range of courses at a wide variety of venues across the globe. The
following courses were on offer in 2013 (OCHA, 2013b): 
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1. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-
CMCoord) Course. 
2. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-
CMCoord) Field Course. 
3. United Nations Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-
CMCoord) Training of Trainers (ToT) Course . 
4. Humanitarian Civil-Military Coordination (UN-CMCoord)
Familiarisation Course. 
Answering Heaslip’s (2011) call for more cross-fertilisation between the
military, UN agencies and NGOs within training (p.164) the UN-
CMCoord Courses are aimed at military and civilian organisations with
experience in emergency response. The strategy is that UN
representatives as well as those from governments, NGOs and the
military are able to share ideas and discuss operational strategies in a
learning environment (OCHA, 2013b). TPU did concede that attendance
at these courses was difficult for some and that participation from smaller
organisations was very low. He also agreed that whilst the cluster
concept was discussed on these courses it may be a prudent idea to
establish a course aimed at cluster leaders which could clarify roles, 
structures and responsibilities.  
4.8.3 Relationships
There was clear support for the belief that coordination has come a long
way since the OCHA was created and that the organisation was striving
to form stronger relationships between donors, NGOs, and UN agencies; 
but also acknowledgement that this is not always an easy task. During a
discussion on the merits of local engagement and building relationships
with local authorities PP spoke of his experiences during the initial
response to the Haiti earthquake (2010): 
“The majority of Haitians lived in poverty prior to the earthquake, 
and depended on a dysfunctional urban economy which effectively
collapsed within seconds. There was no identifiable authority or
government to speak of, hence establishing relationships with the
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locals was extremely difficult. Prior to the disaster there wasn’t a
functioning economic system but there was political instability and
weak national institutions. This made it very difficult to obtain local
decisions on critical issues, such as land ownership for the
relocation of the hundreds of thousands of displaced Haitians or
on simple things such as waste disposal”. 
This vignette serves to demonstrate the overall Group opinion on the
challenges associated with building relationships with local
organisations, and also illustrates that those challenges are much the
same as those reported within the business sector (Iglesias et al, 2011; 
Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007). Whilst there is a clear
consensus that relationship building with local authorities was a good
strategy, as it helped communities to take ownership of the recovery and
also relief agencies to develop exit strategies at an early stage, in reality
identification of the local authorities was not always an easy task. TPU
returned to the discussion on the Training and Partnership Unit (see
4.9.2) and reminded the Group that this is aimed at establishing
partnerships with a wide variety of global humanitarian relief 
organisations, and that the strategy not only trains OCHA staff but also
aims to promote inter-organisational relationships by offering training to
members of other relief organisations. 
The Group agreed with the view that the private sector is an increasingly
influential contributor to all stages of humanitarian relief (Christopher and
Tatham, 2011, p.1) and also noted the contribution that smaller
contributors have to make. 
“We shouldn’t forget the private sector’s role in this as well as other
emerging smaller contributors, such as religious
organisations……there is a need for OCHA and the international
humanitarian community to establish standards and certification
systems, and this should include ensuring that existing
coordination and partnership strategies are inclusive and effective
at bringing all of these different groups together” (OIC)
As discussed in the literature (Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 
2011) there is also recognition that humanitarian relief workers have
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some significant lessons to learn from the private sector in a number of 
areas including risk management and logistics, and that there is a need
to create relationships with the private sector which may help the
humanitarian community to increase capacity and fill any gaps that exist 
within the humanitarian response. Whilst the increasing number of 
partnerships within the sector were acknowledged, it was argued that 
this is not being reflected by a “growing spirit of community” (PP). The
overall feeling is that inter-organisational relationships are running on a
project timeline and that this is leading to a culture of “working in siloes
with duplication of effort” (PP). Ultimately, the Group conceded that the
sector is predominantly governed by transactional relationships, based
on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than transformational
partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and a feeling of loyalty
and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385). 
4.8.4 Military Involvement
“Whilst the Oslo Guidelines call for the use of military involvement 
in humanitarian relief as a last resort there are clear areas where
the military can offer expertise and resources” (PP)
The Group discussed the availability of military transport and logistics
and other resources as well as the expertise in the provision of flexible
and responsive supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 
2011). These assets, termed Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)
are provided on a non-profit basis and are made available under the
control and coordination of OCHA and the CMCS (OCHA, 2012d). 
Resources will be requested by CMCS through a 24-hour contact point 
system which is established with UN Member States, but only as a last 
resort when all other resources have proved to be insufficient, 
exhausted, or unavailable. Despite these controls there was clear
concern within the Group regarding the idea of “militarising” (PP) the
overall relief effort, and the adverse effect that the presence of foreign
military forces can have on the local population and also on the ability of 
civilian humanitarian organisations to operate freely within certain
countries.  
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“When a humanitarian disaster happens many international
governments will use their military forces as a means of providing
a quick and visible response. This can create a problem when local
and international humanitarian organisations are also involved but 
obviously it is essential that everyone can operate in the same
areas without effecting the overall civilian perception of the
humanitarian relief process” (OIC). 
The Group acknowledged the efforts of some countries and
governments to increase the overall military contribution to the
humanitarian relief effort as discussed by Heaslip (2011), Seipel (2011)
and Tatham (2011) as well as the increasing number of disasters that 
see international and local military forces working alongside civilian relief 
organisations. The view is that the CMCS task of ensuring and
administering collaboration and cooperation between civilian and military
actors is more and more important; however, there was also
acknowledgement that the organisation and its staff have to be aware of 
and promote the humanitarian principles, and aim to help all
organisations to pursue common goals to the benefit of those in need.  
There is also a consensus that the CMCS has to be aware of the political
influence that is often placed on the military participants. OIC spoke of 
the Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines that are produced by OCHA
and offered by way of example the document produced for operations in
Haiti (OCHA, 2011). Hinting at the discussion offered by Heaslip (2011, 
p.163) on the need to establish “clear blue water” between military and
civilian actors, OIC explained that the document was written to address
any potential “blurring of lines between military actors on one side, and
humanitarian actors on the other” and thereby “ensure adequate
arrangements for civil military-engagement and to safeguard
humanitarian principles and action” (OCHA, 2011, p.3). 
4.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues  
As the first of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research
findings, this chapter has drawn upon data gathered from the UN OCHA
and in particular the respondents within the Organisation’s CMCS. 
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Having firstly established the key etic issues and themes through
analysis of questionnaire responses, emic issues were developed and
then investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with
OCHA participants. Finally, additional analysis and application of 
relevant literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within
a participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the final research
strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from
questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the
chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration
within humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to identify how
these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future. 
Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings and
trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-
domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions
and academic contribution. The section will now be broken down into the
key emic themes and issues identified within the UN OCHA arrived at 
through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy and
confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.  
4.9.1 Management and Control 
Initial discussion and analysis surrounding the secondary data available
on the UN OCHA, confirms the organisation’s growing influence within
the coordination of effective humanitarian relief. OCHA’s overall
approach to its role to “bring together humanitarian actors to ensure a
coherent response to emergencies” (OCHA, 2012a) is established, as is
the contribution that the UN CMCS has to make in the facilitation of the
interaction between civilian and military actors within disaster relief 
zones (OCHA, 2012d). Whilst there is agreement with the academic view
that effective coordination has a significant role to play in any supply
chain activity (Carroll and Neu, 2009), the data gathered concurs with
arguments on the challenges that OCHA faces in achieving effective
coordination against the growing number of actors within humanitarian
relief zones (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Moreover, the increasing
scale and number of crises and the worry that such events now occur
simultaneously adds to the issues that OCHA faces, as does the fact that 
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emergencies are now made worse by long term problems such as
extreme poverty, population growth and climate change.  
The positive impact of OCHA’s strategic framework is highlighted and
there is general agreement with the view (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) that 
the use of clusters in general, and the UN Cluster Concept in particular
has a clear role to play in future successes. There is a suggestion within
the literature (Patti, 2006) that clusters have to include both upstream
and downstream customers in order to be effective and in confirming this
opinion, participants added that clusters should not be formed or driven
from the top down. Concerns are raised surrounding effective cluster
implementation, and agreement demonstrated with Porter’s economic
cluster theory (1998), in that whenever possible clusters should strive to
include local authorities at an early stage. In keeping with the thoughts
of Jensen (2012), OCHA’s function is likened to that of a 4PL, and
consequently, cluster leads can learn valuable lessons by considering
the adoption of 4PL strategies (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011). 
Information sharing (Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Bozarth and Handfield, 
2008) is a key to success in disaster relief operations, but the role of 
OCHA in the provision of information is misunderstood in that the
organisation is established to facilitate information sharing and not, as
some believe to carry out information gathering.  
4.9.2 Understanding and Training
Thomas and Mizushima (2005) argue the case for logistics training being
a necessity and not a luxury within the humanitarian sector, and their
views, and those of more recent commentators (Tatham and Altay, 2013; 
Bolshe et al, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011) are echoed as training and
professionalisation were a key theme of discussion amongst OCHA
participants. There is a clear requirement for experienced and
professional humanitarian logisticians, but such skills are not easy to
find. Educational and training strategies should include local
representation and all of those agencies involved in the relief effort, as
this will help to develop and facilitate successful exit strategies post the
disaster and the reconstruction phase. As discussed in the literature
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(Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011), there is recognition that 
humanitarian relief workers have some significant lessons to learn from
the private sector in a number of areas, including risk management and
logistics; moreover, there is a need to create relationships with the
private sector which may help the humanitarian community to increase
capacity and to fill any gaps that exist within the current humanitarian
response. Consequently, the availability of OCHA training courses, 
which are aimed at establishing partnerships with a wide variety of global
humanitarian relief organisations should be highlighted (OCHA, 2013b); 
however, attendance at these courses is difficult for some organisations
and very limited from other, smaller organisations. Furthermore, whilst 
the cluster concept is discussed on these courses it might be prudent to
establish a course specifically for cluster leaders.  
4.9.3 Relationships
Coordination within humanitarian relief zones has improved markedly
since the formation of OCHA, but there is still an ongoing requirement 
for more improvement, and a need for the establishment of stronger
relationships between all actors within the sector. The relationship that 
exists between humanitarian actors will change depending on the type
of emergency, and on the initial roles and responsibilities that are agreed
for the associated military contributors. The UN CMCS is seen by some
humanitarian relief organisations as the power broker (Burt, 2005) within
the supply chain, although the organisation’s role is as a centre for
advice and support, rather than one that necessarily provides leadership. 
The challenges associated with building relationships with local
organisations within the humanitarian sector, reflect the views on the
similar issues faced by those within the business sector (Iglesias et al, 
2011; Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007). There is clear
correlation with literary opinion on the importance of early local
engagement (Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005) and on effective coordination
with local authorities. OCHA’s role is to facilitate such initiatives whilst at 
the same time aiming to return control to local government at the earliest 
opportunity. Such strategies help communities to take ownership of the
recovery and also assist aid relief agencies in the development of exit 
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strategies at an early stage; however, in reality identification of 
appropriate local authorities is not always an easy task. 
There is an increasing contribution from the business sector, and an
associated growth in the number of partnerships between business and
humanitarian organisations; however, this is not reflected by a
corresponding growth in a spirit of community. These views concur with
the thoughts on the challenges surrounding Hastily Formed Networks
(Kumar and Havey, 2013) and with those of Senge (2010) on the lack of 
trust and propensity for transactional relationships within modern day
Supply Chains. Inter-organisational relationships are organised and
agreed against project timelines, and this results in a culture of working
within siloes which lead to unnecessary duplication of effort. Ultimately, 
the humanitarian sector is predominantly governed by transactional
relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than
transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and a
feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385). Disagreeing with the
view that market competition does not really influence organisations
within the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 
2102) the opinion amongst OCHA participants echoes academic
commentary (Olson and Gregorian, 2007) in that there is evidence of 
competition between donor organisations, which has a negative effect 
on the overall relief effort. In essence, there is a propensity amongst 
donor organisations to try and be noticed through involvement in the
higher profile elements of the disaster relief process, such as those that 
may appear on the worldwide media.  
4.9.4 Military Involvement
OCHA is trying to establish a more predictable approach to the
involvement of military resources within humanitarian relief zones by
encouraging their use in not just the disaster relief stage, but also in the
build-up and recovery phases, clearly linking to Kovács and Spens
(2008, 2007) discussions on the different phases of disaster relief 
operations and, in particular to their call for an increase in the military
contribution within the preparation and reconstruction phases. The
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inevitability of military involvement within disaster relief operations is
accepted and regarded as a means of maintaining supply chain
resilience (Christopher, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011), particularly
where there is a perceived risk to the well-being of humanitarian actors. 
However, a question still remains as although military intervention is
seen by some international governments as a means of demonstrating
a timely response, the conflict between a military presence and the
maintenance of humanitarian principles (Tomansi and Van
Wassenhove, 2009) presents a clear challenge for future disaster
response operations. Weiss and Collins (2000) note the dilemma that 
may emerge when humanitarian organisations are asked to provide aid
in regions where armed conflict means that non-combatants are being
targeted by a warring party, and the data gathered acknowledges the
need for military assistance in such disaster relief areas. However, there
is also agreement with the Humanitarian Policy Group Report (2009) in
that violence against aid workers in other humanitarian areas has
reduced over the last 5 years, and that this is probably due to overall
improvements within the management and assessment of security risk.
Humanitarian relief organisations, and in particular those sponsored by
the UN, do struggle to maintain a meaningful presence and safe access
to affected victims who are located in areas of inherent conflict. Despite
these issues, reflecting the academic discourse on the reluctance of 
some aid organisations to accept military assistance (Heaslip, 2011; 
Seipel, 2011; Beauregard, 1998), it is also evident that the UN CMCS
strategy is to avoid a military response whenever possible, and to refrain
from the use of armed escorts and centralisation or restricted movement. 
Despite these challenges, reassuringly, the data also offers empirical
support to the assertion that relief organisations will always find a way to
deliver aid to affected populations (Heaslip, 2011). Moreover, in light of 
changes in the overall UN security management strategy, there has
been a shift in approach amongst some organisations, who now
appreciate the importance of remaining in the secure environment that 
military contributors provide.
As discussed in the literature (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 
2011), some countries and governments are seeking to increase the
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overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort and there is
a corresponding increase in the number of disasters that see
international and local military forces working alongside civilian relief 
organisations; however, the UN CMCS is also conscious that it has to
be aware of the political influence that is often placed on those military
participants. Consequently, the Civil-Military Coordination Guidelines
that are produced by OCHA for disaster relief operations, are written to
effectively address any potential blurring of lines between military actors
on the one side and humanitarian actors on the other (Heaslip, 2011); 
thereby, safeguarding the humanitarian principles (Tomansi and Van
Wassenhove, 2009). 
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CHAPTER 5
THE UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE JOINT FORCES COMMAND –
INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS
"Some enabling military capabilities are best delivered jointly. To
provide a more effective vehicle for organising, commanding and
championing some of these capabilities, we propose setting up a Joint 
Forces Command (JFC)."  
(MOD, 2011)  
5.1 Introduction
The data gathered from the UK Ministry of Defence (MOD) Joint Forces
Command (JFC) is presented and discussed concurrently with
appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first 
introduced within Chapter 2. By way of introduction a short background
and history of the UK military contribution to humanitarian disaster relief 
is included. A discussion on the strategy behind the Joint Forces Logistic
Component (JFLogC) then follows, together with narrative on the
organisation’s role within the planning and coordination of the UK military
contribution to humanitarian disaster relief. The UK MOD’s definitions of 
disaster relief operations are then explained and clarified before the
future strategy for the JFC (post 2012) is considered, together with a
consideration of the on-going and escalating MOD involvement within
disaster relief. A listing of respondents and their backgrounds (Table 5.1)
is included before the discussion turns to an analysis of the key etic and
emic issues and themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain
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themes and issues are then established through triangulation of the data
gathered and the academic discourse.  
5.2 Background – UK Military Contribution to Humanitarian
Disaster Relief
Following a humanitarian disaster the UK government may be requested
to mount or lend support to the relief effort in the country or region
affected (see discussion on the role of a humanitarian military, Fischer, 
2011). The UK contribution will usually be led by the Department for
International Development (DFID) who may call on military assistance if 
civilian resources are insufficient or if this approach provides a
comparative advantage. A Service Level Agreement exists between
DFID and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) should this military contribution
be required. Weiss and Campbell (1991) note that it seems that when
disasters, either natural or man-made occur, governments often turn to
the military for help as the military have certain resources immediately to
hand, such as food, medicine and fuel as well as transport and human
assets with which to distribute them. However, it should be noted at this
stage that under United Nations agreements, the use of military foreign
humanitarian aid must always be as a “last resort” (UN, 2006, p4). 
Logistics is regarded as fundamental to every military activity in all
environments (MOD, 2003). Forces involved on operations, wherever
they may be, require the right level of support at the right time, in the
right place. The challenge lies in the identification of right and its most 
effective, economical and efficient delivery. Historically, each UK military
service has been responsible for delivering its own support and whilst 
this arrangement provided commanders with sound guarantees it came
at a price; heavy resource costs, duplication of effort and an unwieldy
and complex logistics tail (MOD, 2003, p1-1). In a bid to make best use
of limited resources, whilst also being cognisant of the critical need for
rapid and flexible response, the JFLogC was formed by the UK MOD in
2003. The JFLogC was formed in the light of the need to be prepared to
operate logistically within multiservice, multinational environments, in
which it may be necessary to provide both support to, and draw from
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other nations and organisations. For the purposes of the JFLogC
logistics is defined as “the science of planning and carrying out the
movement and maintenance of forces” (MOD, 2003, p1-2) whilst joint 
logistics is “the co-ordinated mutual logistic support of two or more
[military] Services” (MOD, 2003, p1-3). 
The JFLogC is tasked with the planning and coordination of all military
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief Operations (HADRO)
(MOD, 2008). JFLogC policy and doctrine (MOD, 2003) identifies the
possible requirement for the MOD to initiate humanitarian and related
operations and acknowledges that these will involve personnel and
formations adapting quickly to a ‘non-war fighting stance’ (p9-2). As a
consequence, the type of commodity or functional service required will
alter subtly from warlike stores to those for humanitarian needs. This
change will require rapid adjustment to the logistic demands within the
supply chain; for example where once ammunition handling was
required there may be a need for the bulk movement of food, water, tents
and the like. Military doctrine (MOD, 2003) dictates that where
operations are associated with the provision of humanitarian relief then
those personnel involved will be expected to take account of the
remaining national infrastructure, establish environmental conditions, 
provide liaison with the local civilian authorities and, most importantly the
reporting media. Indeed, note is taken of the negative effect that a lack
of attention or application to the media response to the military logistics
contribution can ultimately have at a political level (p9-3). Military
doctrine does stress that the delivery of humanitarian assistance must 
be perceived to be impartial, and that any aid or support that is provided
should enhance the perceived legitimacy of the deployed forces
amongst the recipient population and other humanitarian actors within
the affected region (MOD, 2008, p4-3). 
5.2 MOD Definitions
The MOD (2008) utilise 2 distinct definitions of disaster assistance to
help them to define and plan the associated level of response. A Disaster
Relief Operation (DRO) is defined as a “primary military task and
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contribution to a disaster relief response” (p1-2). Such a task should be
designed to provide specific assistance to an afflicted overseas
population. Humanitarian Assistance is designated as a secondary
military task, which is defined as “the provision of relief aid by military
forces conducting operations other than DROs” (p1-2). By way of 
example, consideration of the UK MOD contribution to the response to 2
earthquakes in Central Asia, illustrates the distinction between a DRO
and Humanitarian Assistance: 
Earthquake in Northern Pakistan, October 2005: UK Chinook
helicopters were involved in the relief effort as part of an Operation
specifically mounted in response to a request from the Pakistani
government for assistance in respect of this disaster, hence this
example represents a DRO. 
Earthquake in Northern Afghanistan, March 2002: UK Chinook
helicopters were once again involved in the relief effort but were
already deployed within Afghanistan in support of the International
Security Assistance Force (ISAF). They undertook relief flights as
a secondary task within the wider ISAF mission, hence this
represents Humanitarian Assistance. 
5.4 Future Strategy – The Joint Forces Command  
Established to ensure that a range of vital military capabilities, functions
and organisations, such as logistics, medical services, training education
and intelligence were organised and managed effectively and efficiently
to support success on military operations, the JFC achieved Initial
Operating Capability in April 2012. The launch of the JFC was regarded
as a major milestone in the MOD's Transforming Defence programme
(MOD, 2012) as it brought together a number of joint Defence
organisations including the JFLogC. The JFC was to ensure that 
investment in joint capabilities is appropriate and coherent, and to seek
to strengthen the link between experience in operational theatres and
top-level decision-making. The creation of the JFC was recommended
by the Defence Reform review (MOD, 2011), led by Lord Levene, as part 
of what has been regarded as the most significant programme of change
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across the MOD in a generation (see discussion within the Strategic
Defence and Security Review, direct.gov, 2010). The total number of 
military and civilian personnel in the JFC will be in the region of 30,000, 
a figure which includes those forces deployed on operations. These
personnel are at sites across the UK, overseas in the Permanent Joint 
Operating Bases, and on operations in military theatres around the
world, most notably Afghanistan (MOD, 2012).  
5.5 On-going and Escalating MOD Contribution to Disaster Relief
With the end of the Cold War, the UK government has become more
involved in the provision of humanitarian aid, not only through the
funding of UN Agencies and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
but also with the tasking of its armed forces. The 1998 Strategic Defence
Review (MOD, 1998) signalled greater emphasis on, and
acknowledgement of the provision of ‘Peace Support and Humanitarian
Operations’ (p22) and such a focus focus has continued in more recent 
governmental publications resulting in the Humanitarian Emergency
Response Review (HERR, 2011) which, under the chairmanship of Lord
Ashdown considered the way that the UK government responds to
humanitarian emergencies. The review identified that: 
“It is because the impulse to relieve suffering is rooted in morality
that our interventions to relieve suffering at times of disaster must 
always be driven by need and need alone. Nevertheless, the fact 
that Britain is prepared to play a full part (and often a leading part)
as a member of the international community in order to relieve
suffering at times of crisis makes for, not only a more
compassionate world, but a safer one too – and that benefits all of 
us”. (HERR, 2011, p3)
As a consequence of this continued and developing governmental focus, 
the UK MOD are involved in a wide variety of on-going relief efforts
across the globe. For example, each year Royal Navy (RN) personnel
who are employed on the Atlantic Patrol Task (North) pre-position a
warship and supporting royal fleet auxiliary ships in the Caribbean for
the hurricane season. In 2007 such RN resources followed some 150
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miles behind Hurricane Dean and after its destructive landfall in Belize, 
joined British Army personnel who were training in the region at the time
to assist in relief efforts. Later in the same season a RN Lynx Helicopter
was tasked to deliver aid following Tropical Storm Noel’s devastating
landfall in the Dominican Republic. More recently the deployment of RN
(The Telegraph, 2013) and Royal Air Force (RAF) resources (BBC
News, 2013c) in support of Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines serves to
further illustrate the escalating MOD contribution to the aid effort.  
5.6 Data Collection, Respondents and Results
JFLogC were first contacted in February 2012 through a series of 
introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research
methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 5.1: 
Respondent Military
Rank
Time
with
MOD
(years)
Relevant Practical 
Experience
Role Code
Commandant
JFLogC
Air Cdre 25 Afghanistan, 
Pakistan
Earthquake, Haiti, 
Asian Tsunami
(Banda Aceh), 
Africa, Balkans
Leadership and overall
command of the
JFLogC.  
CDT
Component
Commander
JFLogC
Colonel 20 Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Bosnia, Pakistan, 
Asian Tsunami
(Banda Aceh)
Control and
management of force-
level logistic support and
resources engaged in a
response operation. 
COM
SO1 HADRO Lieutenant 
Colonel
22 Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Haiti  
Development of overall
response strategy given
a particular operation
and management of that 
strategy from within the
UK Headquarters. 
SO1
SO2 HADRO Major 15 Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Bosnia
Support to the overall
strategy development. 
Reconnaissance of 
disaster areas and
assessment of on-site
needs. 
SO21
SO2 HADRO
Lieutenant 
Cdr RN
18 Caribbean Hurricane
Relief (x3)  SO22
SO3 HADRO
Flight 
Lieutenant 
10 Afghanistan Direct liaison between
JFLogC and site
facilities. 
SO3
Table 5.1: JFLogC – Key Respondents
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5.6.1 Natural Disasters and Complex Emergencies  
Prior to a discussion on, and analysis of the data gathered from the
JFLogC participants it should be noted that whilst the focus of this
research was on the immediate response to natural disasters, it quickly
became apparent that respondents did not make the same distinction
between natural disasters and complex emergencies that can be seen
in the academic discourse, which does acknowledge the inherent 
differences between the required responses (Cross, 2012; Balcik et al, 
2010, Kovács and Taham, 2009). Consequently, JFLogC respondents
regard their experiences to be of equal importance irrespective of the
type of disaster (Van Wassenhove, 2006). Hence, at times the data and
associated analysis of JFLogC data will refer to participant experiences
within complex emergencies, as these are viewed to be of equal
importance in helping to address the final research question and aim of 
this thesis. 
5.7 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues
Analysis of the data gathered from JFLogC via the introductory
questionnaires (Appendix D), will now be discussed. In achieving this
due consideration will be given to the practical relevance of the initial etic
issues and themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and
codified at Appendix E. Note that respondent codes within Table 5.1 will
be used at this stage.  
5.7.1 Humanitarian Principles and Space
The four humanitarian principles were acknowledged by all participants
and given equal priority by the senior respondents (CDT, COM, SO1); 
however, whilst all of the junior respondents (SO21,22, SO3) ranked
humanity (HUMSHUM) and impartiality (HUMSIMP) as the most 
important principles they did not offer a view on the significance of 
neutrality (HUMNEU) and independence (HUMSIND). Perhaps this is
understandable given the clear conflict between these principles and
their chosen military careers (POLINF, POLMOT). The senior
respondent (CDT) also commented on the importance of the Oslo
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Guidelines (UN, 2006a) in the maintenance of the humanitarian
principles when his staff were called upon to work alongside civilian
organisations and local governments on disaster relief operations
(SUSCSR).  
  
  
5.7.2 Collaboration, Organisation and Power
All respondents believed that they were in a position to establish and
facilitate an effective supply chain (COLRES) that was specifically
designed for the delivery of humanitarian aid. Moreover, whilst all
respondents acknowledged and recognised that they operate within the
UN Cluster concept, the junior respondents saw this as a bottleneck to
success and questioned its ability to offer practical coordination in an
operational context (COLCLU). The senior respondents (CDT, COM, 
SO1) were happy to take the lead in future operations (PWRPOS, RMT)
and all respondents recorded that they were content to work with other
organisations and to share facilities and resources (COLRES, COLALL, 
COLHOR, COLVER). Validity of contribution was important to the senior
respondent (CDT) and all respondents ranked the demonstration of 
Corporate Social Responsibility (SUSCSR) above the demonstration of 
competitive behaviour towards other contributors (SUSSTRAT).  
  
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Humanitarian Principles/ Military Role/ 
Politics/ Maintenance of Oslo Guidelines
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
UN Cluster Concept/ Power and
Relationship Management/ Collaboration/ 
Corporate Social Responsibility  
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5.7.3 Summary – JFLogC Key Etic Themes and Issues
Theme  Issue Description Notes
Humanitarian
Principles and
Space
Humanitarian
Principles
Neutrality and
Impartiality
Conflict with military
values
Military Role Conflict with
humanitarian
principles
How addressed
Politics Political influence on
decisions  
Affect?
Maintenance of 
Oslo Guidelines
Importance of 
Guidelines
How achieved/ 
maintained/ 
enforced
Clarify meaning/ 
understanding
Collaboration, 
Organisation
and Power
UN Cluster
Concept 
Success of the
approach
Successes?
Examples?  
How established/ 
managed/ 
maintained
Power Between military, 
local and national
governments and
NGOs
How received?
Successes?
Examples?
Relationship
Management 
Collaboration
Corporate
Social
Responsibility
Demonstration of 
CSR
How?
Examples?
Table 5.2: JFLOGC – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues
5.8 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and
Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with
members of JFLogC listed in Table 5.1 will now be discussed. In keeping
with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based around
the schedule (Appendix F) which had been developed following cross-
domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and issues
that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes listed
within Table 5.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
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5.8.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration
“By the time we got there, there were already a lot of organisations
on the ground. All of the NGOs had flooded in and pitched their
tents with their flags flying. What was evident to me was that there
were a number of organisations on the ground that had to
demonstrate that they were there, but how effective they were
being and what their reason for being there other than that was not 
really clear to me. It was pretty chaotic because NGOs don’t like to
be told what to do, they don’t like to be coordinated and
commanded or controlled”. (CDT)
The thoughts above illustrate how the data reveals a common perception
amongst the respondents within the JFLogC in respect of NGO presence
within disaster relief zones. In keeping with the thoughts of Heaslip (2011
and 2010) on the military’s suspicion of aid workers and the inherent lack
of understanding between military contributors and NGOs, questioning
of the actual contribution of some non-military participants is a common
theme as is a clear need amongst JFLogC participants to understand
the reasons behind why some NGOs are in the disaster region at all. 
There is obvious frustration at the fact that these organisations are taking
up valuable space on the ground (SO1) whilst, in the eyes of JFLogC
participants, they make no visible contribution to the overall aid effort. 
Comments regarding chaos and a lack of coordination are perhaps
understandable, as military ethos and training are traditionally and
necessarily based around identifiable structure, command and control
and reporting procedures (see for example Joint Defence Publication 3-
52, MOD, 2008). The data gathered supports the view (Heaslip, 2010)
that whilst military personnel are happy to be led and controlled in a top-
down manner, members of the NGO community, in the eyes of the
military appear to be somewhat disorganised, but at the same time
significantly more operationally flexible. Observations that are supported
by Thompson (2010) who notes that “even though military forces have a
huge potential to make a difference in the [disaster relief] logistics arena
sensitivities remain” (p.2) and Heaslip (2010) who believes that these
“radically different” methodologies and guiding principles can result in
clashes. COM was keen to describe his frustration and annoyance at 
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what he described as “the ridiculous reticence of some NGOs to remain
deliberately uncoordinated for no good reason”. 
The following demonstrates a commonly held view amongst JFLogC
contributors in respect of the UN Cluster Concept: 
“The UN Cluster Concept works in the final area of delivery. The
UN believes that it works upstream but it doesn’t work like that. In
my experience it at least provides a way of having a nightly meeting
to try and facilitate some order of coordination amongst those who
are there. To be fair it sort of works a bit but the name ‘Cluster’ is
a really apt name for it!” (COM)
In clear disagreement with the academic support for a clustered
approach (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 
2006; Porter, 1998) it is evident amongst the more junior respondents in
particular (SO21, SO22 and SO3), that the concept is held in some
contempt and that, in keeping with Jensen’s (2012) thoughts, in practice
is regarded as a hindrance to successful provision of disaster relief. 
Participants clearly disagree with the assertion that clusters allow
participants to operate more productively (Patti, 2006), and feel that the
UN Cluster Concept actually “stove pipes” the relief effort, meaning that 
contributors just focus on their own perceived area of expertise; 
moreover clusters are regarded as something that NGOs can hide
behind whilst working in isolation (SO3). The data confirms that there is
a common understanding of the concept of Supply Chain Collaboration
and it is reassuring to note that the definitions offered by JFLogC
respondents are in agreement with the academic views already
discussed within this thesis. However, this common understanding
seems to exacerbate the situation for JFLogC as it serves to highlight 
what CDT regarded as “visible flaws in the UN Cluster Concept idea”. In
essence, respondents can see the need for the Cluster Concept, but are
frustrated by its inability to achieve its aims in reality. Agreeing with
Jensen’s (2012) thoughts on the challenges for cluster leaders to take
responsibility in an environment where many independent organisations
“often object to being directed” (p.148), the comment that serves to sum
up the JFLogC feelings on the UN Cluster Concept comes from SO1: 
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“What they really need is a good Sergeant Major to coordinate the
effort on the ground!”
The data gathered within JFLogC does not make happy reading for the
UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which
COM regarded as the “biggest misnomer around as OCHA doesn’t do
coordination”. The consensus of opinion amongst respondents is that 
OCHA may work in what CDT described as “peace time”, meaning
during periods of quiet, but that it is “unable to produce the goods on the
ground when it really has to”, referring to times following events where
immediate disaster response is called for. A clear theme within the data
is that OCHA do not really coordinate disaster relief events and hence
do little to address the issue of “stove piping” discussed earlier in this
section. This belief would seem to misalign itself with the stated overall
aims of OCHA itself (OCHA, 2012a) and of the UN Cluster Approach
(UN, OCHA, 2005) in particular. Rickard (2003) is clear in the view that 
within humanitarian relief zones “Logistics planning and coordination
need to be seen as essential rather than merely desirable”; however, the
senior respondents (CDT, COM) agree that they have seen little
evidence of any improvement in this area since OHCA’s introduction. 
CDT refers to the “Crowded Stage” (Heaslip, 2011, p150) as he cites an
example where aid was being received in a disaster relief zone that was
“clogging up the area”, and was clearly frustrated as he believed that 
“most of the aid that arrived was not needed” or had “arrived at the wrong
time”:  
“If the UN OCHA cannot resolve these sort of issues then who
should…”. (CDT)  
Furthermore, CDT believed that this lack of coordination meant that 
there was: 
“no real organisation of NGOs as they arrive in the disaster relief 
zone……it [the relief effort] grows organically as NGOs pitch tents
wherever they can as they arrive and stake a claim to their
ground……”. 
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These observations seem to echo academic discourse on the
importance of coordination and information flow (Ernst, 2003; Rickard, 
2003) and the overall assertion on the requirement for a comprehensive
needs analysis prior to the commencement of any disaster relief effort:  
“What is clear is that contributors [NGOs] are flying in due to the
urgency to be seen to be doing something on the ground. I believe
that this should not happen straight away and that there is a
requirement to stand back, assess what is the real need in the
context of the particular operation and then to act, something else
that OCHA claim to do but from my experiences do not achieve in
reality” (COM)
Sadly, the data also demonstrates that things have not really moved on
since the observations made by Reindorp and Wiles in 2001, who whilst 
observing humanitarian coordination within the field, conclude that 
humanitarian responses are often based on insufficient analysis of the
context of the disaster and that contributing agencies often struggle to
make a telling impact due to a lack of local knowledge (Reindorp and
Wiles, 2001). 
5.8.2 Power and Relationships
“There is a power base in that scale does matter. Some smaller
organisations who might be delivering in the same field do rely on
some of the bigger ones for logistical support. Others jealously
guard their independence as they do not want to be seen to be
tarnished by others. As a general rule they [NGOs] are happier
operating on their own rather than in alliance with others”. (CDT)
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Supply Chain Control/ OCHA Role/ UN
Cluster Concept/ Coordination/ Local
Control
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Clearly contesting the concept of a value chain (Porter, 1990), a common
view amongst the JFLogC respondents concurs with that offered by
CDT. Whilst Porter argued for efficiency and effectiveness through the
formation of supply chain networks the inherent theme within the data
reflects the views of Chandes and Paché (2010) and Olson and
Gregorian (2007) in that in order to be successful NGOs rely on
competition for resources, ground and other assets. Consequently, the
view is that there is a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be
seen to act alone rather than in partnership with others. In essence the
military view is that: 
“NGOs are not happy to be led and are much happier when
working alone” (COM).  
Burt (2005) contends that an organisation can become a power broker
by creating bridges to cross what he terms the structural holes within a
supply chain; hence, in light of this discussion, and the foregoing on the
military requirement for an identifiable management structure, it is
unsurprising that JFLogC respondents are quick to offer the view that 
they would happily assume the role of the power broker (Kumar and
Havey, 2013; Don and Teegan, 2003) and adopt lead status within a
humanitarian relief zone if the opportunity arose. However, CDT made
some interesting and candid points about what he described as the
arrogant attitude that is sometimes evident amongst him and his
colleagues: 
“The trouble with the military is that we think that we always know
best, however in this context [disaster and humanitarian relief] that 
is clearly not the case”  
Echoing the views of Heaslip (2011, 2010) on the level of understanding
between military humanitarian contributors and their civilian
counterparts, CDT went on to explain that the military do not understand
what he describes as “the humanitarian landscape” nor do they have an
appreciation of “NGOs and what they can do”. CDT acknowledges that 
NGOs are the “experts in their field” and that the military could clearly
learn a lot from them. However, reflecting Seipel’s (2011) assertions
regarding the “over-inflated view of their own capabilities” (p.227) that is
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inherent amongst some military contributors, CDT is also quick to argue
that the reciprocal of this is also true in that “NGOs could learn a lot from
the military in respect of command and control and other niche skills that 
military logisticians possess”. SO1 also has strong views on what he
described as “niche areas” and these will be discussed within the
following section. 
Data on the issue of trust supported the view proffered by Heaslip (2011)
as it revealed a common perception that respondents feel that they are
not trusted by NGOs and other donor organisations, and that this is in
part due to a “clear misunderstanding of the military role within
humanitarian relief” (SO22): 
“NGOs should be made aware of what the military can do for them
and also why we are there…education is the key…..” (SO22)
This idea is expanded upon in the next section where measures to
“educate NGOs” will be discussed. 
Tatham and Kovács (2010) develop Hung et al’s (2004) discussion on a
peripheral route to trust and suggested a model for the establishment of 
swift trust within the Hastily Formed Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013)
which are inherent within humanitarian relief zones. The data gathered
suggests broad agreement that relationships and relationship
management is “what the military are trained to facilitate” (SO1). More
than one respondent was quick to highlight the extensive experience that 
they had of rapidly establishing teams and nurturing the relationships
that are associated with success.  
“I have witnessed good and bad relationships but talking to people
is what we are about” (SO21).  
Referring again to the issue of trust (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 
2010), and on the need for mutual trust and openness within successful
partnerships (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), SO1
acknowledged that the public perception of the UK military has been
tarnished by recent interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that this
might have an adverse effect on relationships with other organisations; 
he also suggested that working relationships could be built by putting
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forward the idea that JFLogC should be regarded as the “acceptable
face of military”: 
“JFLogC is about the provision of logistics support and that is what 
is needed in disaster relief zones. High readiness and rapid
response is what disaster relief calls for and we can provide that. 
We should remind other donor organisations that the JFLogC are
not a war fighting command and that we are there to help”
  
5.8.3 The Humanitarian Space
“Some organisations do trade on their Independence and are
obsessive in trying to demonstrate independence and impartiality. 
They are renowned for it, believing that they do what they do and
do it very well”. (SO1)  
Despite the academic view that the humanitarian principles must be
present to constitute a humanitarian operation (Seipel, 2011; Tomansini
and van Wassenhove, 2009) SO1’s statement typifies the data gathered
within the JFLogC on the subject of the Humanitarian Space and
Principles (DFID, 2008). There is obvious frustration at the influence that 
the humanitarian principles have on the overall disaster relief effort but 
also an evident scepticism amongst respondents in the fact that these
principles could prove to be “malleable when required” (CDT). By way of 
support to this assertion, CDT offered the following vignette in respect of 
his experiences during the disaster relief effort to the Pakistani
Earthquake (2005): 
“We were asked to provide helicopter support to an NGO who had
a very strong reputation for its impartiality and independence and
was well known for its refusal to accept military assistance or to
work alongside the military in any capacity. I discussed the
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Relationships/ Humanitarian Landscape/ 
Expertise/ Acceptable face of the military
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requirements with the NGO representative on the ground and he
presented me with an ultimatum on behalf of his head office. We
were to put red crosses on the sides of the aircraft involved, our
aircrew were not to fly in their military flying clothing and no
weapons were to be carried. For sound military reasons I refused
on all 3 counts whereupon the representative agreed that he was
happy to work with us anyway. He later told me that had he passed
my response back to his head office the chances were that they
would have refused him permission to use our aircraft. An example
of a pragmatic decision on the ground that led to the successful
delivery of life saving aid”. 
The clear message that comes out of this vignette and the one that is
supported by similar responses from other JFLogC respondents is that 
NGO representatives employed in disaster relief areas are relatively
happy to work with the military under the right circumstances, but that 
further up the NGO managerial chain there is a different attitude in
respect of the maintenance of the humanitarian principles; thereby
underpinning the view that during humanitarian relief operations, 
“strongly motivated people from the military and NGO organisations
usually find ways to surmount barriers that they encounter” (Heaslip, 
2011, p.163).  
Analysing the associated JFLogC data highlights the fact that in keeping
with the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR, 2011)
discussed earlier, the military are very keen to do significantly more in
respect of the disaster relief effort; however, the respondents see the
humanitarian principles and associated NGO attitudes to them as a real
barrier to effective progress in this area: 
“We want to up the profile of the military within humanitarian relief 
and my organisation has been established to do just that, but the
humanitarian principles seem to be a real hindrance in achieving
this aim” (COM).  
To that end, and in keeping with the discourse on integrating learning
(Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip 2011) and learning mechanisms for
humanitarian logistics (Lu et al, 2013) members of the HADRO team are
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keen to establish links within NGOs and to deliver presentations on what 
the military can offer by way of contribution. SO1 believes that NGOs are
“naïve to think that the military can just provide security and heavy lift 
helicopters and they should tap in to a lot more relevant capability”. 
Citing the UK military publications on Logistics for Joint Operations
(MOD, 2003) and on Doctrine for Disaster Relief Operations (MOD, 
2008), SO1 went on to discuss the following “niche areas” where he
believed that his organisation can make a meaningful contribution: 
1. Initial reconnaissance and identification of need. 
2. Provision of effective data links and information gathering. 
3. Logistics planning and coordination both immediate and longer
term. 
4. Establishment of central operations centres and the associated
command and control. 
5. Engineering and building projects to re-establish infrastructure and
logistics links. 
Ultimately SO1 felt that military personnel can offer the same “can do”
attitude that he had witnessed amongst members of NGOs engaged in
the provision of disaster relief “on the ground”; however, when pressed
he did agree that his niche areas do look remarkably similar to the overall
aims of the UN Cluster Concept and the associated OCHA
responsibilities (OCHA, 2005); moreover they would also seem to reflect 
the economic cluster theory proffered by Porter (1998) and developed
by Patti (2006). 
Turning to the political dimension CDT supported the academic view on
the linkage between governments and their military (Yaziji, 2009; 
Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003; Weiss and Collins, 2000). CDT
believes that in a lot of disaster affected areas “the local military are the
government” and that: 
“NGOs should realise that by working with the local military they
are effectively working with the local government”.  
193
CDT went on to develop the idea that in lots of countries where disaster
happens, boundaries between the military and government are unclear
and asserts that NGOs should be ready to adapt to this: 
“Whilst NGOs don’t like dealing with military, they need to
understand that the local military is the government and therefore
they should be happy to work alongside them in appropriate
circumstances”.  
On a similar theme COM felt that in his experience host nations are all
too happy to “hand over their sovereignty to the NGOs”, and that local
governments should look to “be strong and maintain overall control of 
the disaster relief effort”. He offers the following vignette regarding his
experiences of the events following the Asian Tsunami (2004):  
“One of the great strengths in Banda Ache was the Indonesian
military ground forces as they were effectively the government’s
representatives on the ground. When we arrived they had a clear
plan that mapped out where the relief effort would be within 3
weeks and when contributors including ourselves would be
expected to leave the area. It was evident that despite being fully
aware of the need for outside assistance, they were not happy to
hand over control of the situation to any other organisation and as
a result they maintained control over the NGOs and other
contributors in the area. This framework gave the Indonesian
military and government clear control.”
COM believes that other nations should consider this approach and that 
forward planning would enable them to control the “flood of contributors”
into their country as well as the “influx of foreign aid and NGOs”. He feels
that governments have certain levers to use to facilitate this control, for
example visa allocation, but did acknowledge that what are invariably
desperate nations have to remain “forceful enough to make such
strategies happen”.  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Political Pressure/ Local
Governments/Perception
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5.8.4 Organisational Sustainment
“In Haiti there must have been over 300 NGOs and other
organisations on the ground when we arrived. They were all there
taking up precious hard standing in an area where, ironically
ground space was at a premium, but I did struggle to see what they
were all doing there………..the vast array of different coloured
tents, banners and logos on show did serve to brighten up the
place” (SO1)
“When we arrived all of the NGOs were in tents on the hard
standing with flags flying, it quickly became apparent that their
main aim seemed to be get the publicity as its good for fund
raising”. (COM)
“I have seen the UN Cluster Concept used to allocate areas to
each organisation and this seemed important for each NGO to
have their own area where they can demonstrate that they are
doing stuff to their donors”. (CDT)
The thoughts offered above reflect those of all of the JFLogC
respondents as there is a clear perception that the demonstration of 
“presence on ground” (COM) is a key issue for NGOs within
humanitarian relief zones. Moreover, some respondents regard this as
the main reason why so many organisations quickly arrive in a disaster
relief zone and then seem to “add little if anything to the actual relief 
effort” (SO22). 
“What was evident to me was that there were a number of 
organisations on the ground that had to demonstrate that they
were there, but how effective they were being and what their
reason for being there other than that was not really clear to me”. 
(CDT)  
CDT’s frustration triggered the discussion which has already been
related in the last section regarding strong local control over NGOs and
the levers that nations have to control the “flood of contributors” (COM). 
CDT believes that a “fear of a loss of funding” may actually drive NGOs
to “utilise their resources in an inefficient yet publically acceptable way”; 
an opinion that would seem to echo those of Olson and Gregorian (2007)
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who highlight the negative impact that funding relationships and
competition can have on the coordination process and those of Kent 
(1987) who discusses the adverse influence on NGO’s of a “fear of donor
withdrawal”.  
5.8.5 Summary – JFLogC Key Emic Themes and Issues
Theme Issue Description Notes
Management 
and Control
Supply Chain Who has overall control? Issues brought bycomplexity
UN Cluster
Concept 
Ineffective;  
Stove pipes effort 
Frustration at lack
of overall impact 
Coordination
NGOs Who coordinates  
Ineffective? Doesn’t work
Local control Who maintains this? Strength of local
governments
Understanding
and Training
OCHA Misnomer  What is its Role?
NGOs
Roles Overall
Contribution
Why so many?
Why are some
there?
Humanitarian
landscape Lack of knowledge How to educate
Relationships  
Community
Military vs Civilian How to develop
Avoided by some NGOs Why?
Acceptable face
of the military What is it?
How to
demonstrate to
other
participants?
NGOs
Reticence to work alone How to change
perception and
opinionDon’t trust the military
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Understanding of NGOs role/ Control of 
NGOs  
196
Theme Issue Description Notes
Expertise Trained to nurture asense of community How to exploit 
Military
Involvement 
Pressure to do
more
Demonstrate more
humanitarian involvement
Exploit niche
areas
Local
Governments
Work with local
authorities and do not 
take over sovereignty
How to ensure  
Help to maintain overall
control
Strength of local
governments
Perception JFLOGC is not a Warfighting Command
How to change
perceptions
Table 5.3: JFLogC – Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues
5.9 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirming Emic Themes and
Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with
members of JFLogC will now be discussed. Two of the participants
(COM and SO22) listed in Table 5.1 were unable to take part in the
Focus Group, hence membership was restricted to the remaining four
JFLogC participants listed in Table 5.1. In keeping with Stage III of the
final research strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based
around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been
developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key emic
themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note that 
respondent codes listed within Table 5.1 will still be used throughout this
discussion. 
5.9.1 Management and Control 
Initial discussions within the JFLogC Focus Group reflects the literary
views on the positive impact that collaboration and coordination can
have on supply chain performance (Dash et al, 2013; Carroll and Neu, 
2009). All participants agree that the facilitation role should rest with
OCHA, “after all the C is meant to stand for coordination” (CDT), 
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however there is also clear frustration amongst the Group with OCHA’s
inability to achieve this aim and with what SO1 termed the
“ineffectiveness” of the organisation. By way of illustration, CDT offered
the following experience: 
“In Pakistan OCHA watched on as NGOs pitched their tents on the
hard standing whilst we were left to operate helicopters from a
muddy field. They [OCHA] did not seem to appreciate the
ridiculous situation that they were supposedly coordinating…..”
The Group do not agree with the idea that an ad hoc approach to
humanitarian relief has any merit although they do echo the view (Akhtar
et al, 2012; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; Oloruntoba, 2005; Gustavsson, 
2003) that this is what regularly happens in reality.  
“In my experience, planning and coordination will always make an
operation more effective and a lack of it must result in inefficiency
and overall wasted effort” (SO1)
This response is perhaps predictable given the military training and
culture of the Group and CDT did become somewhat emotional as he
discussed the contribution that the military had to make in respect of 
coordination as, once again he related his experiences in Pakistan: 
“In Pakistan the young men had to stay high in the hills to keep
control of their land. It was clear that there were no plans for the
winter and so we agreed to take the planning task on. We used our
expeditionary logistics experience to model where depots could be
placed to give helicopter and vehicle access and I believe made a
significant contribution to the relief effort as a result. To deny the
overall effort this opportunity just because we are military would
have been crass to be frank”  
The Group then mooted the idea of establishing a coordinating authority
amongst UK based NGOs. Referring back to Porter’s Value Chain SO3
suggests that this authority should be based on niche capabilities, and
that it should not be forgotten that the military has some key skill sets
and capability to contribute, particularly in the areas of rapid reaction and
expeditionary logistics provision. The idea of the military skill set in
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expeditionary logistics was a key theme of the focus group and there
was strong agreement that the military has a lot more to offer, if permitted
and accepted.  
There are equally strong opinions on the role and success of the UN
Cluster Concept UN OCHA, 2011). Questioning the overall effectiveness
and aims of the Concept (OCHA, 2005), SO3 offered further support to
Jensen’s (2012) discussion on the cumbersome nature of clusters in
practice. SO3 believes that the Concept serves to “stove pipe” the relief 
effort, giving those involved an excuse to work in isolation from other
donors. The Group agreed that some form of performance measurement 
might help the situation, and that it would also help to hold the cluster
leaders accountable for their actions. Discussion surrounding the traffic
lights performance management system of key performance indicators
led to a suggestion that this approach might offer a possible solution, 
although there is agreement that such a strategy will call for very careful
and political management. (Note: The traffic lights system is a military
adaptation of the Balanced Scorecard System (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996), for an example of its application within the military see Australian
Government, (DofD), 2005).  
Concurring with the academic views that in order to be effective clusters
should include both “upstream suppliers and downstream customers”
(Patti, p266), the Group agreed that local governments should be
involved in all aspects of the relief effort and that this should include
cluster management itself. However, there is acknowledgement that this
could be difficult in light of what the literature identifies as blockers (Burt, 
2005) and gatekeepers (Hingley et al, 2010). CDT recalled an
experience in Haiti and also pointed to the Balkans where he found it 
“difficult to know who was actually in charge from day to day”. Turning to
the discussions in support of the use of partnerships within successful
supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 
2006) there is also consensus that the linkage between OHCA and the
clusters is confusing and unclear and at times “non-existent” (CDT), and
that clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and overall usage will
serve to help all those involved. 
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5.9.2 Understanding and Training
The theme and importance of training and overall professionalisation
within humanitarian logistics is argued for by Thomas and Mizushima in
2005 and is also highlighted in more recent work (Tatham and Altay, 
2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011). Agreeing with the importance of such a
strategy, the Group view was that integrated training exercises have a
role to play in the overall promotion of partnered working and
collaboration within humanitarian relief zones (Goffnet et al, 2013; 
Heaslip, 2011). This is unsurprising given that this type of approach is a
key feature of military training and development. Echoing the economic
cluster theory (Porter, 1998) CDT supported the involvement of local
governments and organisations in such strategies and by way of 
example related his experiences of forward planning exercises in
Malawi, Mozambique and Sierra Leone: 
“Working through contacts in Ghana we were able to speak to local
governments and discuss how we could work with them on
disaster relief projects. Using the fictitious scenario of a broken
dam and the associated floods we briefed government 
representatives on our military capability and were able to
convince them to build military cooperation into their long term
plans. They realised how by working together and using our
different skill sets and expertise we could help to address the relief 
effort in an efficient and effective manner.”
The introduction of the idea of the humanitarian landscape (Tomansini
and van Wassenhove, 2009; Seipel, 2011; Spearin, 2001), first 
discussed during Stage II of the research confirmed CDT’s view that 
there is a lack of appreciation of the skill sets possessed by NGOs and
other donor organisations amongst JFLogC participants. Whilst agreeing
that successful relationships should be built on mutual trust and
openness (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007) all Focus
Group members conceded that they do not fully appreciate the different 
roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief, 
but also argued that the reciprocal is also true in that other humanitarian
organisations fail to understand the military role, hence the consensus is
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that joint training would help; a discussion that offers clear empirical
support to the assertions offered by Heaslip (2011). 
The Group agreed that the current military chain of command would
never sanction humanitarian logistics as an individual profession per se, 
but could see clear benefit if such an approach is adopted by the civilian
sector. Echoing the ideas purported on integrated service learning within
the sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) SO1 believes that it would
be beneficial if the military ‘experts’ are involved in advising on the
content of any associated courses or training programmes, but was also
happy to accept the opinions of other members of the Focus Group in
that this will probably not happen in reality. Indeed, the overall view is
that realistically military involvement in any such training initiatives will
not be politically acceptable. SO1 went on to discuss the ongoing
development work of an appropriate training course for members of the
JFLogC who are tasked with the planning and coordination of all military
HADRO. Referring back to the earlier discussion on the Cluster Concept 
(5.10.1) there is strong agreement that any training initiatives should
include appropriate elements on the Concept and the associated
structures, roles and responsibilities, and that a course aimed
specifically at cluster leads will also add great value.  
5.9.3 Relationships
Participants feel that the inclusion of local governments and
organisations, be they military or not is key to the overall effectiveness
of the disaster relief effort. The discussion did turn to the associated
issues surrounding identification of the local authorities but SO1 best 
surmised the JFLogC Group opinion: 
“There is clear value in establishing working links with the local
authorities. After all the disaster is on their patch therefore they
should best know the area and their peoples’ needs. I see us [the
military] as a resource provider and we should be guided by those
who have the knowledge to make us most effective”.  
Handfield and Nichols (1999) contest that relationship management is
the most fragile and tenuous component in any successful supply chain
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and the Group felt that given their experience of working with different 
nations under the NATO Chain of Command, they have a role to play in
this area. Agreeing with the literary discourse on partnership sourcing
(Christopher, 2011, Iglesias et al, 2011, Lysons and Farrington, 2006)
the Group believe that JFLogC staff already have relevant experience of 
establishing international relationships; however, there is
acknowledgement that the circumstances and demands when
comparing a NATO operation to that in respect of a response to a
humanitarian disaster, are somewhat different. That said, there is still a
strong view that what is required is a NATO style organisation for
disaster relief and that although OCHA claim to be that organisation, the
command structures that they implement do not have the same effect.  
The Group echoed the lessons learned following the Hull floods in 2007
(DEFRA, 2007) in that relationships at the UK level should be addressed
in the first instance and that the working relationship between JFLogC
and DFID can be improved. The feeling is that there should be a lot more
liaison between JFLogC and DFID and that the associated teams should
get to know one another, and to try and understand their roles and
contributions to the overall disaster relief effort. The Group acknowledge
that DFID has responsibility for leading and coordinating the UK
Government’s humanitarian response (DFID, 2008; MOD, 2008 and
2003) and suggest that, because of this they can have some influence
on the UN if that is needed or deemed appropriate. However there is a
consensus that DFID are a difficult organisation to work with: 
“DFID want to command the military mission….What we [the
military] want is to be given mission command and not to be micro
managed”. (SO21)
(Mission Command is a military doctrinal philosophy which represents a
shift away from a leadership methodology based on iron discipline and
control to one which is based on the commander being given the
freedom of thought to achieve a given task. Also see Watters, 2002)
202
Information flow is acknowledged as a critical component in the supply
chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1999) and communication between
organisations in the field was discussed by the Group as a real issue of 
concern. CDT was quick to point out that Command and Communication
was a real problem for him in Pakistan. However, he suggested that 
these problems illustrate that the type of person who is drawn to work in
the voluntary sector perhaps already has a prejudiced view of the military
and that this does not help with relationship building:  
“Perhaps we could flag ship previous military successes within
humanitarian relief and work together with OCHA to try and
address these prejudiced views of the military contribution
amongst those in the voluntary sector”
Power is not viewed as an issue by the Group as all participants were
happy to act in a subordinate role and to effectively accept the inherent 
power imbalances (Hingley, 2005a) within the overall supply chain
structure. Referring to the Joint Doctrine Publication on Disaster Relief 
Operations (MOD, 2008) all participants appreciate the coordinating
responsibilities that the UN and its associated offices have to play in
disaster relief areas and seem to concur with the idea that the UN are to
act as the power broker (Burt, 2005) within humanitarian relief zones. 
There is however, obvious frustration at the lack of control and
coordination witnessed and clear disagreement with the idea that this is
being improved within the field (Altay and Labonte, 2011) indeed, this
became a key feature of the whole session. In essence, consensus
within the JFLogC Group is that the organisation is happy to carry out all
tasks given, but that it should be effectively coordinated and controlled
by those who are placed in a position of power in the relief zone, the
gatekeepers in academic terms (Hingley et al, 2010). However, 
participants find it difficult to identify who has the lead role on the ground, 
or who has specific responsibility for elements of the relief effort: 
“….if we can’t identify who is in charge, then how can anyone else”. 
(CDT)  
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5.9.4 Military Involvement
The Group began this section by discussing the idea that in keeping with
the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011) the UK
Government are keen that the military look to demonstrate more high
profile involvement in humanitarian relief. The Group agreed that this
could prove difficult as, in keeping with Dunanist principles (Seigel, 2011; 
Tatham, 2011) their experience is that most NGOs are not happy to work
alongside a military man in uniform. The view is that a military uniform
would always be viewed by some as a symbol of an organisation that 
operates in contravention to humanitarian principles, and that attempts
to reduce the impact of a uniform such as the UN blue beret are, on the
whole ineffective; there are still clear challenges ahead: 
“We [the military] are still tarnished with Iraq backlash. A serious
repair job is needed at a national and international level.” (CDT)
“In my experience, changing from an Army to a UN blue beret has
little effect at the end of the day” (COM)2
There is broad acceptance that any association with the military can be
seen by some donor organisations as being against the humanitarian
principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and in particular
impartiality (DFID, 2008), but also a view that NGOs appear to be happy
for military intervention when their staff feel under threat. The consensus
is that JFLogC and the military in general should do more to publicise
military measures in respect of impartiality and to challenge the
perceptions of NGOs. The suggestion is that examples such as the
prioritising of medical aid for injured Taliban forces in Afghanistan or the
support for the International Red Cross stance to provide first aid kits, 
training and other humanitarian aid to anyone in the conflict area, 
including Afghan security forces and the Taliban (Washington Times, 
2010) can help in this respect.  
CDT offered the following regarding the local military: 
 
2 The researcher can also add operational support to this view given his personal
experiences as discussed in section 1.2. 
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“In lots of places where disaster happens, the boundaries between
military and government are unclear. For example Pakistan has a
civilian president but we all know that the military runs the country. 
The same could be said for Haiti and some North African countries. 
In Indonesia this was true to a certain extent hence whilst NGOs
do not like working with the military they must appreciate that in
these cases the local military is the government and therefore they
should be prepared to work alongside them”. (CDT)
There was a debate on the role of the military in future disaster relief 
operations and a suggestion that whilst no one can stop NGOs arriving
in the disaster area, the JFLogC could be utilised to control the arrival
and distribution of military resources. CDT suggested that JFLogC
should look to simple niche markets as they seek to identify a greater
role. As an example, he offered his successes in Banda Aceh where his
team had placed a large map of the area on an outside wall and
populated it with relevant information, thereby becoming an information
centre for all contributors.  
5.10 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues
This is the second of four chapters presenting an analysis of the
research findings and the discussion has drawn upon the data gathered
from participants within the UK MOD’s JFLogC. Having firstly
established the key etic issues and themes through analysis of 
questionnaire responses, emic issues were developed and then
investigated through a series of semi-structured interviews with JFLogC
participants. Finally, additional analysis and application of relevant 
literature within the field informed the areas of discussion within a
participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the final research
strategy through triangulation of data gathered and findings from
questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key informants, the
chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to collaboration
within humanitarian relief supply chains and also identified how these
barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration in the future. 
Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the findings and
trends discussed within this section will be used during a final cross-
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domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final conclusions
and academic contribution. The section will now be broken down into the
key emic themes and issues identified within the JFLogC arrived at 
through application of Stages I and II of the final research strategy, and
confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.  
5.10.1 Management and Control 
The JFLogC participants agree with academic opinion on the positive
nature of, and clear requirement for collaboration and coordination along
the humanitarian relief supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; 
Carroll and Neu, 2009; Rickard, 2003). Participant experiences confirm
that planning and coordination will always make the relief effort more
effective and efficient, and will help to reduce overall waste (Slack et al, 
2010). Whilst the coordination role should rest with the UN OCHA the
organisation struggles to meet its coordination task and is at times
ineffective. OCHA works well during periods of quiet, but is less effective
in the face of events where an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 
2008, 2007) is required. An ad hoc approach to the management of the
humanitarian relief supply chain is not appropriate, but participants do
concur with literary observations which suggest that this is the case in
some relief zones (Akhtar et al, 2012; Kovács and Tatham, 2009; 
Oloruntoba, 2005; Gustavsson, 2003). The idea of establishing a
coordinating authority amongst UK based NGOs is suggested, and in
agreement with Porter’s concept of a Value Chain (1990) the arguments
presented are based around niche capabilities and the provision of 
supply chain agility (Christopher, 2011) through exploitation of the
military’s key skill sets within the field of expeditionary and rapid reaction
logistics.  
In disagreement with academic support for a clustered approach (Altay
and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010; Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), 
the overall effectiveness and aims of the UN Cluster Concept (UN
OCHA, 2011) are questioned as in keeping with Jensen (2012) the
concept can prove to be cumbersome and serve to stove pipe the relief 
effort, acting as a hindrance in some practical cases; moreover, clusters
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give those involved an excuse to work in isolation from other participants. 
To improve success the Cluster Concept requires some form of 
performance measurement system, which serves to hold cluster leaders
accountable for their actions. Hence, there is support for the adoption of 
a traffic light system similar to that used by the MOD (Kaplan and Norton, 
1996, Australian Government, (DofD), 2005). Academic discourse on
the need to include both “upstream suppliers and downstream
customers” (Patti, p.266) is reflected in the view that local governments
should be involved in all aspects of the relief effort and that this should
include cluster management. However, this could be difficult due to
blockers (Burt, 2005) and gatekeepers (Hingley et al, 2010) within the
supply chain, and due to inherent problems with the identification of 
appropriate local authorities within some humanitarian relief zones. 
There is broad support for the use of partnerships within successful
supply chains (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 
2006), but also consensus that the linkage between OHCA and the
clusters is confusing and unclear and at times non-existent, hence, 
clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and overall usage are
required. 
5.10.2 Understanding and Training
JFLogC opinion reflects the academic view on the importance of training
and overall professionalisation within humanitarian logistics (Tatham
and Altay, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and
Mizushima, 2005). However, the overall consensus is that whilst the
current military chain of command would never sanction humanitarian
logistics as an individual profession within the military, participants can
see clear benefit if such an approach was adopted by civilian
humanitarian organisations. Echoing the ideas purported by Goffnet et 
al (2013) and Heaslip (2011), and in keeping with military approaches to
training, integrated training exercises have a role to play in the overall
promotion of partnered working within humanitarian relief zones. Whilst 
agreeing that successful relationships should be built on mutual trust and
openness (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007), JFLogC
participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the different roles
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and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in disaster relief; 
however in keeping with Heaslip (2011) the belief is that the reciprocal
is also true, in that other organisations do not understand the military role
within humanitarian operations. Joint training strategies will help to
address this lack of understanding and appreciation. Concurring with the
economic cluster theory (Porter, 1998), the involvement of local
governments and organisations in such educational strategies is
regarded as an essential element in their overall success. Supporting
the ideas offered on integrated service learning within the sector (Goffnet 
et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) it will be beneficial if military ‘experts’ can be
involved in advising on the content of any associated courses or training
programmes; however, there is also a pragmatic acceptance that this
will probably not happen in reality due to political pressures (Thompson, 
2010) and the overall impact on some donor organisations to preserve
the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
DFID, 2008).  
JFLogC is also engaged in the development of an internal training
course for members of the organisation who are tasked with the planning
and coordination of all military HADRO. To address issues surrounding
the implementation, management and overall structure of the UN Cluster
Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) such training initiatives will include
appropriate elements on the concept itself. Furthermore a training
programme specifically aimed at cluster leaders will also be of great 
benefit.  
5.10.3 Relationships
Handfield and Nichols (1999) offer the view that relationship
management is the most fragile and tenuous component in any
successful supply chain. Agreeing with the literary discourse on
partnership sourcing (Christopher, 2011, Iglesias et al, 2011, Lysons and
Farrington, 2006) the consensus is that JFLogC staff already have
relevant experience of establishing international relationships. Working
with different nations under the NATO Chain of Command means that 
JFLogC staff are skilled in relationship management, and in generating
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swift trust (Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the inherent Hastily Formed
Networks (Kumar and Havey, 2013).  
Whilst Porter (1990) argued for efficiency and effectiveness through the
formation of supply chain networks, the inherent view echoes that of 
Chandes and Paché (2010), in that in order to be successful NGOs rely
on competition for resources, ground and other assets. Consequently, 
there is a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act 
alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, views which
concur with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and
Kent (1987) on NGO’s actions due to financial pressures and the fear of 
donor withdrawal. The inclusion of local governments and organisations
is considered to be a key to the overall effectiveness of the disaster relief 
effort, and the JFLogC regards itself as a resource provider which is
happy to be guided by those who have the local knowledge to ensure
the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall relief effort. A NATO style
organisation for humanitarian relief is required to help address the
associated issues and although OCHA claim to be that organisation
(OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that it implements within the
field do not have the desired effect. The lessons learned following the
Hull floods in 2007 (DEFRA, 2007) suggest that the UK based working
relationship between the JFLogC and DFID should be addressed in the
first instance. Consequently, there should be significantly more liaison
between the JFLogC and DFID, and the associated teams should take
measures to gain a clearer understanding of their organisation’s roles
and overall contribution to the relief effort. In essence, JFLogC
participants want to be given the freedom to make decisions using the
military doctrinal philosophy of Mission Command (Watters, 2002). 
Information flow is a critical component in the supply chain (Handfield
and Nichols, 1999; Ernst, 2003; Rickard, 2003) and JFLogC participants
agree that communication between organisations within the field is a real
area of concern. Reflecting the discussion on mistrust (Heaslip, 2011), 
the challenge of relationship building is further exacerbated for the
JFLogC due to some organisational and/or individual prejudiced views
of the military amongst other humanitarian organisations. The aim for the
military should be to build upon past successes within the humanitarian
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relief sector, and to try and use these to redress the preconceived views
of their contribution.
The JFLogC is happy to act in a subordinate role and to accept the
inherent power imbalances (Hingley, 2005a) within the overall supply
chain structure. Military policy documents (MOD, 2008 and 2003) reflect 
the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and its associated offices
have to play in humanitarian relief areas and concur with the idea that 
the UN are to act as the power broker (Burt, 2005) within such areas. 
The JFLogC is content to carry out all tasks given to it, but its contribution
should be effectively coordinated and controlled by the gatekeepers
(Hingley et al, 2010) in the field, namely the OCHA. However, a lack of 
clear control and coordination has been witnessed, clearly in
disagreement with the view that this has improved in recent humanitarian
responses (Altay and Labonte, 2011). In sum, it is difficult at times to
identify who has responsibility for elements of the relief effort on the
ground. Whilst military personnel are happy to be led and controlled, the
view is that members of the NGO community are not; an opinion
supported by Thompson (2010) who notes that whilst military forces
have the potential to make a difference with disaster relief arenas, what 
he describes as “sensitivities” still remain (p.2) and by Heaslip (2010)
who believes that these radically different methodologies and guiding
principles can result in what he terms clashes between the military and
civilian humanitarian organisations.  
5.10.4 Military Involvement
In keeping with the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011)
the UK Government is keen that the military look to demonstrate more
high profile involvement in humanitarian relief. However, this could prove
difficult as, in keeping with Dunanist principles (Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 
2011) most NGOs are not happy to work alongside the military. A military
uniform will always be viewed by some as a symbol of an organisation
that operates in contravention to humanitarian principles, and attempts
to reduce the impact of a uniform, such as the UN blue beret are on the
whole ineffective. Referring to the issue of trust (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham
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and Kovács, 2010) and to the need for mutual trust and openness within
successful partnerships (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 
2007), JFLogC participants acknowledge that the public perception of 
the UK military had been tarnished by recent interventions in Iraq and
Afghanistan, and this may have an adverse effect on relationships with
other organisations. Hence, the JFLogC should strive to be regarded as
the acceptable face of military. In a similar vein, there is also broad
acceptance that any association with the military can be seen by some
donor organisations as being against the humanitarian principles
(Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and in particular against 
impartiality (DFID, 2008), but also a belief that NGOs appear to be happy
for military intervention under the right circumstances, and particularly in
situations where humanitarian actors feel under threat. Consequently, 
the JFLogC and the military in general, should do more to publicise
current and past military measures and successes in respect of 
impartiality. Moreover, NGOs who refuse to work alongside the military
should be reminded that in some cases the local military is the
government and that if the drive is to include local authorities in the
overall relief effort, then they will be forced to work alongside them. To
that end, and in keeping with the discourse on integrating learning
(Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) and that on learning mechanisms for
humanitarian logistics (Lu et al, 2013), members of the HADRO team
are keen to establish links within NGOs and to deliver presentations on
what the military can offer by way of a lasting contribution. As the UK
military and the JFLogC in particular look to expand its role in future
humanitarian relief operations by exploiting niche areas of expertise, the
suggestion is that they could assist with the control of the arrival and
distribution of international military resources within the relief zone. 
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CHAPTER 6
OXFAM INTERNATIONAL – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS
“Working with thousands of local partner organizations, we work with
people living in poverty striving to exercise their human rights, assert 
their dignity as full citizens and take control of their lives.”
(Oxfam International, 2011)
6.1 Introduction
The data gathered from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (Oxfam)
is presented and discussed concurrently with appropriate academic
discourse within the field of research that was first introduced within
Chapter 2. By way of introduction a short background and history of 
Oxfam International is included together with a discussion on the
organisation’s current (as at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes
and structures. A justification on the use of Oxfam as a research domain
for this study is then offered. Following the inclusion of a listing of 
respondents and their backgrounds (Table 6.1) the discussion turns to
an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and themes identified. Final
conclusions and overall domain themes and issues are then established
through triangulation of the data gathered and the academic discourse.  
6.2 Background – Core Beliefs, Drivers and Scale  
Formed in 1995 by a group of independent non-governmental
organizations whose aim was to work together for greater impact on the
international stage, Oxfam International is an international confederation
of 17 organisations networked together in more than 90 countries, as
part of a global movement for change to build a future free from the
injustice of poverty (Oxfam International, 2011). One of the 14 members
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of the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) they work directly
with communities and seek to influence the powerful to ensure that poor
people can improve their lives and livelihoods and have a say in
decisions that affect them.  
Oxfam International believe that respect for human rights will help lift 
people out of poverty and injustice, allow them to assert their dignity and
guarantee sustainable development. They argue that everyone should
have the right to a livelihood and they work at many levels with partners
and communities in support of their right to a decent living. They strive
for better working conditions and better protection of the natural
resources on which poor communities depend. They work with partners
and communities to implement programs that lead to self-sustaining
livelihoods, with a strong focus on women and campaign for fairer trade
rules at the global level, and for better policies at the national level. They
maintain that being healthy and educated is an essential step along the
route out of poverty, and point out that millions of people have no access
to health services, schooling or safe water. Moreover, Oxfam
International remind the world that many communities are constantly at 
risk from illnesses that are easily prevented or treated, or are unable to
read and write, which means exclusion from their society (Oxfam
International, 2011). They campaign for more and better aid, with a focus
on basic services.  
Oxfam International is registered as a Foundation in The Hague and as
a foreign company limited by guarantee in the UK (Oxfam International, 
2011). Each affiliate is a member of the Foundation and subscribes to
the Foundation’s constitution through an affiliation agreement. The
constitution consists of three documents: the Constitution, the Code of 
Conduct, and the Rules of Procedure (Oxfam International, 2012a, 
2012b, 2012c). Affiliates must also sign a trade-mark licence, which
enables them to use the Oxfam International brand. The Foundation is
governed by the Oxfam International Board which meets annually. The
2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) records total
expenditure as €911 million (£730 million as at November 2012), with
€660 million (£530 million) being spent on regional programmes. 47% of 
this expenditure was split across the top 20 countries; the biggest 
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beneficiary during the reporting year being Haiti to the tune of almost €60
million (£48 million).  
6.3 A Brief History – Committed to Human Rights since 1942
The name “Oxfam” comes from the Oxford Committee for Famine Relief, 
founded in Britain in 1942. The group campaigned for food supplies to
be sent through an allied naval blockade to starving women and children
in enemy-occupied Greece during the Second World War (Oxfam
International 2011). As well as becoming a world leader in the delivery
of emergency relief, Oxfam International implements long-term
development programs in vulnerable communities. They are also part of 
a wider global movement, campaigning with others, for example, to end
unfair trade rules, demand better health and education services for all, 
and to combat climate change. Today, there are 17 member
organizations of the Oxfam International confederation. They are based
in: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hong
Kong, Ireland, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, The Netherlands, New
Zealand, Quebec, Spain and the United States. The Oxfam International
Secretariat is based in Oxford, UK. The Secretariat runs advocacy
offices in Brussels, Geneva, New York, Washington DC and Brasilia. 
At the program level, Oxfam International provides health training and
clean water supplies, as well as funding schools and teacher training. 
They contend that in disasters, people are at greater risk of violence, 
disease and abuse and seek to contribute to saving lives in emergencies
by providing shelter, clean water and sanitation, and by working with
local partners, help communities to rebuild and to better prepare
themselves for future disasters (Oxfam International, 2012). Oxfam
International supports partners and communities to understand their
rights and to speak out about their needs and concerns and, with others, 
to get people in power to listen and act. They also support the view that 
people who are marginalised, because they are women, disabled or
members of a religious or ethnic minority are more likely to be poor and
work to combat such discrimination, to ensure that such groups have the
means to enjoy equal access to jobs, essential services and influence. 
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6.4 Current Humanitarian Programmes and Structures
The 2010/11 Annual Report (Oxfam International, 2012) states that 
Oxfam International was engaged in operations in 92 countries
worldwide (see in green on Fig 6.1). This work included long term
development programs, responding to humanitarian crises, campaigning
and advocacy and raising public awareness of the causes of poverty and
injustice. As at November 2012 they were involved in emergency relief 
efforts in the Sahel region of Tunisia, Eastern Africa, Pakistan (support 
to the floods), Sudan, DR Congo, Afghanistan, and Haiti.  
Fig 6.1: Oxfam International – World Wide Commitments (Oxfam International, 
2012)
6.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results
Oxfam International was first contacted in March 2012 through a series
of introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research
methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 6.1: 
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Respondent Time with
Oxfam
(years)
Practical 
Experience
Role Code
Head of
International 
Logistics and
Supply
6
(19 years
with MSF)
Involved in logistics
support to every
major humanitarian
crisis since 1987
To lead and manage the
International Logistics and
Supply team. 
HOL
Deputy Head
of
International 
Logistics and
Supply
12 Most major crises
since joining the
organisation
A member of the Logistics
Management Team for a
given relief programme. 
DHOL
International 
Logistics
Manager
10 Haiti, Pakistan, South
Sudan, Liberia,  
To manage resources
engaged in the delivery of 
specific relief projects  
ILM
International 
Area
Manager
8 Haiti, Pakistan Responsible for the
management of specific
logistics and supply chain
functions involved in one
particular relief project. 
Regular communication
with other agencies and
partner organisations. 
IAM
Table 6.1: Oxfam International – Key Respondents
6.6 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues
Analysis of the data gathered from Oxfam International via the
introductory questionnaires (Appendix D), will now be discussed. In
achieving this due consideration will be given to the practical relevance
of the initial etic issues and themes identified within the Literature Review
as set out and codified at Appendix E. Note that respondent codes within
Table 6.1 will be used at this stage.  
6.6.1 General Processes and Coordination
The senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) agreed that Oxfam International
operate a supply chain that is specifically designed for its role
(COLRES). They confirmed that the organisation is affiliated to the
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) and that they are familiar with
the United Nations Cluster Concept (COLCLU). All respondents agreed
that the Cluster concept was used to help alleviate bottlenecks and to fill
216
logistics gaps (COLALL, COLRES) and the senior respondent (HOL)
confirmed that the concept also helped to prioritise logistics interventions
and investments (COLHOR) and to collect and share information assets
(COLVER), however this was not a view shared with the operational
managers (ILM, IAM). Similarly there was a difference of opinion on the
use of the cluster concept when it came to coordinating port and corridor
movements and to reduce congestion (COLALL, COLRES). Whilst the
senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) agreed that the concept helped with
coordination of the logistics effort the juniors (ILM, ALM) with more
recent operational experiences, believed that this was not the case. 
Indeed all agreed that coordination of the logistics effort with UN
agencies, other NGOs and the military (COLALL) within disaster relief 
operations was not achieved through the United Nations Cluster
Concept. Moreover, the provision of information on equipment and on
specific relief supply items was not gained through the concept (HOL, 
DHOL). 
6.6.2 Organisational Sustainment, Power and the Military
The senior respondent (HOL) confirmed that Oxfam International took
the lead in product specification and procurement (PWRPOS) and that 
they work with suppliers and program staff to create material kits that are
used to support standard interventions within water and sanitation
(COLHOR, COLVER, COLALL, COLRES). He also confirmed that 
Oxfam purchase and preposition water and sanitation kits as part of the
overall Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster approach which, 
under the overall leadership of UNICEF aims to address gaps in
response and enhance the overall quality of humanitarian assistance
(PWRPOS, RMT, COLALL, COLHOR). Moreover, Oxfam International
are happy to take the lead in future operations (PWRPOS, RMT) and do
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Use of and Success or otherwise of the UN
Cluster Concept 
217
share facilities with other NGOs (COLALL). Those with recent 
operational experience (ILM, ALM) confirmed that facilities are shared
with numerous NGOs (COLHOR, COLVER). Oxfam is prepared to
accept military assistance from organisations that are working under a
UN mandate, but acceptance of this did depend on the associated
circumstances (RMT). The senior respondents (HOL, DHOL) were in
agreement that the demonstration to donors of an organisational
presence and of the value of their contributions, was the priority within a
relief zone (SUSFR) and that they did not regard competitive behaviour
towards other contributors as important (SUSSTRAT). It was notable
that the demonstration of the concepts of CSR was a priority for the IAM
and ILM (SUSCSR). 
6.6.3 Summary - Key Etic Themes and Issues
In completing Stage I of the research strategy with Oxfam the following
key etic themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the
research strategy. 
Theme  Issue Description Notes
General
Processes
and
Coordination
UN Cluster
Concept 
Alleviate bottlenecks and
fill logistics gaps
How?
Which gaps?
Examples?
Successful?
Prioritise logistics
interventions and
investments
Collect and share
information assets
Coordination of the
logistics effort with UN
agencies, other NGOs
and the military is not 
achieved
Why not?
Examples?
How to improve
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Positive Aspects of Power/ WASH cluster
approach/ Trust/ Relationship Management/ 
Military Assistance/ Organisational
Presence/ Corporate Social Responsibility  
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Theme  Issue Description Notes
Organisational
Sustainment, 
Power and the
Military
Power Oxfam take the lead in
product specification and
procurement 
Examples?
Successful strategy?
WASH cluster
approach
Oxfam purchase and
preposition water and
sanitation kits as part of 
the overall approach
Successful strategy?
Issues?
Trust Oxfam are happy to take
the lead in future
operations and do share
facilities with other
NGOs
How is trust 
established/maintained?
Relationship issues?
Examples?
Relationship
Management 
Military
Assistance
Oxfam are prepared to
accept military
assistance but this
depends on the
associated
circumstances.  
What circumstances?
What type of/ how much
assistance?
Examples?
Organisational
Presence
The demonstration to
donors of an
organisational presence
and of the value of their
contributions was a
priority.  
How demonstrated?
Examples?
Corporate
Social
Responsibility
Demonstration of CSR is
a priority. 
How achieved?
Table 6.2: Oxfam – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues
6.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and
Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with
members of Oxfam International listed in Table 6.1 will now be
discussed. In keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy
interviews were based around the schedule (Appendix F) which had
been developed following cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and
the key etic themes and issues that had been identified as a result. Note
that respondent codes listed within Table 6.1 will still be used throughout 
this discussion. 
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6.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration
In discussing resilience and the requirement for agility and flexibility
Christopher (2011) highlights the issues surrounding the complexity that 
is inherent within modern supply chains, arguing that such supply chains
will quickly descend into chaos unless they are connected through
effective coordination and collaboration, shared information and
knowledge. The data gathered from Oxfam concurs with these ideas as
participants agree that whilst the humanitarian relief supply chain is
designed for its needs, it does struggle to work in reality and efforts to
facilitate effective collaboration in the field are hampered by overall
complexity. In essence, the view is that in most cases, when faced with
the need for an immediate response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007)
there is little evidence of coordination on the ground as donor
organisations according to IAM:  
“Jump in as there is nothing to prevent the influx of NGOs and other
agencies”  
Participant opinion on collaboration and coordination is typified by HOL: 
“In my experience 5 or 6 big agencies deploy into a disaster zone
and they take on national and local partners…..less well equipped
organisations then arrive who have people but no access to
materials or supply chains…”  
The thoughts above also serve to illustrate the agreement that is evident 
amongst Oxfam participants with academic discourse on the challenges
presented within humanitarian relief zones by the growing number of 
donor agencies and the resulting supply chain complexity that they bring
(Heaslip, 2012a and 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006)  
HOL agrees that some coordination is a good thing and cited the
example of a unified coding system for humanitarian relief equipment 
that is now in place as one that is helping larger agencies and cluster
leads to gain access to, and share common equipment and resources. 
He echoed the opinions of Altay and Labonte (2011) believing that 
coordination of technology is a step forward and that new IT systems
220
and the associated information sharing opportunities have significantly
improved standardisation and interoperability across the sector. 
However, HOL also offered a counter view on collaboration and
suggested that what he described as an “ad hoc approach” might 
actually benefit the overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief effort. 
Arguing for the benefits of an element of chaos and uncertainty and
agreeing with Mullins’ (2013) assertion that “without uncertainty there
would be no decisions to make” (p.639), HOL’s belief was that there is
far too much time spent in trying to apply formal structure to the supply
chain. Contesting academic opinion on the benefits of applying business
sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and
Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006), HOL argued
that striving for structure and coordination within humanitarian relief 
zones is actually a “red herring” and felt that the inherent bureaucratic
barriers actually served to slow the relief effort down. HOL’s assertion
was that what the sector really needs is a model built on an
organisation’s ability to perform.  
In keeping with the arguments offered by Dash et al (2013) the data
suggests that the use of classic market mechanisms will not guarantee
a quality response in the provision of humanitarian relief and that what 
is really needed in the sector is a more rigid system that can judge
agencies on their performance; moreover, such a system should have
the legitimacy to exclude those that have a history of letting the overall
effort down. DHOL cited the example of large Christian organisations
that have access to considerable funds through church donations, but 
that have in his experience turned this funding into bibles at a time when
food, shelter and medical aid were a clear priority. DHOL also highlighted
the efforts of the Inter-Agency Procurement Group (IPAG) which is a
“network of logistics professionals who work collectively on humanitarian
supply chain activities” (IPAG, 2013) who are trying to establish an
overall organisational certification standard across the sector as a first 
step in such a strategy. He also acknowledged the Sphere Project (2011)
as the common reference for the minimum standards of delivery within
the field, but agreed with the view that whilst it does advocate integration
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of humanitarian organisations, it does not state specific performance
evaluation measures (Heaslip, 2011, p.165). 
The data gathered highlights UN reforms where donors are encouraged
to donate more money through UN agencies, but the inherent view is
that such measures can be restrictive and that the policy is actually
designed to reduce the number of agencies on the ground, or at the very
least to bring more structure between the lead and other agencies. ILM
offered the view that in his experience: 
“UN agencies were reluctant to take on the level of control that is
needed…..were not equipped to cope……and did not have the
required skills to implement coordination on the ground”.  
Porter (1998) suggests that “clusters allow companies to operate more
productively whilst coordinating with related companies” (p.78), however
IAM feels that clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at 
communicating with local actors and local governmental organisations, 
clearly in disagreement with the advice offered by Patti (2006) on cluster
membership within the supply chain context. HOL cited the overall
Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) cluster approach (UNICEF, 
2013) within which Oxfam International purchase and preposition water
and sanitation kits (see Section 6.7.2) as an example of the frustrations
that he has experienced with the clustered approach. Oxfam has worked
in close collaboration with developmental and engineering organisations
to help develop a common standard for the contents of these sanitation
kits and on setting the overall quality requirements of the associated
contents. The WASH Cluster working group now aim to manage these
prepositioned stocks and to allocate kits to agencies who have capacity
but no supply lines. However, this strategy calls for a standard
specification of kit contents and overall quality, a specification that has
been almost impossible to arrive at and sustain. The data also contends
with academic views on the advantages of pre-positioned equipment 
(Mangan et al, 2012; Gadde et al, 2010; Gourdin, 2006) as it 
demonstrates an overall belief that having pre-positioned equipment 
presents its own particular problems. DHOL spoke of his experiences in
the response to the Pakistan floods (2010)  
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“All stocks were drawn upon at the outset….stock from stores were
arriving on mass without any coordination….it reminded me of 
when we used to receive unsolicited truckloads of unwanted teddy
bears in the past…”
DHOL went on to confirm that the critical bottleneck is not the availability
of supplies but of money and people. He confirmed that Oxfam
International is content to share the organisation’s equipment and
materials with other NGOs and agencies and argued that the Oxfam
International catalogue of humanitarian logistics equipment is regarded
as the one that sets the standard within the sector for the provision of 
water and sanitation equipment. 
HOL suggests that a real concern that he has perceived across the
sector is in respect of the ability of the humanitarian relief community to
respond to multiple disasters and the likelihood of having to cope with
more than one disaster at the same time. He believes that it is not a case
of if but when this will be a requirement and contested that whilst the
response system was growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower
rate than that required to cope with the complexity of the impending
demand for multiple responses. 
There is broad agreement amongst Oxfam participants, with the view
that the military does have a role to play within disaster relief zones
(Heaslip, 2011; Thompson, 2010, Beauregard, 1998) but also some
reservation in that the contribution has to be under the right 
circumstances and on what ILM termed “An ad hoc basis where there
may be a need for military resources such as trucks and planes or for
military manpower to boost capacity”. HOL discussed the role that the
local military can play in coordinating the efforts and contribution of 
external military organisations and cited his experiences of the Pakistani
military in this respect. However, he also referred to Haiti and to the
aftermath of the 2010 earthquake, where in keeping with the
observations offered by Lynch (2010), HOL felt that the country was
disorganised and did not have a strong enough political or military
structure to help with the coordination of the US military contribution.  
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6.7.2 Power and Relationships
The data demonstrates overall agreement with the academic discourse
on the advantages of a partnered approach (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 
2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) and that Oxfam International is
happy to take the lead or be led within humanitarian relief operations. 
Acknowledging the challenges associated with the formation of what 
Kumar and Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the
onset of an immediate response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 
2007), HOL offered Oxfam International’s contribution to the WASH
Cluster (UNICEF, 2013) as an example of a possible route to swift trust 
(Tatham and Kovács, 2010) within the sector, and of the organisational
relationships that can work within the provision of humanitarian relief. 
Albeit a longer term relationship, the initiative is led by UNICEF under
the IASC approach and acts as the global lead agency for water, 
sanitation and hygiene. HOL explained that Oxfam International has
successfully coordinated developmental programmes for water and
sanitation equipment in partnership with various engineering companies
and that such relationships can be used as building blocks to address
the challenges associated with future HFNs: 
“The famous multi-functional Oxfam Bucket has not only ensured
that fresh water can be transported quickly and safely but it has
also enabled us to demonstrate our expertise in providing
sanitation and water as a part of the overall disaster relief effort”  
(For more on the Oxfam Bucket see Oxfam, 2013). 
The Lancet (2010) and Olson and Gregorian (2007) acknowledge the
inherent competition amongst NGOs for donor funding, and the
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Coordination/ Quality/ OCHA/ Ad hoc
military contribution/ Equipment 
sharing/ Equipment development 
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associated desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency
sometimes at the expense of quantifiable end results. In a review of the
immediate response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake the Lancet observed
that NGOS were “Jostling for position, each claiming that they are doing
the most for earthquake survivors” (p253). The data concurs with this
view and DHOL highlights that the humanitarian sector is like any other
and that it should not be forgotten that: 
“Oxfam International is still a business….. it would not exist without 
donations…….because of this normal market forces and
competition will inevitably be a factor within the sector”. 
Clearly in disagreement with academic opinion on the positive impact 
that collaboration and coordination can have on supply chain
performance (Dash et al, 2013, Christopher, 2011, Patti, 2006; Porter
1998 and 1990), and on the concerns that humanitarian organisations
run the risk of entering into competition with other organisations
(Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007), the data
demonstrates that whilst the perception may be that the humanitarian
sector is driven by a willingness to help, business opportunism still exists
as do financial and political motives. In keeping with this observation all
respondents comment that the key limiting factors on the ability to
provide aid will always be the availability of money and people, and that 
there is always more work than capacity. ILM suggests that this lack of 
resources has, in his experience led to some issues in the past with other
organisations who have accused Oxfam International of “not showing
up” at certain disasters, and that this did present relationship
management issues on occasion particularly with respect to the vital
areas of “mutual trust and openness” (Upadhye and Battacharya, cited
by Sadler, 2007, p.169).  
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Equipment sharing/ Equipment 
development/ Market forces/ 
Competition/ Finance
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6.7.3 The Humanitarian Space
The data gathered concurs with the academic views on the importance
of the preservation of the humanitarian principles within the
“humanitarian space” (Spearin, 2001, p.22). All participants confirm that 
Impartiality and Neutrality (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
DFID, 2008) are key factors in the overall disaster relief effort and in the
associated response. DHOL believes that the UN has a key role to play
in leading discussions on the “rules of engagement with the military
contributors”. He introduced the idea of what he termed 2 hats for the
military and discussed the difficulties that this will inevitably bring: 
“At times [following natural disasters] the military want to wear 2
hats, one driven by the pressure to achieve political aims [in the
aftermath of the disaster] and the other to support the humanitarian
relief effort [at a later stage]……they cannot wear both….”. 
DHOL contests that trying to incorporate humanitarian relief within the
larger political context is an impossible task as military and political
objectives will always collide with humanitarian principles. Whilst offering
agreement with Heaslip’s (2011) assertion that “military and
humanitarian organisations need to establish clear blue water between
one another” (p.163), in DHOL’s terms the military has to clarify which
hat they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort, and should
consistently adopt that one role (or hat) throughout the relief operation. 
HOL also agrees with the thoughts offered by Williamson (2011), in that 
the military idea of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a
flawed one that does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work.  
All participants agree that politics does not have a role to play in Oxfam
International’s overall strategic approach. However, in keeping with the
academic view (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; 
Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003), HOL is happy to accept that 
political influence is an inevitable factor within the humanitarian sector
as a whole. He discussed his experience of the role that the local
interests of some donor countries has to play: 
226
“The European Community prepositioned [humanitarian relief] 
stocks in Dubai…..the local government were happy to accept this
as the storage and subsequent transportation costs boosted their
economy”  
“The Norwegian Government were keen to support Norwegian
Church Aid’s contribution to the WASH cluster as local production
costs of water and sanitation kits would bring money back into the
Norwegian economy”  
6.7.4 Organisational Sustainment
In keeping with the view that an increasing number of organisations are
seeking visible means to demonstrate their involvement in, and
contribution to the humanitarian relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Tomansini
and van Wassenhove, 2009; Katoch, 2006; Porter and Kramer, 2002)
the data demonstrates that organisational sustainment is a significant 
consideration within Oxfam International. Weiss and Collins (2000)
acknowledge the inevitability of this and argue the negative impact that 
such pressures can have on charitable organisations such as Oxfam
International, whose reliance on financial donations from the donor
community may result in them looking to capture the humanitarian space
that best suites perceived donor need. Echoing this assertion, and in
agreement with the arguments offered by Oloson and Gregorian (2007), 
DHOL believes that his organisation is not on its own in this respect, and
that NGOs and aid agencies in general operate on a business model in
competition with each other. He also pointed to the fact that Oxfam
International would not exist without donations and to the statement in
its annual report: 
“Oxfam would not exist without the support of the millions of people
across the world who donate, support the Oxfam shops, participate
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Rules of engagement/Conflict with
warfare/ Political influence
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and organize events and buy gifts from Oxfam Unwrapped”.
(Oxfam International, 2012)
All respondents agree with this view and the belief amongst them is that 
relief organisations compete for resources in order to function, and that 
those organisation’s donors often want to see their donation being used
to assist certain types of victims in particular ways. This would seem to
agree with the observations offered in the Lancet (2010) in that relief 
workers tend to adopt certain types of behaviour even when they know
that their resources would be better used in other ways; moreover they
also echo the thoughts of Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987)
who commented on the adverse influence that financial pressure and a
corresponding fear of donor withdrawal can have on NGO behaviour
within humanitarian relief zones. By way of an illustrative summary, ILM
offered the following: 
“If you are seen to be giving an appropriate response then you will
be put on the list for the response to the next disaster………..it is
important to be invited to the party to encourage donations and to
maintain the organisation [Oxfam International] going forward”  
HOL also discussed the effectiveness of the UK Disaster Emergency
Committee (DEC, 2012) offering it as an example of an organisation that 
was able to provide a mechanism to unify fund raising and of one that 
encourages working together, joint advertising and collective working. 
He did however, offer a cautionary note in that he felt that the UK DEC
can undermine individual agency accountability and with it the
incentivisation to achieve higher performance levels that market 
mechanisms will bring; moreover, HOL felt that the Committee also lower
the threshold for participation by agencies that are essentially unqualified
to contribute to the overall relief effort.  
Confirming the argument that competition does exist within the sector
(Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000), DHOL confirmed
that Oxfam International is now recognised by the European
Commission as a Human Care Procurement Centre, meaning that they
are able to sell water and sanitation equipment to other disaster relief 
agencies who will not have to go through the standard 3 quote
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procurement cycle. This removal of levels of administration helps with
quicker purchasing and therefore provision of rapid aid. However, DHOL
was also quick to highlight that this new status is helping Oxfam
International to recover equipment developmental, production and
operational costs, whilst also confirming what he argued is the
organisation’s lead status within the sector and their overall competitive
positioning in respect of other donor agencies.  
  
6.7.5 Summary – Oxfam International Key Emic Themes and
Issues
Theme Issue Description Notes
Management 
and Control
Coordination
Lacking on the ground Why?
Information sharing is a good thing Promote
Strict coordination slows down relief 
effort 
Ad hoc
approach?
Accept sector
for what it is
Clusters Bad at communicating locally Why?
Quality Judge contributors an ability toperform
IPAG –
certification
standard
across sector
Sphere – no
power
OCHA
Unwilling to take on control function Incorrect skill
setsUnable to cope
Relationships
Equipment 
sharing and
development
WASH Cluster
Positive
examplesEngineering successes
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Competition/ Market Forces/ Donor
influence  
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Theme Issue Description Notes
Market 
Forces
Drive the sector like any other
Accept within
and out with
the sectorCompetition NGOs compete for resources
Finance NGOs must be ran as businesses
Political
Influence
Governmental pressures to promote
economy
Military
Involvement 
Rules of 
engagement
UN to lead discussions Clear
guidelines for
all contributors
Conflict with
warfare  
Military cannot wear “2 Hats” Clarify which
role
Hearts and minds initiatives Not 
humanitarian
relief 
Ad hoc basis When needed  
Table 6.3: Oxfam International – Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues
6.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirm Emic Themes and Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with
members of Oxfam International will now be discussed. All participants
listed in Table 6.1 were able to take part in the Focus Group. In keeping
with Stage III of the final research strategy discussion during the Focus
Group was based around the Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G)
which had been developed following analysis of the Stage II findings and
the key emic themes and issues that had been identified as a result. 
Note that respondent codes listed within Table 6.1 will still be used
throughout this discussion. 
6.8.1 Management and Control 
“OCHA are always on the ground and visible but I feel that some
of their staff lack the experience to grasp the initiative and to really
coordinate the overall response” (IAM)
The consensus amongst the Oxfam International Focus Group was that 
the efforts of UN agencies do help to save lives and that the UN, and in
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particular OCHA should take the lead in ensuring that timely and
adequate relief is provided. However, there was also agreement with the
precautionary views offered by Senge (2010) on the lack of success
within supply chain collaboration and also with those offered by
Kampstra and Ashayeri, (2006) in that “You cannot collaborate with a
party that lacks a genuine desire to collaborate” (p.312). The participant 
view is that OCHA has to try and achieve overall coordination against 
what ILM describes as “a tide of uncoordinated but willing donor
organisations”. The Group agree that OCHA has already made a
significant contribution to the relief effort by supporting international and
local governments in planning and co-ordinating humanitarian
responses, but that more could and has to be done. 
Discussing his experiences of the Pakistan Floods (2010) ILM offered
the view that the “painfully slow” overall UN response had resulted in an
aid effort that was equally slow and often uncoordinated and that, as a
consequence one that had struggled to deliver sufficient assistance to
all of those who needed it. HOL commented on the perception amongst 
some that the sector is dominated by the UN and a relatively small
number of western based international donor organisations, and
discussed moves to create collaborative organisations away from UN
and Western influence. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN, 2013), an inter-state collaboration of 10 regional agencies was
offered as an example of such an initiative with an “amalgamation of the
willing” (ASEAN, 2013) being established which does not rely on UN or
western money but instead centres itself on Japan as its main donor. 
Whilst there was agreement that strategies such as this offer a means
of increasing overall global capacity for disaster response, the Group
were also quick to agree that ASEAN has modelled itself on the UN
structure and approaches, which could possibly lead to similar
bureaucratic frustrations to those experienced as a result of UN
involvement. 
Discussion on the Cluster Concept (UN OCHA, 2011) centred on
Oxfam’s involvement in the Logistics Cluster and in keeping with
academic discourse (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 2010)
on the organisation’s aim to develop strategies from the bottom up. The
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clear drive is to develop an approach which helps the victims of 
humanitarian disasters to help themselves; the suggestion was that this
is being achieved by working closely with local communities and
involving appropriate local authorities and organisations in the cluster at 
an early stage, thereby adhering to the suggested academic guidelines
for successful cluster implementation and management (Patti, 2006; 
Porter, 1998). The Group agreed with the view that strong inter-cluster
coordination is required (Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 
2006) together with mechanisms to provide comprehensive
recommendations and directions on how to better assess and analyse
humanitarian disasters of the future. The consensus is that such
strategies will help to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of relief 
operations as a whole through the gathering of detailed information and
illustrations showing overall need at an earlier stage. DHOL explained
that better knowledge of who is doing what and where will help to target 
those in greatest need in a timelier manner. Opinion was that the cluster
system is currently struggling due to a lack of experience amongst 
cluster coordinators of the skill sets necessary to cope with the initial
phase of the response (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). The training
implications of this will be discussed in the next section of this chapter, 
but this together with the fact that too many key UN staff are based
centrally rather than in the field of operations, leads to what ILM
contends are “gaps in provision, duplication of effort and frustrating
delays in delivery of aid”. This discussion on the negativity of 
centralisation clearly echoes the views offered by Handy (1993, cited by
Mullins, 2013) on the concept, together with the thoughts of and
arguments for, decentralisation and less hierarchical supervision within
organisations (Bollinger and Hofstede, 1987, cited by Chanlat et al, 
2013). 
The administrative procedures used to distribute funds to the relief 
organisations by some cluster leads was also called into question, as the
belief is that these are slowing things down and unsuited to meet the
demand for a highly flexible supply chain which is capable of quickly
adapting to deliver urgently needed aid as disasters rapidly develop and
change (Christopher, 2011; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011; Chopra and
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Meindl, 2010). This lack of supply chain responsiveness and resilience
(Christopher, 2011) clearly frustrated HOL who believes that if the
associated issues can be addressed then the immediate response
phase can be shortened in a significant number of cases, allowing
organisations to concentrate on the recovery and sustainment phases
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). It is his hope that with the right level
of coordination and management, it will be possible to offer a combined
approach across all phases of the relief effort as argued for by Thomas
and Kopczak (2005).  
6.8.2 Understanding and Training
In agreement with the academic arguments and calls for an increase in
logistics training and professionalisation (Tatham and Altay, 2013; 
Bolshe et al, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 
2005) all participants agree that there is a need for additional training, 
and that such an approach can only benefit the overall efficiency and
effectiveness of their organisation in particular, and the overall disaster
response in general. Echoing the academic view (Tatham and Altay, 
2013, Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) the Group acknowledged that 
there is a lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some staff, 
particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations
and participants within the sector as well as in areas such as the Cluster
Concept (UN OCHA, 2011). However, there is also consensus that whilst 
the relatively high turnover of staff within Oxfam International itself might 
be problematic in respect of educational development, opportunities to
professionalise within the sector could act as a retention tool; thereby
concurring with the viewpoint offered by Lu et al, (2013). HOL believes
that the increasing number of disasters worldwide (Oloruntoba and Gray, 
2006; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) together with the high overall cost of 
logistics provision, (Guhu-Sapir, et al, 2011) can be used as a “lever” to
justify greater investment in training, however, he does concede that 
given the current financial climate, this may be difficult to achieve. ILM
suggested that within Oxfam there is a tendency to recruit staff with
previous knowledge of the sector, or those with a specific skill set gained
within the business sector (for example supply chain managers), a
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strategy which would seem to align itself with a policy of “individual
grafting” as suggested by Song et al (2003). HOL agreed with this
assertion and cited his own experience where he joined Oxfam after
gaining 19 years of experience of the sector working with Medicins Sans
Frontieres (MSF).
The Group discussed the need for the inclusion of local organisations
and governments in training strategies and offered as an example the
approach that had been adopted by Oxfam in Laos, a country which is
prone to flooding and landslides during the regional monsoon season.  
“We [Oxfam] help to train the vulnerable local communities so that 
they are better able to deal with their needs in times of disaster. 
The locals are now able to adopt mitigation measures and be ready
before the disaster strikes. In the longer term, this training means
that the local community is able to improve its own food security
together with its own people’s livelihoods”. (ILM)
This example of successful training delivery seems to echo the academic
advice on integrated learning (Goffnet et al, 2013), as the strategy is
facilitated in partnership with the local National Disaster Management 
Office in Laos where local residents are trained on how to take effective
action should flooding occur. Some 8000 community volunteers have
already been trained in rescue and emergency response measures and
are supplied and trained in the use of the required emergency equipment 
such as boats, life jackets and first aid kits. 
6.8.3 Relationships
The Group echoed the academic discourse on the partnered approach
and on who should be included in the management of successful supply
chains (Christopher, 2011, Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; 
Patti, 2006); moreover, the discussion reflected the importance of local
involvement and also the strategy that Oxfam adopts of striving to build
what HOL describes as “grass roots relationships”. However, the Group
confirmed that whilst fine in principle relationship management with local
authorities is not without its challenges in practice. In order to illustrate
this, 2 vignettes are included within this section which were discussed
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during the Focus Group and are based on Oxfam International projects
within Somalia. They serve to illustrate the value of, and the frustrations
associated with achieving local cooperation whilst trying to preserve
Oxfam International’s strict policy against making any payments to local
armed groups.  
“Somalia is a classic example as insecurity and difficulty in
identifying who is the government on the ground mean that it is
very difficult to monitor movements of funds. Another problem is
that we [Oxfam International] find it very difficult to maintain
humanitarian quality standards as well as transparency and
accountability to our donors. Because of this we try and use the
long standing relationships that we have established with local
partners to help ensure that our aid is actually getting through to
the most vulnerable”. (HOL)
The Group agreed that whilst the above approach helps to illustrate
Oxfam International’s efforts to maintain the humanitarian principles
(Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009) and, in particular impartiality, 
the strategy also meant that it was virtually impossible to offer
predictable and timely delivery of aid to those who were in greatest need. 
HOL went on to relate his experiences of an initiative in 2011 in Somalia
under the WASH Cluster working group (UNICEF, 2013) where Oxfam
looked to expand an existing programme in an area of the country which
was under the control of an armed opposition group:  
“Our plan included giving money to our local partners to directly
help support their livelihoods. On hearing of this the local
authorities demanded 20% of the project budget, which our partner
refused to pay. The money was only available for a 3-month period
and as negotiations continued it looked like we would have to use
the funding on another project. On hearing this the local authorities
finally gave their provisional and unconditional support. It still took
another 4 or 5 days before approval was finally given because the
local commander was travelling to another part of the country. This
negotiation meant that the overall project and associated aid were
delayed for around 2 months”. 
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The Group consensus was that inter-organisational cooperation is a
good idea in theory, however in practice such a strategy leads to
“bureaucratic systems that slow down the overall response” (ILM). The
consensus was that this is in no small part due to governmental influence
on some organisations as discussed by Yaziji and Doh, (2009) and Doh
and Teegan, (2003) and to the fact that some countries look upon
humanitarian relief as a means of supporting their own economies, also
concurring with the academic opinion on political influence (Steinberg, 
2003; Porter and Kramer, 2002). 
Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Weiss and Collins (2000) contest that 
competition exists within the humanitarian sector in the same way as the
business environment, and in agreement with these assertions DHOL
returned to his discussion during Stage II of the research and to his
assertion that humanitarian relief organisations are still businesses that 
will be driven by the market. There was agreement within the Group to
this idea and a clear consensus that:  
“Money talks, just like in any other industry” (DHOL).  
6.8.4 Military Involvement
There was clear agreement within the Group with the proposition that 
there was a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief 
(Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Thompson; 2010); however, the
consensus was that wherever possible aid is most effectively delivered
by civilian humanitarian organisations under the leadership of the UN. 
Regional stability and with it security are enhanced and not undermined
by the provision of impartial, needs-based humanitarian aid and there is
a potential for military involvement to lead to potentially dangerous
consequences which may affect and limit civilian aid agencies’ ability to
work.  
The participants acknowledged the view that the overall military
contribution to the humanitarian relief effort is growing (Heaslip, 2011; 
Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011) and that the increasing number of disasters
worldwide is resulting in a correspondingly larger number of 
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humanitarian relief operations where international and local military
forces are working alongside civilian relief organisations. There was also
agreement that under the right circumstances, and Iraq and Afghanistan
were offered as examples of such circumstances, military forces should
be used to provide aid, particularly if the region is deemed to be too
insecure for civilian agencies to operate safely. All participants would
welcome military support when it was not safe for them to work; however, 
referring back to the debate on the preservation of the humanitarian
principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008) there
was also concern raised regarding the perception that such actions
might have with the local community.  
“Neutrality and impartiality do not go cap in hand with a military
uniform I am afraid.” (IAM)
The overall feeling within the Group was that in order to ensure an
appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all organisations
involved, including those from the military should ensure that any aid
delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of either poverty or
suffering. 
The issue of longer term involvement for the military led to a discussion
on the UK governments’ approach in Afghanistan, and to the
implementation of the stabilisation doctrine (MOD, 2009), which
effectively sees the change from a focus on rapid short term, high profile
response to aid provision aimed at winning hearts and minds, in favour
of a policy of involvement in highly-visible militarised aid units created to
assist in building projects such as schools and hospitals. These projects
are funded by donor aid but owned and led by the local communities
themselves and give the military an opportunity to facilitate and support 
developmental and structural improvements, whilst using their obvious
expertise in ensuring security for the local community. Whilst 
acknowledging that such measures may prove to be a step in the right 
direction, there were concerns voiced in that military involvement is used
by some governments as a means of inflicting influence as they seek to
use aid provision as a means to achieve longer term political objectives
(Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Consequently the Group felt 
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that any military forces involved in the relief effort should adhere to the
UN agreed civil-military guidelines that are issued for each humanitarian
relief operation and that the associated military rules of engagement 
should prohibit the use of humanitarian assistance for military or
governmental objectives. The consensus was that whilst there is a clear
responsibility on governments to take action in such cases, there is also
a role to play for NGOs and that Oxfam International and other aid
organisations have to ensure that their activities and donations do not 
directly or indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military
conflict. Consequently, participants felt that NGOs should refuse any
donations which are conditional on them cooperating with military forces, 
or which require the recipient organisation to distribute aid based on the
political or military cooperation of those receiving it. Perhaps ILM best 
summed up the overall opinion within the Group: 
“All of those involved must ensure that the aid that we provide does
not contribute in any way to any contravention of international
human rights and the overall humanitarian principles”
6.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues  
As the third of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research
findings, this chapter has drawn upon data gathered from participants
within Oxfam International. Having firstly established the key etic issues
and themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, emic issues
were developed and then investigated through a series of semi-
structured interviews with Oxfam International participants. Finally, 
additional analysis and application of relevant literature within the field
informed the areas of discussion within a participant focus group. Hence, 
in keeping with the final research strategy through triangulation of data
gathered and findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group
with key informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the
barriers to collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also
looked to identify how these barriers might be addressed to improve
collaboration in the future. Following the classic case study process (Yin, 
2009) the findings and trends discussed within this section will be used
during a final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform
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the final conclusions and academic contribution. The section will now be
broken down into the key emic themes and issues identified within
Oxfam International arrived at through application of Stages I and II of 
the final research strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during
Stage III.  
6.9.1 Management and Control 
The data gathered from Oxfam International concurs with the calls for
agility and flexibility within humanitarian relief supply chains
(Christopher, 2011). However, the supply chain struggles to work in
reality and efforts to facilitate effective collaboration are hampered by
overall complexity. In cases where an immediate response (Kovács and
Spens, 2008, 2007) is called for, there is little evidence of coordination
and agreement with academic concern on the challenges presented by
the growing number of donor agencies involved within humanitarian
relief zones (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006). The
efforts of UN agencies does help to save lives and OCHA should take
the lead in coordinating the overall relief effort. However, there is also
agreement with the academic discourse on the inherent lack of success
with supply chain collaboration strategies (Senge, 2010) and also an
acknowledgement that collaboration cannot be achieved with
organisations who do not wish to do so (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006). 
OCHA had already made a significant contribution to the relief effort by
supporting international and local governments in planning and co-
ordinating humanitarian responses but, in keeping with the arguments
for the inclusion of downstream customers in successful supply chains
(Patti, 2006) more can and has to be done in this vital area. The overall
UN response is very slow at times, and this results in an aid effort that is
equally slow. There is a perception amongst some that the sector is
dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international
donor organisations, hence, there are ongoing strategies to create
collaborative organisations away from UN and western influence. Such
strategies might offer a means of increasing overall global capacity for
disaster response, but new models are based on the current UN
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structure so may well encounter similar bureaucratic frustrations as a
consequence. 
Academic opinion on the benefits of new IT systems are echoed (Altay
and Labonte, 2011) and the associated information sharing opportunities
have significantly improved standardisation and interoperability across
the sector. An alternate view on the effects of collaboration was offered, 
and the suggestion made striving for collaboration within the sector was
a red herring; an ad hoc approach might actually benefit the overall
effectiveness of the humanitarian relief effort. Arguing the case for an
element of chaos and uncertainty and agreeing with the idea that 
uncertainty leads to decision making (Mullins, 2013) the view was that 
there was far too much time spent in trying to apply formal structure to
the supply chain. Contesting academic opinion on the benefits of 
applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian
sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; 
Beamon, 2006), efforts to establish structure and coordination within
humanitarian relief zones are actually detrimental on occasion. In
keeping with the argument that classic market mechanisms will not 
guarantee a quality response within the sector (Dash et al, 2013; Olson
and Gregorian, 2007) what is really needed is a more rigid system that 
can judge agencies on their performance, and that has the legitimacy to
exclude those that have a history of letting the overall effort down.  
Porter (1998) suggested that “clusters allow companies to operate more
productively whilst coordinating with related companies” (p.78), however
the Oxfam participant view is that clusters and cluster leaders are
notoriously bad at communicating with local actors and local
governmental organisations, clearly in disagreement with the advice on
cluster membership within the supply chain context (Patti, 2006). In
keeping with academic discourse (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and
Jensen, 2010) on the organisation’s aim to develop strategies from the
bottom up, and following academic guidance on successful cluster
implementation (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) Oxfam’s strategy is to develop
approaches which help victims of humanitarian disasters to help
themselves and this is being achieved by working closely with local
communities and involving appropriate local authorities and
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organisations at an early stage. The consensus echoes the academic
discussion on the requirement for inter-cluster coordination (Stoddard et 
al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) and mechanisms to provide
comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to better
assess and analyse future humanitarian disasters should be introduced. 
The UN Cluster system is struggling due to a lack of experience amongst 
cluster coordinators in dealing with the immediate response phase
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Moreover, in keeping with the
academic debate on the negative effect that centralisation of staff and
decision makers can bring (Handy, 1993, cited by Mullins, 2013; 
Bollinger and Hofstede, 1987, cited by Chanlat et al, 2013) too many key
UN staff are based centrally rather than in the field of operations. 
The critical bottleneck in the supply chain is not the availability of 
supplies but that of money and people. Administrative procedures used
to distribute funds to the relief organisations by some cluster leads are
questioned as these are seen to slow things down and are regarded as
unsuited to the demand for a highly flexible and adaptable supply chain
(Christopher, 2011; Chopra and Meindl, 2010; Harrison and van Hoek, 
2011). If this lack of supply chain responsiveness and resilience
(Christopher, 2011) can be addressed then the immediate response
phase (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007) could be significantly shortened. 
Furthermore, with the right level of coordination and management, it will
be possible to introduce a combined approach across all phases of the
relief effort, as called for by Thomas and Kopczak (2005). A real concern
is in respect of the ability of the humanitarian relief community to respond
to multiple disasters and the likelihood of having to cope with more than
one disaster at the same time. The belief is that whilst the response
system is growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that 
required to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for
multiple responses. 
6.9.2 Understanding and Training
Oxfam International participants agree with the academic call for an
increase in logistics training and professionalisation (Tatham and Altay, 
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2013; Bolshe et al, 2013; Allen et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and
Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005). Echoing the academic
discourse (Tatham and Altay, 2103, Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011)
there is a lack of understanding and appreciation amongst some relief 
workers particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other
organisations and contributors within the sector. However, whilst there
is concern that the relatively high turnover of staff within Oxfam
International itself might be problematic in respect of educational
development, there is agreement that opportunities to professionalise
within the sector could act as a retention tool (Lu et al, 2013). The
increasing number of disasters worldwide (Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; 
Thomas and Kopczak, 2005) together with the high overall cost of 
logistics provision (Guhu-Sapir, et al, 2011) could be used as a means
to justify greater investment in training, but there is pragmatic resignation
that the current financial climate will make financial investment in training
difficult to justify. Moreover, Oxfam International tend to adopt an
“individual grafting” (Song et al, 2003) approach to staff recruitment by
employing those with previous knowledge of the sector, or those who
possess specific skill sets gained within the business sector (for example
supply chain managers).  
Echoing the academic advice on the benefits of integrated learning
(Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011) participants acknowledge the need
for the inclusion of local organisations and governments in training
strategies and believe that such initiatives help to facilitate partnerships
with the local communities; thereby, supporting Oxfam International’s
bottom up approach to humanitarian relief provision.  
6.9.3 Relationships
The data gathered echoes the academic discussion on the partnered
approach and on who should be included in the management of 
successful supply chains (Christopher, 2011, Sadler, 2007; Lysons and
Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006). Oxfam International are happy to take the
lead or be led within humanitarian relief operations, and place great 
importance on local involvement in building what were described as
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“grass roots relationships”. However, whilst fine in principle, relationship
management with local authorities can be problematic in practice, 
particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity. 
There is often difficulty in identifying who the local government is, hence
it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movements of donor
funding and to maintain humanitarian quality standards. Hence, Oxfam
International staff attempt to establish and utilise long standing
relationships with local partners to help ensure that aid is delivered to
the most vulnerable. Whilst this strategy helps to maintain the
humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009, DFID, 
2008) it also means that it is virtually impossible to offer predictable and
timely delivery of aid. The bureaucratic processes associated with the
approach mean that in some cases local militia demand percentage
payments from project funds. Oxfam International’s refusal to not make
such payments and the consequent negotiation process has delayed
projects in the past and the associated delivery of aid (see vignettes in
section 6.9.3).  
There are challenges associated with the formation of what Kumar and
Havey (2013) term Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an
immediate response operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Oxfam
International’s contribution to the WASH Cluster (UNICEF, 2013) was
included as an example of a possible route to swift trust (Tatham and
Kovács, 2010) within the sector. The data gathered reflects agreement 
with the benefits of the value chain (Porter, 1990), and inter-
organisational cooperation is seen as a good idea in theory; however, in
practice such a strategy leads to bureaucratic systems that slow down
the overall response. In accord with the academic discourse (Yaziji and
Doh, 2009; Doh and Teegan, 2003; Steinberg, 2003; Porter and Kramer, 
2002) the participant view was that there is governmental influence on
some organisations within the sector, and some countries regard
humanitarian relief as a means of supporting their own economies and
political agendas.  
In disagreement with academic opinion on the positive impact that 
collaboration and coordination can have on supply chain performance
(Dash et al, 2013, Christopher, 2011, Patti, 2006; Porter 1998 and 1990)
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and on the concerns that that humanitarian organisations run the risk of 
entering into competition with other organisations (Chandes and Paché, 
2010), the data offers empirical evidence that business opportunism
does exist within the sector. The overall analysis supports the contention
that humanitarian relief organisations are still businesses that will be
driven by the market and associated market forces, and that the desire
to demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors will
sometimes occur to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The
Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000). 
6.9.4 Military Involvement
There is a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief 
(Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Thompson; 2010, Beauregard, 1998); but 
there are also some reservations in that the military contribution has to
be under the right circumstances and where there may be a need for
military resources such as trucks and planes or for military manpower to
boost capacity. However, wherever possible aid is most effectively
delivered by civilian humanitarian organisations under the leadership of 
the UN. Regional stability and with it security, are enhanced and not 
undermined by the provision of impartial, needs-based humanitarian aid
and there is a potential for military involvement to lead to dangerous
consequences which may affect and limit the ability of civilian aid
agencies’ to work (Williamson, 2011).  
The overall military contribution to the humanitarian relief effort is
growing (Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011, Lynch, 2010) and
the increasing number of disasters worldwide are resulting in a
correspondingly larger number of humanitarian relief operations where
military forces are working alongside civilian relief organisations. Under
the right circumstances military forces should be used to provide aid, this
is particularly true within regions which are deemed as unsafe for civilian
agencies to operate in. Referring back to the debate on the preservation
of the humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
DFID, 2008), concerns are raised regarding the perception that military
involvement has within local communities; the data supports the
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academic view (Williamson, 2011; Heaslip, 2011; Seipel, 2011) that the
concepts of neutrality and impartiality do not sit well with military
intervention within the humanitarian relief supply chain. In order to
ensure an appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all
organisations involved, including those from the military should ensure
that any aid delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of poverty or
suffering. 
Trying to incorporate humanitarian relief within the larger political context 
is an impossible task as military and political objectives will always
collide with humanitarian principles. Warfare will always conflict with
humanitarian principles and consequently, there are occasions when the
military want to wear 2 hats, one driven by the pressure to achieve
political aims and the other to support the humanitarian relief effort. 
Whilst offering agreement with Heaslip’s (2011) assertion that “military
and humanitarian organisations need to establish clear blue water
between one another” (p.163), Oxfam participants believe that the
challenge for the military is to clarify which hat they are wearing at the
outset of the relief effort and to consistently adopt that one role
throughout the ensuing relief operation. In agreement with the
observations made by Williamson (2011) the military idea of using
humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one and does not 
constitute or assist humanitarian relief work. 
The implementation of the stabilisation doctrine (MOD, 2009) and the
corresponding change of military focus away from purely rapid short term
humanitarian support, in favour of a policy of involvement in longer term
militarised aid and building projects is welcome; however, there are
concerns voiced in agreement with the observation that some
governments regarded military involvement as a means of achieving
long term political influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). 
Consequently, any military forces involved in the relief effort should
adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines; moreover, the
associated military rules of engagement should prohibit the use of 
humanitarian assistance for the fulfilment of military or governmental
objectives. Whilst there is a clear responsibility on governments to take
action in such cases there is also a role to play for NGOs and aid
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organisations who have to ensure that their activities and donations do
not directly or indirectly provide resources to be used to assist military
conflict. Consequently, NGOs should refuse any donations which are
conditional on them cooperating with military forces and all agencies
involved in the relief effort have to ensure that the aid that is provided
does not contribute in any way to any contravention of international
human rights and the overall humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 7
TEARFUND – INDIVIDUAL DOMAIN ANALYSIS
“Tearfund has a big vision which we've been bringing into being since
1968. We know there's God-given-potential in poor communities. We
work with local churches to unlock this potential.”
(Tearfund, 2011)
7.1 Introduction
The data gathered from participants within The Evangelical Alliance
Relief (TEAR) Fund is presented and discussed concurrently with
appropriate academic discourse within the field of research that was first 
introduced within Chapter 2. By way of introduction a short background
and history of Tearfund is included together with a look at its current (as
at 2012) portfolio of humanitarian programmes and structures. The
discussion then turns to an analysis of the key etic and emic issues and
themes identified. Final conclusions and overall domain themes and
issues are then established through triangulation of the data gathered
and the academic discourse.  
7.2 Background – Core Beliefs, Drivers and Scale  
Tearfund is a Christian international aid agency working globally to end
poverty and injustice (DEC, 2012). They are passionate about living out 
God’s kingdom values of love, hope and transformation (Tearfund, 
2011). One of the 14 members of the Disasters Emergency Committee
(DEC) they are recognised for their professional expertise in
development, disaster response, disaster risk reduction and advocacy. 
Tearfund believe that this level of professionalism and expertise, 
matched with the enduring, sustainable effectiveness of the local church, 
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is a powerful force in the face of poverty. They are committed to
standards of conduct and good practice that ensure that they are always
accountable for the work that they do. Tearfund are signatories to the
Red Cross Code of Conduct (IFRC, 2012) and members of the
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP, 2012).  
Core to Tearfund’s Christian values is the belief that aid must be given
regardless of race, religion, nationality or gender, and that it will never
be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint. This is of 
vital importance to Tearfund staff as this is seen as the kind of 
‘development work’ that is described in the Bible. They follow a biblical
path in believing that helping communities in need is central to the
purpose of local churches, wherever they may be (Tearfund, 2011).  
The 2011/12 Director’s Report and Accounts (Tearfund 2012) records
total Tearfund income as £70 million and expenditure on charitable
activities as £59 million. All expenditure is overseen by the UK Charity
Commission, and the Fund is committed to ensuring that as much as
possible of the money donated to them is spent in ways that benefit the
people who need it most. Approximately 91% of all donations go towards
emergency, development and humanitarian work, as well as other
elements of Tearfund charitable work such as campaigning and
advocacy. Of the remaining funds, 8% is spent on fund raising activity
(which compares well with similar size organisations) and around 1% is
spent on the costs of governance. (Tearfund, 2011).  
7.3 A Brief History - Fighting Poverty since 1968
Donations to the Evangelical Church during World Refugee Year in
1960, and subsequent donations in support of famine relief efforts in
Biafra prompted the public launch of Tearfund in 1968. Increasing
publicity and public awareness prompted Cliff Richard to give his first 
fundraising concert for the cause in the Royal Albert Hall in 1969. In the
1970s Tearfund expanded with facilities being created to enable
supporters to sponsor children in Bangladesh; their donations being
used to provide food, healthcare and education through Christian
projects. In 1980 Tearfund sent its own medical team to work in refugee
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camps in Somalia and in 1985 driven by the events surrounding Band
Aid, the Fund established a regular donation programme to provide long-
term support for aid development programmes. The 1990s were marked
by civil unrest in the Balkans and Tearfund were at the forefront of the
associated humanitarian relief efforts. In 1994 Tearfund launched a
significant appeal and relief response effort following the Rwandan
genocide, and in response to the devastating effects of Hurricane Mitch
on Central America (1998) joined the Disasters Emergency Committee
of relief agencies to appeal for funds (DEC, 2012). Tearfund ended the
1990’s by becoming a founder-member of the Jubilee 2000 movement, 
an international coalition movement in over 40 countries that called for
cancellation of third world debt by the year 2000 (Dent and Peters, 
1999).  
Since 2000 Tearfund has been involved in all major disaster relief efforts
across the globe, from severe floods in Africa and South Asia to helping
to cope with the humanitarian impact of conflicts in Afghanistan and
Darfur. The Fund responded to the devastation following the Asian
Tsunami (2004) and in 2005, acted as a leading member of the Make
Poverty History (2005) coalition; a coalition of charities, religious groups, 
trade unions and campaigning groups aimed at holding governments to
account to end world poverty (Nicholls, 2005).  
7.4 A Growing Portfolio - Current Humanitarian Programmes
and Structures
Tearfund’s meteoric rise within the humanitarian relief sector continues
today as it has a policy of responding operationally to humanitarian
disasters in situations of overwhelming need (Tearfund, 2011). As at 
October 2012 operational programmes were on-going in Darfur, South
Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan and Haiti
(Tearfund, 2012). During financial year 2011/12 more than 7,300 new
local churches were established to address the needs of poor, 
vulnerable and marginalised people in their communities. Integral
mission initiatives were increased to 109, across 59 countries including
partnerships with support organisations in Nepal, Zimbabwe and
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Pakistan (p6). A comprehensive and integrated approach to disasters
and disaster vulnerability, undertaking disaster risk reduction and
disaster response exists through the activities of Tearfund partners, their
direct operational programmes, Tearfund UK teams, local churches and
global networks. Each programme is led by a programme director and a
senior management team and each project location is under the
responsibility of an Area Coordinator. The Operational Team in the UK
Head Office includes finance staff and technical services staff to ensure
that programmes are effectively supported, along with a humanitarian
support team which provides wider support to Tearfund staff and
partners (Tearfund, 2012). 
7.5 Data Collection, Respondents and Results
Tearfund were first contacted in May 2012 through a series of 
introductory letters and questionnaires, as per Stage I in the research
methodology. Key respondents are shown in Table 7.1: 
Respondent
Time
with
Tearfund
(years)
Practical 
Experience Role Code
Head of
International 
Finance and
Logistics
24
Involved in logistics
support to every
major humanitarian
crisis since 1989
To lead and manage the
International Finance
and Logistics team. 
HOL
Deputy
Programme
Director 19
Most major crises
since joining the
organisation
Part of the Senior
Management Team for a
given relief programme
with significant external
representation of 
Tearfund. 
DPD
International 
Logistics
Manager 7
Darfur, Pakistan, 
South Sudan, 
Liberia, Haiti, DRC
To manage resources
engaged in the delivery
of specific operational
projects  
ILM
Area
Coordinator
7
Afghan National
Solidarity
Programme, Haiti
Responsible for the
management of specific
financial, logistics and
human resource
functions engaged on
AC
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Respondent
Time
with
Tearfund
(years)
Practical 
Experience Role Code
one particular operation. 
Regular communication
with other agencies and
partner organisations. 
Base
Manager (x3)
5 DRC, Haiti Responsible for
managing a project area
office and delivering
operational support to
project sites in Logistics, 
Finance, HR and general
administration. 
BM1
3 Haiti BM2
2 Haiti BM3
Table 7.1: Tearfund – Key Respondents
7.6 Data Analysis – Stage I – Key Etic Themes and Issues
Analysis of the data gathered via the introductory questionnaires
(Appendix D), will now be discussed. In achieving this due consideration
will be given to the practical relevance of the initial etic issues and
themes identified within the Literature Review as set out and codified at 
Appendix E. Note that respondent codes within Table 7.1 will be used at 
this stage.  
7.6.1 General Processes, Power, Relationships and
Collaboration
All respondents agreed that the organisation operated a supply chain
that was designed specifically for its particular role (COLRES). However, 
senior respondents (HOL, DPD, ILM) stated that Tearfund do not 
operate under the UN Cluster Concept (COLCLU) whilst only one junior
respondent (BM1) was aware of the strategy. All respondents offered the
view that Tearfund do not take the lead in any logistical activity along the
humanitarian relief supply chain and the senior view was that they would
not be willing to accept such responsibility in any future operations (HOL, 
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DPD) (PWRPOS, PWRNEG, RMT, RMOPP). Facilities are shared with
other NGOs (AC, BM1,2,3) but this is at a localised level (COLHOR) and
there is no visibility of this in the higher operational sense (COLVER)
(HOL, DPD, ILM). When it comes to acceptance of military assistance
there was a resounding answer of ‘Depends on the circumstances’ from
all respondents (HUMSIND). 
7.6.2 The Humanitarian Space
When considering the Humanitarian Space and the 4 humanitarian
principles, all principles were recognised and acknowledged by the
respondents but whilst they were scored as being of equal importance
by the senior respondents (HOL, DPD), it was interesting to note that the
more junior respondents (ILM, AC, BM) were all happy to offer an opinion
and to grade most and least important as in Fig 7.1
Fig 7.1: Humanitarian Principles - Tearfund Junior Responses
Ϭ
ϭ
Ϯ
ϯ
ϰ
ϱ
ϲ
,ƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ EĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇ /ŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůŝƚǇ /ŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞ
DŽƐƚ/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
>ĞĂƐƚ/ŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
UN Cluster Concept/ Lead Status/ Power/ 
Relationships/Sharing of Facilities/ Military
Assistance
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Humanity (HUMSHUM) and Impartiality (HUMSIMP) are clearly the most 
important with Neutrality (HUMSNEU) and Independence (HUMSIND)
being the least important in the eyes of the Tearfund’s humanitarian relief 
practioners. However, perhaps this could have been expected as if one
considers the definitions of the 4 principles set out in the questionnaire
(Appendix D), there are some close similarities between those offered
for Humanity and Impartiality and Neutrality and Independence which
should have perhaps, with hindsight been avoided. 
7.6.3 Organisational Sustainment
In prioritising the statements surrounding organisational sustainment the
senior respondent (HOL) pointed to Tearfund’s membership of the
interagency Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP) and noted
that one of the Fund’s most important aims was to adhere to the
associated quality, accountability and performance improvement 
initiatives (HAP, 2012). The senior respondent also noted that whilst 
there was a drive to demonstrate to donors that their presence and
inputs into a humanitarian mission were valuable (SUSFR), this was only
in the context of value for money. Moreover, demonstrating competitive
behaviour towards other humanitarian actors and organisations
(SUSSTRAT) and seeking visible means of demonstrating active
subscription to CSR, (SUSCSR) were not applicable in his eyes. Other
respondents (DPD, ILM, AC, BM) noted that it was important to
demonstrate a presence (SUSFR) and this was particularly true of the
junior respondents (LM), who regarded this to be a priority when working
in a practical relief area. Demonstration of subscription to CSR
(SUSCSR) was also an area of importance, but demonstration of 
competitive behaviour (SUSSTRAT) was considered to be not-
applicable by all respondents. 
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Humanitarian Principles  
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7.6.4 Summary - Key Etic Themes and Issues  
In completing Stage I of the research strategy with Tearfund the following
key etic themes and issues were identified to inform Stage II of the
research strategy. 
Theme Issue Description Notes
General
Processes, 
Power, 
Relationships and
Collaboration
UN Cluster
Concept 
Senior vs junior
knowledge  
Why Tearfund do not 
adopt the strategy
LM not aware of 
concept 
Lead status Do not take the lead
in any operational
activity
Who does?
Happy to follow?
Power/relationships?
Sharing of 
facilities
Facilities shared but 
at local level
Why not at a higher
level?
What is shared?
Who with?
Military
Assistance
Acceptance will
‘Depend on the
Circumstances’
What circumstances?
What type of/ how
much assistance?
The Humanitarian
Space
Humanity vs
Impartiality Misunderstanding of 
definitions
Clarify understanding
and relevance of 
principlesNeutrality vs
Independence
Organisational
Sustainment 
Membership of 
HAP
Adherence to the
associated quality, 
accountability and
performance
improvement 
initiatives. 
Check general
awareness of HAP
membership and
principles
Key Etic Themes and Issues: 
Membership of HAP
Demonstration of Value for money/ 
Presence
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Theme Issue Description Notes
Demonstration
of Value for
money
Must demonstrate
value for money to
donors
How?
Awareness at junior
respondent level?
Demonstration
of Presence
Must demonstrate
presence to donors
How?
Senior vs Junior
opinions. 
Table 7.2: Tearfund – Stage I Key Etic Themes and Issues
7.7 Data Analysis – Stage II – Developing Emic Themes and
Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the semi structured interviews with
members of Tearfund listed in Table 7.1 will now be discussed. In
keeping with Stage II of the final research strategy interviews were based
around the schedule (Appendix F) which had been developed following
cross-domain analysis of Stage I findings and the key etic themes and
issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes
listed within Table 7.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
7.7.1 General Processes, Coordination and Collaboration
“The UN Cluster Approach is fine to a point but I have seen it work
as both a bottleneck and an enabler……for it to be truly effective
the controlling authorities must concentrate on the effective
coordination of international agencies much more than they do at 
present…..they must take a more active role on the ground and
not sit back and let things develop…” (HOL)
The quote above echoes the feelings of all Tearfund respondents in
respect of the effectiveness of the UN Cluster Approach (UN OCHA, 
2011). The data gathered demonstrates overall support for the
theoretical concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), but that the
practical application of the concept in real time disaster relief operations
is somewhat different. The view is that there are too many priorities
competing with each other and that the current approach clouds the
issue and does not allow donors to have a clear understanding of what 
the immediate needs are (DPD). Referring to his experiences during the
255
2005 Pakistan earthquake, when the Cluster Approach was first used
ILM did feel that the overall relief effort was better coordinated than it 
would have been without it; however, there were clear areas for
improvement and, in keeping with the thoughts of Jensen (2012) clusters
contributed to unaccountability and inefficiencies in the response as
many cluster leads had no delegated authority to make decisions. 
Moreover, ILM was obviously frustrated as he discussed his experiences
of the response to the Haitian earthquake (2010), where he agreed with
the view offered by Lynch (2010) in that little had changed in the
intervening 5 years.  
The data show a common perception amongst the Tearfund
respondents that there are cultural barriers to effective collaboration: 
“The greatest limitation of the UN Cluster Approach is the failure
by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately prioritise
and resource cluster leadership and coordination
responsibilities…..this is not just down to funding issues but also
to inter-agency culture and rivalry” (HOL)
This view would seem to echo that offered by Reindorp and Wiles (2001)
in a report commissioned by the UN OCHA, which ultimately informed
the introduction of the UN Cluster Approach, where they note that “there
is an institutional culture within humanitarian agencies in which
cooperation is neither required nor rewarded” (p.50). Views that would
also seem to concur with comments on the reticence of some
organisations to act alone (Heaslip, 2011; Senge, 2010) and on the
simple fact that “You cannot collaborate with a party that lacks a genuine
desire to collaborate” (Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006, p.312). Moreover, 
and somewhat disappointingly, the practical observations of ILM would
also seem to be confirmed in that little has in fact changed since the
introduction of the Cluster Approach in 2005 (Lynch, 2010). AC sums up
the overall Tearfund view on the Cluster Approach as he agreed with
Patti (2006) in that the best way forward was to retain clusters, but to
make them more concise by outlining clear priorities and including as
many stakeholders as possible in the process.  
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Christopher (2011) supported the need for a flexible and agile supply
chain and BM1 supports this idea as he calls for agencies to increase
their capacity to respond speedily with skilled coordinators. Furthermore, 
BM1 contends that this can be best achieved through the development 
of a classic partnered approach (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; 
Lysons and Farrington, 2006), adopting closer working relationships
together with the sharing of assets, facilities and knowledge. Referring
to his experiences in Haiti (2010), BM1 felt that a more accurate analysis
of the situation on the ground would have helped, and that the lack of 
reliable information sharing and communication mechanisms was the
main contributor to an overall lack of knowledge and awareness. BM3
supported this view and the observations made by Lynch (2010), as he
discussed the limitations on offloading capability and storage capacity
that he had experienced in Haiti; issues that he felt were as a direct result 
of the sheer scale of devastation to the airport, sea port and roads, 
combined with a lack of information sharing that had led to a very slow
dispersal of aid. BM3 also felt that partnerships and the sharing of assets
is a key factor in the provision of effective humanitarian aid: 
“We [Tearfund] aim to be accountable to our donors and to those
partners who we participate in projects with……Tearfund is about 
participation….because of this we are happy to share information
and facilities”  
AC offered some very strong views on the acceptance of military
assistance and reflected the observations offered by Williamson (2011)
in believing that the military should never act as the lead organisation
within natural disaster relief zones. Heaslip (2011) suggests that there
are 2 aspects of military support in humanitarian, the provision of security
and the provision of resources; however, AC’s clear view was that the
military should focus solely on the first of these, as he believed that the
military are in a humanitarian relief zone to protect him and his
colleagues, and that military contributors should leave humanitarian
organisations to carry out the actual relief effort: 
“They [the military] have a clear role to play in providing security
for relief workers but should not try and interfere with NGOs and
donors in the relief zone”
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His views are probably influenced by his personal experiences in Haiti, 
where he felt that in the immediate response to the natural disaster the
US military had initially taken control but that they had done this without 
any clear authority, when perhaps it would have been better under the
auspices of the UN. DPD was a little more reserved on this issue and
pointed to the fact that sensitivity over sovereignty will almost always rule
out an international military role unless it is as part of the UN; thereby
supporting the view that in response to natural disasters civil-military
coordination should be strictly between governments and their military’s
(UN OCHA, 2013a). Echoing the academic discourse on the benefits of 
applying business sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian
sector (Chandes and Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; 
Beamon, 2006) DPD believed that NGOs and aid agencies in general
should operate on a business model in isolation from the military and in
direct competition with each other. His overall view was that although
international military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, 
delivery and distribution of aid, a well-coordinated humanitarian
response must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the
re-establishment of systems and livelihoods, thereby helping a
population to recover as quickly as possible. In sum, his overall view was
that:  
“The military is not equipped nor really interested in dealing with
this”. 
The data gathered suggests that these opinions are shared by the other
Tearfund respondents, but that there is also general agreement with the
view that military intervention does have a vital role to play in the overall
relief effort (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Thompson, 2010). However, 
the consensus would seem to support the argument proffered by Katoch
(2006) in that foreign military assistance should only be provided at the
request of the affected government and that any subsequent response
must be coordinated through that government. Moreover the data goes
on to acknowledge the view that the UN is best placed to coordinate the
relief effort given its position in relation to affected governments and the
worldwide donor community (Reindorp and Wiles, 2001). 
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7.7.2 Power and Relationships
The data gathered concurred with academic views in support of a
partnered approach (Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006) and on
who should be included in the management of successful supply chains
(Christopher, 2011; Patti, 2006); furthermore it confirms that a key tenant 
of Tearfund’s overall strategy is to work in partnership with other
organisations within the humanitarian relief sector. DPD discussed the
organisation’s membership of numerous committees and groups within
the sector and cited the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012)
and the Inter-Agency Procurement Group (IPAG, 2013) as examples of 
Tearfund’s willingness to work with partner organisations, NGOs and
governments who specialise in areas where they believed that they
could have the greatest impact: 
“When we work with partners we do not try and impose on
them…..we try and work with partners who share our
values……we are always trying to improve the quality of our
partnerships”. (DPD)
Disappointingly for the sector as a whole, HOL offered support to the
academic discourse on the negative effect that power can have on the
workings of a successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation
and is not helpful in building relationships (Olson and Gregorian, 2007; 
Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 1997) as he added that, to
his knowledge certain other smaller NGOs were not happy to join such
organisations as there was a perception that they would not be treated
on an equal basis.  
Tearfund participants were content with the idea that power imbalance
is a first step towards successful relationship building, and were clearly
Key Emic Themes and Issues
Clusters/ Coordination/ Information Sharing
and Knowledge/ Asset Sharing/ Military
Assistance/ Links to local Government 
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content to operate within conditions of imbalanced power and reward
(Hingley, 2005a, p.63), as they accepted that the size of their
organisation meant that, realistically they will not be offered lead status
in a relief zone. The consensus was that trust and relationship
management within what Kumar and Havey (2013) describe as Hastily
Formed Networks (HFN) were of vital importance to them, and to the
Tearfund’s overall strategy. Chandes and Paché (2010) and Olson and
Gregorian (2007) contend that business opportunism exists within the
sector, but the data gathered demonstrates that competition was not an
issue in the case of the Tearfund; however, this view can probably be
explained by consideration of the core Christian values that drive overall
organisational policy (Tearfund, 2011). HOL was quick to refer to the
Organisation’s overall belief that they should be open and accountable
to their financial supporters and that “for every pound donated around
91 pence goes to our humanitarian field work” (according to the Tearfund
website, approximately eight pence is spent raising funds and less than
one penny in every pound is spent on the costs of governance (Tearfund, 
2011)). HOL and DPD discussed Tearfund’s membership of the
Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP, 2012) and the fact that 
the organisation is a signatory to the Red Cross Code of Conduct (IFRC, 
2012):  
“Our Christian values mean that we are committed to living out 
God’s core values through our dedication to those who need us
and relationships with other donor organisations” (HOL)
7.7.3 The Humanitarian Space
The data gathered demonstrates that the maintenance of all
humanitarian principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Partnerships
Accountability to Donors
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2008) and Christian beliefs are a significant factor in the Tearfund’s
overall strategy. All respondents are clearly aware of the Tearfund’s
Quality Standards (Tearfund, 2013) and Statement of Faith (Tearfund, 
2013a): 
“God’s love for everyone is important to us and our Christian
beliefs mean that we will always remain neutral…..we will try and
reach all who need our help” (AC)
“The Bible describes development work and that is what we
do……we help local churches to help themselves wherever they
are” (BM3)
In disagreement with the academic view (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson
and Gregorian, 2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003), the data
confirms that politics do not influence Tearfund policy or direction in
respect of the humanitarian effort in the field and that respondents
“would not let political barriers prevent us from carrying out God’s
teaching” (BM3). Typical of the responses in this area is that offered by
ILM who felt that help must be provided on the basis of need, and that 
he and his colleagues must clearly identify those who are in greatest 
need regardless of political pressures. However, in contrast DPD did
acknowledge the view (Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003) that in
recent years some NGOs had attempted to influence policy decisions to
help shape global political perspectives on a wide range of humanitarian
issues as he cited Tearfund’s involvement in the Enough Food for
Everyone IF (2013) as an example of the organisation’s attempts to bring
influence to bear on what he described as “key decision-makers”. 
7.7.4 Organisational Sustainment
Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent (1987) comment on the adverse
influence that financial pressure and a fear of donor withdrawal can have
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Influence Key Decision Makers  
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on NGO behaviour within humanitarian relief zones, and the data
gathered demonstrates acknowledgement of a commitment and
accountability to the donor community. HOL explained that Tearfund is
dedicated to ensuring that the work that they do will have a lasting and
positive impact and that the relief effort has been built on local need and
local skills and resources. He explained that Tearfund achieve this
through a network of local churches and partner organisations and that 
the money donated is used to help to inspire Christian believers to
challenge poverty and injustice and to help the most vulnerable as a
result. ILM referred to the Tearfund Supporter’s Charter (Tearfund, 
2013b): 
“Where we set out our commitment to our supporters, make clear
promises to them and ask for their feedback on how we spend their
donations”
The data does not suggest that Tearfund actively seek publicity; they
rely on their donors to keep abreast of their activities through a dedicated
website and the publication of annual report and accounts. The
Organisation is aware of the impact on the environment and is committed
to the key tenants of Corporate Social Responsibility: 
“We want to reduce our impact on the environment……when we
work with the local churches we always ensure that we do not do
anything that may harm the natural environment” (AC)
Key Emic Themes and Issues: 
Accountability to donors
Impact on the Environment  
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7.7.5 Summary – Tearfund Key Emic Themes and Issues  
Theme Issue Description Notes
Management and
Control 
Coordination Practical reality  Competing
priorities
Clusters
Areas for
improvement 
No change since
inception
Inter-agency
culture and rivalry
Negative effect on
clusters
Make role more
concise
Outline priorities
and include
stakeholders
Relationships
Information and
Knowledge Sharing
Lack of reliable
information
Poor overall
awareness
Slow distribution of 
aid
Asset sharing Increase capacity Speed updistribution
Partnerships
Unequal treatment 
Concern of smaller
NGOs
Quality of delivery Seek to improve
Success achieved
through Christian
beliefs
Influence key
decision makers
Aim to help poor
and vulnerable
Partnership with
action groups
Accountable to
donors
Feedback to
donors
Awareness
Impact on the
environment 
Corporate Social
Responsibility
Military
Involvement
Assistance Clarity of role  
Links to local
government 
Maintenance of 
Sovereignty Establish control
over external
military participantsRole of local
military
Interest beyond
initial response
Not just distribution
but overall recovery
Accelerate overall
recovery
Table 7.3: Tearfund – Stage II Key Emic Themes and Issues
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7.8 Data Analysis – Stage III – Confirm Emic Themes and Issues
Analysis of the data gathered during the Focus Group carried out with
members of Tearfund will now be discussed. Two of the participants list 
in Table 7.1 (BM2 and BM3) were unable to attend the Focus Group, 
hence membership was restricted to the five remaining members of 
Tearfund listed in Table 7.1. In keeping with Stage III of the final research
strategy discussion during the Focus Group was based around the
Focus Group Topic Guide (Appendix G) which had been developed
following analysis of the Stage II findings and the key emic themes and
issues that had been identified as a result. Note that respondent codes
listed within Table 7.1 will still be used throughout this discussion. 
7.8.1 Management and Control 
There is a clear support amongst the Tearfund Focus Group for the view
that all participant organisations have a part to play in the relief effort and
that better coordination will benefit the overall provision and efficient 
delivery of aid. However, the consensus was that OCHA has an
impossible task (ILM); moreover, the Group also acknowledged the
increasing demands being placed on OCHA in light of the growing
number of donor agencies involved within the overall humanitarian relief 
effort (Heaslip, 2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006). 
Coordination of the relief effort is required but the belief was that the task
is too big for one organisation: 
“The competing agendas and open rivalry at times between
international organisations means that little coordinated activity
can actually take place…… We prefer to do our own thing if 
possible and to work by establishing close links with the local
community at an early stage”. (ILM). 
Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that a critical component to a
successful supply chain strategy is relationship management and to
counter the ILM’s assertions the remaining participants acknowledged
that the Tearfund has to work with other agencies in order to gain access
to vital resources and expertise. The overall view was that the Tearfund
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is not a large enough organisation to act in isolation and that 
consequently, it has to rely on other agencies for resources such as
transport and storage space. However, the bureaucracy involved in such
a strategy can lead to significant delays in getting aid to those who need
it most. Tearfund also relies on other organisations for strategic
information on the disaster area itself, but in keeping with the
observations made by Heaslip (2011) and Lynch (2010) there was
agreement and noticeable frustration at the slow and at times inaccurate
information flow: 
“In Haiti we really struggled for information at the beginning as
there was no central point…..we were also regarded by some as a
small organisation so we had to search out information when it 
would have been better to have been given it” (BM1)
This statement highlights another area of concern for the Group in the
way that NGOs, in their experience are ranked within disaster relief 
areas (HOL). The Group felt that those larger organisations in the field
lacked an understanding of what others had to contribute, and that an
increase in knowledge would help the overall effort.  
Turning to the UN Cluster Concept, participant opinion echoed with that 
of Jensen (2112), in that whilst clusters were fine in principle, in practice
they were ineffective and slowed things down in the field. Whilst there
was clear acknowledgement of, and support for the academic concept 
of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) the overall opinion agreed with
Jensen (2101) in that they can prove to be cumbersome and difficult to
manage, leading to significant delays in relief provision. This is due in no
small part to the fact that clusters and their leaders are not held
accountable and in most cases are not empowered to make decisions
and to sanction actions. The view was that the link between the clusters
and OCHA is not clear and that some cluster leaders keep referring back
to the UN to make decisions, whilst others carry out their own ideas
without any consultation. The idea of performance management (Kaplan
and Norton, 1996) and cluster accountability was well received and there
was agreement that some clearer guidelines on cluster implementation
and management will help to address the inherent confusion amongst 
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participant organisations. There was also a strong consensus that in
keeping with the academic view, in order to be effective clusters should
include both “upstream suppliers and downstream customers” (Patti, 
p.266); consequently the inclusion of local governments and
organisations is paramount to any successful strategy. Moreover, the
involvement of local communities and authorities in the cluster concept 
would serve to enhance its overall success and to prevent a sense of 
distrust amongst recipient communities. 
“Local communities are at the heart of all Tearfund activity and this
works for us……why should the cluster approach be any
different…..leaving them out makes them suspicious and
unsure…include local authorities and communities and they can
begin to take responsibility for their own well-being and recovery
at an early stage in the relief effort” (AC)
7.8.2 Understanding and Training
There was clear agreement with the view that training and
professionalisation is a vital aspect of humanitarian provision (Tatham
and Altay, 2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 
2005); however, the Group and HOL in particular were pragmatic in
respect of the financial restrictions that are associated with the provision
of specific training within the Tearfund. The overall consensus was that 
given its size and budget, the Tearfund is restricted in respect of training
funding. The organisation’s aim is to turn as much of its donations into
aid as possible, hence, the organisation could not really justify
committing funding to professional training for its staff. As a
consequence, the overall approach to training within Tearfund is one that 
takes advantage of employing staff from other organisations with
appropriate knowledge, a process referred to as “Individual Grafting” by
Song et al (2003) or one that encompasses a strategy of experiential
learning within the organisation itself (Huber, 1991). 
“Tearfund recruit predominantly volunteers who are driven to them
by Christian belief, if these volunteers can offer additional and
relevant skills then so much the better but we are happy for them
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to learn through experience and from others within the
organisation” (HOL)
The size of the Tearfund was also raised as an issue in respect of joint 
training and exercises as whilst it was acknowledged that this is a good
idea in theory (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011), there was a fear that 
such a strategy might detract from ongoing relief provision and effort. 
Indeed, the question was raised as to how organisations, and in
particular those smaller ones such as the Tearfund can spare staff to
take part in joint training exercises as the vast majority of their volunteers
are constantly engaged in aid provision across the world. 
The Group were keen to discuss Tearfund’s approach to local training
and the successes that they have had. The following vignettes serve to
illustrate the Tearfund strategy in respect of local engagement and
training:  
“After the initial response to the Haiti earthquake, Tearfund started
to help the local communities to deal with the flooding and
landslides that affect them every year after the huge storms which
pass over the country. We identified that the residents of the very
difficult to access communities had to be equipped with the training
and understanding to reduce the risks and hard ship using their
own resources.’ (ILM)
Also based in Haiti, AC spoke of a school building project: 
“Through our local partner in Haiti, the Union of Baptist Churches, 
we opened a school to train builders of the future. Part of the
training was also to prepare local communities for future
earthquakes or disasters”.  
7.8.3 Relationships
In keeping with the view that customer/supplier relationships should be
based on partnership and that successful supply chains will be those
based on mutuality and trust where there is a constant search for win-
win solutions (Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Sadler, 2007; Christopher, 
2011), Tearfund’s fund raising and aid delivery strategies rely on
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successful relationships and effective use of partnered working. The
Group discussed Tearfund’s membership of organisations such as the
DEC and HAP (see earlier discussion in this Chapter), together with its
affiliation to the Micah Network, “a global Christian community of 
organisations and individuals, often operating in isolation, drawn
together to significantly enhance their capacity and impact as well as
develop their ability to act collectively in key areas of concern” (Micah
Network, 2013). The Focus Group agreed that memberships such as
these were vital in helping Tearfund and other similar sized or smaller
humanitarian relief organisations to have a more significant say in
proceedings and disaster relief operations in general; thereby, 
suggesting that there is an inherent power imbalance (Hingley, 2005a)
within humanitarian relief zones, but also acknowledging the Tearfund’s
position within it. By way of illustration, DPD felt that: 
“We know that will never be in a position of power, but we don’t 
want to be……our aim is to improve the quality of our partnerships
to the benefit of those in need”. (DPD)
Referring to the work on Hastily Formed Networks (Kumar and Havey, 
2013; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) the consensus was that a significant 
challenge is to establish working relationships at an early stage of any
relief project; in keeping with Tatham and Kovács development of 
Chung’s work on swift trust (2010) the aim is to try and build relationships
through trust and common Christian belief. Tearfund’s Open Door
strategy of tailored relationships (Tearfund, 2011) was discussed as an
example of the organisation’s creation of such relationships:  
“We [Tearfund] encourage local churches to join with us to
establish a project within an area of community. These projects
stretch far and wide with a number of UK churches establishing
links across nations” (DPD)
This approach has seen significant funds raised by UK based churches
and dioceses in support of long term projects in South America, Africa
and Asia (Tearfund, 2011) and the belief amongst participants is that 
they offer a great illustration of what can be achieved by working together
in close partnership. Although the projects discussed by the Focus
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Group are longer term the consensus was that they serve to illustrate
what likeminded Christian people and organisations can achieve by
working together. The Group also believed that their strategy of working
with local organisations within disaster relief areas was another key to
the organisation’s overall success.  
“We [Tearfund] give financial grants to partner churches to fund
specific projects and also encourage our partners to develop their
own capacity within individual communities”. (AC)
There were also further discussions around the organisation’s training
initiatives with local partners on the development of disaster
management and risk reduction schemes. 
7.8.4 Military Involvement
There was clear acknowledgement that the military has a role to play in
the provision of humanitarian relief (Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010)
and also agreement that the overall military contribution to the relief effort 
was growing; however, whilst the Group did agree that the military might 
possess the will and the expertise to make a larger contribution, some
participants clearly found it difficult to align military involvement in
disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian (Tomansini and
van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), and Christian principles. AC was
quick to reaffirm the views that he had offered during Stage II of the
research: 
“The military have a clear role, to maintain security and to protect 
the aid workers when required…….they [the military] should not try
to involve themselves in aid provision itself as this type of 
involvement confuses the local communities who may well live in
fear of a military uniform”  
There was acknowledgement that the UN blue beret might help to
address some of these fears, but also agreement with the worry that a
military uniform will always be a sign of conflict and suffering to some. In
keeping with the views offered by Heslip (2011) and Williamson (2011)
the belief was that the military would always struggle to address differing
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roles within a humanitarian relief zone, or indeed to change roles part 
way through a disaster relief operation. In essence, the Group support 
clear guidelines and UN control of military resources and felt that there
would never be a situation where the military should be given a
controlling influence over the disaster relief effort. In sum, the UN and
OCHA are given a controlling role and they should maintain it in close
liaison with local governments and authorities.  
The data gathered demonstrates agreement with the thoughts of Doh
and Teegan (2003) in that the Tearfund regards itself as a political
lobbyist which tries to influence governments and organisations to help
the needy and vulnerable around the world: 
“We don’t just respond to disasters but look to actively influence
authorities and governments in support of those who do not have
a voice……we do this through our membership of organisations
and groups which have similar hopes and desires” (HOL)
There was agreement with the view that politics does have a role to play
in the relief effort itself and that some organisations are influenced by
political agendas (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson and
Gregorian, 2007). The overall consensus was that political influence was
inevitable as a lot of donors are large multi-national organisations who
want to be seen to be making a contribution by their shareholders. 
However, the Group did feel that this is why Tearfund and similar
organisations do prove attractive to some donors, as they believe that 
their strategy based around common belief was appealing to what they
termed as “the average Christian man in the street”. 
7.9 Conclusions and Overall Domain Themes and Issues  
As the last of four chapters presenting an analysis of the research
findings, this chapter has drawn upon data gathered from participants
within the Tearfund. Having firstly established the key etic issues and
themes through analysis of questionnaire responses, emic issues were
developed and then investigated through a series of semi-structured
interviews with Tearfund participants. Finally, additional analysis and
application of relevant literature within the field informed the areas of 
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discussion within a participant focus group. Hence, in keeping with the
final research strategy through triangulation of data gathered and
findings from questionnaires, interviews and a focus group with key
informants, the chapter has explored trends that describe the barriers to
collaboration within humanitarian relief supply chains and also looked to
identify how these barriers might be addressed to improve collaboration
in the future. Following the classic case study process (Yin, 2009) the
findings and trends discussed within this section will be used during a
final cross-domain analysis within Chapter 8 which will inform the final
conclusions and academic contribution. The section will now be broken
down into the key emic themes and issues identified within the Tearfund
arrived at through application of Stages I and II of the final research
strategy and confirmed and expanded upon during Stage III.  
7.9.1 Management and Control 
All participant organisations have a part to play in the relief effort and a
more coordinated approach will benefit the overall delivery of aid. 
However, OCHA has an impossible task as the growing number of donor
agencies involved within the overall humanitarian relief effort (Carroll and
Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; Kovács and Spens, 
2007; Yamada et al, 2006) means that the coordination role is too big for
one organisation. Competing agendas and open rivalry at times between
international relief organisations, means that little coordinated activity
actually takes place; as a result on occasion, the Tearfund preferred to
work alone and to concentrate on establishing close links with the local
community. When the Tearfund does work with other agencies it is as a
result of a need to gain access to vital resources such as transport and
storage space, this strategy relies on sound relationship management 
along the supply chain (Handfield and Nichols, 1999). However, the
bureaucracy involved in such a strategy can lead to significant delays in
getting aid to those who needed it most. The Tearfund also looks to other
humanitarian organisations for strategic information on the disaster area
itself, but in keeping with the observations made by Heaslip (2011) and
Lynch (2010) there was agreement and noticeable frustration at the slow
and at times inaccurate flow of such information.  
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NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, and larger
organisations in the sector lack an understanding of what others have to
contribute; an increase in knowledge in this area will significantly help
the overall effort. Concurring with Jensen (2012), clusters are fine in
principle, but in practice are ineffective and slow things down in the field. 
The concept of clusters (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) has support but did
prove to be cumbersome in practice as cluster leaders are not held
accountable and are not empowered to make decisions or to sanction
actions. Competing priorities within relief zones mean that the cluster
approach clouds the issues at hand and does little to allow donors to
have a clear understanding of what the immediate needs are. The link
between clusters and OCHA is not clear and many cluster leaders
appear to have no delegated authority; consequently, some leaders refer
back to the UN to make decisions whilst others carry out their own ideas
without any consultation. Some form of performance management 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1996) strategy which makes cluster leaders
accountable is required, as are clearer guidelines on cluster
implementation and management. The Tearfund participants agreed
that little has changed since the introduction of clusters and that in order
to be effective, clusters should include both “upstream suppliers and
downstream customers” (Patti, p.266); hence, the inclusion of local
governments and organisations at an early stage is considered as
paramount to any successful strategy. The involvement of local
communities and authorities is at the heart of the Tearfund’s activity and
a similar approach within clusters will serve to enhance overall success
and help to prevent a sense of distrust amongst recipient communities. 
There is a common perception that there are cultural barriers to effective
collaboration and the greatest limitation of the UN Cluster Approach is
the failure by cluster lead agencies at a global level to adequately
prioritise and resource cluster leadership and coordination
responsibilities. These failings are due to inherent rivalries within an
inter-agency culture; as reflected in the associated academic discourse
(Heaslip, 2011; Lynch, 2010; Senge, 2010; Kampstra and Ashayeri, 
2006; Reindorp and Wiles, 2001). 
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7.9.2 Understanding and Training
Training is a vital aspect of humanitarian provision (Tatham and Altay, 
2013; Moore and Taylor, 2011; Thomas and Mizushima in 2005); 
however the size of the Tearfund’s budget means that the justification of 
funding for training programmes is difficult. The organisation’s stated aim
is to turn as much of its donations into aid as possible, hence it struggles
to commit funding to professionalise its staff. Consequently, the overall
approach to training is one of Individual Grafting (Song et al, 2003) with
staff being employed who already have appropriate training and
knowledge or one that encompasses experiential learning within the
organisation itself (Huber, 1991). 
The size of the Tearfund is also a factor in respect of participation in joint 
training and exercises and whilst the concept is acknowledged as a good
one in theory (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011), there is a fear that 
such a strategy may detract from ongoing relief provision. Smaller
organisations cannot spare staff to take part in training exercises as the
vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid provision
across the world. The Tearfund’s approach to local training and the
resulting successes with residents being equipped with the training and
understanding to reduce the risks and hardship of future disasters, was
highlighted as an example of the merits of local engagement in any
training initiatives.  
7.9.3 Relationships
Christopher (2011) supports the need for a flexible and agile
humanitarian relief supply chain and there was support for this idea and
a call for disaster relief agencies to increase their capacity to respond
speedily with skilled coordinators. There is agreement with the argument 
that customer/supplier relationships should be based on partnerships
and that successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and
trust (Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Sadler, 2007; Christopher, 2011). 
Fund raising and aid delivery strategies within the Tearfund rely on
successful relationship management (Upadhye and Battacharya cited by
Sadler, 2007; Christopher et al, 1991) and on the effective use of 
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partnered working. The Tearfund’s membership of organisations such
as the DEC and HAP (see earlier discussion in this Chapter), together
with its affiliation to the Micah Network (2013), are vital in helping it and
other similar sized or smaller humanitarian relief organisations to have a
more significant say in disaster relief operations.  
There is support for academic arguments (Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Olson
and Gregorian, 2007; Steinberg, 2003; Doh and Teegan, 2003) on the
impact of political influence within the sector, in that the Tearfund regards
itself as a political lobbyist that tries to influence governments and
organisations. The Tearfund does not just respond to disasters, but 
seeks to influence authorities and governments through its membership
of organisations and groups which have similar hopes and desires and
who aim to act as a single voice for the needy and vulnerable around the
world. From Tearfund’s perspective, politics and political agendas do not 
have a role to play in the relief effort in the field; however, some
participants agreed that some organisations’ contribution to the relief 
effort is influenced by political agendas (Williamson, 2011; Olson and
Gregorian, 2007; Yaziji and Doh, 2009). The view was that this is
inevitable as a significant number of donations come from large multi-
national organisations who want to be seen to be making a telling
contribution by their shareholders. However, the hope is that the
Tearfund and similar organisations will prove attractive to some donors, 
as their funding strategies are based around common beliefs which will
hopefully appeal to what Tearfund participants regard as the “average
Christian man in the street”. In sum, aid must be provided on the basis
of need and the Tearfund’s role is to make best use of donations by
identifying those who are in greatest need, irrespective of political
pressures.  
The inherent power imbalance (Hingley, 2005a) within humanitarian
relief zones is accepted, and the Tearfund is content with its position
within it. It is acknowledged that the organisation has neither the
expertise nor the desire to be placed in a position of power, relying
instead on its ability to improve the quality of its partnerships to the
benefit of those in need. A significant challenge is to establish working
relationships at the early stages of any relief project (Kumar and Havey, 
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2013; Tatham and Kovács, 2010) and these relationships should be
developed through trust and common Christian belief. Tearfund’s Open
Door strategy of tailored relationships (Tearfund, 2011), which
encourages UK churches and churches within disaster relief zones to
establish joint projects within local communities, was offered as an
example of the success that the creation of such relationships with
likeminded Christian groups can bring. The Tearfund is also a member
of numerous committees and groups within the sector such as the
Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC, 2012) and the Inter-Agency
Procurement Group, (IPAG, 2013) but certain other smaller NGOs elect 
to not join such organisations as there is a perception that they will not 
be treated on an equal basis.  
Handfield and Nichols (1999) argue that information flow is a critical
component to a successful supply chain strategy and Tearfund
participants agreed that a more accurate analysis of the situation on the
ground is required. In keeping with Heaslip (2011), a general lack of 
reliable information sharing and communication mechanisms is a main
contributor to an overall lack of knowledge and awareness, and is a key
contributor to the resultant slow dispersal of aid.  
7.9.4 Military Involvement
The military has a role to play in the provision of humanitarian relief 
(Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010) and the overall military contribution to
the relief effort is growing (Tatham, 2011); however, whilst the military
might possess the will and the expertise to make a larger contribution, 
some Tearfund participants found it difficult to align military involvement 
in disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian (Tomansini
and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008), and Christian principles; 
principles which are clearly a significant factor in Tearfund’s overall
strategy, Quality Standards and overall Statement of Faith (Tearfund, 
2013, 2013a).  
The Tearfund view is that the military should maintain security and
protect aid workers when required, and should not be involve itself in aid
provision, as this may confuse local communities who might already be
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living in fear of military uniforms. The belief is that whilst the UN blue
berry might help to address some of these fears, a military uniform will
always be a sign of conflict and suffering to some. Following the views
of Heaslip (2011) and Williamson (2011) the consensus is that the
military will always struggle to maintain 2 roles, or indeed to change roles
part way through a disaster relief operation; consequently, clear
guidelines should always be issued clarifying the military contribution
and foreign military assistance should only be provided at the request of 
the affected government, with the UN maintaining control of international
military resources at all times. Sensitivity over sovereignty will almost 
always rule out an international military role unless it is as part of the UN, 
and civil-military coordination should be strictly between governments
and their military’s (UN OCHA, 2013a). There should never be a
scenario where the military are given a controlling influence over the
disaster relief effort. The UN are given a controlling role and they should
maintain it in close liaison with local governments and authorities. 
Echoing the academic discourse on the benefits of applying business
sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and
Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006) NGOs and
aid agencies in general should operate on a business model in isolation
from the military and in direct competition with each other. International
military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, delivery and
distribution of aid; however, a well-coordinated humanitarian response
must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the re-
establishment of systems and livelihoods; thereby helping the affected
population to recover as quickly as possible. The overall belief was that 
the military are not equipped nor really interested in dealing with this type
of longer term approach. 
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CHAPTER 8
THESIS CONCLUSIONS AND OVERALL CONTRIBUTION TO
KNOWLEDGE
“Most scholars are not going to generate a new theory from scratch. 
Instead, they work on improving that which already exists”
(Whetten, 1989, p.492)
8.1 Introduction
The ultimate aim of any study such as this is to spell out the final
significant contribution to knowledge (Phillips and Pugh, 2005; Rugg and
Petre, 2004). Consequently, the overall aim of this thesis was to make a
theoretical contribution to academic perspectives and a functional
contribution to existing practical business and humanitarian supply chain
practice. The study was designed to fill the identified gap (established
within Chapter 2) in the knowledge surrounding the effective planning
and coordination of the provision of emergency logistics and in doing so
answer the following research question: 
When considering the Immediate Response to Natural 
Disasters what are the key drivers within the Humanitarian
Relief Supply Chain that will help to improve future
collaborative working?
Thus far the thesis has, in keeping with the classic case study process
(Yin, 2009) considered each of the research domains in isolation
(Chapters 4 through 7). Hence, if the final findings and overall academic
contribution are to be established this Chapter must discuss the results
of a cross-domain analysis and use as its basis the 4 significant emic
themes and issues that emerged during the individual domain analyses. 
These were: 
Management and Control
1. Understanding and Training
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2. Relationships
3. Military Involvement 
Each emic theme will be discussed separately, with the latter part of the
Chapter drawing out the significance of the overall cross-domain
analysis and with it the final findings and overall contribution to
knowledge.  
There is increasing support for the view that the traditional concept of a
predictable and stable commercial supply chain should no longer be the
accepted norm and that, as a consequence supply chain managers
employed within the business sector are increasingly forced to adopt the
more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian relief 
counterparts (Kovács, 2012; Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 
2011). Hence, the implications of this research and the associated
findings will be considered within the context of the business supply
chain. Furthermore, in common with all research this study suffers from
a number of limitations. Whilst these limitations do not detract from the
overall significance of the findings, it would be remiss to not comment on
them at some stage in the final reporting process. Similarly, whilst the
final Research Strategy proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not 
without its difficulties and challenges; hence, by way of lessons learned
some comment is included on the implications for methodology. Finally, 
the findings of this research reveal a number of opportunities for further
research that would both enhance the contributions identified here and
generate new contributions to the body of knowledge. Hence, in closing
the Chapter a number of suggestions for further research are offered. 
8.2 Cross - Domain Analysis and Final Research Findings
8.2.1 Management and Control 
8.2.1.1 Collaboration and the Humanitarian Supply Chain
Many academic commentators (Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; 
Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Kalafatis, 2000; Dyer et al, 1998 to name
but a few), advocate a partnered approach to the management of the
supply chain. Cross-domain analysis of the data gathered during this
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research provides empirical evidence that this approach is not just the
preserve of the business sector and that the merits of the value chain
concept are also fully appreciated and supported by logistics
practitioners engaged in the provision of humanitarian relief. Indeed, as
will be discussed and developed later in this Chapter, the data
demonstrate that the humanitarian sector is analogous to the business
sector, in that humanitarian relief organisations are in effect businesses
that are driven by the need to demonstrate and establish competitive
advantage within a humanitarian market that is driven by market forces
within the sector. The data also offer support to the view that SCM
techniques are becoming more prevalent within the humanitarian sector
and that theoretical views offered on the drive to encompass cross-
functional and inter-agency approaches (Tomansini and van
Wassenhove, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006) should be extended to
include the humanitarian sector. Moreover, participant experiences also
contributed to the traditional theoretical position that planning and
coordination would always make the supply chain more effective and
efficient by helping to reduce overall waste (Slack et al, 2010).  
A recurring theme within the empirical investigation is a call for agility
and flexibility within humanitarian supply chains, corroborating that 
within the literature (Christopher, 2011); however, the data gathered
during this research from both participant NGOs is not consistent with
theory as it demonstrates that the supply chain is ineffective in reality
and in particular when faced with a demand for an immediate response
(Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). The critical bottleneck in the
humanitarian supply chain is not the availability of supplies but that of 
money and people. There is agreement with the broader concept of a
highly flexible and adaptable supply chain (Christopher, 2011; Chopra
and Meindl, 2010; Harrison and van Hoek, 2011) but administrative
procedures used to distribute funds to relief organisations are slowing
the relief effort down and are, therefore regarded as unsuited to the
sector’s requirements. The data gathered add empirical support to the
view that resolution of the inherent issues surrounding supply chain
responsiveness and resilience (Christopher, 2011) would significantly
reduce the length of the immediate response phase (Kovács and Spens, 
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2008, 2007). Furthermore, there is also support for the assertion that the
right level of coordination and management within the humanitarian
supply chain will make it possible to introduce a combined approach
across all phases of the relief effort (Thomas and Kopczak, 2005).  
In essence, efforts to facilitate effective collaboration within the supply
chain are hampered by overall complexity. The view amongst Tearfund
participants adds empirical support to the view identified within the
literature review on the inherent competition within the sector (The
Lancet, 2010; Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; 
Fenton 2003), as participants believe that competing agendas and open
rivalry at times between international relief organisations, means that 
little coordinated activity actually takes place; indeed when smaller
agencies turn to larger organisations for strategic assistance the
response is frustratingly slow. Further analysis of Tearfund data reflects
the view that NGOs are effectively ranked within disaster relief areas, 
meaning that they are classified by order of size; moreover, the view
expressed by all Tearfund participants is that larger organisations
working in the sector lack an understanding of what other, smaller
organisations have to contribute. Finally, the research moves the
academic discussion forward as analysis of the data gathered suggests
that a perception exists amongst some that the sector is dominated by
the UN and a small number of western based international donor
organisations. No significant study within the field seems to refer to these
issues surrounding organisational perception and positioning hence a
theoretical finding of this study is: 
The data gathered reveal that participants from all four research domains
agree with the academic stance on the positive nature of, and clear
requirement for, collaboration and coordination within the humanitarian
supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011 and 2010; Carroll and Neu, 
Finding 1: Smaller NGOs who are operating within the humanitarian
relief supply chain believe that they are ranked according to size
and that the sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of
western based international donor organisations.
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2009; Rickard, 2003); moreover, the data reflect that the efforts of the
UN agencies involved in the provision of humanitarian aid do help to
save lives and that OCHA should take the lead in coordinating the overall
relief effort. However, the data also add to the literary discussion on the
inherent lack of success within the business sector in respect of supply
chain collaboration (Senge, 2010; Kampstra et al, 2006). Furthermore, 
the data gathered serve to extend existing theory into a field where it is
yet to be applied, as it confirms that the same issues are prevalent within
the humanitarian sector, in that collaboration cannot be achieved
amongst organisations who do not wish to do so. This study offers
empirical evidence that to achieve the panacea of collaboration, the
greatest challenge for the humanitarian supply chain is to facilitate and
manage the effective coordination of the overall collaborative effort. The
concerns raised by participants link back to discussions within the
literature review regarding the challenges that OCHA face in light of the
growing number of actors within humanitarian relief zones (Heaslip, 
2011; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007; Yamada et al, 2006), and also to the
ever increasing number of humanitarian disasters that are occurring
worldwide. Participant opinion is that whilst the response system is
growing incrementally, the growth is at a slower rate than that required
to cope with the complexity of the impending demand for multiple
responses. Specifically, this research moves the academic trajectory
forward from its current position, as data gathered demonstrate that 
participants are not only concerned with the increasing scale and
number of crises, but also with the fact that such events are likely to
occur simultaneously. Furthermore, the fact that current emergencies
are made worse by long term problems such as extreme poverty, 
population growth and climate change will also have to be a
consideration in the on-going debate. Hence a practical finding of this
study is:  
Finding 2: The demands placed on the humanitarian supply chain
during the immediate response phase, the threat of simultaneously
occurring disasters and the effect of longer term environmental 
problems mean that effective collaborative working is not achieved. 
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8.2.1.2 The UN Cluster Concept
In presenting his economic cluster theory, Porter (1998) suggests that 
being part of a cluster will allow organisations to “operate more
productively whilst coordinating with related companies” (p.81). Patti
(2006) extends the concept into the supply chain context, as he contends
that clusters should “include upstream suppliers and downstream
customers and may often extend horizontally to include the makers of 
similar and complementary products” (p.266). Martin and Sunley (2003, 
p.5) question the success of a clustered approach and debate the
influential nature of such an approach and the fact that “its overall
seductiveness has resulted in a rush to apply the concept in some
business arenas, in advance of theoretical and empirical assessments
of the strategy” (p.35). This thesis contributes to the theoretical
discussion on clusters by moving its trajectory on from the traditional
business arena into that of the humanitarian sector. Specifically, the
study concerns itself with the UN Cluster Concept and with gathering
empirical data in respect of the logistics cluster in particular.  
The data add to the discussion within the literature review in confirming
that the use of clusters in general, and the UN Cluster Concept (UN
OCHA, 2011) in particular, was considered by all participants to be a
good idea in theory and that, as such the Concept should have a role to
play in the future provision of humanitarian relief. However, a recurring
finding that emerged during this research, was a clear concern amongst 
participants surrounding the practical implementation and the leadership
and management of clusters. Indeed, the data extends Asheim et al’s
(2009) theoretical criticism of Porter’s (1998) original work from the
business into the humanitarian sector whilst adding empirical evidence
in support of their contention that the cluster concept has been “oversold”
(p.23). The data also reflects an inherent mismatch between the
theoretical concept of clusters and practical reality; thereby, serving to
demonstrate that Simmie’s (2009) observation that many industrial
regions and areas of the business sector cannot be fully analysed and
driven using a clustered approach, is a theoretical position that is equally
applicable to the humanitarian sector. Moreover, this research concurs
with Jensen’s (2012) argument that whilst the use of clusters in the
282
humanitarian sector is fine in principle, in practice they are ineffective
and cumbersome as they slow things down in the field. Adding to
Jensen’s stance, and extending his theoretical debate, questions were
raised during this study regarding the overall effectiveness and aims of 
the UN Cluster Concept, as participants felt that the concept served to
‘stove pipe’ the relief effort and effectively acted as a hindrance in some
cases. The perception amongst study participants was that there were
cultural barriers to effective collaboration and that the greatest limitation
of the Cluster Approach was the failure by cluster lead agencies at a
global level to adequately prioritise and resource cluster leadership and
coordination responsibilities.  
The data gathered here offer empirical support to the discussion on the
negative impact that inherent organisational rivalries can have within an
inter-agency culture (Heaslip, 2011; Lynch, 2010; Senge, 2010; Olson
and Gregorian, 2007; Kampstra and Ashayeri, 2006; Reindorp and
Wiles, 2001). In addition, the data also demonstrate support for
academic debate on the requirement for inter-cluster coordination
(Stoddard et al, 2007; Street, 2007; OCHA, 2006) and there was a call
amongst study participants for the introduction of mechanisms to provide
comprehensive recommendations and directions on how to better
assess and analyse future humanitarian disasters. The view amongst 
JFLogC participants is that the UN Cluster Concept gives those involved
an excuse to work in isolation from other humanitarian organisations; 
furthermore analysis of the data gathered from the participant NGOs
suggests a conflict with the theoretical views on the importance of cluster
involvement and engagement (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), as participants
believe that clusters and cluster leaders are notoriously bad at 
communicating with local actors and local governmental organisations. 
In practice, cluster leaders are not held accountable for their actions and
are not empowered to make decisions or to sanction actions. 
Consequently, the data reflect the view that what is really needed is a
more rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance
(Heaslip, 2011) and add to the theoretical debate by suggesting that 
such a system should have the authority and legitimacy to exclude those
that have a history of letting the overall effort down. Competing priorities
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within relief zones mean that the cluster approach clouds the issues at 
hand and does not allow donors to have a clear understanding of what 
the immediate needs are. The link between clusters and OCHA is not 
clear and many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority; 
consequently, some leaders refer back to the UN to make decisions
whilst others carry out their own ideas without any consultation. Thus in
light of these concerns, a theoretical finding of this study is to move the
academic trajectory on to consider the introduction of some form of 
performance management strategy and to extend the use of Kaplan and
Norton’s (1996) theory on the Balanced Score Card Performance to
encompass the humanitarian sector, thereby making cluster leaders
accountable for their actions and decisions. Additionally, the findings
also give empirical support to the need for a practical discussion on the
development of clearer guidelines on cluster implementation and
management.  
8.2.2  Understanding and Training
8.2.2 Understanding and Training
8.2.2.1 Understanding
The data offer empirical support to the concepts of relationship
management and understanding within supply chain partnerships
(Christopher, 2011; Monczka et al, 2010; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and
Farrington, 2006). The issues surrounding relationship management will
be considered in the next section of this thesis, but the data gathered
demonstrates the clear similarities between the humanitarian and
business sectors. The data gathered effectively extend the theoretical
debate on mutual understanding away from the traditional business
context, and into that of the humanitarian relief sector; where
understanding amongst partners is considered to be of equal importance
if successful collaborations are to be achieved. Specific examples that 
arise serve to supplement ongoing discussion on the lack of 
Finding 3: Ineffective cluster leadership and unclear cluster
implementation guidelines within the humanitarian supply chain
have a negative effect on collaborative working.  
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understanding and appreciation amongst some relief workers, 
particularly in respect of the roles and contribution of other organisations
within the sector (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 
2011). JFLogC participants concede that they do not fully appreciate the
different roles and responsibilities of the organisations engaged in
disaster relief, nor do they have an understanding of the specific logistics
skill sets possessed by NGOs and other donor organisations; however, 
in keeping with Heaslip (2011) they also suggest that the reverse is true
in that other humanitarian organisations do not seem to understand what 
the military can offer to the overall relief effort. The data gathered from
the participant NGOs reflects a similar perception with an evident lack of 
understanding of military logistical capabilities and skills. Moreover, the
Tearfund participant view is that the military role is to maintain security
and protect aid workers when required, and should not involve aid
provision itself as this may cause confusion within local communities. 
Hence, this research suggests that there is a requirement for an
extension of the current theoretical debate on how practical
understanding, particularly between the military and humanitarian relief 
NGOs can be improved. 
8.2.2.2 Humanitarian Logistics Training and Professionalisation
A recurring theme that emerges within this research is that of training
and the requirement for a professionalisation strategy within the
humanitarian logistics field. The empirical evidence gathered reflects the
debate that is already evident within the literature and the associated
regular calls for appropriate training and skills development programmes
within the sector (Allen et al, 2013; Bolsche et al, 2013; Tatham and
Altay, 2013; Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Heaslip, 2011; Moore and Taylor, 
2011; Thomas and Mizushima, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 2005). The
Finding 4: The lack of understanding amongst humanitarian relief
practitioners and military contributors of the logistical capabilities
of other organisations operating within the supply chain has a
negative impact on collaborative working.  
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data gathered here offers agreement that there is a clear requirement for
experienced and professional humanitarian logisticians, and an
acknowledgement that such skills are not easy to find. However, the data
also suggest a new trajectory to the theoretical debate as they
demonstrate concerns amongst the NGO participants that their relatively
high turnover of staff may be problematic in respect of educational
development, and that despite the increasing number of disasters
worldwide and the corresponding rise in overall logistics costs (Guhu-
Sapir, et al, 2011), the current financial climate and budgetary
constraints make financial investment in training difficult for humanitarian
organisations to justify. In contrast to these concerns, the data also serve
to corroborate the argument that opportunities to professionalise within
the sector could act as a retention tool (Lu et al, 2013). This study does
offer empirical support to the concepts and discussions on the
approaches to training and recruitment that are currently being adopted
within the humanitarian sector. Specifically, the data gathered from the
participant NGOs confirms that both Oxfam International and Tearfund
favour an individual grafting (Song et al, 2003) approach to staff 
recruitment, as they seek to employ those with previous knowledge of 
the sector, or those who possess specific skill sets gained within the
business sector (for example supply chain managers). 
The data also support the view that humanitarian relief workers have
some significant lessons to learn from their private sector counterparts
in a number of areas including risk management and logistics and that 
consequently, there is a need to create relationships with logisticians in
the private sector which are aimed at bridging the educational and
capability gaps that exist within the overall response (Christopher and
Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). The data also show that OCHA is
attempting to answer calls for more educational cross-fertilisation
between military, UN and NGO humanitarian contributors (Heaslip, 
2011, p.164) by providing a variety of training courses which are
designed to establish partnerships with a wide variety of global
humanitarian relief organisations (OCHA, 2013b), thereby also
promoting collaborative working. Moreover, referring back to the last 
section of this thesis and to finding 4 of this study, the data confirm that 
286
the content of these courses aims to develop the knowledge necessary
between humanitarian and military actors within the field, and to facilitate
communication and successful coordination and interaction. However, 
the data also demonstrate that attendance on these courses is difficult 
for some NGOs and very low from the smaller humanitarian
organisations in particular. Indeed, Tearfund participants suggest that 
the courses are not attractive or readily accessible to their staff in
particular, and to smaller humanitarian organisations in general; in effect, 
smaller organisations within the sector cannot spare staff to take part in
training and educational programmes as their policy’s and donors dictate
that the vast majority of their volunteers are constantly engaged in aid
provision activities across the world. Hence, given that there is no
significant study in this area, a finding of this research is to suggest that 
the theoretical trajectory should be extended to consider the whole issue
of OCHA training courses and in particular to consider ways to make
such courses more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number
of humanitarian organisations. 
8.2.2.3 Local Engagement and Joint Training
Linking back to the discussions within Chapter 2 on the importance of 
local engagement within the supply chain (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998) and
on the advantages of an integrated approach to learning within the sector
(Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011), the data gathered corroborates the
theoretical call for the inclusion of local organisations and governments
within training strategies, and confirms the assertion that such initiatives
help to facilitate the development of working partnerships with local
communities. Moreover, the data illustrate that the inclusion of local
representation and all agencies involved will help to develop and
facilitate successful exit strategies following the final reconstruction
Finding 5: Current OCHA humanitarian relief training programmes
are designed to promote collaborative working, however the
courses are not readily accessible or attractive to a large proportion
of organisations within the sector.
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phase. Reflecting the academic discussion on the practical relevance
and advantages of an integrated approach to learning within the
humanitarian sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 2011), JFLogC
participants believe that a joint approach to training, similar to that 
adopted by the military would be of great benefit to the future success of 
the overall relief effort. Furthermore, JFLogC participants are keen to be
given the opportunity to utilise their military expertise in quick reaction, 
expeditionary logistics to assist with the development of such courses or
training programmes, although there is a pragmatic acceptance amongst 
military participants that this may not be politically acceptable in reality. 
Hence, a finding of this study is to offer empirical evidence to support the
extension of the current theoretical and practical discussions to consider
the implementation of a concept of training within the sector where
integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of 
collaborative working.  
8.2.3 Relationships
8.2.3.1 Competition within the Humanitarian Supply Chain and
Defining Value
It has been suggested that the practice of partnership sourcing is now
widespread and that the benefits of such an approach can include
improved quality, innovation sharing, reduced costs and integrated
scheduling of production and delivery (Christopher, 2011). At the route
of this argument are the concepts of Relationship Marketing (RM) and
Partnering; however, Handfield and Nichols (1999) offer the view that 
relationship management is the most fragile and tenuous component in
any successful supply chain. Whilst offering support to this assertion, the
data gathered during this research reveal that the relationships that exist 
between actors within the humanitarian supply chain will change
depending on the type of emergency, and on the initial roles and
Finding 6: Joint training initiatives which include all participant
organisations would improve collaborative working within the
humanitarian relief supply chain.  
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responsibilities that are agreed and established with and for contributors
to the overall relief effort. Despite the added complexity associated with
the humanitarian supply chain, this research adds empirical support to
the findings of the literature review and confirms the need for mutual trust 
and openness within successful partnerships in general, and within the
humanitarian supply chain in particular (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and
Kovács, 2010; Upadhye and Battacharya, cited by Sadler, 2007; Sadler, 
2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006; Patti, 2006). 
Furthermore, the data demonstrate agreement amongst participants that 
coordination within humanitarian relief zones has improved significantly
since the formation of OCHA and that inter-organisational cooperation is
a good idea in theory; however, in practice such a strategy leads to
bureaucratic systems that slow down the overall response. Hence, there
is an ongoing requirement for improvement in this area and for the
establishment of stronger relationships between all actors within the
humanitarian supply chain. In direct contrast with these aspirations, the
data also offer empirical support to the view that humanitarian
organisations run the risk of entering into competition with other
organisations within the sector, as in order to be successful NGOs often
find themselves competing for resources, ground and other assets
(Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007). In short, 
triangulation of the data gathered from participant NGOs demonstrates
the existence of business opportunism within the humanitarian sector. 
Whilst revealing this mismatch with the view that market competition
does not really influence organisations within the humanitarian supply
chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) the data also provide empirical
evidence that this competition between donor organisations has a
negative effect on the overall relief effort. Furthermore, the data show a
propensity amongst donor organisations to try and be noticed through
involvement in the higher profile elements of the disaster relief process
such as those that may appear on the worldwide media. There is also a
reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act alone and
to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, findings which concur
with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and Kent 
(1987) on NGO’s actions in light of funding pressures and a fear of donor
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withdrawal. Hence, the data corroborate the contention that 
humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by
the market and the associated market forces, and that the desire to
demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors is inherent 
within the supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The
Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000).  
Adding to the earlier discussion on the broader concept of a value chain
approach to supply chain management (Porter, 1990), and to the
assertions offered on the negative impact that the use of different 
language and terminology can have on overall perception and trust 
(Heaslip, 2011), a recurring theme that emerged during this research
was the lack of a common understanding and definition of the term value
amongst participants within the humanitarian sector and the detrimental
impact that this has on the final efficient and effective delivery of aid. 
Lindgreen et al (2012) argue that academics and practitioners alike
agree that they have only just begun to understand what value means
within a business context (p.207); hence, this research suggests that this
theoretical debate should be taken into a new sector as it demonstrates
that this same lack of understanding exists within the humanitarian
sector. Indeed, the data gathered demonstrates a conflict within the
sector in respect of what humanitarian value actually is. In support of 
Porter’s (1990) concept of value, Lindgreen et al (2012) suggest that in
order to action what they term value delivery, managers need to leverage
their resources by executing decisions that mobilise, coordinate, and
deploy them in efficient and effective ways (p.212); the contention being
that this form of leveraging is essential to provide an offering that 
satisfies end customer need. Value should be specified from the end-
customer perspective (Harrison and van Hoek, 2011), however, this
research demonstrates that what constitutes value to the end customer
within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with that of contributing
organisations. Whilst the end customer (the victim of the disaster)
regards the provision of the means to survive post the onset of a disaster
as the value of the supply chain, contributing NGOs must factor in their
own sustainability and seek to address inherent market forces and donor
pressure as they seek to agree their definition of value, whilst military
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contributors seek to demonstrate value in terms of political and
governmental expectation.  
Given the foregoing discussion, a finding of this study is to move the
theoretical debate on to a new academic trajectory highlighting the
negative impact that competition is having on efforts to establish
collaborative working within humanitarian supply chains. Furthermore, 
given the lack of a significant study in this area, the debate must also be
linked to the need for agreement on a common definition and
understanding of what constitutes value by all organisations operating
within the humanitarian sector.  
8.2.3.2 Hastily Formed Networks and Local Engagement
Whilst corroborating the argument that customer/supplier relationships
should be based on partnerships, this research also concurs that 
successful supply chains will be those based on mutuality and trust 
(Christopher, 2011; Sadler, 2007; Lysons and Farrington, 2006). A
recurring theme within the data gathered here links back to the earlier
discussion within the literature review and acknowledges the challenges
associated with the formation of what Kumar and Havey (2013) term
Hastily Formed Networks (HFN) at the onset of an immediate response
operation (Kovács and Spens, 2008, 2007). Furthermore, the data
gathered reveal the increasing contribution from the business sector to
the humanitarian relief supply chain and an associated growth in the
number of partnerships between the business and humanitarian sectors
as a whole. However, the data also demonstrate that this is not reflected
by a corresponding growth in a spirit of community within the sector, 
thereby giving empirical support not only to the issues surrounding the
theoretical concept of a HFN (Kumar and Havey, 2013) but also agreeing
Finding 7: Market competition between donor organisations within
the humanitarian sector and the lack of common agreement of what
constitutes value has a negative impact on collaborative working
and on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of the humanitarian
supply chain.  
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with the academic views on the lack of trust and propensity for
transactional relationships within modern day supply chains in general
(Senge, 2010), and within humanitarian relief supply chains in particular
(Heaslip, 2011). This research gives empirical evidence to support the
view that inter-organisational relationships within the humanitarian
sector are organised and agreed against project timelines and that this
results in a culture of working within siloes, leading to unnecessary
duplication of effort and to a lack of collaborative working and trust within
the supply chain itself. In essence, support is offered for the view that 
the humanitarian sector is predominantly governed by transactional
relationships, based on authority and bureaucratic structure rather than
by transformational partnerships, with an emphasis on a joint vision and
a feeling of loyalty and trust (Mullins, 2013, p.385; Heaslip, 2011).  
This research offers evidence to support the contention that one of the
main characteristics of the final HFNs that are formed within
humanitarian relief operations is that they will inevitably involve
participants from different communities, organisations and cultures
(Heaslip, 2011; Tatham and Kovács, 2010). However, despite adding to
the overall complexity of the resultant HFNs, early engagement with local
authorities is considered to be a key to the overall effectiveness of the
humanitarian relief supply chain; thereby extending Vincent and
Bagshaw’s (2005) existing theoretical position on the importance of early
local engagement within business sector supply chains and associated
HFNs into the humanitarian sector itself. Moreover, the data gathered on
the challenges faced by humanitarian organisations as they attempt to
build relationships with local authorities, also offer empirical evidence to
support assertions that similar challenges are faced by supply chain
managers working within business sector organisations (Iglesias et al, 
2011; Upadhye and Battacharya cited by Sadler, 2007). However, this
research also demonstrates that whilst this concept and approach is
considered to be fine in principle, relationship management with local
authorities within the humanitarian sector can be problematic in practice, 
particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity. 
Participants in this research believe that it is OCHA’s role to facilitate
such initiatives and that OCHA should also aim to return control to local
government at the earliest opportunity. The clear view is that such
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strategies help communities to take ownership of the recovery and also
assist aid relief agencies in the development of exit strategies at an
earlier stage; but the data also acknowledge that in reality identification
of appropriate local authorities is not always an easy task. Moreover, a
lack of a clearly identified local authority means that it becomes difficult 
to monitor and control the movements of donor funding and to maintain
humanitarian quality standards. The data gathered from Oxfam
International in particular demonstrate that as a result of these problems
the organisation favour a strategy which relies on the establishment and
utilisation of long standing relationships with local partners, which helps
to ensure that aid is delivered to the most vulnerable; a strategy that is
acknowledged to perhaps better suit the preparation and reconstruction
phases rather than the immediate response phase of the relief effort. 
Hence, a finding of this study is to move the theoretical debate forward
from its current position on the formation of HFNs within the
humanitarian relief supply chain, to one that discusses what measures
can be taken to identify appropriate local authorities at an early stage in
the disaster relief response and considers how these authorities can
then be included as the HFNs develop.  
8.2.3.3 Power Imbalance and the Gatekeepers
As discussed in Chapter 2, power as a construct in business to business
relationships has received irregular and contrasting treatment from
analysts (Hingley, 2005a, p.848). Contrasting views surround the idea
that on the one hand power can have a negative effect on the workings
of a successful supply chain, in that it negates co-operation and is not 
helpful in building relationships (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and
Cannon, 1997); however, there are some commentators (Kalafatis, 
2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois, 1998; Campbell, 1997) who support the
view that power can have a positive influence and that diversity within
relationships is a good thing. The data gathered here demonstrate that 
all participants are happy to act in a subordinate role and readily accept 
Finding 8: The Hastily Formed Networks which develop during the
immediate response phase to a disaster must include identified
local authorities.
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the inherent power imbalances (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 
2005b) within the overall humanitarian supply chain structure. Data from
the JFLogC reveal that military policy documents (MOD, 2008 and 2003)
are written to reflect the coordinating responsibilities that the UN and its
associated offices have to play in humanitarian relief areas, and concur
with the concept that the UN is to act as the power broker (Burt, 2005)
within such areas. Although not previously applied, extending existing
theory into the humanitarian sector helps to explain the inherent power
structure as JFLogC is aware of what Thompson (2010) describes as
the “sensitivities” (p.2) surrounding their presence within humanitarian
relief zones and of the “clashes” that these can generate (Heaslip, 2010); 
consequently, JFLogC is content to carry out all tasks given to it under
the coordination of the UN which they regard as the gatekeeper within
the humanitarian supply chain (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et 
al, 2010). However, a recurring theme within the data gathered is that 
despite the acknowledged role that the UN and OCHA has, there is still
an inherent lack of clear control and coordination within the humanitarian
supply chain; findings that offer empirical evidence that is clearly
inconsistent with the theoretical view that control and coordination have
improved in recent humanitarian relief operations (Altay and Labonte, 
2011). Indeed, the data gathered from the participant NGOs and the
JFLogC during this research reveal that it is difficult at times to identify
who has overall responsibility for elements of the relief effort on the
ground. Moreover, this research suggests that although OCHA claim to
be, and are recognised as the coordinating organisation (OCHA, 2012a), 
the command structures that the organisation implement do not have the
desired practical effect. Hence, a finding of this research is that through
the application of existing theory the power structure within the
humanitarian supply chain can be explained, with OCHA being afforded
power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper status (Hingley and
Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010); however, challenging theoretical
and practical debates should now take place to address why this
structure is not resulting in a coordinated humanitarian response.  
Finding 9: UN OCHA are not effectively coordinating the
humanitarian supply chain in the field. 
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8.2.4 Military Involvement
8.2.4.1 The Escalating MOD Contribution to Humanitarian Relief
The 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) signalled a greater
emphasis on, and an acknowledgement of the provision of ‘Peace
Support and Humanitarian Operations’ (p22), whilst the Humanitarian
Emergency Response Review (2011) highlighted the fact that the UK
Government is keen that the military look to demonstrate more high
profile involvement in humanitarian relief. The data gathered during this
research, and in particular analysis of the findings from participants
within the JFLogC, adds empirical evidence to support these
governmental aspirations and also serve to expand the earlier
discussions within this thesis on the escalating MOD Contribution to the
overall disaster relief effort. 
The data support the view that the increasing number of disasters
worldwide are resulting in a correspondingly larger number of 
humanitarian relief operations where military forces are working
alongside civilian relief organisations (Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011). 
The inevitability of military involvement within disaster relief provision is
accepted and research participants agree with the theoretical assertion
that such involvement offers a means of maintaining supply chain
resilience, particularly in disasters where there is a clear risk to the well-
being of humanitarian actors (Christopher, 2011). However, the data
also contribute to the discussion by demonstrating that there should
never be a scenario where the military is given a controlling influence
over the disaster relief effort. The UN has a controlling role and should
maintain it through close liaison with local governments and authorities.
Analysis of the data gathered from the NGO participants offers empirical
support to theoretical discussion on the benefits of applying business
sector supply chain strategy to the humanitarian sector (Chandes and
Paché, 2009; Oloruntoba and Gray, 2006; Beamon, 2006), and to the
overall view that whenever possible NGOs and aid agencies in general
should aim to operate on a business model which is in isolation from the
military, but on one that is also in direct competition with each other. 
International military forces are useful in providing support to the supply, 
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delivery and distribution of aid; however, triangulation of the data
gathered demonstrates that a well-coordinated humanitarian response
must look beyond the issue of distribution of relief and to the re-
establishment of systems and livelihoods, thereby helping the affected
population to recover as quickly as possible. In essence, the overall
assertion amongst NGO participants is that the military is not equipped, 
nor really interested in dealing with this type of longer term approach. In
a similar vein this research also confirms that OCHA is trying to establish
a more predictable approach to the involvement of military resources
within humanitarian relief zones, by taking measures to encourage the
use of such resources not just in the immediate response phase of the
disaster, but also in the build-up and recovery phases. Such results
extend the findings of the literature review and clearly link to Kovács and
Spens’ (2008, 2007) calls for an increase in the military finding within the
preparation and reconstruction phases. Hence, the foregoing discussion
leads to a practical finding of this study: 
8.2.4.2 The Humanitarian Principles – a Conflict of Interests?
A recurring theme within this research echoes existing theoretical
discussion on military involvement in the humanitarian supply chain, in
that any escalation in military involvement could prove to be difficult, 
given that most NGOs are reluctant to work alongside the military
(Heaslip, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Beauregard, 1998). Whilst the data
gathered from the NGO participants are consistent with the view that 
there is a role for the military in the provision of humanitarian relief 
(Heaslip, 2011; Thompson; 2010, Beauregard, 1998); this research also
demonstrates a belief amongst NGO participants that the military
contribution has to be under the right circumstances; specific examples
offered are situations where there may be a need to boost capacity
through the utilisation of military resources such as trucks, aircraft and
manpower. The empirical investigation adds support to the discussion
Finding 10: Military organisations must seek to expand their
contribution within the humanitarian supply chain from the
immediate response phase to encompass the longer term phases of
disaster relief.
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within the literature review on the inherent difficulty amongst some
participants within the humanitarian supply chain to align military
involvement in disaster relief with the maintenance of the humanitarian
principles (Heaslip, 2011; Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 
2008). The data also highlight concern regarding the perception that 
military involvement has within local communities; furthermore, analysis
of data gathered from Tearfund participants supports the view that the
role for the military should be to maintain security and to protect aid
workers when required. In short, donor governments should not involve
their military forces’ in aid provision itself, as this may lead to confusion
amongst local communities who might already be living in fear of military
uniforms. Moreover, the findings are also consistent with OCHA policy, 
as triangulation of the data gathered from non-military participants
demonstrates agreement that sensitivity over sovereignty will almost 
always rule out an international military role, unless it is as part of the
UN and civil-military coordination between governments and their
military’s (UN OCHA, 2013a). Effectively the findings demonstrate
linkage to the theoretical concepts already discussed within Chapter 2, 
in that neutrality and impartiality do not sit well with military intervention
within the humanitarian supply chain. Indeed, in order to ensure an
appropriate response under the humanitarian principles all organisations
involved, including those from the military should ensure that any aid
delivered has as its primary aim the reduction of poverty or suffering. 
Moreover, NGOs and aid organisations have to ensure that their
activities and donations do not directly or indirectly provide resources to
be used to assist military conflict and consequently, should refuse any
donations which are conditional on cooperation with military forces. 
Finally, all agencies involved in the relief effort have to ensure that the
aid that is provided does not contribute in any way to any contravention
of international human rights and the overall humanitarian principles. 
The data gathered from the NGO participants corroborated the
theoretical views offered by Williamson (2011), in that the military idea
of using humanitarian aid to win hearts and minds is a flawed one, and
one that does not constitute or assist humanitarian relief work; in
essence, aid is most effectively delivered by civilian humanitarian
organisations under the leadership of the UN. Analysis of the JFLogC
data adds additional support to this discussion as the organisation’s
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strategy is to avoid a military response whenever possible, and to refrain
from the use of visible and restrictive contributions such as armed
escorts or centralised safe working areas. The data support the concept 
of the overall UN security management strategy, which aims to establish
a secure working environment for humanitarian relief organisations
through successful collaborative initiatives with foreign military
contributors (UN OCHA, 2013a). Moreover, this study provides empirical
evidence that regional stability and with it security, are enhanced and not 
undermined by the provision of impartial needs-based humanitarian aid. 
However, whilst there is a potential for military involvement within the
humanitarian supply chain, there is also a danger that such involvement 
can destabilise situations which may lead to potentially dangerous
consequences that may ultimately affect and limit the ability of civilian
aid agencies to efficiently and effectively deliver aid. As a result, donor
organisations tend to resist adopting collaborative working strategies
with military contributors within the humanitarian supply chain. Given this
discussion, this study demonstrates consistency with the existing
theoretical position on the influence on the humanitarian principles
(Seipel, 2011; Tatham, 2011; Tomasini and Van Wassenhove, 2009; 
Spearin, 2001; Slim, 2000). However, as highlighted earlier in this
Chapter the UK Government is still keen that its’ military look to
demonstrate more high profile involvement in humanitarian relief, hence
from a practical viewpoint the following finding is highlighted:  
8.2.4.3 Two Hats - The Political Dimension  
This research moves the trajectory of the theoretical debate into the
political arena, as the data gathered offers empirical support to the view
that military intervention is regarded by some international governments
as a means of demonstrating a rapid and visible response immediately
following the onset of a natural humanitarian disaster. Moreover, this
empirical research also corroborates the discussion within the literature
Finding 11: Preservation of the humanitarian principles has a
negative impact on the adoption of collaborative working strategies
between humanitarian relief organisations and military contributors
within the humanitarian supply chain.  
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review in that some governments regard military involvement as a
means of achieving longer term political influence (Williamson, 2011; 
Yaziji and Doh, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000). A recurring theme of the
research is that any military forces involved in the relief effort should
adhere to the UN agreed civil-military guidelines, and that the associated
military rules of engagement should prohibit the use of humanitarian
assistance for the fulfilment of military or governmental objectives. 
However, the data gathered here demonstrate that incorporating
humanitarian relief within the larger political context is an impossible task
in reality as military and political objectives contradict and collide. In
addition, this conflict of interests is leading to confusion, not only
between humanitarian donor organisations working within the supply
chain, but also amongst the final recipients of the aid itself. Analysis of 
the data supports the view that a military uniform will always be viewed
by some as a symbol of an organisation that operates in contravention
of the humanitarian principles, and that attempts to reduce the impact of 
a uniform, such as the adoption of the UN blue beret are on the whole
ineffective; ultimately, a military uniform will always be a symbol of 
conflict and suffering to some. In short, as discussed in the previous
section of this thesis, warfare will always conflict with the humanitarian
principles (Tomansini and van Wassenhove, 2009; DFID, 2008).  
As a result of these circumstances, there are occasions when the military
attempt to wear 2 hats, one driven by the pressure to achieve political
aims and the other to support the humanitarian relief effort itself. The
data gathered demonstrates that the challenge for the military is to clarify
which hat they are wearing at the outset of the relief effort and, as
importantly to avoid confusion by consistently adopting the single role
associated with the chosen hat throughout the relief operation. The
recurring theme in this research is that whilst military organisations
involved in the humanitarian supply chain will always struggle to wear 2
hats, there is also a propensity to try and change hats part way through
a disaster relief operation as military contributors attempt to move from
a political to a humanitarian stance. Ironically, this process may actually
involve a physical change of hat from the standard military one to the UN
blue beret but, as discussed earlier this proves to have little impact on
this issue in reality. Moreover, analysis of data gathered within the
JFLogC reveals that the current UK military chain of command will never
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sanction humanitarian supply chain management as an individual
profession per se, thereby dismissing the idea of creating separate
organisations within the military to deal with the humanitarian and
political elements of the overall contribution. However, the impact of this
repositioning by military contributors will not only destabilise the overall
effectiveness of the humanitarian supply chain, but also deter any efforts
to work collaboratively on the part of the humanitarian NGOs.  
Consequently, in light of this analysis and given that no significant study
has considered these issues, a finding of this study is to offer empirical
evidence that a theoretical debate should be initiated that takes the
current discussions forward to consider how clear guidelines can be
issued clarifying the military contribution at the outset of a disaster relief 
operation. In effect theory should be established which offers advice on
methods to make it clear to all involved which hat the military
organisation is to wear within that particular relief operation. Moreover, 
the academic trajectory should also consider the role that national
governments have to play in ensuring that their military force’s
contributions are consistent throughout a humanitarian operation, and
that the underpinning direction of the military contribution does not 
change part way through the relief effort. 
8.3 Summary of Development of the Final Research Findings
By way of summary, Table 8.1 illustrates the development of the final
findings from the initial etic themes through identified emic themes and
discussion of the cross-domain analysis within this research. The table
also serves to highlight the separate findings which will help to formulate
the overall contribution to the body of knowledge, together with overall
influences on the practical management of the humanitarian supply
chain.  
Finding 12: Changing the underpinning stance of the military
contribution from a political to a humanitarian one has a
destabilising effect on the overall effectiveness and efficiency of
the humanitarian supply chain.  
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supply chain, but such involvement 
can destabilise situations leading to
potentially dangerous consequences, 
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Table 8.1: Summary of the Development of the Final Research Findings
8.4 The Final Contribution to the Body of Knowledge
As discussed earlier in this thesis the field of humanitarian SCM has
developed as a research area, and consequently researchers are now
beginning to lay the foundations for a core body of knowledge. However, 
numerous academic commentators (Fawcett and Waller, 2013; Kunz
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and Reiner, 2012; Mangan et al, 2012; Overstreet et al, 2011; Kovács
and Spens, 2011, 2008 and 2007; Carroll and Neu, 2009; Tomasini and
van Wassenhove, 2009; Thomas and Fritz, 2006; Beamon, 2006; 
Yamada et al, 2006; Lyles, 2005; Murray, 2005; Thomas and Kopczak, 
2005; Rickard, 2003) suggest that the research field of humanitarian
SCM is relatively new and is still in its infancy. Moreover, Larson (2011)
highlights the importance of further research into the role that intra- and
inter-organisational relationships have to play in the “greater
coordination” (p29) of the supply chain itself. Similarly, Kovács and
Spens (2011) suggest that humanitarian supply chain collaboration
should be a key research area (p8), and go on to contend that 
humanitarian SCM requires more research with empirical data being
gathered through the use of case studies or other qualitative
methodologies. Indeed, a poll of Editorial Advisory and Review Board
members carried out to establish the scope of the first publication of the
JHLSCM (Kovács and Spens, 2011) led to specific criticism of the
reliance on the use of quantitative methodologies and Kunz and Reiner
(2012) offer the view that “empirical methodologies such as cross-
organisational case studies should be used more in order to increase
knowledge in the field” (p.133). This research serves to address these
calls for more qualitative, case study based research within the field as
appropriate and topical rich empirical data has been gathered that, as
discussed in this chapter and illustrated in Table 8.1 contributes to the
body of knowledge in a variety of ways. Consequently, this section of the
thesis will draw together the previous discussion within this chapter and
set out the associated contribution to knowledge that develops from
consideration of the final findings. By way of summary, a final generic
conceptual model is offered (Fig 8.1), which illustrates the key drivers
that emerged as a result of this research, which will help to improve
future collaborative working within the Humanitarian Relief Supply Chain
(the grey box). The power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper (Hingley
and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) has a central role in the
achievement of the panacea of overall collaboration and hence, is
depicted at the centre of the model. External influences on the
humanitarian supply chain are shown in green, whilst the internal drivers
are those which appear in blue.  
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Fig 8.1: The External and Internal Influences on collaboration within the
Humanitarian Supply Chain
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As discussed in Chapter 2, power as a construct in business to business
relationships and the inherent power imbalances that exist have received
irregular and contrasting treatment from analysts (Hingley and
Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley, 2005b, Hingley, 2005a, p.848). On the one
hand power is regarded as having a negative effect on the workings of a
successful supply chain (Naudé and Buttle, 2000; Doney and Cannon, 
1997); however, some commentators favour the opposite view and
argue that power can have a positive influence and that diversity within
relationships is a good thing (Kalafatis, 2000; Earp et al, 1999; Blois, 
1998; Campbell, 1997). The theory discussed here restricts itself to the
business sector; however, the findings of this research demonstrate that 
by applying the same theoretical concepts to the humanitarian sector, 
analysis of the associated results evince that UN and OCHA are afforded
power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper (Hingley and Lindgreen, 
2013; Hingley et al, 2010) status within the humanitarian supply chain. 
However, a recurring theme within the data gathered is that despite this
acknowledgment, there is a lack of clear supply chain control and
coordination. Moreover, the data gathered from the participant NGOs
and the JFLogC during this research reveal that it is difficult to identify at 
times who has overall responsibility for elements of the humanitarian
effort on the ground. In short, the findings of this study suggest that 
although UN OCHA claim to be, and are recognised as the coordinating
organisation (OCHA, 2012a), the command structures that the
organisation implement do not have the desired practical effect. Hence, 
an element of the final contribution of this thesis is that through the
application of existing theory the power structure within the humanitarian
supply chain can be explained, however, a theoretical debate should
now take place to address why this structure is not resulting in a
coordinated overall humanitarian response. Most importantly the
discussion should address who should be given the role of power broker
and gatekeeper for the humanitarian supply chain. 
In order to develop an overall view of the final findings of this thesis and
the subsequent overall contribution, four internal pillars have been
identified during this research which have an equally significant bearing
on overall collaboration within the humanitarian supply chain, namely, 
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Management and Control; Understanding and Training; Relationships
and Military Involvement. Fig 8.1 offers a conceptual illustration of these
pillars, together with a depiction of the underlying drivers which influence
them. By way of explanation each of these pillars will now be considered
in turn. 
8.5 Management and Control 
8.5.1 Participant Perception
This study identifies a new debate on the perceived influence that the
larger agencies within the sector have on those smaller contributing
organisations. Moreover, the data gathered also gives empirical support 
to an additional notion amongst smaller NGOs within the field, that the
sector is dominated by the UN and a small number of western based
international donor organisations. Hence, as no significant study within
the field refers to these issues surrounding organisational perception and
positioning, a significant element of the final contribution is the
identification of participant perception as an underpinning factor in the
overall management and control of the humanitarian supply chain. 
8.5.2 Effective Cluster Management
As highlighted within Chapter 2, substantial research already exists on
the UN Cluster Concept (Altay and Labonte, 2011; Jahre and Jensen, 
2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 2007; Street, 
2007; Barratt, 2004), with more recent analysis suggesting that the
Concept offers a step in the right direction towards a collaborative
approach within the humanitarian supply chain (Altay and Labonte, 
2011, Kovács, 2011). However, the data gathered during this study
demonstrate clear inconsistency with this view, and show that the cluster
concept should not be regarded as the silver bullet that it is argued to be
in previous research. Earlier research into UN clusters (Jahre and
Jensen, 2010; ActionAid, 2007; Stoddard et al 2007; Cosgrave et al, 
2007; Street, 2007) notes confusion amongst humanitarian field
workers, in respect of the role of each cluster and the associated cluster
leads and the findings of this study identify that this is still the case as
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cluster management is identified as ineffective. Current criticisms of the
cluster concept (Asheim et al, 2009; Simmie, 2009) are based on
analysis of the business sector; hence, part of the final contribution of 
this research is to extend such commentary into the humanitarian sector, 
with the empirical evidence gathered here demonstrating that the
concept has been equally “oversold” (Simmie, 2009, p.23). Furthermore, 
the findings of this research also show that cluster leaders are not held
accountable for their actions and are not empowered to make decisions
or to sanction actions. Consequently, this study serves to support the
view that what is really needed within the humanitarian supply chain is a
more rigid system that can judge agencies on their performance
(Heaslip, 2011), but also adds to the current debate by suggesting that 
such a system should have the authority and legitimacy to exclude those
that have a history of letting the overall humanitarian effort down. Hence, 
an additional element of the overall contribution is the call for the
introduction of a performance management strategy and to suggest that 
an extension of Kaplan and Norton’s (1996) Balanced Score Card
Performance approach will serve to make cluster leaders accountable
for their actions and decisions within the humanitarian supply chain.  
8.6 Understanding and Training
8.6.1 Joint Training Initiatives
Analysis of data gathered evince support to calls for a joint approach to
training within the humanitarian sector (Goffnet et al, 2013; Heaslip, 
2011). Moreover, analysis of the data also reflect discussion within
Chapter 2 on the significance of local engagement within the supply
chain (Patti, 2006; Porter, 1998), and triangulation of the findings
corroborate theoretical calls for the inclusion of local organisations and
governments within training strategies. Hence, part of the final
contribution is to add to the current academic trajectory, by providing
empirical evidence to support the extension of current thinking
considering the implementation of integrated training strategies within
the sector, which encompass all members of the humanitarian supply
chain.  
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8.6.2 Appreciating Capability
This research offers specific examples that supplement ongoing
discussion on the lack of understanding and appreciation amongst 
humanitarian workers in respect of the roles and contribution of all
organisations within the sector (Tatham and Altay, 2013, Goffnet et al, 
2013; Heaslip, 2011). Hence, the final contribution also calls for an
extension of the current theoretical debate on how practical
understanding, and in particular that between military and humanitarian
organisations operating within the humanitarian supply chain can be
improved.  
8.6.3 Involvement in Training Courses
The data gathered during this research evince that a variety of training
courses are available which are designed to provide opportunities to
establish partnerships and collaborative working amongst all
humanitarian relief organisations (OCHA, 2013b). However, the data
also demonstrate that attendance on these courses is difficult for some
NGOs and very low from the smaller humanitarian organisations in
particular. Hence, given the absence of a significant study in this area, 
an addition to the final contribution of this research is to highlight the
requirement for the development of a theoretical trajectory which
considers attendance on, and involvement in training courses, and has
as its focus consideration of strategies which will make such courses
more readily accessible and attractive to a larger number of the smaller
humanitarian organisations. 
8.7 Relationships
8.7.1 Defining Value
Adding to the discussion on the negative impact that the use of different 
language and terminology can have on overall perception and trust 
(Heaslip, 2011), a recurring theme that emerged during this research
was the lack of a common understanding and definition of the term value
amongst participants within the humanitarian sector. Lindgreen et al
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(2012) argue that academics and practitioners have only just begun to
understand what value means within a business context (p.207); hence, 
as research in this area is currently restricted to the business sector, an
element of the final contribution is to highlight the need to take this
theoretical debate into the humanitarian sector. However, the data
gathered here demonstrates that any such research will not be without 
its challenges as in this context, the end customer (the victim of the
disaster) regards the provision of humanitarian aid and with it the means
to survive, as the value of the chain; whilst contributing NGOs must 
factor in their own sustainability and address inherent market forces and
donor pressure as they seek their definition of value, whilst military
contributors are expected to demonstrate value in terms of political and
governmental expectation.  
8.7.2 Market Competition
The data gathered offers empirical support to the view that humanitarian
organisations run the risk of entering into direct competition with other
organisations within the sector, as in order to be successful NGOs often
find themselves competing for resources, ground and other assets
(Chandes and Paché, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007). In essence, 
the data demonstrate the existence of business opportunism within the
humanitarian sector. Whilst revealing this mismatch with the view that 
market competition does not really influence organisations within the
humanitarian supply chain (Dash et al, 2013; Mays et al, 2102) the data
also provide empirical evidence that this competition between donor
organisations has a negative effect on the overall relief effort. There is
also a reticence amongst some donor organisations to be seen to act 
alone and to demonstrate overall presence on the ground, findings which
concur with the observations offered by Olson and Gregorian (2007) and
Kent (1987) on NGO’s actions in light of funding pressures and a fear of 
donor withdrawal. Hence, the data corroborate the contention that 
humanitarian relief organisations are businesses that will be driven by
the market and the associated market forces, and that the desire to
demonstrate superior effectiveness and efficiency to donors is inherent 
within the supply chain to the detriment of quantifiable end results (The
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Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and Collins, 2000). 
Given these findings, a significant element of the final contribution is
acknowledgement of the impact of market competition within the
humanitarian supply chain.  
8.7.3 Hastily Formed Networks  
Theoretical discussion and research on the importance of early local
engagement has thus far restricted itself to consideration of business
sector supply chains (Vincent and Bagshaw, 2005), hence the final
contribution of this study serves to provide empirical evidence that early
engagement with local authorities is also regarded as key to the overall
effectiveness of the humanitarian supply chain. Local authorities should
be included as the HFNs that are an inevitable consequence of the
immediate response phase are formed. However, the findings of this
research also show that the management of relationships with such
authority within the humanitarian sector can be somewhat problematic, 
particularly in countries where there is conflict, instability and insecurity. 
The data gathered supports the proposition that whilst such strategies
can help local communities to take ownership of the recovery, and will
also assist humanitarian agencies in the development of early exit 
strategies, the identification of appropriate local authorities is not always
an easy task. Moreover, the lack of clearly identified authorities mean
that it becomes difficult to monitor and control the movement of donor
funding and to maintain humanitarian quality standards. This discussion
leads to the assertion that the theoretical debate and research agenda
should move towards a trajectory that seeks to identify what measures
can be taken to identify appropriate local authorities at an early stage in
the humanitarian response, and also consider how these authorities can
be included as HFNs develop. 
8.8 Military Role
8.8.1 Political vs Humanitarian  
The empirical data gathered during this research corroborates the
discussion within Chapter 2 as it confirms that some governments regard
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military involvement in the humanitarian supply chain as a means of 
achieving longer term political influence (Williamson, 2011; Yaziji and
Doh, 2009; Weiss and Collins, 2000). However, the findings of this study
also demonstrate that incorporating humanitarian relief within the larger
political context is an impossible task in reality as military and political
objectives contradict and collide. Hence, a contribution of this thesis is
the proposition that there are occasions when the military attempt to
wear 2 hats within the humanitarian supply chain, one driven by the
pressure to achieve political aims and the other to support the
humanitarian effort itself, this causes confusion for the local recipients of 
the aid, as well as for other organisations engaged in the overall
humanitarian effort. Hence, the findings of this research show that 
military contributors should clarify which hat they are wearing at the
outset of the relief effort and consistently adopt the single role associated
with their chosen hat throughout the humanitarian operation. 
Consequently, given that no significant study has considered these
conceptual issues in the past, a part of the final contribution is to call for
a theoretical debate and associated research to be initiated that 
considers how guidelines can be issued which clarify the military
contribution at the outset of a humanitarian operation, and also ensure
that the associated role is consistently maintained throughout. 
8.8.2 Expanding Contribution
The data gathered during this research, and in particular analysis of the
findings from participants within the JFLogC, adds empirical evidence to
support the reported desiore of the UK Government to escalate the
existing MOD Contribution to the overall disaster relief effort, as set out 
in the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (MOD, 1998) and more recently
in the Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (2011). In a similar
vein this research also confirms that OCHA is trying to establish a more
predictable approach to the involvement of military resources within
humanitarian relief zones by taking measures to encourage the use of 
such resources not just in the immediate response phase of the disaster, 
but also in the build-up and recovery phases. Hence a final element of 
the contribution is join Kovács and Spens’ (2008, 2007) calls for an
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increase in the military contribution by calling for an academic debate on
the measures needed to expand the current military contribution to
include both the preparation and reconstruction phases of the
humanitarian effort.  
8.9 Implications for Business Sector Supply Chain Management
and General Theory
Whilst the previous sections of this Chapter have discussed the
implications of the findings within the specialised context and domains
investigated relating to the humanitarian supply chain, a constant 
consideration throughout this research has been the potential for
generalisation of the findings to the wider body of knowledge and in
particular to that associated within the management of business sector
supply chains. Large scale disruptions with very short lead times are
emerging as one of the most pressing issues for commercial supply
chains, consequently business sector supply chain managers can learn
from their humanitarian sector counterparts who are expected to
respond to disasters with very short lead times (Decker et al, 2013, 
p238). Larson (2011) offers the view that humanitarian logisticians have
much to learn from their business counterparts arguing that there has
been limited knowledge transfer between business and humanitarian
logistics practitioners and that, as a result aid agencies are many years
behind business organisations in the adoption of modern supply chain
practices (p15). However, there is also increasing support for the
reciprocal view in that the traditional concept of a predictable and stable
commercial supply chain should no longer be the accepted norm, and
the findings of this research serve to offer empirical evidence that some
aspects of commercial logistics and supply chain practice utilised in
support of everyday business activity are markedly similar to those that 
are evident within the humanitarian supply chain (Kovács, 2012; 
Christopher and Tatham, 2011; Larson, 2011). Commercial supply chain
managers are increasingly faced with challenges that no longer obey the
traditional rules of forecast driven certainty and are therefore, forced to
adopt the more event driven approaches utilised by their humanitarian
relief counterparts. Consequently, the implications of some of the
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findings of this research and elements of the final contribution should be
considered in the context of the business supply chain.  
8.9.1 Barriers to Collaborative Working
The findings reveal that in keeping with their business sector
counterparts, supply chain managers employed within the humanitarian
sector appreciate the concept of the value chain (Porter, 1990) and
understand that in applying this principle they should look beyond what 
are the traditional boundaries associated with competition and to identify
what in business terms will give them a competitive advantage. 
However, this research demonstrates that despite this
acknowledgement, there are still barriers that exist to achieving the
panacea of collaborative working. The findings add support to the
opinions offered by Senge (2010) in relation to the business sector, in
that a key factor in the construction of a successful collaborative supply
chain must be the elimination of managerial inertia in favour of a
managerial approach that seeks to develop joint initiatives, to ensure that 
each contributor has a stake in overall success by delivering value to the
end customer. In effect whilst the supply chain managers can see the
benefit of collaborative working, they are still averse to applying the
concept in reality. Hence, the academic theoretical trajectory should take
the empirical evidence gathered during this research and move the
debate forward to address the reasons why this is the case, not just 
within the humanitarian sector but also within corresponding business
supply chains.  
8.9.2 Combating Supply Chain Complexity
Resilience, flexibly and agility are all called for if a modern day business
sector supply chain is to be successful, and a common feature of the
resulting chains is the growing complexity resulting from the
corresponding rise in the number of contributors (Christopher, 2011; 
Slack et al, 2010; Greasley, 2009). The findings of this research confirm
that all of these factors are a feature of the humanitarian supply chain
and can therefore, inform business practice as the data gathered here
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serves to illustrate empirically the challenges associated with the
management and control of such supply chains. Analysis of the data
gathered confirms that if raising the number of contributors and the
corresponding increasing supply chain complexity are to be successful, 
then a controlling authority that is empowered to coordinate overall
activity and end customer delivery is essential. However, in order for this
to happen in reality, a collaborative supply chain should seek to develop
appropriate and common performance measures, integrated policies, 
information sharing, and incentive alignment. Discourse in respect of the
business sector suggests clusters as a means of addressing these
challenges as they provide a means to “…operate more productively
whilst coordinating with related companies; and measuring and
motivating improvement” (Porter 1998, p.81). However, whilst the
findings of this research support the demand for appropriate
performance measurement, they suggest that the business sector
should also be aware that for clusters to be effective there is a reliance
on appropriately empowered and accountable cluster leaders and a
demand for clear cluster implementation guidelines. 
8.9.3 Joint Training Initiatives
Analysis of the findings offers empirical support to the view that joint 
training initiatives and training programmes will promote understanding
and appreciation amongst members of the humanitarian supply chain
(Heaslip, 2011), thereby establishing a vehicle to promote collaborative
working. Given the earlier discussion on the growing similarities between
business and humanitarian supply chains, the assertion in light of this
research is that this proposal will apply equally to the business sector, 
and that supply chain managers in general should consider the adoption
of joint training initiatives as they seek to work collaboratively with
partners to benefit overall value.  
8.9.4 Suppression of Market Forces
This research confirms that as in the business sector, market 
competition does have a role to play in the effectiveness and overall
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dynamics of the humanitarian supply chain. Analysis of the data
demonstrates that external forces acting on the supply chain such as
political motives and donor pressure, effectively create competition
within the humanitarian market which has a negative impact on the
willingness of participants to adopt collaborative working strategies. This
empirical evidence should have a bearing on the business sector in
helping to develop an academic trajectory that debates how market 
forces might be suppressed by supply chain managers, to benefit overall
supply chain success and end customer value. 
8.9.5 Defining Value in the Value Chain
Heaslip (2011) suggests that the use of different language and
terminology within the humanitarian supply chain obscures
understanding and leads to misperception and mistrust. Moreover, 
Lindgreen et al (2012) argue that academics and practioners alike agree
that they have only just begun to understand what value means within a
business context (p.207) and Harrison and van Hoek (2011) contend that 
value should be specified from the end-customer perspective. However, 
a recurring theme that emerged during this research was the lack of a
common understanding and definition of the term value amongst 
participants within the humanitarian supply chain. Triangulation of the
data gathered demonstrates that what constitutes value to the end-
customer within the humanitarian supply chain contrasts with that of 
contributing organisations. Porter’s (1990) original conceptual argument 
was that a common understanding of value will result in an efficient and
effective value chain; by way of confirmation of this view the findings of 
this research reveal that a conflicting understanding of what constitutes
value amongst contributors and end-customers has a negative overall
impact on delivery to the end-customer and also on the success of the
value chain itself. Hence, given the similarities between humanitarian
and business sector value chains, the proposal is that the empirical
evidence gathered during this research should be used to move the
general academic trajectory forward to discuss the impact that a lack of 
a common language, and in particular clear agreement on what 
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constitutes value can have on overall value chain effectiveness and
efficiency.  
8.9.6 Supply Chain Structures and Power
The data gathered adds to the findings of the literature review and to the
discussion on the barriers and facilitators to the development of 
sustainable supply chains, and to the associated arguments for a clearer
understanding of the potential benefits of a structured approach within
the business context (Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010). 
The empirical evidence gathered during this research highlights that 
participants within the humanitarian supply chain accept the power
relationships that exist within the sector and are also content to
acknowledge the role of lead organisations within the chain itself. Hence, 
these findings support the view that not all organisations are averse to
playing a subordinate role within the supply chain structure. Moreover, 
given the similarities with the chains formed within the business sector, 
the proposition is that business sector supply chain managers, and
indeed more general managers operating in a variety of contexts and
domains and not simply those that are analogous with the context and
domains of this study, should be content with the assertion that power is
not necessarily a negative concept.  
8.10 Limitations of the Study and Implications for Methodology
In common with all research, but perhaps even more so at this level of 
professional and academic development, this study suffers from a
number of limitations. Whilst these limitations do not detract from the
overall significance of the findings, it would be remiss to not comment on
them at some stage in the final reporting process. Moreover, whilst the
final Research Strategy proved, on the whole to be successful, it was not 
without its difficulties and challenges; hence, it would be wrong not to
offer, by way of lessons learned some comment on the implications for
methodology.  
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8.10.1 Research Boundaries
The focus of this research was to gain an in-depth and thorough
understanding of existing practices within the humanitarian supply chain
as perceived by the study participants. Academic discourse suggests
that this type of research lends itself to exploratory qualitative
techniques, including case studies and in-depth interviews, which have
been shown to be an effective means of gathering a large amount of 
data rich information about a particular subject area while being closely
involved with the subject participants (Silverman, 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 
Brabour, 2009). Moreover, the approach also served to answer the calls
for an increase in the use of such empirical methodology within the field
of humanitarian relief, and also those for good and applicable research
within the field where data is gathered through the use of appropriate
qualitative method (Kunz and Reiner, 2012; Kovács and Spens, 2011). 
Given this approach, appropriate boundary setting based on associated
research boundary work (Gieryn 1983) was a key feature at the outset 
of this research as the decision was taken to limit the overall scope. This
measure was taken as a means of addressing issues surrounding the
generalisability of a purely qualitative approach and also to help maintain
control over the volume of data gathered. Hence, the research took as
its focus the response immediately following the onset of a humanitarian
disaster. Whilst this may be viewed by some as a limitation, the analysis
of the data gathered and the resultant contributions to knowledge
demonstrate that this approach should be regarded as a strength of the
study as it presented ample opportunities for significant theoretical and
practical contribution. Moreover, the approach assisted with data control, 
thereby lending itself to the rich analysis required to fulfil the
requirements of the final research question and should, therefore be
considered as an appropriate methodology for similar research in the
future. 
8.10.2 Multiple Domains
As this thesis was concerned with identifying reasons why participant 
actors within the humanitarian supply chain were struggling to
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collaborate, it was felt that the associated field work was well suited to
the use of multiple-case studies based on different actors within the
supply chain itself. However, consideration of the definition of a classic
case (Yin, 2009, Simons, 2009, Stake, 1995) and its suggestion that the
selected organisations should be considered from all angles and all
aspects, led to the conclusion that this research was not really
concerned with cases per se; hence in order to locate the cases within
the general context the decision was taken to use the term domain in
preference to case. This may be seen as a limitation by some, but the
depth of the analysis and associated findings produced as a result of this
approach supports the argument that it should be regarded as an overall
strength of this thesis and one that could be adopted in future research
which seeks rich analysis of organisations or areas which do not 
necessarily fit the classic definition of a case. 
Similarly, consideration of the number of organisations involved within
the humanitarian supply chain may call into question the selection of only
4 research domains. However, in keeping with any research project this
one suffered from resourcing challenges particularly in relation to time
and researcher availability, as well as those associated with the limited
word count allowance for the final thesis. In short, a pragmatic decision
had to be taken if the required field work and data analysis were to be
completed and the word count restrictions adhered to. In defence of this
limitation the 4 organisations all had a key role to play in the humanitarian
supply chain and as a result were considered to represent the supply
chain as a whole. Moreover, this study used multiple sources of “data
source triangulation” (Yin, 2009, p.116) which were aimed at 
corroborating the same facts or phenomenon. Convergence of Evidence
was achieved as data was gathered through the form of interviews and
focus groups with deliberately diverse organisations within the
humanitarian supply chain and with different types of participants at all
strategic and operational levels. Furthermore, the use of multiple settings
to gather data enhanced the generalisability of the research (Miles and
Huberman, 1994) and checks were also made as to whether the findings
were plausible to the subjects of the research through respondent 
validation feedback following each stage of the research. Whilst the use
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of a high number of domains would have been desirable, the rich data
gathered, final findings and contribution all support the assertion that this
approach was a justifiable and credible one. 
8.10.3 Interviews, Focus Groups and Observation
While the main purpose of the interview is to gather in-depth information
relating to the subject area, it is recommended (Flick, 2009; Yin, 2009, 
Denzin and Lincoln, 2008; Miles and Huberman, 1994) that the
researcher seeks to utilise additional techniques in conjunction with this
strategy to establish further data rich information in order to address
issues surrounding corroboration and generalisability. Consequently, the
decision was taken to utilise focus groups as an additional method which
would allow for collective exploration of themes and issues
(Liamputtong, 2011; Cameron and Price, 2009; Krueger and Casey, 
2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007). Moreover, following the advice offered by
Barbour (2009) observation was identified as a method that would not 
only serve to enhance the data gathered during the interview stage, but 
one that would also add to the overall richness and extent of the data
recorded during the focus groups. However, an acknowledged limitation
of this approach surrounds the use of Skype for some interviews and
focus groups. As discussed in Chapter three, the choice of the UN OCHA
as a domain was considered to be critical to the outcomes of this
research, but the practical reality of interviewing participants during
stage II and facilitating a focus group during stage III of the final research
strategy presented specific problems given that the participants were all
based in Geneva, Switzerland. A visit to Switzerland was out of the
question, hence Skype was used to carry out interviews and focus
groups. Whilst the system was adequate for the interview process, the
use of observation as an additional data gathering method was severely
limited. Moreover, facilitation of a focus group via Skype was virtually
impossible under these circumstances, with the resulting session being
akin to a conference call rather than a facilitated focus group. Hence, 
whilst analysis of the data gathered from UN OCHA participants made a
telling contribution to the final findings of this research, future
researchers would be advised to consider how to address issues
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surrounding face-to-face access to participants as they seek to develop
similar methodologies and take decisions on final methods.  
Finally, in acknowledging these limitations and explaining the
background to them the contention is that they in no way detract from
the significance of the final findings and contribution as discussed earlier
within this chapter. Indeed the proposition is that when properly identified
and developed in addition to informing future methodologies, the
limitations serve two main purposes in respect of this particular thesis. 
Firstly, they highlight the overall breadth of theoretical development 
realistically achievable by the researcher and consequently, that 
expected by the reader; and secondly, they act as a provocation for
further research which may take as its starting point resolution of the
identified limitations. 
8.11 Opportunities for Further Research
The findings of this study offer a number of opportunities for further
research that would both embellish the contributions identified here and
generate new contributions to the body of knowledge. However, one of 
the most seductive characteristics of research is that the options are
virtually unbounded, hence discussion within this section will be
restricted to those topics which are closely linked to the final findings, 
contribution and limitations that have already been discussed. 
8.11.1 Further Generalisation and Triangulation
The limited number of domains under consideration during this research
has already been discussed and acknowledged as a limitation. Hence, 
a repeat of this methodology across a wider section of the humanitarian
relief community which encompasses more participant organisations, 
would serve as a test of the contended generalisability and triangulation
of the final contribution and Research Proposition. Given the final issues
surrounding the lack of face-to-face access to UN OCHA participants
during this research, and the significant role that the organisation has to
play in the coordination of the humanitarian supply chain, any such
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studies should try and encompass a visit to the UN OCHA offices in
Geneva, Switzerland.  
8.11.2 Organisational Perception and Positioning
Analysis of Tearfund data reflects the view that NGOs are effectively
ranked within disaster relief areas, and are effectively classified by order
of size. Moreover, the view expressed by all Tearfund participants is that 
larger organisations working in the sector lack an understanding of what 
other, smaller organisations have to contribute. Finally, the findings
serve to move the academic discussion forward, as analysis of the data
suggests that a perception exists amongst some that the sector is
dominated by the UN and a small number of western based international
donor organisations. Hence, as no significant study within the field
currently exists, additional research is required to gather more rich
empirical data on the issues surrounding organisational perception and
positioning within the humanitarian supply chain. 
8.11.3 Cluster Performance Management and Leadership
The findings of this research offer empirical evidence that the link
between the UN Clusters (UN OCHA, 2011) and OCHA is not clear and
that many cluster leaders appear to have no delegated authority. 
Moreover, analysis of the data gathered suggests that some form of 
performance management strategy which makes cluster leaders
accountable for their actions and decisions is required. Hence, additional
research which is focussed on the effectiveness of the UN Cluster
Concept as a whole is required which takes as its focus the effective
management of the concept, and considers measures to make cluster
leaders accountable for their actions. 
8.11.4 Practical Understanding within the Humanitarian Supply
Chain
The findings of this research offer empirical evidence in support of the
discussion on the overall lack of understanding amongst humanitarian
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relief practitioners and military contributors, in respect of the logistical
capabilities of other organisations operating within the humanitarian
relief supply chain (Heaslip, 2011). JFLogC participants concede that 
they do not fully appreciate the different roles and responsibilities of the
organisations engaged in disaster relief; moreover analysis of the data
gathered from NGOs confirms that humanitarian organisations do not 
understand what the military can offer to the overall relief effort. Hence, 
there is a clear requirement for additional research which seeks to
analyse the reasons behind this lack of understanding and which aims
to offer ways to address how practical understanding, particularly
between the military and humanitarian relief NGOs can be improved. 
8.11.5 UN OCHA Courses and Joint Training Initiatives
This research has identified that the UN OCHA provide a variety of 
training courses which are designed to establish partnerships between
global humanitarian relief organisations and to promote collaborative
working. However, the findings reveal that attendance on courses is
difficult for some NGOs and that participation is very low amongst the
smaller humanitarian organisations. Hence, research is required to
consider ways to make current training courses more readily accessible
and attractive to a larger number of humanitarian organisations. Linked
to this are the ongoing discussions on the merits of a joint approach to
training (Heaslip, 2011) and the assertion, particularly by JFLogC
participants that such a strategy would be of great benefit to the future
success of the overall relief effort. Hence any future research in this area
should also consider a concept of training within the sector where
integrated exercises have a role to play in the overall promotion of 
collaborative working. 
8.11.6 Command, Control and Competition in the Humanitarian
Market
The findings of this research demonstrate that the UN OCHA has
acknowledged power broker (Burt, 2005) and gatekeeper status
(Hingley and Lindgreen, 2013; Hingley et al, 2010) within the
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humanitarian supply chain, but also reveal that the command and control
structures which are implemented by the UN OCHA within humanitarian
relief zones are not effective. In addition, this research offers empirical
support to the assertion that humanitarian relief organisations are
businesses that will be driven by the associated market forces within the
sector (The Lancet, 2010; Olson and Gregorian, 2007; Weiss and
Collins, 2000). Analysis of the data reveals that these market forces, and
the inherent desire to demonstrate superior effectiveness to donors by
some humanitarian organisations, is having a negative impact on the
overall effectiveness of the humanitarian relief supply chain. In effect, 
humanitarian organisations are forced to act independently and as a
result, outside of the UN OCHA command and control structures. Hence, 
further research is required to consider the influence of market forces
within the humanitarian sector and the negative impact that they are
having on OCHA’s efforts to coordinate the humanitarian supply chain.  
8.11.7 The Humanitarian Space and the Military Contribution
The findings of this research confirm that the UK MOD are keen to
expand their role within the humanitarian supply chain (HERR, 2011). 
However, analysis of the data gathered amongst NGO participants also
reveals a direct conflict between this military aspiration and the
humanitarian organisations’ desire to preserve the humanitarian
principles. Moreover, the findings offer empirical evidence of a concern
amongst NGOs that any military involvement in the humanitarian supply
chain serves to destabilise it and to have a negative impact on the overall
effectiveness of the relief effort. To add to this, the findings also
demonstrate that military contributors are often forced by governmental
pressure to move from a political to a humanitarian stance as the
response develops. This not only serves to destabilise situations still
further, but also to deter any desire to adopt collaborative working. 
Hence, further research is required into how this conflict between the
military aspiration to increase involvement in the humanitarian supply
chain and the NGO desire to maintain the humanitarian principles can
be addressed. Any such research should also consider the role that 
national governments have to play in ensuring that military contributions
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are consistent throughout the relief effort and do not change direction
part way through the relief effort. 
But what of the future for this particular researcher? As has been
discussed earlier in this thesis humanitarian disasters are here to stay
and are sadly, on the increase. Hence, the aim will be to continue to
conduct research along a similar academic trajectory and in particular
within the theme of relationship management. The concept of how to
develop managerial strategies which will help to facilitate collaborative
working amongst organisations and individuals which, whilst sharing a
common desire to help those in need are clearly poles apart is a real
challenge and one that appeals. Hence, the intention will be to continue
to develop the insights that the research has revealed thus far into a
more comprehensive theoretical position.  
8.12 A Final Thought
Above all else this research has served to demonstrate the significance
of the overall contribution that the supply chain and associated
managerial discipline have to make to the effectiveness and efficiency
of the humanitarian relief effort in response to immediate disasters. The
findings confirm that in keeping with the corresponding organisations in
the business sector, those who operate in the humanitarian sector are
acutely aware of the importance that the effective management of their
resources has to offer. However, the data gathered here serves to
demonstrate that the humanitarian sector still has some significant 
challenges ahead if this appreciation is to turn into practical results. The
lack of awareness and trust amongst participants within the humanitarian
supply chain identified within this thesis, and the confirmation of a
corresponding unwillingness to adopt collaborative working is having a
negative effect on what is the bottom line for the humanitarian sector; 
which, in the final analysis is improved efficiency and effectiveness within
the humanitarian supply chain leading to reduced response times, the
delivery of more aid and ultimately an increase in the number of lives
saved. In short, organisations and individuals working within the
humanitarian relief sector would be well advised to put aside their
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differences and to consider the thoughts of Sun-Tzu (translated by
Ames, 1993): 
“The line between order and disorder lies in logistics”
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Appendix A
Key Words used Throughout the Research Process
Key Words Notes
“Humanitarian (Aid) Logistics”
“Humanitarian (Aid) Supply Chains”
“Humanitarian (Aid)” and “Supply Chain”/ “Logistics Management”
“Humanitarian Supply Chain Collaboration”/ “Coordination”
“Supply Chain Coordination”/ “Coordination”
“Disaster Relief” and “Logistics”/ “Emergency Relief” and “Logistics”/ 
“Supply Chain Management”
“Humanitarian Logistics”/ “Supply Chain Operations”
“Humanitarian”, “Disaster” and “Emergency” Supply Chain”/ 
“Logistics” and “Efficiency”/ “Effectiveness”
“NGO” and “Coordination”/ “Collaboration” and “Military”
“UN” and “Cluster Approach”
“Power” and “Relationship Management”/ “Relationship Marketing”
General overview of 
topic area accounting
for common link
between ‘logistics’ &
‘Supply Chains’. 
More specific focus
on management of 
chains and in
particular
collaboration and/or
coordination. 
Some authors write
about ‘Disaster
Relief’ as opposed to
‘humanitarian relief’  
‘Disaster’ seems to
be interchangeable
with the terms
‘Humanitarian’ and
‘Emergency’
Specifics of current 
approaches to
collaboration/ 
coordination. 
Investigate the role
that power plays
within collaborative
relationships
“Qualitative Research”
“Case Study” and “Research”
“Qualitative Data” and “Analysis”
“Observation” and “Research”
“Grounded Theory” and “Ethnography”
Increase working
knowledge of 
research tools/ 
techniques available
in order to arrive at 
informed justification
of final methodology  
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Appendix B
Humanitarian and Non-Governmental Organisations Contacted and
Responses
Organisation Address E mail Participate? Response
1 Action Aid Chataway House, 
Leach Road,  
Chard,  
Somerset,  
TA20 1FR
mail@actionaid.org  
N
͞/ĂŵǀĞƌǇƐŽƌƌǇďƵƚ
ĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞŚŝŐŚ
ǀŽůƵŵĞŽĨƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐ
ŽĨƚŚŝƐŶĂƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ
ǁĞƌĞĐĞŝǀĞǁĞĨŝŶĚ
ŽƵƌƐĞůǀĞƐƵŶĂďůĞƚŽ
ĂŶƐǁĞƌƚŚĞŵ
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůůǇďƵƚǁĞ
ĂƌĞŚĂƉƉǇƚŽƉŽŝŶƚ
ǇŽƵŝŶƚŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƉƵďůŝĐĂůůǇ
ĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƐ͘͟
WůĞĂƐĞĨĞĞůĨƌĞĞƚŽ
ǀŝƐŝƚ
ǁǁǁ͘ĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŝĚ͘ŽƌŐ͘Ƶ
Ŭ;ŽƵƌh<ǁĞďƐŝƚĞͿ
ǁǁǁ͘ĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŝĚ͘ŽƌŐ
;ŽƵƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ǁĞďƐŝƚĞͿĂŶĚŽƵƌ
ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂůƌĞƉŽƌƚ͗
ŚƚƚƉ͗ͬͬǁǁǁ͘ĂĐƚŝŽŶĂŝ
Ě͘ŽƌŐ͘ƵŬͬϭϬϭϯϵϵͬƚƌƵ
ƐƚĞĞƐͺƌĞƉŽƌƚͺĂŶĚͺĂ
ĐĐŽƵŶƚƐ͘Śƚŵů
2 International
Federation of 
Red Cross and
Red Crescent  
(IFRC) though: 
British Red
Cross
44 Moorfields,  
London  
EC2Y 9AL
information@redcros
s.org.uk  Y
Willing to
Participate
3 Catholic Fund
for Overseas
Development 
(CAFOD)
Romero House,  
55 Westminster
Bridge Road, 
London,  
SE1 7JB
cafod@cafod.org.uk N NONE
4 CARE
International
UK
9th Floor,  
89 Albert 
Embankment,  
London,  
SE1 7TP  
info@careinternation
al.org.uk  
Y Willing to
Participate
5 Christian Aid PO Box 100,  
London,  
SE1 7RT
info@christian-
aid.org  
N NONE
6 Comic Relief 
UK
89 Albert 
Embankment 
London
SE1 7TP
info@comicrelief.co
m  Y Willing to
Participate
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Organisation Address E mail Participate? Response
7 Concern
Worldwide
13/14 Calico
House ,  
Clove Hitch
Quay, 
London,  
SW11 3TN
info@concern.net  
Y Willing to
Participate
8 Islamic Relief 
UK
Head Office,  
16 Lower Marsh, 
London,  
SE1 7RJ
info@islamic-
relief.org.uk  
N NONE
9 MOD Joint 
Force Logistic
Component HQ
Joint Forces
Command, 
Northwood HQ,  
Sandy Lane,  
Middlesex,  
HA6 3HP
  
Y
Willing to
Participate
10 Médecins Sans
Frontières/Doct
ors Without 
Borders (MSF)
67-74 Saffron Hill
London  
EC1N 8QX
office-
ldn@london.msf.org N
“We are a small
team in London
and are unable to
assist students
with research, but 
we would urge you
to consult the MSF
websites where
there is a wealth of 
information that 
should help you”. 
11 Merlin Head office, 12th
Floor, 207 Old
Street, London
EC1V 9NR
hq@merlin.org.uk  N NONE
12 Oxfam Oxfam House,  
John Smith Drive, 
Cowley,  
Oxford.  
OX4 2JY
enquiries@oxfam.or
g.uk  Y
“We welcome the
opportunity to
discuss our
responses further”
13 Plan UK Finsgate,  
5-7 Cranwood
Street,  
London,  
EC1V 9LH
N NONE
14 Save the
Children UK
Head Office,  
1 St John's Lane, 
London  
EC1M 4AR
supporter.care@sav
ethechildren.org.uk  
N NONE
15 Tearfund 100 Church
Road,  
Teddington,  
TW11 8QE
enquiry@tearfund.or
g  
Y “We are a
relatively small
NGO and I am
very happy to
discuss further if 
this is of interest to
you”
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Organisation Address E mail Participate? Response
16 UNICEF UK UNICEF Supply
Division
UNICEF Plads, 
Freeport 
2100
Copenhagen Ø
Denmark
Telephone +(45)
35 27 35 27
Facsimile + (45)
35 26 94 21
supply@unicef.org  Y Willing to
Participate
17 UN OCHA Office for the
Coordination of 
Humanitarian
Affairs (OCHA)
Palais des
Nations, 1211
Geneva 10, 
Switzerland
ocha@un.org Y Willing to
Participate
18 World Vision
UK
Opal Drive,  
Fox Milne,  
Milton Keynes,  
MK15 0ZR
info@worldvision.org
.uk  
N None

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Appendix C
University of Lincoln
Lincoln Business School
Brayford Pool
Lincoln
LN6 7TS
UK
T: +44 (0) 1522 835629
M: +44 (0) 7894 511131
E: gramsden@lincoln.ac.uk
Director Logistics Operations
[ 
     ] 
Dear Sir/Madam
RESEARCH PROJECT – HUMANITARIAN LOGISTICS COLLABORATION
I am a senior lecturer at the University of Lincoln and am currently engaged in a Doctoral
Research Project which will consider the management of the supply chains and logistics
activities associated with provision of humanitarian relief; in particular my research will
consider how Non-Governmental Organisations collaborate within humanitarian relief 
areas and, in light of past practitioner experiences how collaboration might be managed
within such areas in the future. 
Whilst I fully appreciate how busy you must be, I enclose a short questionnaire of what are, 
hopefully straightforward questions which I trust that you will be able to find the time to
answer. This questionnaire has been sent to a number of NGO logistics practitioners and
my aim at present is to establish some preliminary data; once I have analysed this data my
intention will be to conduct more in-depth research into the trends and issues raised.  
Ultimately, my aim is to make a lasting contribution to knowledge within what is a vital area
for the humanitarian relief supply chain and, to that end, I will be happy for you to review
my findings as and when they become available. 
With many thanks in anticipation
Yours faithfully, 
Gary Ramsden
Senior Lecturer Logistics and Operations Management 
Enc: 
1 x Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management Questionnaire
1 x Stamped Addressed Envelope
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Appendix D
Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management
Questionnaire
Background Details: 
Name
Job Title   
Organisation  
Time employed with this organisation  
Name of any other humanitarian
relief organisations that you have
worked for
Total time employed within
humanitarian relief provision
Operational Experience:  
Please list all relief operations that 
you have had some involvement in
Please turn over for some short questions associated with
Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management 
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Humanitarian Logistics & Supply Chain Management: 
Do you believe that your
organisation operates a supply
chain designed specifically for its
particular role/needs?
Yes No
UK NGOs only:
Is your organisation affiliated to the
Disasters Emergency Committee
(DEC)?
Yes No
Does your organisation operate
within the United Nations Cluster
concept?
Yes No
If yes, please tick the areas for
which your organisation has (or
would) use the UN Cluster concept 
Fill logistics gaps and alleviate
bottlenecks
Prioritize logistics interventions and
investments
Collect/ share information and
assets
Coordinate port and corridor
movements to reduce congestion
Provide details of transporters and
rough indication of market rates
Provide guidance on customs
issues
Provide information on equipment 
and/or relief supply items
Co-ordination with other UN
Agencies
Co-ordination with other NGOs  
Co-ordination with the military  
Which of these principles do you
believe that your organisation would
consider to be of the greatest 
importance in respect of the
provision of humanitarian relief 
(please rank as 1 (most important)
to 4 (least important))
Humanity
(Humankind shall be treated humanely
in all circumstances by saving lives
and alleviating suffering, while
ensuring respect for the individual)
Neutrality
(Advocation of a non-interventionist 
strategy in conflict)
Impartiality
(Decisions should be based on
objective criteria, rather than on the
basis of bias, prejudice, or preferring
the benefit to one person over another)
Independence
(Actions must be kept separate from
political, economic, military or other
objectives)
All are of equal importance  
Does your organisation take the
lead in any logistical activity along
the humanitarian relief supply
chain?
Yes No
If Yes please state which activities
and in which operations
Activity: Operation: 
If No would your organisation be
happy to take the lead in any future
operations?
Yes No
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Does your organisation share
facilities with other NGOs? Yes No
If Yes please list which facilities and
who they are shared with
Facility: Organisation
Shared with: 
Is your organisation prepared to
accept military assistance from
armed forces working under a UN
mandate?  
Yes No
Depends on the circumstances
Within a relief zone which of these
aims are the most important to your
organisation (please rank as 1
(most important) to 3 (least 
important))
Demonstrating to donors that their
presence and inputs into a
humanitarian mission are valuable
Demonstrating competitive
behaviour towards other
humanitarian actors and
organisations
Seeking visible means of 
demonstrating active subscription
to the concepts of Corporate Social
Responsibility. 
All are of equal importance
Would you be happy to discuss
your responses in greater depth at 
a future date?
Yes No
  
Many thanks for taking the time to complete this questionnaire
Please return it to: 
G P Ramsden
University of Lincoln
Lincoln Business School
Brayford Pool
Lincoln
LN6 7TS
UK
in the Stamped Addressed Envelope provided or e mail back to: 
gramsden@lincoln.ac.uk  
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Appendix E
Initial Etic Data Analysis Codes (adapted from Miles and Huberman, 1994)
Theme (Section in Literature
Review)
Description Code
Humanitarian
Space (2.5.1)
Humanity
Humankind shall be treated humanely in all
circumstances by saving lives and alleviating
suffering, while ensuring respect for the individual
HUMSHU
M
Neutrality Advocation of a non-interventionist strategy inconflict 
HUMSNEU
Impartiality
Decisions should be based on objective criteria, 
rather than on the basis of bias, prejudice, or
preferring the benefit to one person over another
HUMSIMP
Independence Humanitarian action must be kept separate frompolitical, economic, military or other objectives. 
HUMSIND
Politics (2.5.2)
Influence  Looking to influence policy decisions and to shapeglobal political perspectives
POLINF
Motivation A perceived moral authority to promote ideologicaland political causes  
POLMOT
World
Economy
(2.5.3)
Influence
Finding neutral ways to operationalize mandates
without compromising underlying principles or
producing a negative impact  
WEINF
International
Pressure
Asserting economic pressure on countries and
organisations to further individually stated goals or
missions  
WEIP
Organisational 
Sustainment
(2.5.4)
Fund Raising Demonstrating to donors that their presence andinputs into a humanitarian mission are valuable
SUSFR
Strategy Demonstrating competitive behaviour towards otherhumanitarian actors and organisations
SUSSTRA
T
Corporate
Social
Responsibility
(CSR)
Seeking visible means of demonstrating active
subscription to the concepts of CSR
SUSCSR
Societal Wealth
(2.5.5)
Interference Applying advance measures to limit the overalleffect of disasters  
SWINT
Influence
Attempts to influence long-term change arising from
both the initial impact effects and corresponding
responses to disasters
SWINF
Power (2.10.3)
Positive Positive aspects of power on collaboration and co-
operation  
PWRPOS
Negative Negative effects of power  PWRNEG
Relationship
Management
(2.8)
Trust Mutual working, partnerships, win-win opportunities
exploited
RMT
Opportunism Self-interest and associated gain are prevalent RMOPP
Collaboration
(Optimisation)
(2.8/ 2.9)
Clusters Concept adopted and appreciated, upstream and
downstream customers are included in supply chain
planning and operations
COLCLU
Horizontal Experts in the same functional area working
together
COLHOR
Vertical Synchronise different functional levels of supply
chain for overall efficiency  
COLVER
Alliances Seen to benefit all involved – encouraged COLALL
Resilience Supply chain is designed to cope with disturbance COLRES

 
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Appendix F
Stage II - Interview Schedule
Introductions
This interview is being recorded – it will only be heard by myself – all materials will
be kept confidential as per the consent agreement.  
For the purposes of the digital recording…………………………..  
Date
Time
Organisation
Name
Job Title
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
This interview should take between 1 and 1.5 hours.  
The interview is semi-structured and informal – basically I want it to be a
conversation and to offer you the opportunity to tell me what you want me to know
about your views on collaboration along humanitarian relief supply chains. 
However, I do have some key issues that I hope we will cover, so I will check my
prompts occasionally to make sure we are more-or-less on track.  
This interview has four parts; 
  
A. General Processes, Coordination & Collaboration. 
B. Power and Relationships
C. The Humanitarian Space
D. Organisational Sustainment 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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SECTION A: General Processes, Coordination and
Collaboration  
A1. Definitions  
To confirm understanding at the outset of the interview, how do you define
collaboration?  
What is coordination and how does it differ from collaboration?
What do the terms mean to you?
A2. UN Cluster Concept
What is your understanding of the concept?
• Is it a good thing – or are there problems with it?  
o What examples would you offer both good and bad, of the concept’s
practical implementation?  
• In your experience does the concept help to facilitate the following: 
o Information and Asset Sharing
o Prioritising of events and interventions
• In your experience does the concept work in reality?
A3. Sharing of Facilities
Does your organisation share facilities with other NGO’s?
• How is this instigated?
• Are agreements in place or established?
• Can you offer any examples of successes and/or failures of such
agreements?
A4. Military Assistance
Does your organisation accept military assistance?
• Under what circumstances?
• When is military assistance acceptable to your organisation?
• Can you offer specific examples of the use of military assistance
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Section B: Power and Relationships
B1. Lead Status
Is your organisation willing to accept lead status in a humanitarian relief effort?
• Can you offer me some practical examples of where this has happened?
B2. Trust
Is your organisation happy to be led by another?
• Can you offer me some practical examples of where this has happened?
B3. Relationship Management
How does your organisation manage its relationships with other NGOs and
contributing organisations?
• Do you regard other organisations as competition?
• Are there conflicts of interest?
• How are these managed?
o Can you offer practical examples?
Section C: The Humanitarian Space
C1. Humanitarian Principles
What do you understand to be the Humanitarian Principles?
• How are these principles maintained by your organisation?
• Do they have a bearing on approaches and attitudes?
• Can you offer practical examples?
C2. The Oslo Guidelines
What do you understand to be the Oslo Guidelines?
• How are these principles maintained by your organisation?
• Do they have a bearing on approaches and attitudes?
• Can you offer practical examples?
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C3. Politics
Does politics play a role in the overall decision making process for your
organisation?
• Can you offer any practical examples?
C4. The Military Role
How does the role of the military in humanitarian relief conflict with the
humanitarian principles?
Is there a role for the military in humanitarian relief?
• Should there be dividing lines and where are they?
• When is military assistance acceptable/ not acceptable?
Section D: Organisational Sustainment
D1. Demonstration to the Donor Community
How important is the demonstration of the following to your organisation and its
donor community: 
• Organisational presence
• Corporate Social Responsibility
• Value for money
How does your organisation achieve the above?
• Can you offer practical examples?
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally
• Many thanks for your help and time.  
• If you think of anything else, or have any queries, please contact me.  
• I plan to hold a series of focus groups to discuss my findings in about a
year’s time as this will give me the time to analyse the data that I have
collected through the interview process. Obviously you would be more than
welcome at one of these and I will contact you with an invitation. 
• I aim to have the final research report finished in 2015 and this will be
accessible to you via the internet.  
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Appendix G
Stage III - Focus Group Topic Guide
Introductions
This focus group is being recorded – it will only be heard by myself – all materials
will be kept confidential as per the consent agreement.  
For the purposes of the digital recording…………………………..  
Date
Time
Organisation
Individual Names and Job Titles
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
This session should take about 1 hour.  
You should notice that the areas covered during this session will be very similar to
those which were raised during our one-to-one interviews. We have already
exchanged feedback on your individual interviews but now the idea is to expand on
some of the key issues that were raised in this open forum. I will introduce the
discussion topics and key issues that I hope we will cover and then it’s over to you
to discuss with my occasional prompting. In essence I will act as chairman, so I will
check my prompts occasionally to make sure that we are more-or-less on track.  
The generic areas that I would like us to cover will cover are: 
  
A. Management and Control
B. Understanding and Training
C. Relationships
D. Military Involvement 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  
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Section A: Management & Control 
A1. Coordination
Discuss the practical realities:  
• Competing agendas
• UN Strategic Framework
o Role of OCHA
• Does coordination restrict the overall relief effort?
o Does an Ad Hoc approach work?
o Lack of coordination has benefits?
• Experiences
o Problems?
o Successes?
A2. Cluster Concept
Discuss experiences of and opinions on the Concept: 
• Is Performance Measurement required?
o Make Cluster Leads Accountable
• Should Local Governments be involved?
o Exclusivity leads to distrust 
• Links to OCHA
o Loose?
• Are Implementation Guidelines required
o Prevent confusion?
• Experiences
o Problems?
o Successes?
Section B: Understanding & Training
B1. Joint Training
Opinions on the idea of joint training and exercises
• Promote wider understanding of roles
o OCHA
o NGOs
o Military
o Local Governmental Organisations
• Promote appreciation of the Humanitarian Landscape
o Environment 
o Demands
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o Problems
o Experiences
• Include Local Organisations and Governments?
o Promote local ownership and responsibility
o Long term exit strategy?
B2. Professionalisation
The adoption of Humanitarian Logistics as a ‘profession’
• Career Paths
• Improve efficiency/effectiveness?
• Academic requirements
o European Qualifications Framework (EQF)
• Experiences?
o Existing Programmes
B3. Cluster Training
Is training required in this area?
• Promote understanding
o Structures
o Roles
o Responsibilities
Section C: Relationships
C1. Local 
Discuss relationships with local organisations
• Experiences?
• How to establish
• Value?
• How to promote a sense of community?
C2. Inter-Organisational 
Discuss the idea of collaboration and working together
• Positive or negative?
• Should NGOs be regarded like any other business?
o Market forces
o Competition
• How should this be managed
o By who?
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• Communication
• Resource sharing
o Examples
o Successes?
o Problems?
C3. Power and Trust
Where does/should the power lie?
• Power Broker(s)
o OCHA
o Cluster Leads
o Local Government 
o Military
Section D: Military Involvement
D1. Perceptions  
Discuss organisational and individual perceptions of the military role  
• Pressure on military to demonstrate more humanitarian involvement 
o How to expand the current agenda
o Longer term involvement beyond initial response
• Security vs Conflict 
o Clash of interests
o Achievable
o Experiences?
• Maintenance of Humanitarian Principles
o Humanity; Neutrality; Impartiality; Independence
o Is this a military responsibility/role
• What is the overall military role?
o Can the military wear 2 hats?
D2. Political Influence
Political pressures and influence of international and local military
• Hearts and minds initiatives  
o Humanitarian relief? 
• Rules of Engagement 
o OSLO Guidelines
o OCHA Guidelines
• Links to Local Governments
o How to establish and maintain sovereignty  
o Who has/should have overall control?





